

Adam Bedřich, Tomáš Retka (eds.)

RYTÍŘ Z KOMÁROVA

K 70. narozeninám Petra Skalníka

KNIGHT FROM KOMÁROV

To Petr Skalník for his 70th birthday



 AntropoEdice

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Introduction / Předmluva:

Petr Skalník – vědec mezi světy

ADAM BEDŘICH, TOMÁŠ RETKA, JANA JETMAROVÁ

Sborníky vycházející u příležitosti jubilejních okamžiků v životě významných osobností jsou v akademickém světě zavedeným formátem. Účelem těchto publikací většinou nebývá patetická glorifikace oslavenců, otištění seznamu gratulačních textů všech těch, kteří s jejím/jeho životem a dílem mají něco společného, ani dalším darem v řadě, kterých bývá při významných výročí mnoho. Jubilejní *Festschrift* je především formou uznání kolegů a bývalých studentů a způsobem širokého ocenění celoživotního významu a přínosu, který adresát a jeho práce v daném oboru představuje. U Petra Skalníka to platí minimálně dvojnásob skrze jeho profesní dráhu objímající a propojující antropologii a afrikanistiku v měřítku přesahujícím hranice, a to navíc ve specifickém historickém období etablování porevoluční československé vědy po téměř půlstoletí určité deprivace.

Sedmdesáté narozeniny Petra Skalníka jsou pro nás především příležitostí k ohlédnutí se za jeho bohatým a navýsost aktivním akademickým životem. V létě 2014 jsme začali sborník připravovat a pročítali na webu Mezinárodní unie antropologických a etnografických věd (IUAES)¹ téměř padesát stran jeho profesního životopisu, zachycujícího půlstoletí terénních výzkumů, konferenčních příspěvků a akademických umístění. Záhy bylo jasné, že na pozadí pestrosti a bohatství témat, lokalit a regionů, publikací, míst působení a kontaktů v rámci oborů antropologie a afrikanistiky i mimo ně, bude prakticky nemožné sestavit sborník tak, aby mohl alespoň trochu aspirovat na reprezentativnost reflektující bohatou celoživotní profesní dráhu jubilanta. Jak byla ve zdravotní Petrovým šedesátinám ve stručnosti shrnuta jeho kariéra (Kandert 2006), tak by se nám, skrze výběr z textů, podařilo zachytit a představit jeho rozsáhlou práci vždy jen velice kuse a neúplně. Nebo bychom potřebovali ne jednu, ale několik publikací, či mnohonásobně více stránek.

Tento sborník tedy z podstaty není objektivní reprezentací a ani nemůže být. Zůstává tak „pouhou“ – a nezbytně jen dílčí – pozvánkou ke společnému oslavení Petra Skalníka skrze texty těch z jeho kolegů a přátel z tuzemských, ale i zahraničních institucí, výzkumných ústavů a univerzit, kteří stihli (nejednu) uzávěrku. Bezpochyby mohlo být přispěvatelů více, stejně jako jsme se nemuseli držet pouze akademických mantinelů. Nakonec však – a posoudíte to jistě sami – zastoupení akademiků z 12 zemí 3 kontinentů lépe vystihuje mnohohrstevnatost zkušeností a rozličnost podob jejich známosti s postavou a prací Petra Skalníka a je nakonec tím, co dokládá šíři a bohatost jeho akademické dráhy nejlépe. Ve společnosti přátel a kolegů antropologů, orientalistů a afrikanistů je suma předložených textů vhodným momentem k reflexi osobní i profesní inspirace a

1 International Union of Anthropological and Ethnographical Sciences, organizace, již byl Petr Skalník od roku 2003 deset let vice-prezidentem (<http://www.iaes.org>). Naposledy přistoupeno 27. 10. 2015.

nezměrného, až nakažlivého elánu pro společenskou vědu, kterými jsou prochnuty jeho práce, výzkumné a pedagogické aktivity a další projekty. Sborník by měl sloužit především jako zhmotněné poděkování za vše, čeho se nám skrze známost s Petrem Skalníkem dostalo a čím jsme byli inspirováni, ale zároveň byl koncipován tak, aby si zachoval obsahovou zajímavost pro čtenáře.

Petr Skalník je postavou s pevným a konzistentním profesionálním charakterem, který osvědčil v celé řadě kontextů a mezních situací – ať už šlo o peripetie studia a příležitosti k terénnímu výzkumu v prostředí tehdejšího totalitního státu, nebo pozdější angažmá na celé řadě zahraničních akademických pracovišť od Nizozemí po Jihoafrickou republiku, či – a především pak – po svém návratu do porevolučního Československa. Jeho neúnavná snaha o rozvoj tuzemského akademického prostředí a etablování sociální antropologie jako svébytné disciplíny je dokumentovaná celou řadou polemických diskusí, publikací a textů, týkajících se jednou polarity antropologie a národopisu v českém i evropském kontextu, podruhé pokusu o navázání na předválečné sociálněvědní mapování obce Dolní Roveň na Pardubicku. Své vypovídá i sedmnáctým rokem pořádaný Gellnerovský seminář, který v roce 1998 s profesorem Jiřím Musilem založili a dlouhá léta vedli, či insignie rytíře řádu Akademických palem, kterých je Petr Skalník nositelem od roku 2006 za vynikající vědeckou práci a pozoruhodné zásluhy k rozvoji francouzsko-českých styků. Na výčet jeho příspěvků k tématům etnicity, procesu utváření a vývoje raných států (Early State Concept), regionálních studií, antropologie politiky a moci a dalších, bychom ovšem potřebovali samostatný oddíl.

Jako pedagog patří Petr Skalník do společnosti skutečně kosmopolitních akademiků. Vždy se konzistentně, a přitom kriticky, zasazoval o inspirativní kontakt tuzemské a zahraniční sociální vědy a propagoval těsnější spolupráci zahraničních vědců a výzkumníků s českými a středo a východoevropskými kolegy. Jeho jméno vzáhraničí stále rezonuje a otevírá dveře – často bývá tím, koho si zahraniční kolegové vybaví při zmínce o české antropologii. Na pardubické katedře sociálních věd, kde od počátku milénia působil a zásadně formoval generace studentů sociální antropologie, na něj vzpomínají jako na osobnost, která skrze líčení své praxe z Nizozemí, Ghany, Jihoafrické republiky, sovětské Tuvy, slovenské Šuňavy, či Papui-Nové Guinei, dokázala zprostředkovat nejen fascinující perspektivy a ryze osobní, reflexivní zkušenosti, ale především svoje nadšení a zápal pro metodu a disciplínu. Nebylo mnoho témat, o kterých by Petr Skalník nedokázal hovořit, nebo ve kterých by nesvedl poradit a doporučit – a vždy povzbudit! Bez nadsázky lze říci, že jeho průprava a vzor daleko přesahuje léta, kdy působil na Pardubické univerzitě, a má formující charakter provázející jeho studenty a studentky, stejně jako kolegy a kolegyně, doposud.

Pozvání k participaci na sborníku přijali pardubičtí kolegové s nadšením a jejich přání shrnuje vše, co by zde mělo zaznít – k čemuž se my jen připojujeme!

Milý Petře,

s velkým potěšením jsme přijali nabídku sepsat několik úvodních řádků a přidat se na tomto čestném místě k zástupu gratulantů k Vašemu životnímu jubileu.

Zajisté by bylo možné se zde široce rozepsat o Vaší pestré vědecké dráze, o nezdolné snaze budovat v českém prostředí kvalitní sociální antropologii, o nepřehledném množství konferencí a publikací, na jejichž realizaci jste měl zásadní podíl, nebo o oborových organizacích, na jejichž rozvoji a činnosti se aktivně podílíte. Zároveň bychom mohli jmenovat desítky absolventů, kteří se díky Vašemu vedení rozhodli zasvětit své profesní dráhy sociální antropologii.

Tato knížka je ale věnována především milému kolegovi s nakažlivým nadšením pro obor, jehož hluboké odborné kompetence jsou spolu se sympaticky lidským přístupem obdivuhodné a inspirativní. Kolegovi s mezinárodním renomé, který svou kritikou, jasnou a ostrou jak břitva, dokázal energicky čeřit stojaté vody českého akademického rybníčku. Skvělému spolupracovníkovi, jenž se stal mladším kolegům vzorem, rádcem a především přítelem.

Milý Petře, děkujeme Vám za roky, kdy nám bylo potěšením s Vámi spolupracovat a přejeme Vám do dalších let pevné zdraví, nevyčerpatelnou zásobu tvůrčího elánu a neutuchající životní optimismus.

Vaši kolegové z Katedry sociálních věd v Pardubicích.

Avšak zdaleka nejen bývalí i současní studenti a pedagogové univerzity v Pardubicích se na přípravě sborníku podíleli. Ten by nikdy nemohl vzniknout bez nadšené práce řady spolupracovníků a spolupracovníků, kteří se alespoň takto připojili ke gratulantům Petru Skalníkovi a jež se sluší na tomto místě připomenout. Je to předně vydavatel díla, tedy spolek AntropoWeb, který poskytl své zázemí, vydavatelské know-how a zkušenosti s publikací volně šiřitelných (v duchu myšlenky open access) špičkových antropologických textů v rámci AntropoEdice. Členové spolku Pavlína Chánová, Veronika Kořínková, Petr Tůma a Jiří Woitsch se postarali o redakční přípravu sborníku, Petr Tůma je autorem grafického zpracování a sazby textu. K „vyladění“ článků do co nejkvalitnější podoby přispěli překladatelé, jazykoví korektoři a proofreaderi, jmenovitě William Golding, Miss. Hester Clarke, Emma Ford, Victoria Biggs a Klára Woitschová. Náš dík patří v neposlední řadě i všem těm, kteří drobnými i většími finančními příspěvky umožnili sborník dotáhnout od počáteční myšlenky až do podoby důstojné a reprezentativní publikace. Seznam všech dárců a sponzorů je uveden v závěru naší publikace.

LITERATURA

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Anthropologist as political actor

ALEKSANDAR BOŠKOVIĆ

ABSTRACT:

In the quest to understand other cultures, anthropologists also carry the burden of the legacy from the societies they come from. This is more than an attempt to establish an “ethnographic authority” in relation to specific “folk models” that people take with themselves to their research – it relates to practical social and political circumstances. The chapter will deal with the politicization of anthropology in the last decades of the 20th century, beginning with some examples from the former Yugoslavia. This seems as a good reference point, as Yugoslavia was a crucial part of the route that Skalník used four decades ago, in order to escape Czechoslovakia and make his way to The Netherlands. This chapter will also present a comparative view of the discipline’s role in different post-conflict and post-transitional societies (like Brazil or South Africa), with all the problems and challenges that the role of anthropologists entails.

KEYWORDS:

Political anthropology; Franz Boas; Anthropology and ethics; Anthropology and human rights; Anthropology and ethnicity

INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT TEXTS AND THE RIGHT PEOPLE

In this chapter, I look at the role of anthropologists as participants in everyday political life. This role is not always obvious or intentional, but as politics is part of all aspects of our lives, it cannot be ignored. The role of anthropologists opens some questions on the ways in which anthropologists (and social scientists in general) conduct themselves in the field, but also about the ways in which their theories can be used (cf. Skalník 1988, Gingrich 2005). Skalník himself dealt with this topic, but in relation to subject/object interplay (2012). I am interested in both the rationality and the consequences of anthropologists’ actions – which opens up a variety of questions dealing with goals and strategies that we employ in our research. In my view, and starting from a premise by two other great Czech-born anthropologists, I take these goals and strategies primarily to be concerned with understanding “why do people do what they do” (Holy and Stuchlik 1983, 4).

I met Petr (“Peter”) Skalník in 2001 in South Africa, at the Anthropology Southern Africa conference in Pretoria. He was introduced to me by a mutual friend, Robert Thornton, with whom he edited a volume of the early writings by Bronislaw Malinowski some years previously (Thornton and Skalník 1993). According to Thornton (personal communication), the book did not sell very well – something that I found surprising, as the volume offered important insights into how theories of one of the most influential 20th century anthropologists were formed. However, perhaps books have their own lives and destinies, in the Buddhist sense of Karma (Delahoutre 1996) – so even an excellent volume can end up relatively unnoticed, if it appears at the wrong moment. Some years ago, when writing about Thomas Kuhn, Clifford Geertz nicely summarized Kuhn’s contribution in that he produced “the right text at the right time” (Geertz 1997). I would like to extend this nice metaphor to people, and Skalník is certainly one of the scholars who appeared “at the right time”, and in doing so, has made a lasting impact on contemporary anthropology.

In this chapter, I wish to examine the role of anthropologists as political actors. I will do it through several examples, and attempt to leave to my readers to draw their own conclusions. Skalník’s anthropological journey offers plenty of examples for this, but I would primarily like to use him as an inspiration (as he has been in an intellectual and moral sense for many people, over the course of his long and productive career). I will mention in some detail only one instance – his speaking out on the eve of a major anthropological event in 2009 – as I believe that it serves to depict him as a scholar and a highly moral person (I do not have time to dwell on the question on morality here, as I dealt with it in Bošković 2012). The fact that the part of this journey (when he left the socialist Czechoslovakia) was done via Belgrade to The Netherlands (Skalník 2011) also provides me an opportunity to inquire into the meaning of the concept of dissent in the former Yugoslavia.

A TALE OF TWO LETTERS

It is obvious that anthropologists also carry the burden of the legacy from the societies they come from. This is more than an attempt to establish an “ethnographic authority” in relation to specific “folk models” that people take with themselves to their research – it also relates to practical social and political circumstances. This can sometimes get anthropologists in trouble. One of the best known examples is Boas’ criticism of the involvement of several American anthropologists during the First World War, in the letter to *The Nation*, published on 20 December 1919 (Boas 2005). As he put it:

A soldier whose business is murder as a fine art, a diplomat whose calling is based on deception and secretiveness, a politician whose very life consists in compromises with his conscience, a business man whose aim is personal profit within the limits allowed by a lenient law – such may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. (...) A person, however, who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist. (Boas 2005: 27)

His criticism was not taken very kindly, as many American anthropologists rallied to the defense of their colleagues (who were not named, but, apparently, everyone knew

who they were), so Boas was censured, and he had to resign from the National Research Council (Boas 2005: 27; Bošković 2010: 107).

In his letter (as well as in his writings on racism, much later) Boas put forward what he perceived to be minimal standards of “common everyday decency”. The fact that several of his colleagues (and some of them ended up being extremely influential in American anthropology – especially in the field of Maya studies) felt unbound by any moral principles was very disturbing for him. On the other hand, the situation was critical, and three out of four of the colleagues that he referred to voted for his expulsion from the AAA (the fourth abstained).

Almost ninety years after the Boas affair, Petr Skalník raised his voice in protest, as 200 people were killed in the demonstrations in China (Antropologi.info 2009a, 2009b). The 16th congress of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES), the most global world anthropology organization, was about to be held in Kunming, China. Skalník’s protest was even more important, as he was a member of the IUAES Executive Committee – and he had a very long history of being committed to this organization. Among other things, he organized the IUAES Inter-Congress on racism in Pardubice (at the University where he taught at the time), in 2005. The success of that Inter-Congress was a fitting tribute to his lifelong commitment to fighting against all kinds of prejudice and discrimination (and this is certainly something that he shares with Boas).

Skalník’s reaction in 2009 was triggered by an invitation that he received just before the Congress from the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of the People’s Republic of China, which invited him (as well as some other leading figures of the IUAES) to a meeting in Beijing, where, apparently, a high-ranking state official was also to be present. Skalník was a bit surprised by this invitation, as he had no intention to serve as a “poster boy” for China’s political leadership. As he put it, in an open letter:

My life experience of studying ethnic problems in other countries (e.g. South Africa, West Africa, Soviet Union and Europe) have taught me that conflicts of the size like that in Urumqi this July or Lhasa last year are not and cannot be caused just by some malicious plotters. There must be also a deal of responsibility on the side of the power holders, your Commission not excluded. However, no self-criticism and constructive proposal for remedy has come out from China till this very day. (Anthropology.info 2009a)

In declining the invitation, Skalník also decided not to attend the IUAES Congress at all:

I also will not participate in the Kunming congress (...) because I do not want to be part of overt and/or tacit legitimization of evidently erroneous handling of nationality question in China. As a person with a particularly strong IUAES loyalty who participated in almost all its congresses and other events starting from Permanent Council meeting in Prague back in 1962 I was very keen on participating and playing active role as a Distinguished Speaker, member of the Executive Council (EC) of IUAES, Czech member of the Permanent Council of IUAES, chairperson of the Commission on Theoretical Anthropology (COTA) and thrice paper giver. The above mentioned reasons, however, thwarted these intentions. Under present circumstance I would not feel free to express my thoughts and research findings. (Anthropology.info 2009a)

Skalník’s letter did have some impact – despite the fact that relatively few people decided to boycott the Kunming meeting. After all, as he emphasized, he wrote it in his personal capacity, as an individual. However, unpleasant questions about the role and complicity of anthropologists in dealing with totalitarian regimes were being asked, and there was quite

a bit of uneasiness in some anthropological communities (in The Netherlands, for example) about the remarks that some of their representatives made during the IUAES congress. By raising his voice, Skalník demonstrated how it was possible to be consistent and at the same time an *engaged* anthropologist (*pace* Eriksen 2006). He also reminded us about the importance of living up to certain standards – perhaps not much more than “common everyday decency”, as Boas called it.

CAUGHT BETWEEN TOTALITARIANISMS

Anthropologists are not the only ones caught in the web of everyday politics, and it would be unfair to set for them standards that are higher than standards for other actors in the public arena. On the other hand, the fact that they work with people, spend considerable amount of time in their communities, and that they gain their trust – makes them potentially very dangerous allies of the ones who want to hurt the communities that they study. The most flagrant case in the 20th century was, of course, the role that some German-language anthropologists played during the Third Reich. In recent years, with the wealth of material being accessible (due to opening of various archives all around the world), this legacy was studied in great detail – especially by scholars like Andre Gingrich (2005). It is also worth noticing that the issue of scholars adapting their theories in context of totalitarian regimes was also present in Skalník’s work.

For example, during his stay in South Africa, where he continued to work on political anthropology – a topic he already contributed to significantly with Henri Claessen during the 1970s (Claessen and Skalník 1978, 1981) – Skalník produced a major study of how a specific reworking of the concept of *ethnos* (*ethnos*) has made its way from its original creator (Russian ethnologist Shirokogoroff), via the most prominent German anthropologist during the Nazi period (Mühlmann), and to the South African anthropologists and ethnologists at the University of Stellenbosch in the 1930s, like Werner Eiselen. South African ethnologists were struggling to understand the consequences of the economic crisis of the early 1930s, and thinking about the ways in which they can devise a system in which the white (predominantly Afrikaner) population will be spared from its devastating consequences. As a result, reworking the *ethnos*, they further developed the idea that the best way in which different cultures can develop is to keep them separate – which contributed to the ideological basis of the political system of *apartheid*, which was dominant in South Africa between 1949 and 1990.¹ It is interesting how a single concept was found to be so useful in three different totalitarian settings, and Skalník’s paper is a masterful study of how ideas are taken and shaped by people, in real political circumstances, as well as how these ideas can turn out.

Living in the totalitarian state for so long reinforced Skalník’s need to understand the functioning of the state, with all of its mechanisms (even from within – as he served first as a Czechoslovakian, and then Czech, Ambassador in Lebanon in the early 1990s). This was also probably a reason why he was keen to meet, during his visit to Belgrade in 2011, Dr. Aleksa Đilas, the son of the former Yugoslav dissident, Milovan Đilas (1911–1995).

1 Technically, this political system was in place until the first free elections in 1994. However, in reality, it was already dismantled with the reforms of the President F. W. de Klerk in early 1990, including releasing Mr. Nelson Mandela, as well as all political prisoners, legalizing of the previously banned political parties, like the ANC and SACP, etc. This led to the cancellation of the international sanctions against South Africa, so the country re-entered the international scene in sports, culture, politics, etc.

Đilas was one of the two dissidents during the socialist rule in the country (the other one was Mihailo Mihailov [1934–2010]).² He was one of the most prominent Yugoslav communists and President of the Federal Parliament, until he was sacked in early 1954. He claimed that communism only served as a means for “the new class” to take and strengthen its power – a far cry from the proclaimed goals of egalitarianism and democracy. For this, he spent most of his time until 1966 in prison, and after that, under strict government surveillance, until the late 1980s. As someone who knew the system from within, Đilas was also very well positioned (because of his intelligence, great writing style, etc.) to criticize it. I will quote here from a conversation that was published in the magazine *Encounter*:

The essence of any Communist system is the monopolistic rule of society by the Communist Party. Communism is about the possession of power. It is, moreover, about the possession of totalitarian power. Communism looks upon itself as fully entitled by the design of history to change and to control *not only* man’s allegiances and behaviour as a political being, but also his readings, his tastes, his leisure time and, indeed, the whole of his private universe. Communism cannot, therefore, transform itself into a free society. (Djilas and Urban 1988: 3–4)

And, commenting on the changes that were then taking place in the Soviet Union:

They have come to realise what other Communists in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and China realised much earlier — namely that Communism doesn’t work. It works neither at the economic level nor at the level of satisfying essential human needs and liberties. Put all these factors side by side with the rapid technological advance of the Western and Far Eastern worlds and you cannot help realising that Communism is a 19th century relic and a prescription for disaster. (Djilas and Urban 1988: 4)

The interesting thing about Đilas is that, once he changed his mind and developed a new understanding of the system that he was living in (and that he helped create), he was consistent and acted according to his beliefs – regardless of the costs. This was the time when critical views of the socialist system were still very rare – although Czesław Miłosz published his brilliant book in 1953, it was for a very long time mostly ignored, as the majority of European intellectuals sought to pursue ideas of emancipation and progress, disregarding the darker aspects of socialism. More importantly, many European intellectuals at the time were disregarding the experiences of people who actually lived in this type of political system.

Anthropologists are frequently in a position to interpret local discourses and present the voices of a “local community” to the outside world. This brings with it a great responsibility, and was in the past sometimes a source for some serious misunderstandings. Here I primarily mean the myth of “anthropology as a handmaiden of colonialism” – something that cannot be taken seriously by anyone with even basic knowledge of the history of anthropology (cf. Lewis 2013). For, even with very dark shades of the Nazi era, or anthropologists who worked (and thrived) during the apartheid regime and the like, the fact is that a great majority of anthropologists (at least beginning with Haddon and Rivers in the late 19th century, and possibly even before them) have usually been committed to ideals of peace and fairness, and refused to collaborate with totalitarian regimes.

2 I mention him here intentionally, both because I had the privilege to know him, and because of a widespread tendency among Yugoslav intellectuals to mythologize their alleged “dissident” status. Thus, people who received state grants to travel abroad and to attend conferences or festivals, and then were able to return to Yugoslavia and live very comfortable lives, like to call themselves “dissidents” (Bogdanović 2009).

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE QUESTION OF PRACTICE

When anthropologists end up being caught up in ethnic conflicts, it might provoke them to rush to the side of “their” ethnic group – or to try to analyze the roots of the conflict. The former Yugoslavia presents a good case for the first scenario. This region became especially interesting for outside observers following the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The amount of violence broadcasted on TV screens was shocking for the audiences throughout the world: atrocities unheard of since the end of the Second World War were present, dangerously close to “home”, and mass murders and rapes were committed in Europe for the first time since 1945. How was this possible? And what kind of people were able to commit such horrible acts? The debates about the Yugoslav wars resulted in interesting rejoinders, angry rebuttals, or threats of legal action (and here I find particularly interesting the situation following the publication of a paper by Cushman [2004] in the journal *Anthropological Theory* — for the responses to this very controversial paper, see Denich 2005 and Hayden 2005). To be quite honest, this does not make anthropologists different from professionals in other academic fields or disciplines — as my primary interest here is in explaining *models of behavior*, I will leave the issues of morality to people with more interest in the thriving area of ethics of academic work.

Another way is best exemplified in Kapferer’s reading of the roots of the conflict in Sri Lanka (Kapferer 1988). Kapferer skillfully navigates between the currents of myth, history, politics, and ethnicity — and maps the origin of a specific ideological construction that will much later be one of the main causes of the brutal civil war. The beauty of his analysis is that the war in Sri Lanka is never mentioned in the book — and yet, chapters of the book serve as a precise and very useful tool for interpreting it. This puts Kapferer in a role as a political actor, similar to the one that Skalník has been in.³ This proves that it is possible for anthropologists to perform important roles in the lives and histories of the societies that they study. Therefore, what anthropologists *do* or *believe* in is not something benign or purely “theoretical” (as many colonized peoples can provide good examples for). It is what anthropologists *practise* that matters. And in practice, there are very few of our colleagues, whose commitment and integrity can match the one by Petr Skalník.

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Domination, Legitimacy, Trust: Socio-anthropological Considerations

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ABSTRACT:

Social sciences have tackled the question of legitimacy in the various forms of domination thanks to the distinction formulated by Max Weber between domination (*Herrschaft*) and power (*Macht*). But it was chiefly anthropologist Georges Balandier who forcefully underscored that power, inherently arbitrary, stands no chance to last long, whereas domination based solely on the exercise of physical force and violence is constantly at risk. Therefore, whoever seeks to govern must perforce establish his own legitimacy through the production of images, the manipulation of symbols and their organization within a ceremonial context. These social representations and practices are essential to foster in the governed that credence in their governors' legitimacy (not to be confused with legitimation) that Max Weber called *Legitimitätsglauben*. Moreover, credence in legitimacy is also based on the trust of the governed in their governors. Notoriously, though, trust cannot be defined as an objective certainty, but solely as the subjective probability of not being deceived. In line with this theoretical reference frame, the presentation aims to analyze legal forms of domination primarily, which, however, display a mutual lack of trust between citizens and governors (politicians and bureaucrats). Accordingly, it centers on the organization of social relationships in societies that may be defined as societies of public distrust. These cases, therefore, display a permanent tension between legality (rooted in state law) and legitimacy since, contrary to Max Weber's thoughts, legality is perceived as illegitimate whereas illegality is considered legitimate.

KEYWORDS:

Power; Domination; Legality; Legitimacy; Informality; Clientelism; Trust

INTRODUCTION

Social sciences have tackled the question of legitimacy in the various forms of power *sensu lato* thanks to the distinction formulated by Max Weber between power *sensu strictu* (*Macht*) and domination (*Herrschaft*) (Weber 1956, Vol. 1, 28). Power *sensu strictu*, inherently arbitrary, stands no chance to last long, whereas domination without recognition is constantly at risk. Therefore, whoever seeks to govern must perforce establish his own legitimacy through the production of images, the manipulation of symbols and their organization within a ceremonial context. These social representations and practices are essential to foster in the governed that belief in their governors' legitimacy that Max Weber called *Legitimitätsglauben* or *Legitimitätsgeltung* (Weber 1956, Vol.1, 122–124). Moreover, belief in legitimacy as I will show is also based on the trust of the governed in their governors.

In line with this theoretical reference frame, my presentation aims to analyze chiefly legal forms of domination or authority (the imprecise and by now obsolescent formulation by Talcott Parsons), which, however, display a mutual lack of trust between citizens and governors (politicians and bureaucrats). Accordingly, the focus is on the organization of social relationships in societies that may be defined as societies of public mistrust. These cases display a permanent tension between legality (rooted in state law) and legitimacy since legality, contrary to Max Weber's analyses, is perceived as illegitimate whereas illegality is considered legitimate.

POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGY

One can hardly claim that political anthropology has had a predominant role in general anthropology, be it social or cultural. With due exceptions, it brings to mind the story of *Cinderella* who was constantly being outshone by her older and apparently more important stepsisters. How can we not notice the greater importance given to the anthropology of the family or of religion, though they both have significant affinities or links with political anthropology?

This neglect or lesser interest probably stems from a distinctively anthropological attitude which would rather employ the *bottom-up* or *from below* perspective than the *top-down* one, thus tending to overlook what Laura Nader called the *studying up* (Nader 1972, 284–311). Through this perspective the anthropologist tends to observe political power *sensu lato* through the eyes of those who endure it or try to counter it with, quoting James Scott, the *weapons of the weak* (Scott 1985). With this conceptual and terminological vagueness though, power *sensu lato* appears to be a sum of essentially uniform and undifferentiated phenomena rife with wanton brutality, intimidation and perversion, thus sheer arbitrariness. If so, political anthropology would have precious little relevance, given this very naïve and banal conception of the relationship between those who command and those who obey, i.e., those in a subaltern condition.

This stance was subsequently strengthened by considerations stemming from *postcolonial studies*, which, due precisely to their peculiarly culturalistic conception, reduced relationships of domination to a crude distinction between hegemonic and subaltern social groups (Spivak and Guha 1988). Aside from the important contributions of *postcolonial studies* to various other analyses of social relationships, we need to underscore that the dichotomy between hegemonic and subaltern groups is ultimately based on a feeble and simplistic theoretical apparatus originating from some thought-provoking but far too loosely connected reflections formulated by Antonio Gramsci (1975).

In short, we can hardly deny that our discipline, by means of what I would define as *anthropological populism*, has somewhat demonized and vacated the question of power, domination and authority in terms of social phenomena as if it were a sort of original sin unworthy of an in-depth analysis of its various forms, strategies, stratagems and stagings. In its empirical program anthropology has somehow forgotten the theoretical reasonings postulated by Niccolò Machiavelli and by those who drew inspiration from this founder of political anthropology.

Drawing on the teachings of Machiavelli, in this presentation I aim to distinguish between various forms of power *sensu lato* by means of a disenchanted approach without moralistic preconceptions. Therefore, I will endeavor to show its social complexity, perhaps in an incomplete and fragmentary manner, but avoiding the pitfall of an a priori stigmatization.

POWER *SENSU STRICTU* AND DOMINATION: A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF POWER

Given the above inaccuracy of the socio-anthropological analysis of power *sensu lato*, resorting to specific basic categories of sociology, as French political anthropologist Georges Balandier did, is more to the purpose (Balandier 1999). We are clearly referring to the concepts developed by Max Weber in his attempt to analyze the array of political phenomena in the most sophisticated way possible.

Therefore, the first and fundamental step, in my opinion, is to distinguish between power *sensu strictu* (*Macht*) and domination or authority (*Herrschaft*).

Power *sensu strictu* (*Macht*) is the possibility that an individual acting in the context of a social relationship may impose his/her own will, even if faced by an opposition (Weber 1956, Vol. 1, 28). As Max Weber aptly points up, the concept of power *sensu strictu* is sociologically, but also anthropologically, indeterminate, thus with practically no cognitive relevance. Simply said, any individual in any social configuration may be in a position to impose his/her own will on someone who cannot object. A classic example is the thief who uses his physical force or a weapon to force his victims into handing over their wallets without being able to counter him effectively. Thus, power *sensu strictu* is based on arbitrariness and in most cases on the use of physical force.

Sociologically and anthropologically more relevant by far is the notion of domination (*Herrschaft*) that may be defined as follows: the possibility that part of an entire group will obey an order given them by one or more individuals (Weber 1956, Vol. 1, 29). From these initial observations we can already perceive the striking difference between power *sensu strictu* and domination; unlike the former, in fact, the latter is not based on arbitrariness, whereas the use of physical force and physical punishments is limited, though clearly possible. According to Max Weber, therefore, whoever is in command and gives orders must be accountable to those whose task is to follow and execute orders. Any leadership, better yet any political elite holding that form of power called domination must obtain a *quantum of consensus* from the dominated. As we shall see more in detail, this means that the imperative requirement of domination is credibility.

In fact, Georges Balandier, the anthropologist who probably more than any other has carried on and expanded on Weber's political typology, in his enlightening book *Le pouvoir sur scènes* noted that power *sensu strictu* based exclusively on brute physical force is constantly at risk (Balandier 1980). Yet, also a rational justification like the bureaucratic *iron cage* (Weber's well-known *stahlhartes Gehäuse*) would prove to be scarcely efficient in long-term practices and strategies of domination (Weber 1956, Vol. 2, 843). Balandier shows us therefore that domination can justify and maintain itself solely with the transposition, production and manipulation of images and symbols within a specific, institutionalized, ceremonial framework (Balandier 1980). This applies to charismatic

leaders and traditional sovereigns, but it also clearly applies to modern-day dictators with their military or militarized hierarchies, *nomenklatura* and single-party State as well as to present-day politicians with their specific systems of legal-bureaucratic democratic domination.

Therefore, domination exerted by the elites, as Vilfredo Pareto called them, and by the *political classes*, as instead Gaetano Mosca defined them, is always grounded in specific dramaturgies by which willingly or not whoever is at the helm, or in Italian political parlance is in the *switch room* (namely the control center) belongs to a *theatocracy* (Pareto 1974, 156, Mosca 1966; Balandier 1980, 14). This particular form systematically resorts to the past, too, in the shape of an idealized history and of a constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed social memory, to its own advantage, i.e., to help maintain its own position within the domination structures. These *ethical ornaments*, as Roberto Michels so aptly described them, are always in the service of domination (Michels, 1970: 17–19).

From these initial observations we can already gather that by differentiating between power *sensu strictu* and domination Max Weber challenges Marx's rather simplistic view by which power *sensu lato* is essentially force and especially force exerted by one class on the other ones. Weber therefore seeks to improve on Marx's inherent *objectivism*, which features above all the importance of the economic or structural dimension understood as the base. This would mean though that the required *quantum of consensus* and *credibility* characterizing social relationships between those in command and those who obey orders, as well as the symbolic and *theatocratic* aspects of domination, are reduced to a superstructure, i.e. merely a deceiving ideology.

If we continue along Weber's line of reasoning and agree that domination is not solely force, i.e., a form of power essentially based on arbitrariness and physical violence, then we need to address the question of the *legitimacy* of the various forms of domination.

LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION

Analyzing common parlance as well as political parlance, we will notice that the two terms are often confused and incorrectly used as synonyms, whereas their meanings are significantly different.

For Max Weber legitimacy is a prerequisite for every relationship of domination (thus not of force) of man over man (Weber 1956, Vol 1, 122) The consensus of the dominated and the willingness to believe of the dominants are the two mainstays of legitimacy. Consequently, legitimacy exists if the dominated are willing to follow the orders of those in charge of issuing them. In a relationship of domination the prerequisite for a recognized legitimacy is that those who execute orders must believe in the specific abilities, qualities or qualifications of whoever administers power. Therefore, believing that the dominant positions are held by the right persons in the right place is essential. This is why Max Weber coined the renowned term *Legitimitätsglaube*, i.e. the belief in legitimacy. Thus, the specific abilities, qualities and qualifications of those exerting domination are not objective but only assumed, i.e., socially constructed.

For this reason Balandier strongly emphasized the importance of the *theatocratic* aspect, which clearly refers to the requisite legitimacy while strategically striving to validate one's suitability for the position of power already held or pursued (Balandier 1980).

These phenomena of the social production of legitimacy are inherent to so-called traditional societies or charismatic movements, but are also and especially visible in modern systems based on democratic legality where the request and demand for legitimacy is particularly important given the strong competition for positions of authority. In these systems, dramaturgical practices aimed at generating belief in legitimacy, and as often as not inventing it, are increasingly on the agenda but peak during political campaigns preceding elections. All the organization involved in creating a politician's public image centers round the production of belief in legitimacy. The public image is necessary to create belief in the candidate's legitimacy.

Yet, the belief in legitimacy as a foundation of domination is only one option, albeit a key one. In fact, we cannot rule out that other reasons may induce individuals or groups to obey and thus accept the state of domination. Obedience may conceal reasons of expediency and quasi-fatalistic feelings of powerlessness.

Unlike legitimacy, which is based on the subalterns' belief in it and has an ascriptive and relational nature, legitimation has distinctly systemic and formal characteristics. In other words, legitimation does not arise from a quantum of consensus or recognition, but rather, as Rodney Barker notes, from the respect, in empirical reality, for specific rules often rooted in unwritten codes regarding conventions, customs, and traditions or in legal systems based on written laws (Barker 2001, 22–25).

This distinction may seem slightly contrived, but a few examples can help us grasp its relevance. During the recent political crises in Greece, Spain and Italy there has been a drifting apart if not indeed a separation between legitimacy and legitimation. In their final phases, the governments led by Papandreu, Berlusconi and Zapatero, though fully aware of their loss of legitimacy, kept on governing to the very end by clinging on to legitimation, i.e., by resorting to articles of the constitution they were able to exploit unexceptionable technicalities of the election laws.

Several dictatorships, well aware of not being able to rely on the legitimacy of their subjects, tailor the legal apparatus to fit their needs, aiming precisely to justify their arbitrary exercise of power in order to create a formal legitimation that will allow them to act with impunity. In this regard we need only mention the most brutal example of the last fifty years: Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia.

Finally, the above examples show how, unlike legitimacy, legitimation may be exploited by an elite or a political class self-referentially; in this case, in line with Brian Turner's formulation, it ought to be defined as exclusively *ruler-centered* (Turner 1982, 370).

LEGITIMACY AND TRUST

An undeniably central point is the close correlation between legitimacy and trust. In fact, crediting a person or group with the recognized social role of exercising domination, thus believing in their legitimacy, also implies, in principle, not being deceived by those in command.

Diego Gambetta has aptly highlighted that trust is based on a subjective likelihood, while German sociologist Niklas Luhmann speaks about a reasonable expectation, but never

of a certainty (Luhmann 1973, 45). Therefore, single or collective actors in a relationship of trust cannot and must not be utterly certain that their partner will never cheat, deceive, betray or defraud them, especially in a relationship of domination. Accordingly, Luhmann likens trust to a risky advance performance, since loyal behavior, i.e., respecting agreements and rules, must be regarded solely as a probability (Luhmann 1973, 45; Gambetta 1988, 217). The trusting actor is constantly coming face to face with a betrayal of trust. Blind trust is simply evidence of naiveté and foolishness, while an excessive amount of trust, as German historian Ute Frevert points up, can only lead to ruination and perdition, since too much trust is generally perceived as a shortcoming or, worse still, as a sign of weakness or powerlessness (Frevert 2003, 11–13). Thus trust is a commodity in short supply that one must know how to get a hold of, as the Italian expression *conquistarsi la fiducia*, *win someone's trust*, rightly expresses.

Going back to our subject, winning the others' trust, possibly even by resorting to lies or other fraudulent means, is of the essence to generate belief in one's legitimacy, thus to build one's dominant position. Accordingly, obtaining trust is a prerequisite to ensure one's legitimacy.

INFORMALITY, LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC MISTRUST

There is a rather widespread phenomenon in some societies (we need only mention south and east Europe and especially southeast Europe) by which mistrust, chiefly in the public sphere, plays a major role. This means that political and administrative classes in these societies are permanently challenged by a severe crisis of legitimacy in which the State and its entire legislative apparatus are ultimately involved.

In these societies anthropologists must deal with specific notions of *public* and *private* that clash somewhat with ideals and ideologies specific to the Occident. The relation between public and private in these societies, which we will call *public mistrust societies*, is clearly conceived as a binary opposition. In terms of collective representations, in fact, there is an undeniable confrontation between the public and the private sphere. There is no empirical evidence in the societies we are talking about of the well-known idea of sociologist Richard Sennett for whom public and private spheres in the Occidental world have been a so-to-say complementary *set of social relationships*, or, more metaphorically, *two atoms of the same molecule* (Sennett 1976, Sennett 1983, 33 and 120). Accordingly, in *public mistrust societies* the clear-cut separation between public and private sphere and the supremacy of the former on the latter has never been questioned. The consequent opinion of these societies' members is categorical: the private sector is regarded as the social space of security, trustworthiness, and solidarity, whereas the public sector is perceived as a dangerous foreign body. For this reason, anthropologist Carlo Tullio-Altan, referring to Italy pointed out that this country has its specific morality (Tullio-Altan 1986). In accordance with this type of morality, which is a more or less a standard feature of *public mistrust societies*, any endeavor a person undertakes to guarantee, achieve, and even maximize the particularistic-like welfare and benefits of his own group is legitimate, given the private sphere's essentially positive features. In line with this type of morality, these strategies can be activated even if they should damage other members of society and above all if they should jeopardize the public welfare.

In parallel with the positive evaluation of private social spaces, this morality is averse to the public ones. In fact, when the public universe is perceived as increasingly impersonal, objectified, anonymous, and rationalized, then suspicion and mistrust will increase among the members of *public mistrust societies*. This is precisely one of the reasons why extralocal public institutions rekindle the feeling that their ultimate aim is to rob and harass people. Anyone who sees this is an undisputed truth can have only one reaction; namely, develop action strategies based on the logic that *robbing your robber* is legitimate (Giordano 1992, 412–417; Giordano 2012, 124).

Aiming to infiltrate and thereby neutralize the untrustworthy public institutions, especially the ones linked to the State, the single actors opt for the multiform methods of informality, which they regard as the most effective course of action to avoid the hazards of the public sphere. Paraphrasing Barbara Misztal, by informality we mean very broadly speaking those social organization systems based on face-to face social interactions and relationships in operation within or in parallel to institutions governed by impersonal and established rules, codes, laws or decrees (Misztal 2000, 3–5).

Informality in the public sphere, such as the one observed by anthropologists in *public mistrust societies*, has a terrible reputation in social sciences and at times is considered a form of *anomie*. Yet, informality is unimaginable without its opposite, i.e., formality. Therefore, informality and formality cannot be treated separately. The sharp distinction and contrast between the two is essentially ideal typical in a Weberian sense (Weber 1968, 235–249). In the empirical reality of social relationships and interactions the two phenomena coexist side by side and as often as not will overlap, intersect, merge and blend.

Based on the socio-anthropological observation that informal relationships and practices in modern *public mistrust societies* are the rule rather than the exception and that they do not necessarily involve socially illegitimate relationships, we can agree with American sociologist Homans that informal behaviors are akin to the more simple, fundamental and effective models of human relationships (Homans 1961). Pointless moralisms aside, informality ultimately implies an extra-institutional resource based on interpersonal transactions and exchanges of mutual services between actors interfacing with each other. I believe this fact has been keenly recognized by anthropology, especially by the Manchester School, which is a constant point of reference for those studying the social organization of informality (Bailey 1970; Boissevain 1974).

As previously mentioned, informality is neither *anomie* nor social disorganization. Actually, the social organization specific to informality is highly complex. We are dealing in particular with dyadic and polyadic relationships and with extended or extensive personalized networks, both horizontal and vertical, which infiltrate the public sphere where impersonal and established structures are, on paper at least, predominant. The purpose of these organizations of informality is to generate relationships of trust with people in dominant positions (politicians and bureaucrats) whom one does not trust a priori and consequently does not attribute any legitimacy. These activities aim to activate forms of reciprocity either directly or mediated by third parties who in turn obtain their own material, political or solely symbolic advantage.

Given the existing types of reciprocity and exchange of favors though, practices in these organizations of informality often have an illegal or semi-legal quality. Returning to Max Weber this generates, as we shall see, a permanent tension between legality and legitimacy.

Among these organizations of informality, in *public mistrust societies* there are clientelist and family networks in particular, the ones including friends and acquaintances such as the renowned Soviet *blat* (Ledenova 1998, 37), the Chinese *guanxi* (Hertz 1998), the Bulgarian *vrazki*, the Serbian *veze* and the Polish *znajomości* (Benovska-Săbkova 2001, 165–168) along with the corruptive cartels. Finally, we also need to add all those highly flexible associations that are far less centralized than official statements would have us believe and which Italian legal parlance defines as *Mafia-like*.

At this point, the anthropologist needs to tackle the reasons underlying mistrust in the public sphere and the rather precarious legitimacy of political classes, bureaucracy and the State’s legal apparatus in general. Researching the social logic, better yet, the social action, in line with Weber’s agnostic tradition, appears to be the most suitable and tenable approach. Therefore, we definitely must avoid moralistic and ethnocentric stances.

The clientelist, corruptive and Mafia practices in the frame of informality should not be considered exclusive to *public mistrust societies* perceived as archaic collectivities or ones plagued by fatalism or social, cultural and moral backwardness (Banfield 1958; Lepsius 1965, 321; Tullio-Altan 1986, 57–60; Haller and Shore 2005, 3–19; Pardo 2004). This would be yet another ethnocentric theory of the sociocultural deficit of some societies compared to others, namely Western ones. Societies deemed more advanced have cronyism, clientelism, corruption and Mafia too, although probably to a lesser extent or maybe just better concealed because the State is more efficient. Evidence that single Mafia networks are by now quite successfully operating in Germany and Switzerland substantiates this thesis.

The question of the diffusion as well as the continuity and persistence of informality and its associated social relationships in *public mistrust societies* cannot be adequately dealt with via a culturalist approach, which usually employs an overly static notion of culture by which the actors are caged in a fixed frame, thus reduced to robots without a choice. An interpretation based on the pure and simple use of the rational choice paradigm appears to be highly reductive as well (Giordano 2003, 548–551).

An historical-anthropological approach, instead, reveals quite clearly that the extent of clientelist, cronyist, corruptive and Mafia-like phenomena in public mistrust societies is strictly correlated to a permanent discord between State and society (Pardo and Prato 2011). In Weberian terms we could say that there is a split between legality and legitimacy as shown in the following diagram:

Formal State institutions and agents	Informal relationships, coalitions and social networks
Legal	Partially Illegal or semi-legal
Non-Legitimate	Legitimate

The roots of this dissonance between State and society and the consequent split between legality and legitimacy reach deep into a distant history. Yet, contrary to most historians’ *modus operandi*, history cannot be reduced to a mechanical or automatic sequence of objective facts. Instead, it must be understood as an interpreted past activated by the actors themselves in their to-be-interpreted present (Ricoeur 1985, Vol. 3, 314). Thus, we reach the

question of history as a past that is experienced, either in a direct or mediated way, and then actualized (Giordano, 2005: 53–57). This concerns what has been defined as the presence or efficacy of history (Schaff 1976, 129; Ricoeur 1985, Vol. 3, 495). Unlike socio-genetic narratives, the historical-anthropological view does not deal as much with the sociologically relevant roots of informality and its manifestations in the social practices of *public mistrust societies*, but rather with the social construction of continuity by which informal activities take on and maintain a specific meaning in the minds of members of *public mistrust societies*.

According to the historical-anthropological view, this persistence, despite inevitable socio-structural changes, springs from the tight and permanent interaction between the collective spaces of experience, in the sense of interpreted past, and the horizons of expectation, regarded, instead, in the present as an imagined future (thus to be interpreted) (Koselleck 1979, 349–359).

Informality as a suitable principle of social organization (along with its above-mentioned social practices) is strictly linked to the dreadful experiences that members of a given society have continuously had with the State, both in a recent and distant past. Obviously, these negative spaces of experience, which have a marked influence on the actors and on the formation of their horizons of expectation, do not reproduce themselves automatically by tradition, i.e., simply because they are handed down from one generation to the next. These spaces of experience must be constantly confirmed in the present. Traditions as well as mentalities are extremely moldable phenomena whose plausibility and effectiveness must be permanently verified and confirmed. In accordance with the members' perception of these experiences, the corresponding systems of representations and behavioral models will be strengthened, modified, or discarded.

As already mentioned, the reproduction of negative spaces of experience in *public mistrust societies*, such as the one in the *Mezzogiorno* or those of Eastern Europe, goes hand in hand with the constant failing of the State and of civil society's institutions. Yet, such a public inability to carry out one's duties is not only an objective fact that can be observed from the outside, but, far more important, is also shared within and consequently built as such by the citizens themselves. Thus, for the actors affected by the permanent disaster of public powers and civil society's institutions, the persistence, resurgence and expansion of informal behavioral models is simply the outcome of a contextual rational choice. Paraphrasing Pizzorno, in fact, members of *public mistrust societies* in the Mediterranean and South East-European areas resort to informality with good reason since nobody is foolish to the point of doing things that serve no purpose or that could be damaging (Pizzorno 1976, 243).

CONCLUSIONS

I would like to close with the following five points:

- By distinguishing between two types of power, i.e., power *sensu strictu* and domination, Max Weber shows that the former is sociologically amorphous, therefore arbitrary and ephemeral, whereas the latter is much more stable since it is rooted in the belief of the dominated in their dominator's legitimacy.
- Dominators must perforce stage their own legitimacy via theocratic strategies.

Hence, there is a constant social production of legitimacy by means of public performances. Domination, therefore, is never based on physical violence alone.

- Distinguishing between legitimacy and legitimation is both useful and necessary. The former has ascriptive and relational characteristics, whereas the latter has essentially formal and systemic ones independent of the subalterns' recognition.
- Legitimacy implies a relationship of trust between dominators and subalterns, where trust refers to a subjective likelihood or reasonable expectation but never to the certainty of not being deceived.
- From an ethnographic point of view, the anthropologist often deals with societies showing a form of legal domination that can rely on legitimation but not on legitimacy owing to a lack of trust in anything public. Consequently, there is a separation between legality and legitimacy by which single individuals feel justified in resorting to informal networks to overcome this deficit. However, the anthropologist must not commit the mistake common to many political scientists of regarding these societies as backward ones. The informalization of society ought to be interpreted, instead, as a sum of rational strategies based on past spaces of experience activated in the present horizon of expectations. We need to stress that this is not a case of historical determinism, but rather of an intentional and properly thought-out choice.

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Limits of Engagement in Anthropology

MARCIN BROCKI

ABSTRACT:

It becomes almost a commonsense truth in social sciences and humanities that the scholar should not only get out of his/her “ivory tower” but also to participate in an activist way in the world of his “informant”. The text critically examines the achievements and research directives of activist anthropology. I’m trying to show that anthropological projects that base on the so called “participation” are far from the epistemological rupture, that is fundamental to the freedom of scientific thinking, the freedom that can lead sometimes to the generation of opposite knowledge to common sense, while participatory projects leads rather toward confirmation of the common sense. In the article I’m trying to show that the researcher who is negotiating the content of his knowledge, which is to be a representation of informant’s knowledge, with the informant, becomes a hostage of the unwritten agreement, which he imposed by himself, assuming that what is good from the moral stand defined by a researcher, is also good for informant, and is good at all.

KEYWORDS:

Action anthropology; Activist anthropology; Moral models in anthropology; Critical anthropology; Para-ethnography

In the mid-1990s, George Marcus indicated the need to rethink the contemporary, single-sited strategy for ethnographic research, and proposed what he referred to as multi-sited research, an approach based on Marcus’s own definition of complicity (Marcus 1995). He Christian Giordano gives the following reasons why other, similar terms that denote a certain aspect of fieldwork related to the researcher-researched relationship have become inadequate (referring to previous proposals by Clifford Geertz, Renato Rosaldo and James Clifford):

1. Rapport, denoting the necessary level of acquaintance with the researched that allows researchers to obtain valuable field data (the value of which is determined by the outside, i.e. the researcher’s professional culture, in relation to the inside, i.e. the perspective of the researched), even though it still symbolises the ideal research conditions, is an inadequate term because:

- a. The context of conducting research and the context of culture have changed. Today's culture is riddled with inconsistencies and interrelationships between different localities. Efficient research does not require sophisticated rapport (enabled only by single-sited research) to permeate/access/cross/enter local knowledge (in a single-sited manner, as all that is local is situated "here");
 - b. The term solidifies the colonialist and neocolonialist division between the active researcher and the passive researched. Under multi-sited research conditions, this division is an externally maintained fiction, as authority relations may actually be much more complex. Consequently, situating the anthropologist within these relations does not necessarily benefit the building of asymmetrical relationships;
2. Not all elements of the semantic field of the term complicity can be used to describe the sense Marcus attributes to them, because even if we take into account causes that are external to the local culture (i.e., if complicity is not limited to the researcher-researched relationship) – in other words, if the external context is embedded "inside the area of research" – we may still find our understanding of the inside too conventional. In Marcus' opinion, this happened to Renato Rosaldo, who situated fieldwork "inside another form of life." It is the figure of "the area of research" that should change;
 3. Dialogue, accordingly, is also an inadequate term, as it refers to Utopian "collaboration" (cooperation in the dialogue), because even though it rhetorically frees fieldwork from an instrumentalised approach to the researched, multivocality still exists in some particular, enclosed "object of study", i.e. a clear, different lifestyle (Marcus 1997).

Marcus inscribes the notion of collaboration with an extremely mysterious similarity of experiences of the "third," an external motivating force that shapes the lives of the researcher and the researched:

What ethnographers in this changed *mise-en-scene* want from subjects is not so much local knowledge as an articulation of the forms of anxiety that are generated by the awareness of being affected by what is elsewhere without knowing what the particular connections to that elsewhere might be. The ethnographer on the scene in this sense makes that elsewhere present. [...] This version of complicity tries to get at a form of local knowledge that is about the kind of difference that is not accessible by working out internal cultural logics. It is about difference that arises from the anxieties of knowing that one is somehow tied into what is happening elsewhere, but, as noted, without those connections being clear or precisely articulated through available internal cultural models. In effect, subjects are participating in discourses that are thoroughly localized but that are not their own. [...] This uncertainty creates anxiety, wonder, and insecurity, in different registers, both in the ethnographer and in her subjects. This recognition of a common predicament is the primary motivation for thinking about the changed conception of fieldwork relationships in terms of complicity. It would be possible to understand our emphasis on the figure of complicity as the achievement of a different kind of rapport, but it would be a mistake to identify it with the precise construction of that figure in the traditional mode. The investment in the figure of complicity rests on highlighting this contemporary external determination of local discourses, marked and set off by the fieldworker's presence but free of the figures of rapport and collaboration that have traditionally characterized fieldwork. Free of these, complicity between an ethnographer whose outsideness is always prominent and a subject who is sensitive to the outside helps to materialize other dimensions that the dialogue of traditional fieldwork, conceived as taking place inside rapport, cannot get at as well. (Marcus 1997, 97–98)

When facing this “external third”, the researcher and the researched are on par with each other. They are equally uncertain, and they both negotiate relations with the third in their own “local” manner. The researcher and the researched enter an “agreement” with the third, thus creating a bond that this time places them both in a situation of “complicity” against the third. Their worlds may differ dramatically, but against the “underground discourse”, a term he quotes after Douglas Holmes to denote “the third”, the researcher and the researched create a community. Consequently, a thread of cognitive kinship is formed that results in a “fair” relationship, i.e. honest partnership (Marcus 1997, 103). The researched becomes a “partner” or an “actor” fully engaged in analysis (Holmes and Marcus 2005, 1104).

A question comes to mind at this point: What is the desired product of such a morally pristine interaction? By referring to Holmes, whose research involves talks with far-right politicians during which he attempts not to exoticise his interlocutors by incorporating them into an apparently obvious frame, the author clearly suggests that the desired product are meeting points between different imaginings of the third, just as in Holmes’s research.

The product, at least according to Marcus’s declarations, does not constitute scientific knowledge about common knowledge. Rather, quite understandably, it constitutes the “unknown”, i.e. loosely defined “internarratives” or “interconnected discourses” (Holmes and Marcus 2005, 1105), even though we actually obtain a conventional product resembling a press article wherein the author openly declares the will to create entities for ideological purposes (Holmes and Marcus 2005, 1108), does not avoid mixing their own interpretation with the interpretation of the researched and attempts to guess what their informer thinks and “instinctively feels”. Thus, contrary to Marcus’s intentions, the informed is exoticised, and the entire enterprise becomes shrouded in complete mystery:

[...] the collaborative space encompassed by integralism created a dynamic purview from which we can view integration in terms of its manifold contradictions, revealing not merely its institutional manifestations but also its profoundly human character - the ways in which it has come to align consciousness and mediate intimacy. For us, this is the essence of a multisited mise-en-scene, a staging that can reveal the interplay between metatheoretical issues and the intricacies of human experience. (Holmes and Marcus 2005, 1104)

Perhaps it is worth adding that Marcus uses *reductio ad essentiam* when collectively addresses the “conventional ethnography” and “traditional fieldwork” (including the aforementioned “conventional” attempts to tackle the complex conditions of fieldwork). The diversity and complexity of researchers’ attitudes are treated as unimportant; empirical complexity is excluded because the proposed solution favours whatever is pertinent in terms of the argument the author wishes to present, rather than the actual state of affairs (Marcus 2008). In other words, Marcus creates a founding myth by killing a fictional “character”. This is accompanied by a rhetoric of challenge, i.e. a rhetoric of the complexity of the enterprise and a rhetoric of “metamorphosis,” of modernising change (Holmes and Marcus 2005), and of the radicalism of the entire project. It is a truly awe-inspiring experience to read about “the most radical thesis” that “spontaneously created para-ethnographies are built into the structure of contemporary and give form and content to continuously unfolding skein of experience” (Holmes and Marcus 2005, 1110). The entire project, promoted by Marcus in numerous venues, is riddled with ambiguous, very general statements that form the basis for the entire explanation. His “ethnography of complicity” resembles a parable more than it resembles a scientific proposal. As a parable, its task is to express simple moral “truth”: that the only good researcher is one that strives to equalise the contribution of the researcher

and the researched during the course of investigation; such a researcher can thus be called a “collaborating researcher”. As any formula reflecting a certain scope of common knowledge, this one is also unclear and does not cover all cases (it can be used to determine many cases, but not all of them). This renders any attempt at making the formula more explicit pointless. Unsurprisingly, Marcus’ publications lack any such attempts. On the other hand, the project does involve a tangible will to imbue complicity with scientific prestige. Complicity, however, does not fall under scientific consideration, as despite referring to a supposed democratisation of research procedure and analysis, it actually constitutes an attempt to mix the structure of knowledge of the researcher and the researched according to vaguely defined rules, and for an obscure purpose. Not only does this stall our understanding of the Other, and through the Other, Ourselves, it actually makes understanding impossible.

Sol Tax’s Action Anthropology Project initiated in the 1940s addressed complicity in a different manner. Unfortunately, the project also resulted in failure. Tax’s project aimed to give Native Americans freedom to introduce changes they wanted and which seemed beneficial for them. Tax’s team wished to break the vicious cycle of impossibilities: The effect of inevitable modernisation on the local community and the actual changes that need to occur on the one hand, and preserving Native American identity and system of values on the other. The team also assumed that permanent financial aid for education and health on the part of the federal government would be a necessary condition for the successfulness of the project. Consequently, they tried to interest politicians with the idea of a new financial agreement that would guarantee support for schools and medical centres and, at the same time, would allow Native Americans to make their own decisions concerning their education and treatment in order to finally show that they are able to manage their own affairs (cf. Tax 2010, 21).

Under Tax’s project, anthropologists in theory follow aims formulated by the local community. However, the role anthropologists are to play in the community-led project of changes is unclear: are they supposed to “give” the freedom to introduce changes as protectors of the right of the local community to make decisions or as the active factors of change themselves? The latter type of activity proved to be more popular than the former in Tax’s as well as other projects. As a result, anthropology in action became action in the name of anthropology (or values connected with it), undertaken for the sake of cultural change. Ultimately, Tax’s project resembles what is referred to as intervention studies, which are saliently orientated towards social change.

Action research aims to solve pertinent problems in a given context through democratic inquiry in which professional researchers collaborate with local stakeholders to seek and enact solutions to problems of major importance to the stakeholders. We refer to this as cogenerative inquiry because it is built on professional researcher-stakeholder collaboration and aims to solve real-life problems in context. Cogenerative inquiry processes involve trained professional researchers and knowledgeable local stakeholders who work together to define the problems to be addressed, to gather and organize relevant knowledge and data, to analyze the resulting information, and to design social change interventions. The relationship between the professional researcher and the local stakeholders is based on bringing the diverse bases of their knowledge and their distinctive social locations to bear on a problem collaboratively. The professional researcher often brings knowledge of other relevant cases and of relevant research methods, and he or she often has experience in organizing research processes. The insiders have extensive and long-term knowledge of the problems at hand and the contexts in which they occur, as well as knowledge about how and from whom to get additional information. They also contribute urgency and focus to the

process, because it centers on problems they are eager to solve. Together, these partners create a powerful research team. (Greenwood and Levin 2005, 54)

The interventional character of the researchers' action is, as stated by the researchers themselves, a way to democratise knowledge, and expanding the fields of cooperation between the researcher and the researched is supposed to benefit this expansion (cf. Miller and Crabtree 2005, 615). However, projects based on increasingly close "cooperation" suffer from the same problem as Sol Tax's actions of involving only superficial democratisation. Superficial democratisation is also the result of formulating the research aim, which was supposed to make this type of investigation similar to the anthropology of dialogism and, at the same time, refute the accusation that the research aim is formulated by external institutions. The most well-known example of a project of this type is Luke Lassiter's collaborative ethnography.

Lassiter claims that for anthropology to acquire a significant position within the public debate, it should be introduced into social change projects in a manner that would allow it to fully collaborate with the objects of change. He also claims that the researcher-research relationship involves asymmetry that may be considered a violation of the reciprocity rule. Lassiter agrees with Robert Borofsky that we are indebted to those who we research (they themselves and the culture they allow us to investigate constitute a gift for us). We should repay this debt by means of our support for matters important for the researched. Furthermore, Lassiter provides a detailed list of areas that should be supported through collaboration with the researched: "From human rights to violence, from the trafficking of body parts to the illegal drug trade, from problem-solving to policy making, from the global to the local and back again" (Lassiter 2005b, 83). Lassiter moves on to state, without giving any extensive explanation that the reach of this kind of collaboration not only does not endanger "strict scientific viability," it fosters it in terms of the addressed subjects and the joint creation of an ethnographic text (during writing). One may agree that Lassiter expounds the public influence of this kind of an anthropology project well: "Collaborative ethnography, as one of many academic/applied approaches, offers us a powerful way to engage the public with anthropology one field project, one ethnographic text at a time" (Lassiter 2005b, 84–85). This will predominantly interest those we engage in the project. The question is, however, what type of influence is it? It is easy to make good "subject for thought" out of the informer by generalizing them, a subject that we will later use during a particular study according to the theoretical opinion about the informer we arrive at. The problem, however, lies in the fact that this opinion may be incorrect. We are unable to decide prior to an investigation what character the type of relationship we enter is going to have, as we do not know whether the informer is able and willing to meet a researcher and whether they perceive the meeting and the developing relationship in the same manner as we do. Dialogue cannot simply be taken for granted, it may only occur on its own. Jean-Claude Kaufmann addresses the potential deep relationship with the researched much more subtly:

From the informer's perspective, the ideal researcher is a remarkable person. The researcher should be someone unfamiliar and anonymous, someone we can share anything with because we are never going to see them again; someone who is obviously not going to play any role in the realm of contacts maintained by the informer. At the same time, the researcher should become someone close to the informer during the interview, someone who seems to be or actually is extremely familiar; someone we can share everything with because they have become our friend. The deepest confessions come from a successful combination of these two opposite expectations. Anonymity is the foundation here. The informer should

absolutely be guaranteed anonymity, just as a physician guarantees discretion. This is why, for instance, I do not agree for a second meeting with the informers after the interview to discuss results, etc., even though it could obviously be a fascinating experience. Once the interview is finished, the informer should feel completely free. In contrast, during the interview, the informer expects the researcher to leave their ivory tower, reject the cold role of someone only concerned with asking questions and show themselves to be a human being with human opinions and feelings. Bashfully yet systematically, the interviewees attempt to bring the researcher out of the ivory tower. For instance, after expressing an opinion, they may ask, "Don't you agree?" It often happens that the interviewer, uncomfortable with this rhetorical figure, mumbles agreement in such a soft and unclear manner that the interviewee understands it to mean that the interviewer either disagrees with them or does not want to tell them what they think. After several fruitless attempts, the informer focuses on ready answers and refuses to become engaged. (translated from Polish; Kaufmann 2010, 82–83)

Lassiter's strategy is practically the opposite of this one. He claims that ethnological knowledge should be negotiated with the informer. That is to say, the researcher, in the name of expectations and predictions completely external to what the informer regards as the communication process, in other words, ignoring the informer's microcosm in the name of the researcher's own plan, pulls the informer into their game for an unspecified amount of time. There is nothing at the end of this informer engagement plan. This comes as no surprise, as the informer has no means of knowing what such interaction is leading to, and the notion of shared knowledge (what does the term even mean?) is an unsupported dream that the researcher and the informer do not necessarily both work towards. Interestingly, when Lassiter comes close to presenting his opinion, he provides a short description of Kevin Dwyer's dialogic anthropology (Dwyer and Muhammad 1987; Lassiter 2005a, 67). Lassiter finds it useful to quote the important fragments, but draws from them only what does not endanger his own concept. In *Moroccan Dialogues*, Kevin Dwyer writes: "The anthropologist who encounters people from other societies is not merely observing them or attempting to record their behavior," wrote Dwyer; "both he and the people he confronts, and the societal interests that each represents, are engaging each other creatively, producing the new phenomenon of Self and Other becoming interdependent, of Self and Other sometimes challenging, sometimes accommodating one another" (quoted after: Lassiter 2005b, 92). In his commentary to this and other quotes from Dwyer, Lassiter notes that dialogic ethnography called for detailed analysis of the intercultural understanding of and respect to real challenges faced by researchers when they strive to re-forge experience into text (Lassiter 2005a, 67). It is astonishing that Lassiter completely disregarded this call and did not analyse intercultural understanding. Had he not done so, he would have realised that communication, especially intercultural communication, involves an extremely complex play of expectations and predictions based on deep cultural experience. Engaging anyone in anything is impossible without taking into account this call. As a result, we cannot call "joint writing" an investigation. Rather, it is at best a type of hegemonic practice whereby the subject becomes objectified and manipulated for the researcher's own needs and aims. In my opinion, Lassiter's intentions were much different; the result, however, could have been better.

Sol Tax's team encountered a similar problem. As later interpretations of what actually occurred during the Fox Project have shown, Tax's team had great difficulties remaining within the Action Anthropology frame. Douglas E. Foley (2010, 289) proposes that the failure resulted from an overly idealistic (Utopian) approach to Meskwaki Native Americans

and the fact that the team assumed the role of spokespersons for the community without full awareness of how this would affect the locals (i.e. that taking one side would exacerbate the existing differences), created and initiated projects and programmes and coordinated them throughout their entire course (i.e. the team appropriated activity for themselves) and suggested cultural and historical topics without prior comprehensive analysis of what the community actually found important. “Circulating between and engaging in informal chats with those who have become a group of ‘professional informers’” (translated from Polish; Foley 2010, 289) constitutes a very feeble base for even the most superficial observations and interpretations. In the end, the Fox Project ended in the “ideals” of applied anthropology becoming implemented, i.e. a type of social engineering whereby the anthropologists functions as a therapist, and their “clinical” actions (Sol Tax called his manner of conducting investigation clinical science, in contrast to “pure science,” which is inapplicable in social practice) are supposed to ultimately “heal” the organisational and psychological dysfunctions of its “patients,” i.e. the researched community (Foley 2010, 291).

Action anthropologists were certain that they know what ails the Meskwaki and white communities. They pictured themselves as easing the psychological and organisational pain caused by violent cultural change. Just as Keynesian economists oversaw the “soft landing” of the unavoidable recession, action anthropologists were convinced that they are overseeing the “soft cultural landing” in the unavoidable acculturation processes. (translated from Polish; Foley 2010, 291)

George Marcus’s and Luke Lassiter’s projects lack epistemological detachment, crucial for the scientific freedom of thought. This detachment may lead to the creation of social knowledge that contradicts common sense. On the other hand, their projects include a particular acknowledgement of the obviousness of common thinking; “particular” because, even though this manner of thinking may agree with what scientific investigation reveals, collaborative ethnography does not account for the possibility of escaping non-knowledge. I use the term non-knowledge to denote an artificial creation that constitutes neither the informer’s knowledge nor the model of knowledge (in other words, the image of the world and the model of categorization) averaged between the members of a given community nor any other form of the researcher’s knowledge, but a set of opinions about something that does not even exist (a lack of reference) outside the “instance of speech”, i.e. something that, rather than existing within a natural situation (which could serve as a starting point for an understanding), exists in a completely artificial situation. The “correct” unfolding of this artificial situation is guaranteed only by the researcher’s ethical project, and the rules and dynamics of conversation are treated as natural because the researcher assumes that it is enough to “somehow” erase the difference between them and the researched to stop having to account for the artificial situation. The researcher negotiates with the informer the content of the researcher’s knowledge that is to represent the informer’s knowledge. Thus, the researcher becomes hostage to the very agreement they imposed, assuming that whatever is good from the researcher’s moral standpoint is good not only for the informer, but also good in general.

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Identities, failed identities, and social ontologies

ROBERT J. THORNTON

ABSTRACT:

The notion of “identity” is fundamental to the social sciences. Contra the Durkheimian idea of “socialisation” in which “society” creates persons and social roles, I argue that “identity” is simply entailed by the ontology of “society” itself. I claim further that not all social forms create “identity” in the canonical sociological sense, and that “identity” is not a useful category of analysis for these social forms, including the market, social networks, and populations. These constitute distinct social ontologies in which “identity” does not exist or is excluded by definition. But even within the social ontology of “society”, it is possible to have failed identities, non-identities, or “spoiled” identities. Thus, the “failure” of identity that I address here is twofold: apparent identities that effectively fail to exist in certain social ontologies, and social identities that fail to be effective or to exist at all even under social ontologies in which they do exist. Examples are drawn especially from South African politics and culture, but the conceptual scope is global.

KEYWORDS:

Identity; Ontology; Society; Social networks; Population; Markets

IDENTITY AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES

The notion of “identity” is one of the fundamental terms in contemporary theory in the social sciences. It is also a fundamental issue in most of contemporary politics and violent conflict in the world today, at the local level – any locality anywhere – and internationally. We assume that identity is something like a “natural” category – an *a priori*, or something *sui generis* – that we both assume and have to explain. In so far as we accept the ontological status of states and groups of any kind – ethnic, religious, gendered, sexual, racial, occupational, etc. – as primary objects of analysis in the social sciences, we must accept the notion of identity as that which characterises the membership of any person in such a group or category. The idea that all human beings have, at least, personhood, and, more than this, that they are fully equal as “human” with rights and duties, derives largely from the Enlightenment. The notion of “society” and “group” as essential “containers” of such persons comes somewhat later in the history of social science philosophy. But by now it is clear that we have assumed that “society” exists in more or less the same terms by which

it was defined during the emergence of this analytic category in the nineteenth century. “Society” replaced god or gods as the ultimate reality – that is the final cause and the primary ontological ground for there being anything (social) at all. It began to do the work of the theological god-entity, especially in the form of the Platonic “*demiurge*”. The *δημιουργός* (*demiurge*) is an energy or active force (*ourgos*) of the people (*δημι, demos*) that exists – that is, has ontological reality status – and that has causal efficacy. Persons have what we call “identity” with reference to these groups as members of society.

However, I will claim here that not all social forms create “identity” in the canonical sociological sense, and that “identity” is not a useful category of analysis for these social forms. Further, even within the social ontology of “society”, it is possible to have failed identities, non-identities, or “spoiled” identities. Thus, the “failure” of identity that I address here is twofold: apparent identities that effectively fail to exist in certain social ontologies, and social identities that fail to be effective or to exist at all even under social ontologies in which they do exist.

Some of this is obvious, but I will argue that we can routinely use other concepts – and ascribe ontological status to them at least for analytical purposes – for which the concept of identity makes no sense. For instance, markets, networks, and populations cannot be “containers” for persons who are said to have an “identity”, or that the kind of identity persons have with respect to markets, networks and populations is of a different sort.

Specifically actors can be ascribed a functional identity in markets, but do not “have” an identity as persons since each actor is theoretically exchangeable – as is money and goods – in the context of market exchanges. This is also true of what we call “networks”, that is sets of person-to-person (or actor-to-actor) relations that form, in the mind’s eye, a network, something like a fishing net, or like the “reticulation” of root systems, electrical networks and circuits, and so on. Many kinds of networks are possible, but the visualization of them as networks is something that only takes place in the imagination. For the actor in the network, only the immediate relation with a next-in-sequence actor is all that is known of the network. The actor or “node” in the “network” never sees the whole network, nor does the analyst. Network memberships cannot be counted in principle because (a) a person (node) may have many or only one relation (link or “edge”) with another/others, including him/herself (b) but never knows who his contacts are linked to as the network expands, and (c) because the network is dynamic with links formed and broken over any arbitrary time span. This is also true of populations, but population have the specific property of treating all elements as identical, and therefore lacking identity by definition.

Each of these types of social formation has a different ontological status, especially with respect to the parts that may be said to compose it, and which in turn they define or bring into “reality”. These are society (according to the canonical definitions), networks, markets and populations, and possibly other specialised concepts of how we as humans manage our relations with one another.

Thus, the theoretical concept of “society” is defined with respect to “identities” that compose it, and in terms of which these identities can be said to exist. Accordingly, Durkheim’s notion of “socialization” (and for that matter Foucault’s teachings about “becoming subject to discourse”) is simply circular: society does not so much “socialise” (non-social) beings into social “roles”, but rather that the social identity is logically entailed by the concept of society itself, and vice versa.

In the case of networks, markets, and populations, a personal identity is not defined, or can only be defined in such a way that it is incommensurable with the standard understanding of the social identity. This should be understood as a different social ontology in which different kinds of entities exist. In contemporary social science, we tend to assume that networks, markets, and populations are somehow sub-categories of “society” rather than separate ontological visions of how social relations work. By “social relations” I mean here any type of interactions humans may have with each other, but also any type of relation that they are imagined to have with each other in terms of some social ontology. Actors in a network never see the network, and rarely have any overall concept of it as such. Such a concept is irrelevant to being an actor in a network. Thus, an identity is irrelevant in a way that cannot be the case for, say, ethnic membership.

“HAVING” IDENTITY

The idea that each person has an identity as some essential property of his or her being implies directly an ontology of identity: it is something that we can “have”, like other property we might own. Indeed status, beauty, charisma, personality, and so on are all considered to be something one owns, that has value, and that can be exchanged for other things such as “social capital”, or even sold, more or less, “as is”.

But more specifically, to have a social identity implies the existence of a person who possesses such an identity within a *social* context that is the condition for the existence of any identity. Any such person has a concept (“identity”) of his or her own being with reference to his or her social ontology.

The social identity implies a *social ontology*, that is, the mode of being that we call “the social”. But I will argue here that the different forms of the social constitute different social ontologies. Social identities can be – and are – understood and constituted within different social ontologies such as markets, populations, networks and institutions. Although the social sciences generally assume that identities are fundamental elements of social being, and are therefore positive, empirical entities, identity must be defined differently within different social ontologies. For instance, the identity of participants in randomised controlled trials (medical population-based experimental method) is necessarily – that is ethically – without personal identity. There are also “failed identities” and frustrated identities, and identities that are not always possible to define with respect to four fundamental social ontologies. These include criminal identities, secret actors in corrupt, nepotistic, kleptocratic or criminal networks. It is often not possible to assign specific identities to economic actors in markets since it is the prices and commodities rather than the human transactors that are important, and that are recorded. This paper offers a critique of the notion that identities are always possible, and positive, and/or necessarily successful; and argues that some identities to which some people might aspire, or that they imagine for themselves, are impossible in practice. These are “failed identities” or frustrated identities. Negative identities, and negation of identity is also possible. Identity, then, depends on assumptions about social ontologies, and is sometimes “undefined”, impossible, negated, or frustrated.

The concept of identity in contemporary social science is invariably a positive concept. It is “positive” in the sense of Positivism, that is, it exists and can be named, measured,

categorised, analysed, aggregated, and otherwise understood as either created by society, as self-existing, primordial, constructed or “imagined”, but nevertheless brought into being as the result of concrete observable social process. In this sense, the social identity can only exist if it is “efficacious” that is, if it “works”, creates positive value. In other words, identities are positive, not negative, not zero (except in the Durkheimian case of *anomie*).

In this sense, the notion of identity has a similar status to that of medicine and technology. A failed identity is not an identity just as a failed technology, or failed medicine, is not technology or medicine, as Marilyn Strathern once remarked.

Medicine, like technology, is only recognized in being efficacious (failed medicine is no such thing, i.e., is not medicine). It works if it achieves results. And those results will of course vary as widely as the subject of treatment. (Strathern 2004, 6)

Identity is treated as if it were always a good thing, even though it can be “misused”, that is, directed towards nefarious or murderous political ends. But what of identities that don’t or can’t exist, or that are indeterminate, confused or otherwise compromised? These can’t be politically deployed, but they present problems for the anthropologists or sociologist who thinks in terms of identities and those (theoretical) objects to which identities refer.

Speaking for myself, now, I have what I will call an “uncertain identity complex”. Call it a global identity. Perhaps I am just a cosmopolitan. Or belong to a “third culture”. I look in wonder at people who come from a (single) place: in short people who have what might be called “identity”. By contrast, I have an itinerary, a travel log, rather than a place. There are many people like me, and often those are just the people who like to theorise about (other) people’s identity.

Some years ago I was helping my daughter with a school assignment. The teacher had asked the children to count up the number of discrete places that they had lived. Her score was 4 or 5 on only two continents. At that time, at the age of 40, I discovered that I had lived in 43 places, on three continents, five countries and seven American states from Hawai’i to New Jersey.

My parents travelled, and so had I. We were effectively nomadic. My father’s parents had come from Appalachia, from one of the poorest counties in the US, descended from Cherokee (*Tsulagi*, Native American) and Celtic ancestry. My mother’s father was an immigrant from Britain who insisted on his Cornish identity. The Cornish, or Kernow, are a small Celtic people whose language died out in the 18th century. It was years before I learned that Cornwall was not an independent country. (In fact, it has only just recently been recognised by the British government as a valid “national minority group” of Great Britain, that allows it to be protected under the European framework convention for the protection of national minorities). My mother’s mother came from American pioneer stock whose earliest ancestors had been among the first Europeans to live in America. As deeply American, then, as it is possible to be, my parents moved first to India, and then to Uganda, among other places where I grew up “local”. We never lived among expatriates in these countries, but “went local”. My brother and sister and I went to Indian schools in India, and Ugandan schools in Uganda. After studying at Makerere University in Uganda, and then Stanford and Chicago in the US, I made my home in South Africa thirty-eight years ago. As an immigrant there, I began the process of becoming African.

But as a white person in Africa, especially in South Africa, this was already a compromised identity. The identities that I have tried to assume – American, Native American, Indian, Ugandan, and South African have all been frustrated, or have “failed” in one way or another. Though compromised, I cannot fully escape them either.

This leads me to identities that are “failed”, compromised, or frustrated. Despite vast writings about identity, it seems to me that there is still a lack of theory and description concerning the condition of the “failed identity,” the “frustrated” or “non-” identity.

Now a South African, with my three children, their spouses and four grandchildren integrated into the South African economy and culture, like all South Africans their identities are also compromised, changing and multiple. They/we cannot escape this.

But this is also true for people born in South Africa: all of their identities are compromised and uncertain too. Current South African politics is the politics of compromised identities.

Take the struggle between Helen Zille, the white, female, former leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) party. She and the party have led a strong campaign against the ANC, the “ruling party” currently in government. President Jacob Zuma leads the ANC, even though his identity (and that of the ANC and the nation) is deeply compromised by accusations of fraud, racketeering and corruption. He claims to be “100% Zulu”. Julius Malema, the former leader of the ANC Youth League, and now self-styled “Commander in Chief” of his own party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) now vociferously opposes the ANC in Parliament. Early in 2015 he and his party were forcibly ejected from Parliament by a unidentified informal “police” action when they insisted on pointing to Jacob Zuma’s corruption, and his failure to acknowledge it, submit to prosecution, or – as they demand – to “pay back the money”. Malema accuses his former political opponent, Helen Zille, of dancing like a monkey, and insists on singing the “struggle song” known as *bulal’ibhunu*, or Kill the Boer, that is, Kill the Farmer or the Afrikaner. Both Malema and Zuma accuse Musi Maimane, the current black African head of the DA of being no more than a “garden boy” to the “White elites” of the DA. Their political identities cut across and blend racial, personal, criminal, animal and other types of identities.

Malema went to trial in 2012 for “hate speech” in the special Equity Court that was originally set up to discipline whites who were suspected of being “racists”. The majority of cases, however, today are concerned with “hate speech” among all kinds of South Africans, but especially “hate speech” among other black African alleged perpetrators and victims of hate speech. Identity is not indemnified against abuse by any others, and all seem to have some animus against the other. In fact, the rapid rise of stand-up comedy in South Africa revolves frequently around the ambiguities of identity, and South Africa soap operas explore the ironies and ambiguities of racial, gender, sexual, local, political and other identities.

Visiting Malema’s hometown, Zille told a small crowd of DA supporters that:

“we will fight for your rights. Julius Malema is ... completely out of touch with his own people. He spends the night drinking Blue Label whiskey, going to sushi parties, ... but he has contempt for his voters because he thinks he can just sing a few struggle songs and mobilise people on race and they’ll keep voting for him.”

These words are all about compromised and failed identity: Malema's "own people" for whom he is alleged to have contempt, his Johnny Walker whiskey and "sushi parties" pointing to Scottish and Japanese (or White) identities that are perhaps unavailable to a poorly educated township man. Above all, Zille told Malema that his mobilisation of race is illegitimate because compromised by the past and bound to fail. Malema returns the political diatribes in equal measure. This is not any more a *racist politics* of South Africa, but it is a politics of race conducted by "White", "Black", "Coloured" and other opponents in South Africa where all identities seem to have failed in the aftermath of Apartheid. Apartheid, of course, aimed to be the identity engine of a new South Africa in which all "identities" were to be "natural", "national", and beyond cavil. Its failure was more than a failure of a political order, therefore.

Malema's hate speech trial was attended by other leaders of the ANC including Winnie Mandela, a woman whose own "struggle identity" has been deeply compromised by allegations of corruption, accusations of murder and other trials. There is another irony in this. Although the song in question contains the line "kill the Boer", and clearly references an Afrikaner and white male identity as a potential victim, Malema's supporters insist that the song today "means no harm". It is now said to be the unalienable heritage of South Africa's struggle for "freedom", a freedom still compromised by high levels of on-going lethal violence, in some cases indeed directed against white Afrikaans-speaking farmers.

A case in point is the death of Eugene Terre'blanche (his name modified from the Dutch surname "ter Blanche", "White" to a pseudo-French meaning "White earth"), a colourful advocate for Afrikaans and "White" separate identity. Before his death at the hands of two young black males, Terre'blanche was the leader of the extreme white nationalist Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging, AWB that stood for Afrikaner, or "White" hegemony, and looked nostalgically at the Apartheid past. He had been discovered naked, in his bedroom, bludgeoned to death by the two men who had admitted to the crime after being quickly apprehended. Terre'blanche's death *might have been used* to prove that Malema's song, "kill the Boer" had led to the death of Eugene on his farm. It was not used, however, because it had been reported that Terre'blanche had been having sex with the two young black males who had killed him, and that used condoms had been discovered at the scene of the crime. These allegations were quickly denied but the true identity of the whitest of White racists was unambiguously compromised.

Zille's identity is also compromised by the fact of her whiteness, but in a different way. She is learning to dance better, she says, but is proud of dancing "like a monkey" in the meantime.

IDENTITY AND THE "COCONUT ANXIETY COMPLEX"

Identities often involve complex ironies and paradoxes. One of these paradoxes is the problem that many black South Africans face as they confront themselves seemingly changed forever by the new freedoms of the 1994 constitutional republic. "Black" South Africans are universally aware of their darker skins – journalists and humourists often say "darkies" to contrast them with the "whities" – South Africans nevertheless have a wide range of colours and shades of colour. But as many black African South Africans move into the middle class, and into former White, Indian, or Coloured neighbourhoods, they feel – and

are made to feel – that they are “merely” brown on the outside, and “white” on the inside, like a coconut. This is the “coconut anxiety complex” that afflicts more than a few contemporary South Africans. The inverse case exists from white South Africans who identify strongly as Africans, and as South Africans, but whose identity is compromised by their skin. What appears to be true or observable on “outside” is contradicted by what also is held to be a deeper “truth” on the “inside”. But the “internal” African identity is contradicted – even negated – by ontological beliefs about “deep” or “shallow” Africanness. These identities, then, constitute a kind of *ontological irony*.

The variety is scarcely possible to describe; it is apparently enough to pretend to divide it into four “canonical races”: black, white, coloured, and Indian. These are the categories of Apartheid, but retain their differentiating power in twenty-first century South Africa due to affirmative action programmes, and their political usefulness. These categories are augmented by the addition of, for instance, “Chinese” and “African”, among others, that do not fit into the historical and political-administrative categories even though they have long been part of South African society. (Nineteenth-century immigrant Chinese are fully part of South African cultures and historical imagination, although recently arrived Chinese from Mainland and Taiwan are more problematic. “African” in South Africa refers to people from the rest of Africa who are not native South African. Always having been present in South Africa, some have been attacked in periodic and recent so-called *xenophobic* violence.)

The colour categories present many paradoxes and ironies of identity. Rich and poor, black and white live close together. Despite apartheid separation, while the majority of South Africans of different race categories still do not live in close proximity, the degree of integration or interaction in the workplace and schools, shopping, and entertainment is very high. It is much higher than one might encounter in the US, or in other African countries.

Because rich and poor – whether they are black or white – are in daily and often intimate contact with each other, this exacerbates issues of identity. White people recall times when their livelihoods were once ensured by the state; today, while this is still the case, many white people have slid into poverty and envy the rising wealth of the black middle classes and elites.

THE IRONY OF IDENTITY

Identity, it would seem, is fundamental to the social sciences. Without “identity”, whom do we write *about*? Can we write without identity? Isn’t identity the fundamental *quality* of what we are: Race, nation, class, tribe, language, gender, age? An identity is the answer to the question, “what *kind* of person is this?”

Ironically, identity is not necessarily the answer to the simple question “who is she/he?” We distinguish in other words between having an identity as a quality of being in a group or a category, and being an individual, a person. The irony in the question involves the fundamental distinction between the person as person and the person as part of a larger social entity. That is, there is a question of the person *asbeing*, and *being* in a society.

The issue of identity is one way of making the connection between what we call “society”, and the person, the physical entity of the actual human being.

We seem to believe independently of culture difference that persons are persons and that their personal identity may be clearly distinct from their national identity, their “racial” or any other social identity.

How do we identify “identity”? How do we know it when we see it ... or do we? Conventionally, not having an identity is a tragedy similar to death, a social death. People are often expected to, and do, fight to the death to ensure and to preserve their identity. But, increasingly in today’s world – and no doubt in the past – many people lack “an identity.” They did not feel the need to have one as such, that is, they were just people, or even “the people” – or, their identity had been “lost”, torn from them, or otherwise ruined.

Those with “ruined identity” could be called “stigmatised” according to the sociologist Erving Goffman (1963). People whose identity have been “ruined” include those with physical marks of “disgrace” – the criminal, the polluted, the ill or insane – but the term also refers to the marks of grace that marked the hands and body of the reborn Christ, and those of his followers who believed deeply enough to manifest lesions on the skin of the hands, feet and body: the *stigmata*. Whether and attribute of grace, or disgrace, the notion of stigma has come to mean to us today the signs or belief concerning a “ruined” identity, of one “reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman 1963, 3). For Goffman what was ruined was the “normal”, whole and usual identity that “society” had established.

A means of categorising persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories. Social settings establish the categories of persons likely to be encountered there. The routines of social intercourse in established settings allow us to deal with anticipated others without special attention or thought. When a stranger comes into our presence, then, first appearances are likely to enable us to anticipate his category and attributes, his “social identity” – to use a term that is better than “social status” because personal attributes such as “honesty” are involved, as well as structural ones, like “occupation” (Goffman 1963, 2).

We must pay special attention to Goffman’s introduction of the phrase “social identity” in his book *The presentation of self in everyday life* (1959). Though not the first use of the phrase, Goffman’s treatment of the “spoiled” social identity, and his work several years earlier on how persons present themselves “everyday” as having “natural” or “ordinary” identities were defining moments in the history of social science theory of “social identity”. In this passage, above, Goffman was correcting Max Weber, offering for the first time the concept of “social identity” in place of Weber’s concept of *Stände*, or “status groups”.

Goffman listed “three grossly different types of stigma”: First, what he called “abomination of the body;” second, he included in the category of “blemishes of the individual character perceived as weak will ... domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs” the stigma of “mental disorder, ... addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, suicide attempts and radical political behaviour” (Goffman 1963, 4). Some of these stigma/ *stigmata* seem surprising today, especially when the “stigma” of AIDS and HIV infection in addition to homosexuality have become such *causes célèbres*, re-imagined as positive

identities associated with political action and self-esteem rather than ruin. Goffman's notion of ruined identity, and specifically the idea of stigma as a ruined *social identity*, has had entirely unanticipated consequences. It appears that negative identities can be *negated*, and turned to positive position of honour and status. Even mental illness, in this age of pharmacological cures for epilepsy, depression and schizophrenia, among other mental illnesses, create support groups, foundations, and political action groups. Neither Weber nor Goffman could have imagined this outcome.

Goffman's focus on the self, performance of the self, and the potential for failure of the self in a ruined identity were pivotal moves for American social sciences in which the notion of identity has, since the middle of the twentieth century at least, attended far more to the emotional and interior life of the person than to the structural and institutional issues of European sociology. Goffman is concerned with impressions and "impression management". He speaks of "our minds" as if this were an automatically knowable and shared knowledge. Such assumptions seem by now out-dated, even antique, for all the value of the larger concepts that we might wish to inherit.

For Goffman, identity is "normal": an ordinary part of everyday life. For Max Weber, identity in all its various forms, was political and economic, and might not have "any objective foundation" at all (1978:389). What he called "ethnic groups", for instance, are based in a:

Subjective belief in their common essence because of similarities of physical type or customs or both ... [and] this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership ...[is] a presumed identity. (Weber 1978, 389)

Critical to Weber's concept is not "identity" understood as a subjective state of knowledge or even of moral being as for Goffman, but rather "objective" membership of groups, especially "status groups", economic groups and political groups or parties. The status groups (*Stände*) are, for Weber, "normally groups" (Weber 1978, 932) although "often of an amorphous kind". This distinguishes them from "class" and from groups formed specifically for political action, that is, parties. Their normality is what counts here for Weber, since they refer to what Weber calls "honour". Honour for Weber seems to be essentially what earlier social philosophers like Giambattista Vico and Niccolo Machiavelli called *virtù*. Honour, in this sense and according to Weber is "any quality shared by a "plurality" (Weber 1978, 932) or "within a larger group ... a special social esteem ... by virtue of their own style of life, particularly the type of vocation, "self styled" ... [or] "hereditary charisma" (Weber 1978, 306).

Against Weber and Goffman, I want to suggest that the "normal groups" that naturally confer identity, or honour and social esteem (according to Weber), are simply one type of group: natural groups that are understood as being normal, ordinary. As Goffman's analysis seems to suggest, Weber's "social esteem" that defines the group can be spoiled and disgraced. Does the status group cease to exist when this happens? Does its identity no longer matter when it is "discounted"? We know now that this is not the case.

Especially today, it is precisely being NOT-"normal", not-ordinary, or belonging to groups of low "social esteem", those stigmatised by a ruined identity, the disgraced as well as those with grace that are often the most visible and highly touted identities in our twenty-first century world.

It is these anti-identities, spoiled and disgraced, those who have run out of esteem, and the unnatural groups that are likely to “tweet” on Twitter, to post a blog on Google’s BlogSpot, or to message on the Wall in Facebook, or to go viral with a video on YouTube. The vocabulary itself – tweet, blog, go viral, and message (as a verb) is unique to this emerging moment, and points to new sources of identity, and to new ways for identity to fail, or to be spoiled and fall from grace and honour – but it also the way up to status, too.

Indeed, could we today even think of defining fundamental social categories in terms of honour and social esteem, or talk in terms of “spoiled” grace, and disgrace? I think the ground has shifted, or at least the epistemological grounds have shifted for our understanding of what identity might mean.

Does this matter? Are the grounds of identity simply being redefined with new identities emerging, or is it possible to think now of the dark side of identity, the null identity, the lost identity, the failed identity?

In our standard sociological imagination, to not have an identity is a failure. For Durkheim, it was one reason for killing yourself. Being “anomic” – literally without name – was the essence of personal failure. The anomic is antithetical to society, an anathema, literally a subject without a predicate, the negation of meaning, and incomplete proposition.

For Durkheim, *anomie* was “a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies”. In fact, it constituted the modern form of suicide in the industrial state, in contrast to egoistic and altruistic suicide. It is the results of “man’s activities lacking regulation and his consequent suffering ... *from society’s insufficient presence in individuals*” (Durkheim 1950, 258). Widowhood, divorce, and separation – what Durkheim called “conjugal anomy” (Durkheim 1950, 273) – are different from the economic condition of anomic suicide in the first instance, but they share the same immediate cause: “irritation [and] disgust” leading to “violent recriminations against life in general” (Durkheim 1950, 293). If loss of identity can lead, according to Emile Durkheim in *Le Suicide* – one of the most important foundational documents of modern sociology – then it must be very important.

In these cases, Durkheim, Weber, and Goffman, the idea of identity is fundamental to the idea of social science itself. Moreover, identity is always a positive entity, that is, it is a moral good, and experientially present and verifiable in all cases.

But, can we write ethnographies and sociologies that describe and detail the patterns of being of nothing but persons? Can we envision something so fundamental as “social structure” *without* identity? Is it necessary to have a social identity? If we can find cases in which identity is less than necessary, or where it does not constitute an “insufficient presence of society” in un-socialised persons as Durkheim believes, or a subject without social honour or esteem of the group in Weber’s sense, or even a “ruined identity” in Goffman’s words?

THE HISTORY OF IDENTITY

I will not discuss here the intellectual history of having an identity. I am not asking what are the structural conditions for “being an X”, or the consequences of being identified as an X, whether by the self or by the other. I am not concerned with the discourse of “the Other”, the notions of self and other.

Instead, I am concerned here with the conditions under which it is possible to have an identity and under which it might be possible to have no identity, or something in between. What are the conditions for failing to have “identity”, and what are the consequences – both for the person or people whose identity has failed, and for those who try to make sense of what this might mean?

Clearly identity – or at least the notion of identity – is one of the most fundamental concepts of the social sciences and history. What did Thucydides write about? Is it not the peoples of the Peloponnesus, that is, the Hellenes? Could we have had history at all without Spartans and Athenians, that is, people who knew themselves as such, who identified as Spartans and Athenians? Through wars over a thirty-year period they protected their identities and sought to extend and to augment them. Their identities were worth dying for, killing for, and were the reason beyond reason for seeking to expand, to grow to exert their “us-ness” against “them”, the other. But what if this had not happened? What if people refused identity, or if identity failed?

For Thucydides identity is, in fact, a constant problem. Thucydides began his *The History of Peloponnesian War* at the outbreak of the wars between Sparta and Athens, fought from 431 BC to 404. He began to record this history, he tells us, because he believed “it was going to be a great war and more worth writing about than any of those which had taken place in the past” [Para.1]. This was because he judged the two city states to be at the height of their powers, but also because

the rest of the Hellenic world was committed to one side or the other; ... This was the greatest disturbance in the history of the Hellenes, affecting also a large part of the non-Hellenic world, and indeed, I might say, the whole of mankind.

Clearly Thucydides understood the importance of identity in his narrative: he was an Athenian and tells us this in the first sentence. But he is also aware that the identity of the “Hellenic world” was itself an historical process. “Hellas” he tells us, only came into being after the Trojan War.

The best evidence for this can be found in Homer, who, though he was born much later than the time of the Trojan War, nowhere uses the name “Hellenic” for the whole force. Instead he keeps this name for the followers of Achilles, who came from Phthiotis, and were in fact the original Hellenes. ... He [Homer] does not even use the term “foreigners”, and this, in my [Thucydides] opinion is because in his time the Hellenes were not yet known by one name, and so marked off as something separate from the outside world. [Para. 3]

Thucydides, writing 2400 years before us, seems to have anticipated the discourse of “self” and “other” that is today so prevalent in social studies of identity. Moreover, he is fully aware of the role of the media (in this case, his own history, with Homer’s and Herodotus’s) in creating the “imagined community” of the Hellenic world that we associate so strongly with Benedict Anderson these days. His endless attention to speech, historical discourse, memory, and to their dubious pretensions to truth, pre-dates by millennia Michel Foucault’s work. Here too we find the roots of the claim that that the Peloponnesian war was of sufficient gravity to affect the “whole of mankind”, and thus to become the foundation of “the idea that Western History is the foundation of everyone else’s [history]” (Sahlins 2004, 1).

Like history from the time of Thucydides, it is inconceivable that we could have a modern social science without the notion of identity. Marx could not have imagined history the way he did without the *possibility* that the “working classes” might become aware of themselves like the Spartans and the Athenians and “affecting ... the whole of mankind”. He expected

“classes” to act for themselves, that is, to have an identity that would make them instruments of history instead of just its object. Apart from any Hegelian forms of historical process, without capitalists who knew and understood themselves to be capitalists, and workers who knew themselves *to be* and to *identify* as workers, the engine of history could not run; indeed it could not have been imagined.

But given the weight that identity carried for Marx, it is perhaps instructive that the “working class” never did become aware of itself as such, or, if acquiring this identity sometimes by force, to act on it in an appropriately responsible and political way. Historically, this pivotal identity did not materialise. The “working class” failed to identify itself from the start. This is because the economy based on a market does not allow such identities to be imagined. The failure of identity in this case is based on a confusion of categories.

First, identity is a quality that the person bears but is not identical to the person. It cannot exist without more than one person. Yet, it is not quantitative either. One is not more Chinese because there are more and more Chinese (1.3 billion in China alone), nor does the Chinese identity become clearer or stronger with their numbers, although the power of such an identity may do so. In other words, it is tied to person and to population, but is neither personal nor a quality of population. It depends on a primitive sense of number – one, or many – but is not sensitive to scale. The identity of a Bushman in a band of forty persons is equal to – no greater, no less – than the identity of any single Chinese person. The relative size of populations identified as “Bushman” or “Chinese” is irrelevant.

Identity does not seem to depend on the quality or quantity of time. With the new ANC government in South Africa, for instance, the old provinces – The Cape, the Transvaal, Natal, The Orange Free State – were dissolved. Nine new provinces were established in their place. The old flag was retired and a new one introduced. Despite the blood that had been shed and the apparent intensity of identification with the four old provinces, all based historically on previously independent states or self-sufficient colonies, all South Africans (with a negligible tiny resistance) immediately embraced the new provincial identities and the new national flag. What has appeared to be historically strong and passionate identities disappeared overnight, scarcely leaving a trace. New provincial identities – Gauteng, Limpopo, and Mpumalanga, in place of Transvaal, Cape and Natal – took their place, with passions transferred to the new provinces whose names had never been heard before in this context. This happened across race, class and other types of identities. Time, historical depth, was not an issue.

This has implications for the kinds of entities that can have identity that is, to which the quality of identity can be ascribed. In other words, it implies a social ontology.

SOUTH AFRICAN IDENTITIES

South Africa is the only country in the world with a national anthem that is sung in four languages, one after the other, with a key change in the middle of the song. This happens nowhere else in the world, and yet South Africans think nothing of it. Everyone sings other people’s languages without taking on their identity, and no one has an identity that is fierce enough to prevent them from speaking, singing or understanding the other’s languages. But the change of key between the Xhosa and Sotho lyrics and the Afrikaans and English

lyrics is a musical pointer to the “transition” to constitutional universal democracy – what is called “freedom” these days – and this makes the song indexical of the subtle waves of difference in South Africa that do not quite make an identity, but at least do not allow “identity” to destroy other potentials for social meaning and coherence. It might be said that though South Africans do not have a clear national identity – time has been far too short for that – what identity as a nation that they do possess is based in their awareness of identity and its enemies.

The struggles around identity and identities in southern Africa have produced societies that struggle constantly to define themselves, and are always in state of slow “transition” to something else. Here racial and tribal identities have been paramount, but as often as not the identities in play are failed identities. In many ways it has been the *irony of identity* that has dominated South African politics, rather than the *tragedy of identity* politics that it has seemed.

Apartheid itself was in part an effort rescue the poor white population of the Union of South Africa from Africanization. In 1949, at the beginning of the National Party government, South Africa was still a Dominion of the British Crown. The effort backfired. It had the effect of spoiling the identity of white people in Africa, creating a “stigma” of white oppression of a black majority. This has had many positive outcomes: there is a large and rapidly growing black middle class. South Africa has recently joined world politics through its domination of the African economies south of the Sahara. BRIC, the bloc of “emerging economies” of Brazil, Russia, India and China now includes South Africa, making BRICS (with and “s”). It is apparent on the ground, though not publicly remarked, that the South African economy is growing much faster than the official numbers indicate. This is because so much of it is “unobserved”, deriving from the rest of Africa, and from covert economies of all kinds. It is far more socially integrated than any politician dares admit since formal politics still attempts to play off a racial identity.

Under Apartheid, white people were encouraged to think of themselves and “European”. It attempted to make black people think of themselves as African, like Ghanaians and Tanzanians, while South Africans of Indian origins were supposed to identify with India. After the release of Mandela, South Africans actually went to Europe, India and the rest of Africa and found that they were South Africans. Their supposed “original” identities evaporated; failed.

The South African identity is identity in the ironic mode: there is always more to it than it might appear, but is never quite what it seems.

Take race for instance. Racial identity has created its opposite, the “non-racial” identity that is predicated on the negation of another historical identity. Indeed, non-racialism has been a prominent marker of identity, especially for many who could not fully identify with any of what I call the “canonical” races of South African legislation. Non-racialism implies a non-race as a racial identity, and dives deep into the heart of the ironic.

Non-race as racial identity is not simply the negation of racism as *anomie* is the negation of identity in Durkheim’s terms. It is a positive political identity predicated on the negation of the forced identification with “race”. It is the negation of a specific politics of identity rather than of identity itself. It has been the identity of the South African cosmopolitans that

has typically included so called “emerging” Black African elites, especially in the church, government or business.

In some ways this is similar to the cultural condition of the migrant from neighbouring countries. They have long histories of migration back and forth; they are not immigrants but bi-national residents, identifying with neither country, but engaging in an economic flow of people that has characterised the region for centuries. Thus, the periodic “xenophobia” is a prosaic reaction to the ironic identity of migrants who are simply mobile across boundaries and who are defined by their double non-identity. They cannot identify fully from the states like Zimbabwe and Mozambique that have forced them to flee, but they cannot shed that identity either as they fail to acquire South African identities.

IDENTITY AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES

Thus, identity exists in relation to institutional ontologies: the state (province, region, parish/county, locality) language and religion, other social organisations, status groups, political party/factions, and today, especially, corporate organisations (businesses, NGOs etc.). In fact, the concept of identity is meaningless without a social ontology that specifies an identity with respect to some institutional form or canonical group, such as Max Weber’s “status groups”, or Durkheim’s religious congregations. This amounts to an implicitly theory of how humans form relationships with each other and how these might (or must) be visualised theoretically. This is what we call the the Durkheim-Weber concept of ‘the social’: a limited ontology that specifically does not include the social forms or ontologies that do not implicitly entail identity, such as

- the market
- the population
- the network

These social forms imply ontologies in which “identity” is not defined or definable.

In markets, only some abstract identities are possible. It is only possible to be an actor in a market and, theoretically, only a rational actor. For instance, the market for sex is excluded from standard textbook notions of markets not because it is not a market, but because since it is held that sexual choices are not “rational”. In other words, it is believed that one cannot rationally choose to enter the sexual market – that is, the market for sex – in a rational manner, or with rational motives. Nevertheless, many do in fact enter the market for sex with sexual motives and make relatively rational choices. A market for sex cannot be contemplated, then, not because it is not a market, but because the identities in such a market are “all too human”. A market actor is a fiction and exchangeable, ultimately for any other, or any other type of person who can act “rationally” with respect to monetary values. But sex requires identity of persons. It cannot be a market in the terms by which we define “market”. It belongs to a different ontological reality, a different worldview.

There can be only functional actors in a market – especially since these are now understood in mathematical terms – not “identities” as these are normally conceived. A mathematical term signifying a “rational” actor cannot have gender, or desire, or be named “Bob”. The producer creates supply with the worker, and the “owner of capital” finances these

activities. But these identities are functional and exist only in terms of the market ontology. That is, they only have existence if the market exists, and the market is only ontologically real if all believe that it is. These are functional identities, not meaningful identities, and differ significantly from self-indexing, personal identities such as “Czech”, “African”, “European”, “Catholic”, “Muslim”, “woman”, “homosexual”, and so on. Some of these identities depend on embodied or bodily markers such as skin colour, circumcision, or type of sexual act (nowadays assumed to be a physical property of the body, not merely an “act” of sex), or other physical marker, but all depend on social consensus that these identities exist, that is, that they are ontologically real.

Population, on the other hand, are specifically defined to exclude personal identity. The members of a population are just that; nothing more or less. According to ethical social science methodologies, a population (or “sample”) consists of anonymous persons who specifically have no identity. This is more than a “failed identity”. The element of a population exists only with reference to a statistical method and a “data base” or register of its members who are elements or items and necessarily equivalent. The sum of members of a population constitutes a “mass”, as in “the popular masses”. A social ontology that postulates “class positions” for members of “masses” have meaning only according to their functional position in a social ontology that postulates economies composed of classes. Such persons exist, that is, have ontological reality, as undifferentiated elements of sets/populations: but identity is not defined because it is conceptually meaningless. There are no “great men” or even persons with identity in Marxian or Foucaultian theory, for instance. These powerful conceptual frameworks lead to significant category errors. For instance, a mass or population has “characteristics” or is defined by its “data”, but it cannot act, and therefore cannot have “power”. This is the problem with Foucault’s abstract notions of power or “bio-power” that is diffused through a “population” is a simple misconception of the ontology of population, or, at best, an unwarranted extension of a metaphor. Such misapprehensions of the ontological status of social forms is common in many theoretical systems, and is often responsible for their appeal since they necessarily present conundrums, that is, problems that cannot be solved but appear to be solvable. These are sociological problems that guarantee failure, but are especially seductive because they also guarantee open-ended discussions.

Networks are different again. Social networks are open-ended collections of relations, rather than sets of people who share an identity. In a social network, such as a criminal drug distribution network, or a “snow-ball” sample in social research, each member of the network shares only enough knowledge of others to accomplish the function that is at issue such as purchasing a drug, or being recruited into a study. Local identities are possible with respect to specific current transaction, but beyond the “network’s horizon” knowledge is extremely difficult to obtain with a rapidly rising marginal cost of transaction to obtain it beyond the first or second degree. Thus we may know our “friends” in a network, and perhaps “friends of friends” (first degree network connections) but it is unlikely that we will know friends of friends of friends (that is, second degree connections in the network). This is why it is so effective in criminal, sexual, or spy networks. The attempt to trace persons in networks is precise the challenge of popular detective novels and TV series from *Sherlock Holmes* to *The Wire* and *CSI: Miami*. Each element has no identity relative to others in the network, even though they are all involved – in theory, and from some imaginary point of view – in the same network. Attempts to trace infection by the HIV virus or Ebola face the same difficulty.

Markets, social networks, and populations, therefore, are ontological real to their members and participants, but are not social forms in which “identity” can exist. A class “identity” in other words, is always a “failed identity” since its underlying ontology is a social form in which identities are necessarily functional rather than meaningful or political.

THE SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES

The social ontologies that we construct, according to the social theorists such as J. R. Searle, Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckman assume the Durkheimian social as “total social fact”, but lacked a theory of the nature of the realities that they proposed. John Searle, for instance, remarks that

... the great philosopher-sociologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, especially Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim ... lacked an adequate theory of speech acts, of performatives, of intentionality, of collection intentionality, of rule-governed behaviour, etc. (Searle 1995, xii)

The “constructivist” ontologies of the social are too limited in scope. We have distinguished here at least four separate ontological “types” in social theory. These appear largely incommensurable since the ontological status of these social forms is never fully developed or understood:

- Institutions
- Networks
- Populations
- Markets

Identities are defined with reference to only one of these, the “institution” as this is conceived and theorised by our standard (Marxian-Weberian-Durkheimian) social theory. As a member, citizen, or subject of institutional forms for power, it is reasonable to believe that a person has an identity. This is also true of primordialist or “religious” identities, but like the state, these social forms are organised in ways that are either formal institutions, or parallel the formal institution sufficient closely (for instance, the Muslim *umma*, “community of the Islamic faithful”) to make identity meaningful.

This is not the case for an actor in a network, the “organism” in a population, or the functional “rational” actor/transactor in a market. Members, actors, transactors, and organisms all imply different ontologies of the person who is an element of one of these ontologically distinct sets of social relations.

The great classic sociologists encountered problems that derived from their inadequate ontologies. Durkheim’s problem with *anomie*, for instance, had to do with “not enough society” in the person, in other words the personal was not sufficiently named (that is “without name” > /a/ “without” + /nom-/, “name”). The opposite of the anomic is the nominal, that is, the category that can be named and that therefore has identity. The condition of *anomie* is loss of category, the uncategorisable and therefore not identifiable, lacking an identity. Durkheim’s problem then is a problem of the ontology of the person as either “named” or “without name” and therefore without existence in the sui generis social fact that, by definition, constituted reality as “the social”.

When Durkheim identified two categories of anomie that he called the “conjugal” and the “modern”, he did so within an ontology that postulated “society” as uniquely real. He took marriage to be a part of this natural reality, *sui generis*, as he said. Conjugal anomie was the loss of the natural state of marriage which he was able to demonstrate was much more beneficial to men, at the cost of a small loss of freedom of (male) lust. (He like most of his contemporaries in Europe assumed that lust was primarily male). The loss of the conjugal was not just the loss of sex and affection – that can be satisfied, in theory and sometime in practice through promiscuity and the market for sex – but rather the loss of the *category* of marriage as a named and formal institutionalisation of love and property in the household. Marriage creates households, while also giving sexual access and legitimation, as well as – for the lucky ones – love. But it is the household not marriage *per se* that distinguishes marriage from promiscuity, not the fact of sex or anything else. (This was a frequently made mistake, as much in the nineteenth century as in our century and the last).

“Modern” anomie for Durkheim, on the other hand, is the loss of category through merging of the personal with the modern market in which the person – with or without “sufficient” society inside them – is lost to the specific activity of trade, commodity forms of interaction and transactions involving pure value. Here only the functionality of the person as trader or transactor is important. Modern anomie, then, is the loss of categorical identity to the functionality of the market.

Identity takes on different characteristics, or even none at all, depending on the nature of the social model that is selected.

A similar argument can be made for “populations” that are composed of masses or aggregates of elements. These elements can be persons in what we call the “human population”, but they are persons only in a biological sense, that is, they do not and cannot carry social identity since social identity is not a biological property. In fact, to the extent that we might consider the elements of the aggregate as having identity, the less they become populations, and the more they become institutions (families, ethnic groups, or tribes, for instance). This notion of “the mass” as primary ontological object is what makes the work of the terrorist, the brutal dictator, or the genocidal “leader” possible. It is the “mass” of people of some kind or other conceived as “population” that must be eliminated, suppressed or contained. But the population is also essential to biological methods including what has been called the gold standard of biomedical research, the randomised controlled trial. This does not mean that the demagogue intent on genocide is equivalent to the pharmaceutical global corporation testing its drugs, but only that they are both compelled to think of populations as aggregates of biological elements, not as collections of persons with identity. Under this ontological vision, the person with identity does not exist. The “failure” of identity is essential, definitional.

Markets are involved in transformations and transactions of value, or with things that are valuable, that carry value (money), or that are treated *as if* they are valuable for any [potentially] arbitrary cultural choice. As such, the identity of the transactors takes second place to the attributes of what they trade or exchange, and the values in terms of which they do this. A trader may have a name, but this has no function in the market transaction as such. For instance, computers today carry out many trades, and as such they have no identity; they merely have a place in a network of computers that is signified by a number (although this is simply a name signified by a set of numbers). While their nominal network name

may act in some cases like an identity – called a URL, or IP address – it is merely a place in a functional space that can be represented mathematically as purely logical functions.

The social network is a set of relations, specifically relations between persons. The *relation* is primary, not the person. Thus a “son” or a father is a “relation”. It does not matter that the son’s name is “Bob” and the father’s name is “Carl”, but only that they stand in relation to each other as father and son. People of any name, any category, and any institutional role or position can stand to each other as father and son. Thus Bob might be the father and Carl the son. They each have identity relative to one another and to the network or ideal concept of the kin network, but not in general. Thus not all Bobs are fathers, nor sons, nor all sons named Bob or Carl. It does not matter to the network that we call this “kinship”. The same is true of any other kind of network whether this is a criminal network, a sexual network, a secret trade network, or a terrorist network. The identity is in many cases inimical to the functionality of the network.

The institution – or what I call here an *institution* more or less as Max Weber defined it – possesses above all social members with social identity; an institution is identifiable, and confers identity. The “status” of Weber’s “status groups” is the status of institutional position while the “social” in Goffman’s “social identity” is like Durkheim’s non-anomic person who is “full of society.” The institution confers categorical identity and is itself a category, not a population, market or network. To confuse an institution with the population, the market, or the network is to commit a specific kind of category error.

The general relation of these social ontologies can be presented in a table form.

FAILED IDENTITIES

There are failed identities, that is identities that are “tried on” or “tried out” and that do not achieve the social integration, benefits, spiritual sense of well-being, or cultural sense of belonging, or access, that was expected. Or that others have achieved with the same identity.

Table 1. Characteristics of Institutions, Networks, Markets, and Populations compared.

Conceptual Structure	Grammatical, semantic, meaningful;	Functional, & mathematical function spaces;
Identity Relation	randomness concept has no meaning	randomness is meaningful
Value relations as transformations & transactions involving value	SOCIAL NETWORKS	MARKETS
Identifiable (and countable) social mass with attributes; categorisable	INSTITUTIONS	POPULATIONS

In South Africa, for instance, the “Africa” identity has been particularly problematic in this regard. The same has been true for the “European”. The “national” identity, and the Nationalist, as in National(ist) Party, the party of Apartheid, is similarly compromised by the fact that today, there are scarcely any “nationalist” Afrikaners left, and those that wish to ascribe to an Afrikaans identity based on language and history, no longer see this as a “national” identity but rather as an “ethnic” or regional African identity.

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The “Oriental”, Orientalists, and Orientalism – as identities and as political agendas – have once more been brought into prominence with the failed outcomes of the “Arab Spring”. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (Döring and Stein 2012; Said 1979; Said and Barsamian 2010) comments on the construction of orientalism by Western powers, but now looks extremely dated and naïve as Muslim extremists such as Da’esh or Al Qaeda create, quite deliberately, an “oriental” identity and an *Orientalism* specifically with reference to an imagined past of the Caliphate, with reference to the literature of the *Hadith*, the *sharia*’ and the *Quran*, and, above all, specifically as an *opposition* to their image of “The West”. If Edward Said’s orientalism had not existed, it seems the “orientals” would have to invent it. Orientalism is always cited in this respect, and scarcely a paper can be written on identity, colonialism can be written without citing this work at least (as I have done here), as well as Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Community* (Anderson 1983). The imagined community of the oriental, and “their” identity, that of the “Other” then, is what is at issue time and again. “The West” is supposed to be responsible for “Orientalism”, an erroneous reification and imagined identification of the “oriental” as archetypal “other”, the mirror image, the mindless and slavish mob, fanatical of religious belief and supine in the face of comically-dressed satraps and dictators. Is this useful? Isn’t ironic that it is Colonel Gadaffi came closest to embodying in this stereotype since the fall of the Ottomans while Assad in what remains of Syria embodies the banality of pure brutality that has become fully endemic. Current events in North Africa and the Middle East seem to show that no one is quite as committed to the Orientalist vision as some of the Orientals themselves, while Orientalism flourishes in both the Orient and the West. These are “failed” identities because they seem to be entirely theatrical, unmoored from the actual past, and, however extreme, appear to be either fantasy or merely ordinary.

Ironically, the “East” is now largely south of an expanded Europe. Europe has gone so far East as to include countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and Turkey, while considering for membership countries even further East in, for instance the failing state of Ukraine. “The East”, meanwhile spread west across North Africa long ago. The geographical designators East and West are as fantastical as the political “Left” and “Right” while the North-South dichotomy has emerged with much more force. Brazil, India and China are now “South” to the fabled “North”, while South Africa – the only country here with an actual compass bearing in its name – wishes vehemently for inclusion in “the South” as the “versus” to the West.

If these are not yet failed identities they are at least dubious identities, and in some cases fantastically ridiculous identities. The “East-West”, “North-South”, “Left-Right” dichotomies need to be given safe passage to exile as they will not serve the community of minds that seek to understand – as we do – what is going on behind the media hype and political self-justification. But how then can we compare and contrast the new identities that are emerging, the old ones that die, and the ones for which we simply have no names, lacking even a vague concept to characterise them?

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Toward a Philosophy of African History: Communality as a Foundation of Africa's Socio-Cultural Tradition

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ABSTRACT:

The principle of communality is denoted as the ability of the originally and essentially communal worldview, consciousness, behavioral pattern, socio-political norms and relations to spread on all the levels of societal complexity including, though in modified or sometimes even corrupted form, sociologically supra- and non-communal. As a pivotal socio-cultural foundation, the principle of communality has a direct impact on all subsystems of the African society at all the levels of its being throughout its whole history. Precisely this is what can explain to a large extent the originality of African culture. In the embodiment of the principle of communality it can also make sense to seek the roots of specificity of the historical process in sub-Saharan Africa.

KEYWORDS:

Sub-Saharan Africa; African history; African culture; African society; African worldview; African tradition; Communality

In the article below, we conceptualize the socio-cultural tradition as a durable modus of life in a society or related societies in all its manifold manifestations, institutionalized and non-institutionalized. It accumulates all-sided specificity of a culture and can serve as a triking example of inseparability of societal subsystems that form a seamless socio-cultural fabric. The tradition is not static. Its mutability and continuity are reflected both in culture and society. In fact, it will be misleading if we carry over to the academic language the common-sense understanding of tradition as something unchangeable, given long ago once and for all, as complete opposite of innovation. In reality, tradition presupposes continuity, which is possible only as a consequent chain of absorbable changes within the tradition's broad general framework. What was an innovation yesterday, has become a part of tradition today, if it has not contradicted sharply the culture's basic foundations. For example, the Chinese colorful plastic bowls have already replaced local handmade calabashes even in distant African villages and have become an inalienable attribute of common people's everyday homecare. However, the African evidence proves that if we really observe development of an existing

culture and not formation of a new one from the old, the culture's foundations (and hence those of its tradition) remain there notwithstanding all changes, including some much more important than the one noted above. Due to either internal evolution or transformations triggered by outside, the culture can acquire new forms in all its spheres, but these forms retain the essential continuity of those preceding them. As Melville Herskovits, a founding father of African Studies in the USA, wrote, "[b]ecause it is a cardinal tenet of scientific method that all relevant factors must be taken into account, the cultural base from which change has come and the place of established tradition in shaping responses to innovation will therefore have to be given full consideration" (Herskovits 1962, 7).

Herskovits seems to be the first prominent scholar who based his conception of African socio-cultural history on the idea of a specific single cultural tradition of the sub-Saharan part of the continent that had continuity both in time and in space, as he argued that this tradition was not lost but, on the contrary, was preserved by, and determined the group cultural identity of, the Black people in the Americas (see e.g. Herskovits 1941; Herskovits 1962).¹ Yet, is it actually lawful to speak about an "African socio-cultural tradition", given the fact that Africa has always been a whole mosaic of societies with their distinctive cultures? We are sure that yes, if a proper scale of analysis is chosen. The valid "unit of measurement" of, for example, political tradition as an integral part and aspect of the more inclusive socio-cultural tradition can well vary depending on the scale of analysis relevant for the task of research. The variety can be significant: from "the human political tradition" (Storey 2006, 21, 43) to that of a separate people (e.g. Anyanwu and Aguwa 1993; Walzer et al. 2003–2006) or even a part of a state (e.g. Howard 1981; Lauck et al. 2011). The logic of our reasoning suggests that it is possible to postulate the presence of an African tradition to the degree to which "the African culture" is real. Indeed, if we compare different African cultures of any historical period, we will no doubt see significant differences between them. Nonetheless, we will definitely also see important similarities that can give us good reason to cluster them geographically at several levels, in particular: of a single polity (if we deal with as a rule multicultural and multiethnic precolonial kingdoms, colonial or postcolonial states), regional (for example, by opposing West African to East African cultures, those of Western Sudan to the cultures of the Congo river basin, cultures of the savannah to cultures of the tropical forest zone, and so forth), and, eventually, at the level of sub-Saharan Africa as a single culture area distinctive from the rest of the world (see e.g. Sow et al. 1977; Ogot 1985; Bondarenko 1997b; Bondarenko et al. 2010).² As the Nigerian anthropologist Simon Ajayi formulates it in an elegantly simple way, "'African Culture' refers to the distinctive cultural elements in Africa that do not exist among the British or the Chinese" (Ajayi 2005, 36).

During the colonial period, the idea of reality of the single African culture served as a background for such powerful theories/ideologies of the time as pan-Africanism (mainly in the British colonies) and Négritude (spread predominantly in the French possessions), each of which became the basis of a tradition in academic research. Nowadays, the idea of the African culture plays the same role for the cultural ideology of Afrocentrism and the

1 It is worth noting that the debate between those who believe that the African origin of Blacks in the New World society is central to their identity and outlook and those who deny this proposition is still going on (see Okpewho et al. 2001; Gershenhorn 2004; Rucker 2005; Rucker 2010; Palmer 2006, 53, 97–98; Jamison 2008, 100–102).

2 The scholar who stood at the origin of socio-cultural zoning of sub-Saharan Africa was Leo Frobenius (1898; see also Frobenius 1923; Frobenius 1933), though his imbued with mysticism constructions are far from the modern understanding of the scientific.

tradition of academic writing that is forming on its basis (e.g. Asante 1990; Asante 2003; Asante 2007; see also Howe 1999, 230–239; Reinhardt 2008; Fenderson 2010; for another, and probably more purely academic, powerful postcolonial substantiation of the idea of the African culture see Sow et al. 1977). In particular, all these theories/ideologies sought to establish a strong link between Africans and black people in the Americas. Thus, they argued that the African culture had been carried across the Atlantic by black slaves and then became, and despite everything always remained, common for all those who trace their origin to Africa. Noteworthy, many prominent thinkers of that trend (in particular, Edward Blyden, William Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Aimé Césaire, Molefi Asante) were born outside Africa – in the USA or on the Caribbean islands.

Some scholars talk of not only “the African culture” but also “the African civilization”, trying this way to give the concept of the African culture a dynamic dimension and to express the idea of its continuity throughout history from Antiquity to the present. An especially strong and distinctive tradition of such an approach has formed in the Francophone literature under the direct influence of the philosophers, poets and Négritude ideologists Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire. In particular, the famous Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop “was the first African with a university degree to support the idea of unity and antiquity of the African civilization” (Vaillant 2006, 294, n. 1; see Diop, Ch. A. 1955; Diop, Ch. A. 1967; Bâ 1995). From probably less ideologically-biased angles, the African civilization is also an object of research for Africanists of other intellectual and academic traditions (Bondarenko 1997b; Fyle 1999–2001; Ajayi, S. A. 2005; Nikitin 2005; Lebedeva and Khoros 2006). What these authors usually want to emphasize, is that sub-Saharan Africa is not just a space on which cultures share some fundamental features but is an area of a historically and socio-culturally specific pathway of transformations in all spheres and of development in general. At the same time, Africanists write both about local (separate “high cultures”) and regional “African civilizations” (e.g., Maquet 1972; Kobishchanov 1985; Onwuejeogwu et al. 2000; Connah 2001; Ehret 2002; Lye 2002). Naturally, the interrelation between the notions of “the African civilization” and “African civilizations” is exactly the same as between “the African culture” and “African cultures”. An analogy suggests itself: we do not hesitate to use such notions as “the French (English, Spanish, etc.) culture” and “the European culture”, “European (or “Western”) civilization” both in everyday speech and academic texts without thinking about any contradiction between them. Indeed, there is no contradiction at all: the choice of a notion depends on what we want to stress in a particular case – differences or similarities between the cultures of Europe. In other words, what matters is our level of generalization, the scale of analysis at the moment. As we have already emphasized, each of the abovementioned levels may be a lawful level of analysis if it is adequate to the task of a particular research.

The question of the temporal scope of the study is equally important. As emphasized at the beginning of this article, the cultural tradition is not static, its variability and volatility reflect continuity and succession over time in culture and society. Thus, we would like to stress once again the need to take into account the historical dynamics of the African culture. In particular, there is a long-lasting (actually, from the first decade of most African states’ independence [Ajayi, J. F. A. 1969]) discussion on the place of the colonial period in the continent’s millennia history, one of the trends in which is to consider it as in fact, nothing more than an “episode” (Herbst 2000; for a review of the discussion see Austin 2010, 13–15). From the perspective of the present research, however, colonialism was

an important and specific stage of African history. Just under colonial regimes the impact of another (European) civilization became an intrinsic and internal factor of African societies' transformations.³ As a result, that was the colonial partition of the continent during which the colonizers redrew radically its preceding political, cultural, and socio-economic map, what eventually, in the course and after decolonization, gave rise to most present-day African states and nations with all their specificity. As for the current historical moment of intensive globalization, internal and external factors of transformations are basically intertwined to the extent when that separation in the analysis becomes artificial and even counterproductive.

So, while different bases can be chosen for the African history's periodization, for the purposes of this article, its division into the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods seems justified and meaningful. The first of the three was that of internal factors' domination in the formation and development of the African culture and tradition. The second period was characterized by interiorization of the previous external influence and this becoming a prime mover of many developments of the time, while those of the current era are determined by actual inseparability of the internal and external factors that drive the newest developments in all the spheres of African societies and cultures.

Definitely, in its entirety Africa, which caught the great travelers of the 15th–19th centuries, is really a thing of the past. However, those tourists and not only, disenchanted at the sight of cars, newspapers and computers in Africa and thinking that “there is no genuine Africa any more”, are wrong. Notwithstanding all the immense changes throughout history, including those of the colonial and postcolonial times, today the cultures of Africa still preserve their identity and, in their essence, remain precisely *African* cultures. This means that beyond the visible novelties, they are still based on the fundamentals, characteristic of them since olden times. Indeed, we are sure that many problems the Dark Continent faces nowadays are rooted just in this fact, as far as these foundations have proved to be compatible insufficiently with the demands of the Modern and Contemporary world, in which Africa was once dragged forcibly and which was at first dominated by industrial, and today is dominated by postindustrial, cultures. Nevertheless, due to these very socio-cultural foundations Africa has remained Africa and has not become a “branch” of Europe despite its direct and in many cases and respects strong influence during the colonial period (for detail see e.g. Bondarenko 1995b; Bondarenko 2005).

What we regard as the most basic common constant foundation of the overwhelming majority of historical and contemporary sub-Saharan African societies and cultures (and hence of the African socio-cultural tradition), is the principle of communality. In our opinion, its meaning is the ability of the historically and essentially communal worldview, consciousness, pattern of behavior, socio-political norms and relations to spread to all levels of societal organization, including supra- and non-communal. Thus, communality follows from, but is by no means reduced to, the fact that the local community has always – from the earliest days of history to the present – remained the basic institution in Africa, the core of social life, which has also determined the specificity of African authentic worldview and spirituality.

3 In the pre-colonial time, not only European but also Arab influence on African societies remained external in most cases: only on the Indian Ocean coast and the adjacent islands a synthetic Afro-Arabian culture – the Swahili culture – formed (Zhukov 1983; Hurreiz 1985; Allen, J. V. 1993; Horton and Middleton 2000; Middleton 2004). The early Portuguese possessions in the continent's South, West and Cape Colony are the only other notable case of interiorization of initially external influence before the second half of the 19th century in sub-Saharan Africa.

Historically and still today, communities in Africa demonstrate a great variety of types and forms, from small kin-based bands to extended family to territorial (or neighbor) communities. The extended family community – the one composed of a number of extended families, in their turn divided into households, is the most widespread community type, as it is adequate to the manual (hoe) slash-and-burn agriculture, which has long been the basis for the economy of the majority of African peoples. The extended family demonstrates a combination of kin and territorial ties by definition (Olderogge 1975), and the situation, naturally, is even more complex at the level of extended family communities. A line between their two kinds can be drawn. The first variant is represented by communities of the Nigerian Bini, peoples of the Central Cameroon, and the Shona of Zimbabwe, among others (Bradbury 1973; McCulloch et al. 1954, 160; Ksenofontova 1970). There extended families within a community preserve kinship ties, and thus these ties dominate in the community as a whole. The second variant is that in which extended families within a community do not hold kinship relations with each other (as, for instance, among the Bambara and the Songhay of the Western Sudan [Paque 1954, 53–54; Rouch 1954, 43]). In such a situation territorial ties predominate over kin at the community level. This means that in the sociological sense, the principle of communality is not equal to that of kinship, although it is inherent for the African culture to formulate and express the relations of different sorts, including political, in terms of kinship (Diop, 1958–1959, 16; Armstrong 1960, 38; see also Kaberry 1959, 373; Tardits 1980, 753–754; Tymowski 1985, 187–188; Ray 1991, 205; Skalník 1996, 92; Bondarenko 2006, 103).⁴

Long heated debates⁵ have finally established as dominant the view that the community was the first fundamental form of human social organization all over the world, characteristic of most types of preindustrial societies, beginning with those of foragers (e.g. Murdock and Wilson 1972; Kabo 1986; Butinov 2000, 75–93). In Africa, the community has survived all the historical periods. In the precolonial time, the socio-political evolution, reflected first of all in the formation and development of the complex society⁶ in most of

4 The phenomenon of “shipmates” seems to be hardly not the most striking confirmation of this. In the time of slave trade, the Africans brought to the New World on the same ship used to begin consider each other and behave towards each other as relatives (siblings, parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren), while the ship’s name became the common name for all the pseudo-kin unit members (Dridzo 1995; Mustakeem 2007; Popov 2009). Nowadays, the fictive kinship relationships can be established between the Africans who, escaping from “hot spots”, have lived in the same refugee camp for a long time (Swigart 2001, 6, 16).

5 Particularly, on the history of those debates in the British functionalist and structuralist social anthropology and in the Soviet ethnography see Bromley 1981, 181–185; Nikishenkov 1986, 133–139; Girenko 2000; Reshetov 2000; Artemova 2009, 102–109. While in the West those debates were an outcome of the change of the dominant theoretical paradigm from unilinear evolutionism to functionalism and structuralism by the 1920s, in the USSR they were initiated in the late 1960s – early 1970s by several scholars who tried to overcome theoretical inertia which was a result of canonization of the ideas of Lewis Henry Morgan due to their high estimation by Engels and Marx (as it is known, Morgan [1877] postulated that not the community but the clan was the first and most fundamental social institution in prestate societies). For the present author’s advocating the community’s primacy in the latest discussions triggered by the attempts (generally, we are sure, much desirable and successful) to expand the theoretical potential of Anthropology and Archaeology through the integration of a world-system approach in the West, and to eradicate evolutionism (what, we believe, is a wrong intention) in post-Soviet Russia, see Bondarenko 2006, 111–112; Bondarenko 2010, 150–152).

6 Anthropologists and archaeologists, especially of the evolutionist schools of theoretical thought, call “complex” the societies in which more than one level of socio-political integration is observed. When preindustrial cultures are concerned, the societies designated as complex are those that comprise more than one local community under one authority. The societies that do not have supracommunity levels of socio-political integration, i.e., consist of one and only community being in fact equal to it, are called “simple”.

the continent mainly during the second part of the first – first half of the second millennia CE, did not result in undermining its basic socio-cultural role. On the contrary, most often the community served as the “matrix” for the socio-political institutions that arose above it (Bondarenko 1995c; Bondarenko 2004; Bondarenko 2012; Bondarenko 2013).

The community was not destroyed by the much more rapid and abrupt changes during the period of colonialism, either. In particular, almost all the colonizers’ attempts to impose unrestricted – permitting its sale – private ownership of land (which, as world history tells, leads to the community’s destruction [see Bondarenko 2006, 71–72]) failed. The only exception was the introduction of the “mailo”⁷ system in Buganda (Balezin 1986, 118) – the core of the British protectorate of Uganda, which undoubtedly became possible because, uniquely for sub-Saharan Africa, yet in the precolonial Buganda Kingdom, the prerequisites for the emergence of private property, including land ownership, had been maturing (Mukwaya 1953). In general, the Africans did not know private property in the politico-economic sense. In the meantime, they believed that the land belonged to the ancestors. Due to that, the Africans were sure in their specific, but not proprietary, relations with the land: the people and the land were perceived as in essence non-alienable from each other, as far as the living formed an indissoluble unity with the spirits of their ancestors. In the final analysis, the existence of community turned to be part and parcel of the colonial society without which large colonial exploitation could not actually be effective or maybe even possible, at least to such a degree (Meillassoux 1991).

Today, over half a century after most African countries’ independence, notwithstanding the increased migration to cities, the majority of the continent’s population still remains rural, agriculturalist, and hence communal. Co-existence of the community and the state is among the most typical and important features of the socio-political composition of many contemporary African countries. The state, at least in its present form, appeared there due not to the long-lasting internal socio-political processes but as a result of imposing and implantation in the late 19th–20th centuries. Hence, what can be observed is precisely the community and the state’s co-existence rather than organic co-evolution.

The community’s decay is interconnected with the process of the wider society’s transition to capitalism (see e.g. Kamen 2000, 126–137). Hence, on the one hand, the continuing existence of the community alongside modern economic, social, political, and cultural elements testifies to internal eclecticism of the contemporary African societies which should be interpreted as an important outcome of violation of their self-development due to the European colonization. On the other hand, Africa has retained its socio-cultural identity up to this day exactly because the community still exists as the basic institution which predetermines communality as a fundamental principle embodied not only inside, but also outside the community as a certain social institution – in the broader, complex society. The indestructibility of the community throughout African history with all its perturbations shows that today it is not a throwback, a relic of the past, but the most vivid and significant expression of the deep general essence of the African civilization as communalist: let us repeat that communality as a socio-cultural foundation, though follows from, is not reduced to the fact of temporal and spatial universality of the institution of community in Africa south of the Sahara. In brief, communality can be called a basic principle of private

7 A corruption of the English word “mile”: the size of the plots given away as private property was calculated in square miles.

and public life in African society; a tenet that organizes the society in all its spheres and at all levels, including those far beyond the community.

Communality is not equal to collectivism. This is directly related to the fact that in most types of communities spread in Africa a combination of the rights of a community as a whole and a separate family on the same means of production, especially arable land, is observed. Characteristically, all attempts to base a postcolonial society on the ideas of “African socialism” failed. One of the major reasons for this was that at all the diversity of these ideas in the treatment of different ideologists (Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, the Guinean Sékou Touré, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and others), their key tenet remained the same: the African peasant, a member of the community and the main inhabitant of the country, is ostensibly “socialist at heart”, as the Russian Narodniks of the 1860s–1870s, those African leaders’ intellectual predecessors (Khoros 1973), used to call the members of peasant communities in their own country (Brockway 1963, 18–36; Mohiddin 1981, 65–94; Metz 1982, 380–384; Idahosa 2005, 2236–2237). Thus, those ideologists tended to ignore the dualistic nature of the community overemphasizing its collectivistic side and underestimating individualistic. As soon as the peasant was deprived by the state of incentives to work for the benefit of him/herself and his/her own family, agriculture, the basis of national economy, fell into a severe crisis, which in its turn, contributed a lot to the general crisis of the socio-political system. For example, in Tanzania the newly formed villages (*ujamaas*) proved economically ineffective already less than a decade after the social experiment began – by the second half of the 1970s (Lofchie 1978; Coulson 1979, 158–172; Freyhold 1979; Hydén 1980, 119–123; see also *inter alia* recent works of Tanzanian researchers: Mwakikagile 2006, 61–80; Mkenda 2010; Shivji 2010).

Naturally, the African “modal personality”⁸ is compatible with the communal social reality in which it has formed. Not a separate person but the society is seen as “the measure of all things”, while similarity of all, and hence of everyone to everyone, is seen as the principle of the Universe’s existence (Bondarenko 1997a; Sledzevski 2006). This means that in people’s minds, the society’s problems, needs, and possibilities are not a sum of those of its separate members, but determined by the communal collectivity as a whole. This is so because the communal world outlook is sociocentric, which means that people perceive their society as the most important element of the Universe (compare with Ancient and Modern European anthropocentrism or medieval theocentrism). Sociocentrism of the world outlook is explained by the belief that namely the ancestors and/or deities of this people have created the Universe and, hence, its fortunes are dependent on their will. But their will, good or bad, is a reaction to their descendants’ conduct, either proper or not.⁹

8 “[D]efined as those character traits that occur with the highest frequency in a social group and are therefore the most representative of its culture” (Haviland et al. 2010, 143) and “referring to central tendencies in the personalities of members of a society that are not necessarily shared by all” (Wedenoja 2006, 1359). The term was introduced by Cora Du Bois (1944) who, however, put a too biologized meaning in it (see Fogelson 2006, 1603).

9 Correspondingly, sociocentric cultures do not know abstract humanism as recognition of human life and dignity’s high value *per se*: the value differs greatly depending on who they are: good-natured members of their society, or either criminals or strangers. The former have high value as those vitally important for all the given society members’ prosperity and actually the whole Universe’s further being, as far as the proper behavior of the descendants pacifies the ancestors and inclines them to confer benefits to the whole society and allow the whole world to persist. Besides, and also in relation with the fundamental inextricable connection between the living and the ancestors, each member of the society occupies a specific place in its web of kinship ties and can extend this main common wealth in such a society by begetting children.

In a sociocentric culture anyone's being is really important, but possible only in the collectivity of people. Respectively, ethics – problems of good and evil – becomes a function of not a person but the society. In such a society, there is nothing about what its member could say: "This is my own business". For example, one cannot consider as a completely personal matter whether to beget children or not: it is important for the whole community to widen the kin net and to be sure that the individual will have descendents to take care of him as an ancestor spirit when he dies. So, not begetting children is regarded as an essentially social act – as failure to perform public duties. Traditionally, childless people became social outcasts, they were feared and despised at the same time (see, for instance, among the Bini: Bradbury 1965, 97–98). Characteristically, this attitude has still not changed. For example, in many African cultures of the postcolonial time the childless are still regarded as witches and sorcerers, and not buried on community cemeteries or buried but without full funerary ritual (Fortes 1978; Ademola 1982; Ebin 1982; Silva 2009; Noret 2010).

However, the individual is not "offset" or "dissolved" in the collectivity but has a clear value in itself, contrary to the conviction spread among Europeans since the time of the first travelers to sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰ This stemmed from the idea of uniqueness of everyone's place, his/her indispensability in the Universe and in the communal collectivity as the Universe's central point, as precisely this person is a relative of these or those community members, a descendant of certain ancestors. The ancestor cult lies at the very heart of traditional African religion and world outlook; it is the primer of the authentic African picture of the Universe (e.g. Fortes 1965; Bondarenko 1996; Grinker et al. 2010, 283–322). The outstanding early student of African cultures Percy Amaury Talbot emphasized long ago that "[n]o one can hope to appreciate the thoughts and feelings of the black man who does not realise that to him the dead are not dead but living, in full command of all their faculties, including memory, and endowed with greater abilities and powers than when on earth" (Talbot 1926, II, 298). Today, ancestor worship co-exists quite easily with Christianity and Islam in the forms of syncretism or dual religiosity all over sub-Saharan Africa.

The ancestor cult dictates that what is most important is to preserve proper relations with the ancestors who can either bless their descendents with all the good or ruin the whole Universe. Thus, the patterns of behavior that have already proved their safety in terms of the

Criminals and strangers are not attributed high value due to the fact of belonging to the human race. Criminals lose it, as their anti-social behavior is a threat not only to those directly against whom they committed the crimes, but first of all to the general welfare: their misconduct can influence negatively the ancestors' attitude to the living. Strangers do not have high value by definition: "others" cannot be as valuable as "we" are because, contrary to ours, their ancestors did not participate in the creation of the Universe, and hence their descendents cannot influence crucially its fortune. Characteristically, till the moment when the exogenous (European and Arab) slave trade corrupted the moral foundations of the African societies involved in it as human commodity suppliers, in the overwhelming majority of cases, only criminals and strangers, particularly captives of war, could be enslaved by force and sold legally (Park 2000, 256–263; Fage and Tordoff 2002, 267; Perbi 2004, 28–68; Bonislowski 2007, 353–354; Lovejoy 2011). It is also not by chance that adoption, that is integration into the local system of kinship relations and hence linking to the societies' ancestors, was regarded as the natural, if not the only, way of obtaining the status of the recipient society members by strangers in the authentic African culture.

¹⁰ In academic works, with respect to non-modern societies, this "common wisdom" was conceptualized particularly by Émile Durkheim in "Individual and Collective Representations" (1953), first published in 1898. In philosophy and ideology, this view was articulated, for example, by Karl Marx (see Overing 1992). Joanna Overing (1992, 32–33) is completely right in her statement about the roots of the academic and philosophic problem of collectivism and individualism of "the primitive Other": "The very opposition of the priority of the collectivity and the priority of the individual is characteristic of Western thinkers and is of fundamental importance for understanding of the political legacy of the West. In brief, at the heart of these contradictions are rather our own estimates than objective differences between 'modern' and 'premodern'".

ancestors' reaction, i.e. those followed from generation to generation, are always definitely preferred to any new ones; the novelty as such is seen as something risky and hence, *a priori* undesirable. As the dynamics of life is perceived as cyclic, in which everything new is actually a repetition of old,¹¹ society is focused on the simple socio-economic and cultural reproduction of itself (thus giving to the community and the principle of communality additional durability and significance), while behavior of one its member is seen as inevitably affecting all, as ancestors are regarded as simultaneously personal (of that ancestor's direct descendants) and collective (of the whole community). Hence, each and everyone is responsible for maintaining of the vitally necessary fragile universal balance between the living and the ancestors. The individual's role in what we call "history" seems to be very big, as far as the myth, the predominant form of how it is perceived in an authentic African society, allows voluntarism by making changes in it while telling. So, the myth gives faith in the possibility to change the past by an effort (and in this sense, in reality, myth opposes history). At the same time, not only all the community members as individuals but also the community as a whole is liable to the ancestors who are also perceived as simultaneously individuals and, more importantly, a collectivity – the host of ancestors. In the final analysis, communality demands concerted action to maintain the universal balance and mutual responsibility for the correctness of conduct (Bondarenko 1994; Bondarenko 1996; Bondarenko 1997a). The principle of communality, in whatever it is manifested – religion, politics, social or economic relations, is based on the interplay of the individual and the collective, and the interests of the latter, though do not suppress those of the former, are regarded as superior in relation to them (Sow et al. 1977, 158–161).

Contrary to the Modern European ideas, in the authentic African culture, to be a personality meant not to manifest individuality, difference from other members of society but to consciously be like they. Only this way the African got and felt his/her indispensability and uniqueness. The individual's exclusivity was seen in the uniqueness of his/her not qualities and traits but social role and position. The collectivity, which in the Africans' minds included both the living and their ancestors, was perceived in the communal notions and categories. Its priority over the individual, thus, was grounds for existence of the community as the overarching fundamentals of African societies at all times. Like any individual could have access to a plot of land only as a member of the community, a person could be socially full and substantial exceptionally as a worthy, in a sense typical, part of the communal collectivity either. The principle of communality dictates the imperative to align themselves with other members of the collectivity and to act not contrary to, but within the standard model of behavior. Only basing on the recognition of superiority and primacy of the collectivity over the individual, an African could realize him/herself as a personality, only in the collectivity he/she could feel truly free.

Indeed, communality as a socio-cultural principle is directly related to the fact that community in a great variety of types and forms has remained the essential, fundamental social institution throughout the whole of African history. But communality is wider than community in the sense that, as a principle of social life organization and a basis

11 For example, in African cultures, even the birth of a baby is seen not as a completely new event but as a reincarnation of an ancestor in the baby's image. So, the newborn is not a "completely newly-born" but someone who was born, lived and died before, and is now beginning the traffic on the same circle of life again. The main task of the relatives and other co-communalists of the baby during the first days of his or her life is to find out which of the ancestors has returned to life in the material form. Usually, special diviners are invited to solve the problem (and also to foretell the newborn's fortune). On their decision the name the baby will be given often depends (Bockie 1993, 129–130; Ephirim-Donkor 1997, 38; Nel 2007, 136–148).

of culture, it can well manifest itself in complex societies, far beyond the community, that is when the community served either as a true matrix for a complex society's building or as at least an ideological metaphor, a pillar for its construction (Bondarenko 2008, 26–30). In fact, communality became a fundamental socio-cultural principle exactly because it turned out able to surpass the community. Essential communalism of the African culture found significant manifestations in the supra- and non-community contexts. It found them both in the precolonial period and during colonial and post-colonial times, when completely new, unrelated to the community institutions were imposed. Let us remind that above the principle of communality as a socio-cultural foundation was defined as the ability of the originally and essentially communal socio-political norms and relations, worldview, consciousness, behavioral pattern to spread on all the levels of societal complexity including, though in modified or sometimes even corrupted form, sociologically supra- and non-communal.

The African city is a very good example of the aforementioned. Sometimes the African civilization is called “rural” or “village” (e.g. Huynh 1986, 117; Sadous 1986, 80; Ranger 1997, 277), which is basically wrong (Bondarenko 1995a, 283; Şaul 1998, 543). There were at least three areas in sub-Saharan Africa in which numerous cities flourished long before many more appeared in the colonial time all over the continent: the Western Sudan, Upper Guinea, and the Indian Ocean Coast (Lvova 1988; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1993; Anderson and Rathbone 2000; Connah 2001). However, “African precolonial cities had a distinctly agrarian character with a majority of the male population commuting regularly to farms a couple of miles away from the town. In such cities, quite a bit of farming occurred in any available space within the city” (Fyle 1999–2001, I, 109–110). Respectively, socially, those cities were intricate compositions of a considerable number of communities similar to rural, each of which usually occupied a ward in the city. Thus, the precolonial African city was not separated from the village, but quite the opposite, it preserved economic, social, and cultural continuity with it. The city and the village equally were unthinkable without the community, and together they formed the self-consistent socio-economic and socio-historical fabrics of the precolonial African culture (Bondarenko 1995d). It is correct to call the sub-Saharan African civilization not “rural” or “village” but “communal”.

Colonialism promoted erosion of the communal social composition of the “old”, “traditional”, cities by introducing industry and stimulating intensive migration there from the countryside. It also gave birth to a great number of “new” cities, especially big cities, predominantly non-communal in their social basis (and non-agricultural economically) from the very beginning. These tendencies further strengthened in the time of independence. Nevertheless, the principle of communality remained in the socially transformed old, and penetrated into new cities, finding various manifestations; sometimes positive for the society, sometimes negative. For example, most migrants to the city, especially recent, send remittances to their native settlements, many of them try to go there for holidays and other proper occasions. Besides that, we will mention just two of those many striking manifestations of communality in the city, the present author has observed personally in a dozen African states. These manifestations differ considerably from each other, and thus indicate the scope of possible differences.

On the one hand, in the biggest cities which attract migrants from actually all over the respective countries, like Accra, Cotonou, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, Luanda or Lusaka, there are mutual aid associations of the same region natives and their descendants. Significantly, these associations are really regional, not ethnic: for example in Dar es Salaam, people

from the same multiethnic region join the same association, irrespective of their ethnicities. Even if people from the same region do not form distinctive city neighborhoods but live dispersed, they tend to communicate and co-operate with each other (see also Ivanchenko 2012; Ivanchenko 2014, 38–42).

On the other hand, there are neighborhoods in the cities which inhabitants, despite differences in regional and ethnic origin or religion, regard themselves as forming not a random group of neighbors but rather a specific social unit. Contrary to the first example, in this case people do not strive to preserve their “pre-city-dweller” identity in the new socio-cultural environment, but *vice versa*, adapt the modern city realities to their basically communal consciousness. Furthermore, they “tear” the social space of the city by drawing a thick line between “them” and “others” – all those who live in other neighborhoods. They regard their neighborhood as “only theirs” and believe they have every right to regulate all the relations in it, including the “mode of stay” and “rules of conduct” of strangers, be it a foreigner or a resident of another block, often including representatives of the city authorities and even policemen. There are such neighborhoods in big cities of Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa, other countries, but probably most well-known are those of Lagos in Nigeria, controlled by the notorious “area boys” gangs (Momoh 2000; Momoh 2003).¹²

So, as a pivotal socio-cultural foundation, the principle of communality has a direct impact on all subsystems and at all levels of the African society throughout its whole history up to present. In our opinion, precisely this is what to a large extent explains the specificity of African culture, African civilization. Therefore the embodiment of the principle of communality is where it makes sense to seek the roots of the peculiarity of the historical process in sub-Saharan Africa.

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12 The Nigerian novelist and Lagos native Dolapo Ajakaiye writes about her heroine: “She was raised in Lagos Island, a Cosmopolitan city. To survive in Lagos, you must not only know your rights, but must constantly ask for it and be street-wise” (Ajakaiye 2011, 9). A local businessmen working in the fastfood sector tells: “... if you build anything on Lagos Island, you have to pay ‘area boys’, even if your generator develops fault and you want to repair it, you must settle them because they claim they are the owners of the land” (Ogbor 2009, 357). The present author had a problem with area boys when he took a picture of the hippodrome in the very center of the city: the boys argued aggressively he was to ask for their permission to take pictures in “their” area.

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A Flâneur and Ethnographer in Their Home City: The Krakow of Bronisław Malinowski and Feliks Gross. Remarks of a Historian of Anthropology

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ABSTRACT:

The paper discusses the beginnings of anthropologists' interest in the city, using the examples of Bronisław Malinowski and his student and collaborator Feliks Gross, who both came from Krakow. Malinowski's entries in his diaries suggest a modernist figure of a flâneur, an urban spectator, as depicted by Walter Benjamin. The figure has very much in common with an ethnographer, and they are both versions of the male adventurous explorer. Gross can be seen as a pioneer of urban anthropology because of his fieldwork in the Jewish district of Krakow, which he started in the late 1930s, but could not complete because of the outbreak of World War II. He later used the experiences and knowledge he acquired from it in his theoretical writings. Malinowski's and Gross's home city, walked in a flâneurian way, had thus been a testing ground for their future ethnographies and theories.

KEYWORDS:

Bronisław Malinowski; Feliks Gross; Urban anthropology; Literary anthropology; Krakow

Classical anthropology used to focus predominantly on rural areas of traditional societies. For anthropologists, urban spaces were places they rather had to leave in order to carry out their legitimate fieldwork. Thus early ethnographies rarely described cities, and one can label them anthropological “non-places”, to use Marc Augé's term (Augé 2008). They did not have much significance for the discipline. Often the only chance to learn about them is to read anthropologists' personal documents and correspondence, as well as their non-academic literary output, written “with the other hand” (Kubica 2013).

Walter Benjamin created the modernist figure of a flâneur, an urban spectator, an investigator of the city, and at the same time a symbol of alienation both of the city and of capitalism (Benjamin 2002). The figure has been interpreted in various ways. One of these interpretations is especially important here, as it refers to anthropology, gendered spaces and Bronisław Malinowski. It was performed by the anthropologist Henrika Donner, who pointed to his

well-known role as someone who had changed the image of an anthropologist from a collector of data sitting on the verandah of a colonial house to a male fieldworker, who became an explorer of an unfamiliar and public terrains. In her opinion, though, there is more to it, and the modern fieldworker can be perceived as a similar figure to an urban flâneur, embodying the masculinist paradigm of modernity: “a proactive stranger-observer free from domestic responsibilities, equally at home in the village on the island as in the city at the street corner”. According to Donner, there are more characteristics shared by the flâneur and the ethnographer: a distinctly academic mindset; involvement in observing, collecting and recounting; a sense of adventure and inquisitiveness; reflections upon the surroundings; voluntary cosmopolitanism of urban middle-class consciousness; and finally they also share “a reflexive mode of thinking about themselves and the world and that encounter and the tropes of traveling and comment are built into their common vocabulary” (Donner 2012, 173). Thus both the flâneur and the ethnographer can be seen as two versions of the powerful image of a male adventurous explorer at the same time engaged and distanced from the world around.

The way anthropologists describe the city can expose this double role, or rather a common trait underlying the two roles. To show this, let me refer to Krakow and two Cracovians – Bronisław Malinowski and Feliks Gross. Both men reflected on their home city: one in his diaries and other personal documents, and the other in his project of early urban anthropology, which was not completed but made him think about his home city in a more ethnographic way.

I hoped to be able to find some interesting insights concerning Krakow in Bronisław Malinowski’s diaries and letters to present him as a flâneur in his home city. I remembered that in his *Dziennik w ścisłym znaczeniu tego wyrazu* (Malinowski 2002),¹ which I edited, he often referred to Krakow (and the geographical index of the volume can prove it). Unfortunately, this was not really the case. It seems that Malinowski treated his home city as a container for his personal memories, or an address of his experiences, but still we can find him there as a flâneur, perhaps less eloquent than we would wish.

Let me cite one passage. This comes from the time, in 1912, when Malinowski had a long stay in Zakopane after his studies at the London School of Economics. He came to Krakow with Żenia Zielińska, his lover: a painter and a married woman (one of the protagonists of my book *Siostry Malinowskiego* [Kubica 2006]): “In Krakow we leave things; we go to the Hotel Royal No. 69 – Then along Grodzka to the Market Square and cafe. There, looking through newspapers; I feel how it would be good to be with her in all situations of life. We return along Grodzka. Poetry of a quiet sleeping town; strangely warm and mild air. We sit down and talk. The electric lamp on the floor. Moments of fatigue and sleep. Then the strong tides of feelings. So until morning. I go to bed to my room. I go to be shaved. – Ż. is a little negatively disposed to me. (...) I go to the hairdresser then via Planty to Mały Rynek, through the gate to Bilewskis, where I buy a brush and a clip, then a tram back. Ż. already almost completely ready (...). We walk the same path; recourse against Jewish batmen on the pavement. Then, via Mały Rynek, Mariacki Square (the watch yard of the Bursa) we go to Michalik’s [cafe], where we look at caricatures and say a lot of tender things. From Michalik’s to Siemek; then passing the Grand [hotel] to the church of St Mark, via Reformacka Street, Szczepański square, Planty, to St Ann Street, yards, then Jagiellońska

1 Malinowski wrote his diaries in Polish between 1906 and 1918. The full and comprehensive Polish edition is much more extensive than the English translation, *A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term* (1989).

Street, Planty; Smoleńsk Street, Felicjanek Street (house of Tichy) along the Vistula River to the Wawel Castle” (Malinowski 2002, 214).

The next time, he came to Krakow with another lover, Karola Zagórska, and later with Otolia Retingerowa. The references to the city were very similar. Here, it is just the scene of his intimate relations, and the landscape of his former life. He shows it to his lovers. It is a kind of a guided tour. He is no longer a citizen of Krakow, but Krakow is still his home town. For instance, he shows “podwórze Bursy” on Mały Rynek, the courtyard of the university dormitory, of which his father had been a provost, and in which his family had an apartment for several years. The building is situated on Mały Rynek Square, next to the church of St Barbara. It used to belong to the Jesuits, and after the delegalisation of the order the premises were given to the Jagiellonian University and a student dormitory was established there. (The building later returned to the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church.)

Other points on the guided tours are not that meaningful: just a nice walk on the medieval Krakow streets and a modern element: the newly built house of Karol Tichy, a Krakow painter. With Karola Zagórska, Malinowski also went to Kazimierz, the Jewish quarter; not, though, to admire synagogues, but mainly to see the monumental church of St Catherine. They also went to the Franciscan church to admire the stained-glass windows designed by Stanisław Wyspiański (Malinowski 2002, 285).

Later, during his fieldwork in New Guinea he dreamt about Krakow several times, and he came back to the time of his childhood when he learnt about his mother’s death: “Every small detail reminds me of Mother – my suits and my linen which she marked. (...) Memories: Krakow, boarding school,² and Warsaw. I think (...) about going back to Poland, meeting Auntie, Mrs. Boronska, Mrs. Witkowska. My time at the gymnasium; I recall Szarlowski and other teachers, but Sz. most vividly of all. Planty [public gardens in Krakow], morning moods, going back home. At times I see Mother still alive, in a soft gray hat and a grey dress, or in a house dress, or in a black dress, with a round black hat” (Malinowski 1989, 297). Thus again, the city was just a landscape of his childhood and later memories that connected him to his mother.

He rarely referred to his home city in his letters to Elsie Masson, his fiancée, which he wrote from the Trobriands. In one of them again he planned his imaginary erotic tour, this time with her: “I went for a walk at sunset as usual. I thought first of my return South ...then my thoughts wandered further back, to my schooldays in Krakow. I tried to remember the exact mental atmosphere of the white washed room with brown benches; the faces and physiognomies of my school fellows – many have grown so dim. And the history of my life then. I had a vision of us two visiting the III Gimnazjum in Krakow and my showing you all the spots of my youth. ...I return now always to my young days – it is the thought of my Mother that draws me back” (Wayne 1995, 166).

The only longer narration concerning Krakow can be found in a letter to Elsie, then his wife, which he wrote during his last visit to his home city when he got rid of his old things. “The moist autumnal air already had this particular smell and feeling which in olden days meant return to Krakow from vacations, long evening walks on the plantations [the Planty Park which rings central Krakow]. (...) We [together with his cousin Mancia Kobylińska]

2 This should be a dormitory, not a boarding school. This is a mistake of the translator, who did not know the context of the diaries well.

drove through the lonely silent streets – again a well-known experience full of so many old memories.” The next morning, “It was sunny and beautiful but rather cold – I felt quite chilly without overcoat. First I looked up the Academy of Science where I found appointments from Nitsch and Rozwadowski, then to the University – I found Krakow much cleaner and more beautiful – but very stinky still. I think it was as much my better health as anything else, but I liked both Vienna and Krakow better than on my previous post-war visits. I wish you could see it in autumn when everybody is in town – I mean people who matter. At the Univ. I saw first Nitsch and a few others. Then we (Mancia and I) went to Władysławowa [former servant] and after a few handkisses (she still kisses my hands) we went up to the strych (Dachboden) and began sorting papers etc. (...) With all this I did not have much time left for amusement or sightseeing. (...) Chwistek – whom we met in the street and ordered to meet him at a cafe in the evening. Then to a restaurant for dinner (food is either really better now in Poland or my appetite improved!) and (...) I went alone to the Grand Hotel Cafe where I met (by arrangement) Rozwadowski, Nitsch, Bystroń (the anthropologist who got the chair in lieu of me) and Chwistek. (...) Then Chwistek and I walked together and had another sitting where we gossiped and reminisced and boasted dreadfully as in olden days – Chwistek obviously does not like now Staś Witkiewicz and talks about him nastily.” The next day: subsequent visits, and the following: “I went with Chwistek to the Gimnasium where I went to school and where he now teaches. It gave quite an impression”. He got rid of furniture (distributing it among family members and the former servant), and his father’s books (donating them to the university). “Then to lunch, then to the Piwkos for the final selling of the piano, to Władysławowa to give her \$100 and say goodbye, for a short walk to St Mary’s church, and to the station. (...) My own sweetheart – I thought of you all the time in Krakow – mixed with memories of our visit and with ghost-like, dream-like memories of the Past” (letter of 9th October 1926; Wayne 1996 II, 79–81).

In his scholarly works, Malinowski referred to his home city only once, in the often cited “Dedication to James Frazer” from 1925: “If I had the power of evoking the past, I should like to lead you back some twenty years to an old Slavonic university town – I mean the town of Krakow, the ancient capital of Poland and the seat of the oldest university in eastern Europe. I could then show you a student leaving the medieval college buildings, obviously in some distress of mind, hugging, however, under his arm, as the only solace of his troubles, three green volumes with the well-known golden imprint, a beautiful conventionalized design of mistletoe – the symbol of *The Golden Bough*”. (Malinowski 1948, 93–94).

And this is all one can find about Krakow in Malinowski’s writings. No deeper reflection about his home city – just the obvious, taken for granted locus of his experiences. At the time, he was sharpening his ethnographic skills on other topics, and at the early stage of his career he never really turned his literary abilities to his own milieu: the city. But the flâneur pose is evident in this material. Strolling through Krakow is an important activity for him; it is certainly not only about dealing with business, but also observing and admiring, judging aesthetically and fulfilling his masculinity by walking with his subsequent (and sometimes overlapping) lady friends.

Michael Young, Malinowski’s biographer, found among his papers a very interesting document, a draft – or rather a synopsis of the introduction – to a textbook he was to write for an American publisher in the early 1930s. The provisional title read: “The A.B.C. of Culture: A Text-Book of Comparative Anthropology and Sociology”. Part of the introduction, called “Culture as Personal Experience”, consisted of facts about his own childhood

that were relevant to his later career as an anthropologist. He wrote about his living in two different worlds then: a Carpathian village with peasants and the city of Krakow: “When I was eight we returned more or less permanently to the town (...). In Krakow we lived in an old stone building, a property of the University. It was a shabby-genteel existence, withal a truly cultured world not without dignity and heroism (see J. Conrad’s recollection). We belonged to the dispossessed, impoverished small Polish nobility, shading into the *inteligencja*. (...) By the time I was eight I had lived in two fully distinct cultural worlds, speaking two languages, eating two different kinds of food, using two sets of table manners, observing two sets of reticences and delicacies, enjoying two sets of amusements. I also learned two sets of religious views, beliefs and practices, and was exposed to two sets of morality and sexual mores (see Sex and Repression)” (Young 2004, 15–16, MPLSE Culture 1/139).

It is a pity that Malinowski did not write the book. It would be very interesting to learn how he would have described Krakow. Judging from this draft, he would have focused on the sociological and cultural side of the city, on class differences and various lifestyles. There would also be a chance that his flâneurism could be articulated more and find its way into the written text.

Nonetheless, he took Krakow with him, not only in his memories but also in his habitus. A certain young compatriot, who met him in the late 1930s, later remembered: “he was a real Krakauer, no professorial moods, but Cracovian sentiments, a sense of humour; he was nasty in an intelligent way” (Bator and Łukasiewicz 2000).

This young compatriot, Feliks Gross (1906–2006), was a Cracovian lawyer who came from a renowned assimilated Jewish family. His father was a member of the Austrian Reichsrat in Vienna. Feliks became a socialist activist interested in sociology and anthropology, who was preparing for an academic career. This turned out to be impossible because of the growing wave of anti-Semitism in Europe. Gross became a student and collaborator of his Cracovian compatriot, then a London professor, Bronisław Malinowski, who advised him to conduct a “survey of the ghetto”, the Jewish district in their hometown, and to teach a course on “Social anthropology of the urban societies of East Central Europe” at the London School of Economics to overcome his problems. The research progressed promisingly, but was halted by the outbreak of the Second World War. The lectures were announced in the LSE Calendar for 1939/40, but for the same reason never delivered. Gross managed to escape from Krakow during the German invasion and went to Vilna, where he tried to continue his research working with YIVO (the Institute of Jewish Research). He finally arrived safely in the USA, where he met his mentor and later started his academic career (Kubica 2007).

While preparing his research and lectures, Gross became acquainted with recent developments in social sciences concerning urban studies (most likely following the advice of Malinowski), especially the Chicago school of sociology. The main characteristic of this was a “willingness to allow social research and social practice to inform one another”, as Chicago sociologists “were consistently animated by a high-minded reformist impulse” (Bidwell, 1992, 11–12), incited by the contemporary social and economic problems of rapidly growing American cities. Another feature which is relevant here is the affinity of Chicago sociology to anthropology. Robert E. Park suggested that although the life and culture of the city are more subtle and complicated than those of primitive societies, Little Italy in Chicago or Greenwich Village in New York City may be studied with anthropological methods of insightful observation, because the set of fundamental issues is similar

(Park et al. 1925). Gross also read the classic of community studies, the Lynds' *Middletown*. They modelled their analysis on the anthropological study of primitive societies by William H. R. Rivers. The closeness of these approaches to anthropology was remarkable.

Especially important was the essay *Urbanism as a Way of Life* by the Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth (1938). He proposed a theory about the influences of urban life on social organisation and attitudes, arguing that urban life is characterised by impersonal and instrumental contacts, which tend to free individuals from the strong control of primary groups, especially the extended family. This freedom of individual action, however, is accompanied by the loss of collective security. Another important contribution of Wirth was his book *The Ghetto*, where it is described as an institution, which "represents a prolonged case of social isolation" and is "not so much a physical fact as it is a state of mind" (Wirth 1926, 4). This approach is also traceable in Gross's research.³

Moreover, Malinowski was sympathetic to the Mass Observation movement,⁴ and contributed to a volume that summarised the first year of the project. He openly stated there that it was his deepest concern that anthropology should have to come to the point of studying one's own societies with the same methods and the same mental attitude that was the case with exotic tribes (Malinowski 1938b). Jeremy MacClancy points out that Malinowski, unlike other British anthropologists, "gave a qualified welcome to the new organization. (...) For by informing citizens about the nature of their own society, it held the promise of countering the increasing threat of totalitarianism, which seemed to thrive on ignorance" (MacClancy 1995, 504; see also MacClancy 2013). This was the political value of the anthropology at home of which Malinowski had spoken repeatedly. Thus the engaged character of urban studies had been an important element from the very beginning, also in the case of anthropology. Malinowski compared the sociological seminar Gross carried out among workers in Krakow to the format of Mass Observation.⁵

Let me recall Feliks Gross's research, which was one of the first cases of anthropological fieldwork carried out in Europe in the Malinowskian tradition and in the format of urban studies. I was able to learn about the Cracovian project by consulting the correspondence between Malinowski and Gross, as well as other archive material (see Kubica 2014).

As for the theoretical framework of his research, Gross wanted to "do the whole thing functionally" and to "present culture as a whole that 'hums' – to use a drivers' phrase". It was a very apt metaphor: culture as a humming engine. Its different parts were united and worked together. Culture was regarded as a comprehensive and integral unit. Gross wrote that "all this medieval system, such an enclave, functions as if in an engine with elements of modern culture, which again live their own life, their idea".⁶ Other problems Gross wanted to

3 Though I was able to find the following critical remarks on the copy of the book from Gross's private library: "The historical part – Europe is interesting. On American ghetto – on Chicago ghetto – utterly trivial, non-interesting. Chicago material – Wirth's work – extremely dull. No understanding of issue of drama – no distinction between relevant and irrelevant facts, no skill in proper selection of facts. Extremely poor – at least up to [page] 187. On American ghetto reads like minutes of a joint stock company. Still the story of Am. Jews must be interesting best chapter XIV. [The sociological significance of the ghetto]. F.G." (copy of the 1956 edition of *The Ghetto* held at the Library of the Institute of American and Polonia Studies, Jagiellonian University).

4 See the site: <http://www.massobs.org.uk/index.htm>.

5 A letter from Malinowski to Gross, 4. December 1937, Malinowski Papers (further MP), Sterling Memorial.

6 Gross to Malinowski, 14. June 1939, MP SML.

explore were: “the function of a ghetto for Jews, the petrification of religion, pervasion and reception of new currents, and their unification together with an antique religious culture into one whole, ‘a clash of cultures.’”⁷ He also pointed out two other issues: the ghetto as a closed milieu, and its pragmatic relation to the outside world. Gross called his research a “functional survey of the ghetto”, which might suggest that it was to be theoretically informed by Malinowski’s functionalism and methodologically by Chicago sociology, as the term “survey” suggests.

How did Gross describe the Krakow ghetto? In his letters he wrote to his mentor with the agitation of a discoverer: “I have already been to the field – wonderful types. One of the chapters [of the future book] will be entitled ‘Types of Szeroka street’, There I will give a cross-section of professional types of the ghetto. e.g. the ‘sofer’, who is a scribe of scrolls, the bible. He writes the bible by hand, because only a bible written by hand is scrolls and has liturgical value. If he is wrong once in writing, he cannot continue, he has to start from the beginning. This is an occupation which has remained unchanged for hundreds of years, and passes from father to son. There are more such ‘benedictine’, unknown occupations.”⁸ In another letter Gross wrote: “You, Professor, splendidly felt there would be treasures for us there. I have already managed to get some friends in the field. (...) Next to the sofer-benedictine, cheerful anyway, who is stuck in a petrified culture, I encountered the whole schools, as if ‘religious parties’. These are adherents of individual Rabbis-sages, coming together in ‘stiebles’ [shtiebels] (something between a synagogue and a club, a fraternity) and are involved in heated discussions.”⁹

In his memoirs Gross added some more ethnographic texture. He described his visits to an ancient inn called Pod Krzyżykiem (i.e. “under the small cross”): “Here came Jews and gentiles, craftsmen, small traders, students (...) who loved those old places. All the time talk on politics – international politics – went on with passion. This was a place, where a poor *Handele* a street buyer and vendor of old clothing felt at home and enjoyed the same respect as any doctor. I had great sympathy for those *Handeles*. So many made fun of them, while they went from yard to yard crying *Handele, Handele, Handele* in Jewish, ‘Trading, Trading, Trading’ and we all knew that it means buying, selling old clothing. (...) On one of the ancient streets (...) was an hassidic *Shool* [shul] or synagogue, in an old town house. A part of it was just a large room with a table. Around the table sat Jews of various professions – tailors, craftsmen, *handeles* – discussing and interpreting the scriptures and Talmud, and sometimes, in a commentary “Arist” was mentioned, no one else but Aristotle. An old rabbi, or an elder was at the head of the table leading those unusual scholarly discussions and interpretations of texts.

Here the *Handele*, pushed around and laughed at, had his dignity and respect for he was a learned man, as the other, his leisure work and sense of life altogether were here in the *Shool* [shul], in those evening meetings. Though his fare – potatoes, herring and similar was far less than plentiful, he gained here the sense of his life. Further down the same streets, tailors were working in their modest workshops. They went to synagogue, twice or three times daily – and had to live close to it. They would not take a better paid job in a distance from their *Shool* [shul]” (Gross 1992, 22).

7 Gross to Malinowski, 29. September 1938, MP SML.

8 Ibidem.

9 Letters from Gross to Malinowski of 29. September 1938 and 14. June 1939, MP SML.

It is worth noting that Gross's *Cicerone* to Kazimierz was Karol Estreicher, an art historian, the author of an important guide to Krakow (Estreicher 1931), and the son of Stanisław Estreicher, a professor of law, politician, and Gross's mentor, who helped Malinowski greatly in publication of his first, Polish book, *Wierzenia pierwotne i formy ustroju społecznego* [Primitive Beliefs and the Forms of Social Organization]. Gross wrote about his visits to Kazimierz with his friend: "this was our world, Karol's and mine, our perception of history, romance and adventure (...) I had – like Karol – a love for this old city, and decided to write a cultural-anthropological study of the old Jewish Section" (Gross 1992). In this passage one can see two flâneurs, male explorers of the exotic urban landscape, who would later change into an ethnographer who would write a scholarly monograph of the ghetto, and an art historian who used his academic knowledge and interest in the urban locus to write a serious tourist guide.

Gross returned to the topic of his home city twenty years later in his book *World Politics and Tension Areas* (published in 1966), using the case of Krakow to illustrate one of his models of "Interethnic Relations and Tensions". One chapter of the book was called: "A ultiple Ethnic Pattern. Ethnic and Religious Relations in Krakow". Gross pointed out that ethnic relations in the city at the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century were of special importance, because there were several diametrically different patterns, not complementary, but often contradictory: "They corresponded to various levels and degrees of acculturation; to different political and ideological orientations; and, in many cases, to different social and economic relations" (Gross 1966, 133).

Gross described the city of Krakow as inhabited mainly by Roman Catholics and Jews and by a small number of Protestants. The Jewish population formed a complex subculture of many degrees of acculturation. He also pointed to the fact that ethnic and religious divisions were "complicated by the class structure, and by a variety of political orientations that contributed to their diversity" (Gross 1966, 19). He identified two extremes: Orthodox Jewish groups (own specific culture, strong self-segregation, and neutrality toward outsiders), and Polish-Catholic nationalists (self-segregation, hostility toward other groups). Between them there were many Polish Catholics and Jews who were integrated, and other Polish and Jewish groups which favoured cultural autonomy (Gross 1966, 133).

Gross wrote that this had changed during periods of intensified hostilities like the one following World War I, when the extremists, especially right-wing student organisations, were active in the city and influenced the inhabitants. On the other side were Polish groups and parties which opposed anti-Semitic actions, but they were not very effective.

The author gives a historical overview of the Jewish minority in the ancient Polish Kingdom and during Austrian rule. Furthermore, it is especially important and interesting to note that he shows the geographical aspect of this, which he calls – as a title of one of the sub-chapters says – "Ecology of an ethnic pattern: the Orthodox; self-segregation". The Orthodox Jews lived in Kazimierz, they spoke Yiddish, but also knew Polish, German and Hebrew. They "represented a distinct culture rooted in ancient and strong values as well as stable institutions. There was little if any tendency toward change and acculturation with other ethnic groups. The Orthodox had their own class structure. At the top was prosperous merchant, at the bottom, the pious beggar. (...) Life was not easy, and few were wealthy. The tailor or the cobbler who worked on the Jewish street earned far less than his Christian counterpart who worked in the well-established shops of the midtown. However the Orthodox worker, like the Orthodox merchant, had no desire to move out of the Jewish section.

He did not advocate integration with other groups nor any change in his customs and religion” (Gross 1966, 137). Orthodox craftsmen did not want to move because they had to be close to their synagogue and shul. For them wealth was not important; what mattered were piety and learning. “This was a socially introverted group,” Gross wrote, “little concerned with the doings of the outside world. For them the Christian town consisted of out groups; some friendly, some hostile. They had no desire to establish closer ties with those of a different religion” (Gross 1966, 137). Their energies were socially “introverted” and they created a self-segregated community.

Gross also describes what he calls *The transitional area: the “secular”*. The territory between Kazimierz and the centre of Krakow developed in the second half of the 19th century. It was inhabited by the Jewish middle class: merchants and small entrepreneurs. A section of the secular Jewish population also lived here. It was a similar case in another district, Podgórze. Gross noted that secular Jews varied in their political and ethnic orientation, listing the left-wing Bund, Democratic Party (and Jewish Independents), as well as the Zionist movement. The Bund advocated the development and preservation of the Jewish culture and language, developing a programme of cultural pluralism and autonomy. The Jewish intelligentsia before World War I was in favour of the Democratic Party and saw Poles as neighbours and friends. This attitude was reciprocated by the Polish intelligentsia, though there were also anti-Semitic sentiments.

To write the chapter Feliks Gross used various sources of knowledge: historical works, his own and his father’s experiences as political activists, and also information he had collected during his fieldwork and earlier while strolling through Kazimierz with Karol Estreicher.

Gross also theorised about the city in his article entitled “Remarks about Dress, Customs and Symbols”, which was published in 1969 in the Polish émigré journal *Tematy*. Here, one can find some remarks about cities in the context of religion, especially rituals. Gross’s main thesis is that “totalitarian movements have found fertile ground in Catholic countries and countries of ‘marginal’ Protestantism, rather Lutheran, than Calvinist, coloured with nationalism, as in Germany, and at the same time in countries with militaristic traditions and centralized institutions” (Gross 2002, 295–296).

Gross argues that Catholicism is a religion of ritual and liturgy, which play a significant role in it. Ceremonies group thousands of people in one place, like a square or great cathedrals. Protestant churches are generally modest, and radical Protestant congregations rather small. There are no complicated rituals or processions. “The very architecture of cities reflects not only the social structure of inhabitants and their economic activity, but also their cultural needs, system of values, aesthetics, custom, religious character. The architecture of the cities which were predominantly Catholic created great cathedrals built for mass celebrations, huge squares – for religious, as well as folk, political demonstrations.” (Gross 2002, 298) Here he gives the example of St Peter’s Square in Rome. But he could also invoke Krakow’s Market Square, one of the largest squares in Europe.

He then writes that an individual together with thousands of the faithful participate on these squares in religious ceremonies, and are deeply moved. He points out that in their history societies have learned to distinguish between the religious sphere and the professional or political, but “this pattern of religious behaviour can be deftly flipped in the field of mass political movements, ideological movements. This “flipped” symbolic mechanism is then

used for the consolidation of power and to spread militant political ideology” (Gross 2002, 299). He juxtaposed the huge continental European squares with Trafalgar Square in London and Times Square in New York, which are rather small, and concludes that Great Britain and the United States “are countries of reduced symbolic formality, whereas, for example Catholic countries were and are countries of symbolic intensification” (Gross 2002, 299).

It may well be that Gross formulated these remarks after comparing his home city with New York, to which he emigrated during World War II, though his Italian experiences are more visible here. We can almost see him reflecting on the role of space in religious and other public rituals while sitting in a cafe on some piazza over a redolent espresso: observing the urban landscape around and recalling his own home city and the Main Square there he liked to walk across so much.

Gross referred to Krakow again in his last book *Citizenship and Ethnicity: the Growth and Development of a Democratic Multiethnic Institution* (Gross 1999). He showed that it was European cities that were the cradles of the idea of citizenship, and gave a few historical Cracovian examples. He gave a reminder that in Poland municipal law was often adopted from Magdeburg, but the principle that the “city air makes one free” was often challenged by nobles or burghers themselves. Gross pointed out that “By the seventeenth century the general spirit of toleration of Protestants and dissidents had also declined. At this time it was the crown, King Sobieski of Poland, who ordered the City Council of Krakow to respect the laws and the old traditions and respect the same full rights of citizens who were Proestants and dissidents” (Gross 1999, 18–19).

Gross argued that it was a broad territorial solidarity that continued in the spirit of ancient Roman traditions. “A medieval city was not a consanguineal community of related clans and fratries. To the contrary, with the foundation of new cities, and many were founded or rebuilt in Eastern Europe, in Poland, after Mongol and Tatar invasions, many of the new cities were inhabited by immigrants who spoke foreign languages and were at times even of different religions. They gave the oath of allegiance to the city; now the city was their patria, fatherland. Their citizenship was not tied to their ethnicity; although foreign born, they were members of the urban community. The ethnic bond and identity did not disappear of course. A German immigrant in Krakow continued to speak German at home, read in his native tongue, enjoy German dishes, but in the city he shared the common bond of solidarity. He might have been a Lutheran or Roman Catholic and a German, but at the same time he was a civis Cracoviensis, a citizen of Krakow, thus, he had three identities or even more” (Gross 1999, 58).

Gross stressed that “urban solidarity was rooted in neighbourhood”, and involved duties to defend the city, mutual aid in times of emergency, and participation in the local political government. Again the examples of his home city are used to illustrate his thesis, while his education in law and interest in history also helped.

To sum up Gross’s theorising about his home city, I would like to stress several issues. Firstly, still in the 1930s Gross pointed out the existence of manifold identities, something which must have been quite innovative then, because the normative assumption of singular attachment dominated in the social sciences until the 1960s. His study of the Jewish quarter in Krakow and his university course on urban anthropology would also have been quite original in Europe, as this subject was practically non-existent at the time. Later his analysis of various patterns of inter-ethnic relations and pointing to their geographical

dimension was also quite original. His thesis that cities' architecture reflects their religious character (big squares in Catholic countries) and may facilitate ideological manipulation is very interesting. It is worth stressing that, in trying to describe the genealogy of the concept of citizenship, Gross relates it to the idea of neighbourhood and place as sources of identity, which was rather inclusive and pluralistic.

Yet apart from his theoretical contribution, one can also find in Gross's engagement with his home city the gesture of a flâneur, like his mentor. This can also be seen as "a specifically male way of dwelling in the modern, increasingly urbanized world, that we have to refer as fieldwork" (Donner 2012, 173). Traversing the Market Square, sitting in a cafe and looking through the newspapers, dropping into a church to marvel the stained-glass windows of a genius of Young Poland, and even enjoying the warm and mild air of the city, can be seen as revealing the attitude of observing, reflecting, and possessing, which are so characteristic of a flâneur and an ethnographer, and of which the home city had been a testing ground.

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Agrarian Ideology and Local Governance: Continuities in Postsocialist Hungary

CHRIS HANN AND LÁSZLÓ KÜRTI

ABSTRACT:

The subject matter is political anthropology at the grass roots in rural Hungary. We analyse the local election results (October 2014) in two settlements of a Great Plain region called the Kiskunság in the context of recent national and international developments, focusing on the long-term continuities of an ideological complex we call “agrarianism”. We make a specific connection to Petr Skalník’s work by engaging with his re-study of a Slovak village after 1989 (1993 chapter in Hann ed. “Socialism” in which he emphasized local-level continuities with the socialist period).

KEYWORDS:

Elections; History; Hungary; Populism

INTRODUCTION

One feature of anthropological approaches to politics is the detailed attention, which researchers pay to case studies at the micro level of political action. In the case of Europe, as “discovered” by Anglophone anthropologists following the Second World War, this tended to mean the rural community. Using various theoretical frameworks and methods, ethnographers’ local studies illuminated larger themes characteristic of the region, nation or macro-region (e.g. “the Mediterranean”), most notably patronage networks and their ideological underpinnings.¹

During the era of the Cold War, such studies were inevitably lacking for Eastern Europe. Apart from the problems of access for Western researchers, there was in any case little scope for comparable forms of political manoeuvring and faction building in the non-pluralist societies of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia was somewhat easier and Joel Halpern (1956) and Irene Winner (1971) were able to conduct pioneering field research in the 1950s and 1960s; but they did not focus on politics. With her pioneering research in Buriatia,

1 We have in mind works by Julian Pitt-Rivers, Jeremy Boissevain, Frederick G. Bailey, Sydel Silverman and Caroline White, among others. For a survey of this Mediterranean literature, see Davis 1977.

Caroline Humphrey was the first to explore how local actors bargained with external hierarchies in the context of a Soviet collective farm (Humphrey 1983). By the 1970s it was possible for a foreigner to document frictions in the institutions of a Hungarian socialist village (Hann 1980). But even in the last decades of socialism, foreign researchers tended to avoid writing explicitly about the political (see for example the contributions to Hollos and Maday 1983). One compelling reason was the ethical concern that such accounts could have awkward consequences for both their friends in the village and the colleagues in the capital who had made their research possible.

Those colleagues, the “native ethnographers”, were obviously not well placed to specialise in political anthropology. This had not been a well-established area of specialization in the pre-socialist era. When they wrote about traditional Hungarian “proper peasants” in English for Western audiences, Edit Fél and Tamás Hofer found room to document local administration and politics, including elections (Fél and Hofer 1969, 324–35, 370–75). However, this material did not find its way into their publications for Hungarian audiences, and in any case they did not address the socialist era. Local politics was something for novelists and sociographers, but not for the discipline of *néprajz*.

This changed when conditions changed so dramatically in 1989–1990. Petr Skalník took advantage to re-visit the village of Šuňavain Slovakia, which he had first studied between 1970 and 1976 in the frame of an international comparative project. Having spent most of the intervening decades in exile abroad, pursuing very different kinds of project in political anthropology, this was a re-immersion into the political conditions of his homeland. Despite the radical changes, which had taken place in the capital and in international relations, at local level, Skalník was struck by the continuities (Skalník 1993). In terms of local power relations, nothing seemed to have changed: a “big man” style of politics prevented the emergence of a new “civil society.” The anthropologist was highly critical of the fact that Czechoslovak society was still evidently attached to the security and consumerist satisfaction it had enjoyed under socialism. Citizens did not know how to exercise their rights and duties in the public sphere. On the basis of his research in Šuňava in 1991, little more than a year after the change of government, Skalník concluded with a tone of disappointment: “Its political culture is still based on particularistic group solidarities – namely, kinship and friendship – rather than open democratic competition” (1993, 225).

Comparable continuities in the early post-socialist years were also noted in Hungary, where the transition was a smoother, negotiated process (Tőkés 1996). Why should we be surprised that people vote for the individuals known to them through “particularistic” ties, especially at the local level? Perhaps anthropology as a discipline has a proclivity to detect such continuities. Compared to political scientists, psychologists and journalists, we engage more closely with political actors in their socio-cultural contexts, and the habits of these human actors are harder to change than Constitutions and electoral mechanisms. Where are the moments of rupture or “major transition” in recent Hungarian history? In the rhetoric of Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), nowadays the dominant party, their return to power in 2010 marks a more decisive break with socialist legacies than 1990. Only now, they claim, after two decades of turbulence during which only one government succeeded in gaining re-election (the socialists in 2006, but only by means of gross deception), is the nation again truly sovereign.

This claim is implicitly endorsed by the media in Western European countries and North America, which have painted an almost uniformly negative picture of recent political devel-

opments. It is commonly alleged that constitutional changes introduced by Viktor Orbán's government, thanks to the two-thirds majority it enjoys in parliament, have threatened the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the media (Szikra 2014). There has been interference in the activities of foreign-based NGOs. Contrary to its former liberal support for market economy, Orbán's government has not hesitated to intervene in the economy and to re-nationalise privatized enterprises whenever it considered this to be in the public interest. It has introduced educational reforms to ensure that a standardized version of national history is taught in all schools and opened the way for many schools to pass back under ecclesiastical control. Hungarian history provides rich resources to distract attention from economic problems, which worsened following the financial crisis of 2008 and the nation is prominent in everyday life as never before (Feischmidt 2014). Public nostalgia for the days of imperial glory confines individuals' nostalgia for socialism to the private sphere (Hann 2014). In the realm of symbols and "memory culture", the government has promoted not only the Habsburg era when Budapest shared imperial power with Vienna but also the inter-war period, generally considered internationally to be an era of authoritarian conservative government marked by *ressentiments* following the loss of empire.

Another key strategy of the government is to find scapegoats for the country's obvious difficulties. Three convenient candidates present themselves. The first is the Roma, by far the country's largest minority group, whose socio-economic situation worsened with the disintegration of the economy (even before the end of socialism they were the first to be made redundant when economic difficulties set in: see Szirácski 1990). The second is the Jewish community, very small today but a reminder of past *urbánus* culture against which the true Magyar had to define and defend himself. The third is the European Union. This is paradoxical. The EU is indeed the source of some of Hungary's problems, e.g. many small-scale wine producers fail to understand why the country is obliged to allow large-scale imports of inferior wine from Italy and Spain at dumping prices when they themselves have difficulty in finding buyers for their product. Hungary has been adversely affected by the EU's foreign policy towards Russia as a result of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Everyone is aware that without the flow of subsidies from Brussels because of EU membership, most things would be a great deal worse. Nonetheless, the government has consistently attacked both over-regulation and the degenerate liberal values of the EU, especially when it expresses criticism of the true Christian nation governed from Budapest. To a considerable extent, Brussels has replaced Moscow as the convenient locus for national grievances.

Through the government's influence over the popular media, especially television, these sentiments saturate the life-worlds of the citizens. Some anthropologists and political scientists use the term political culture to sum up the tacit understandings, symbols and rituals, which often seem more significant than interests and rational arguments in mobilizing citizens. We prefer to speak of ideology. We identify a dominant ideology of Christian, nationalist agrarianism which took shape in Hungary when it was still an overwhelmingly rural country in the pre-socialist era. This forms the background to our analysis of local elections in one region of provincial Hungary over the last quarter of a century. We first provide a general historical introduction to the Kiskunság, a large region of the western Great Plain, southeast of the capital Budapest, in the context of nationwide developments down to the end of the socialist period. Following this general outline, we look more closely at local governance and elections over the last quarter of a century, first in Lajosmizse, the home town of László Kürti, and second in Tázlár, a village studied by Chris Hann since the 1970s. In the final section, we revisit Skalník's problematic of continuity and change, suggesting

that in the case of rural Hungary this dominant ideology defied the changes of the socialist era and continues to shape political outcomes, long after the material conditions of rural society have been transformed.

THE REGIONAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIANISM

The impact of industrialization and capitalist markets on East-Central Europe was highly uneven. By the beginning of the twentieth century, regions such as Bohemia and Silesia were highly industrialized and urbanised. Generally, however, the territories of the imperial powers, which governed the East were economically backward – certainly in comparison with the new nation-states of North-West Europe. If we take a long-term perspective, it can plausibly be argued that large tracts of Eastern Europe experienced systematic underdevelopment in the course of the structural processes, which enabled the rapid development of the West. This analysis fits quite well for the Great Hungarian Plain, including the western zone known (after its previous inhabitants) as the Kiskunság. This *puszta* region was repopulated in the eighteenth century following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Turks. Resettlement became more intensive towards the end of the nineteenth century, when Hungary had few industrial jobs to offer its swollen rural population. Some migrated abroad, particularly to North America, but others conquered the “internal frontier” by purchasing parcels of *puszta* as the former large estates were gradually broken up (den Hollander 1980). The medieval settlements of Lajosmizse, close to the market town of Kecskemét, and Tázlár, mid-way between the rivers Danube and Tisza, were repopulated in this way. The immigrants were diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion and economic resources. Most lived on more or less isolated farms as they set about transforming the previous economy of extensive cattle breeding to one based on agriculture, including intensive fruit and vegetable cultivation and vineyards. The consolidation of central institutions and an autonomous public administration in the rural settlements of the Kiskunság was a gradual process, which continued well into the twentieth century.

Although many details of this colonization process were specific to this western zone of the Great Plain, it highlights key features of the general transformation of the Hungarian peasantry in the era when industrial capitalism was beginning to establish itself in other regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Budapest grew rapidly to become the second imperial capital. It was intellectually vibrant. It was also the centre of a strong national movement, which extracted compensation for the defeat of 1848–1849 with a deal struck twenty years later (the *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867) which gave the Magyars almost equal rights in the running of the Empire – and full autonomy to pursue nationalizing policies in their half of it. The capital itself remained highly cosmopolitan and for some time the German language remained more prestigious in some contexts. However, by the end of the century most Jews, Germans and others communicated in Hungarian. Many sought to assimilate into the Hungarian nation, e.g. through changing their surname for a Hungarian-sounding name, and (in the case of Jews) through being baptized as Christians. But this did not necessarily diminish the gap between non-Magyar elites, typically associated with the new industries and their financing, and Magyar gentry landowners and military officers. Assimilationist policies transformed the rural periphery too. But they did not bridge the chasm between that periphery and the capital city. The bulk of the population resided

in villages and can be classified as peasant according to the usual anthropological criteria; this peasantry was highly stratified and inchoate politically. Politics at the national level were the domain of Magyar elites. At the local level, from 1871 there existed a dual structure comprised of a body of representatives and a “village board,” both chaired by the mayor. Although most members were elected, village governance was generally dominated by the largest taxpayers, the *virilisták*, who filled half of the seats in the body representatives without election (Fél and Hofer 1969, 329).

The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 1918 and at the Treaty of Trianon (1920) the new Hungarian state was definitively deprived of vast territories which had previously formed part of the Kingdom of Hungary, including regions where most of the population was ethnically Magyar. The ensuing sense of injustice was overwhelming across the political spectrum, but the inter-war period was dominated by the right. In the absence of significant industrial development, the rural population continued to grow. Productivity levels were low and poverty acute, notably during the Great Depression. It was increasingly obvious that no local action could tackle the deeper causes of the problems. The most popular diagnoses linked the crisis of the countryside to the persisting prominence of “foreign” elements in the cities, notably Jewish and German capital in Budapest. During the 1930s the tensions between *népi* (folk) and *urbánus* (cosmopolitan) orientations became salient in literature as well as ethnography and other embryonic social sciences (Borbándi 1989; see also János 1982). They found political expression in laws restricting Jewish access to the public sphere.

The *népi* camp was internally divided. Its most sophisticated intellectual was Ferenc Erdei, who discovered Marx and Lenin while a student at the University of Szeged, the largest city of the Great Plain. Following study trips to Western Europe, financed by the onion cooperative for which he worked in his native Makó, Erdei concluded that voluntary cooperatives offered the most promising path to modernize or civilize the Hungarian countryside, while preserving its unique folk culture (Huszár 2012; Hann 1995, 2013). However, most *népi* activists leaned to the political right. They called for distributive justice based on the sanctity of private property, and tied this peasant agenda to the national symbols of the Hungarian nation and the Christian religion. Following the Second World War, the Independent Smallholders Party emerged as the principal representative of this current. In the relatively free elections of 1947 it was victorious in most rural constituencies, receiving far more votes than the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party or the National Peasant Party of Ferenc Erdei. However, the Smallholders and Social Democrats were rapidly eliminated and for the next four decades, both national and local governance proceeded along non-pluralist lines.

During the first decades of socialism, the population declined as many families migrated to take up urban industrial jobs. Others commuted from their farms because they could not find urban housing. It was easier to build a new house in the nuclear village centres, now strongly promoted in order to tackle the root causes of backwardness. The new authorities invested in infrastructure, including electricity, roads and piped water. New administrative offices, schools and Culture Houses were constructed. In spite of these developments, for the rural population the first decade of socialist rule was a nightmare. Peasants did their best to resist compulsory deliveries to the state, infringements of their property rights and pressures to join cooperatives (Kürti 2013). When mass collectivization was nonetheless imposed in 1959–1961, many feared the worst.

But things turned out better than expected. Most villagers of the Kiskunság were not required to give up family farming. As members of a “lower” organizational form known as the specialist cooperative or *szakszövetkezet*, rather than a Soviet-style collective farm, they were able to continue cultivating their own plots (Hann 1980). They were assisted by the new institution with farm inputs, mechanical services and final marketing – though villagers were free to pursue private options instead if they wished. The cooperatives were expected gradually to expand the sector of large-scale cultivation; but if they confiscated family-held plots for this purpose, the rural exodus allowed them to offer adequate compensation elsewhere. The public-private symbiosis of the *szakszövetkezet* was an extreme version of the synergies which developed everywhere between the collective farm and the household plot (Swain 1985). It exemplified the pragmatic spirit of the “market socialist” reforms consolidated in 1968. To impose the Soviet model in a region of scattered settlement would have led to substantial losses, if only due to the patchwork of vineyards and orchards, so the Hungarian reformers worked out compromises. The Kiskunság had epitomised the problems of backwardness and underdevelopment in the pre-socialist era. Now it demonstrated the success of an “agrarian lobby” at the national level, proving that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party could represent the interests of the peasants as well as the proletarians (Varga 2013). Ferenc Erdei was one of the major players in these complex adaptations, as a result of which the former chasm which separated the backward countryside from the advanced *urbánus* was dramatically reduced. Indeed, in terms of income and material opportunities, living standards under the party of the workers improved most rapidly for the peasants and post-peasants.

By the end of the 1970s many households were prospering as a result of their own labour in small-scale agriculture. Yet the public institutions did not function well. The old system of local governance was replaced in 1950 by a socialist *tanács* (council or soviet). Power was concentrated in the hands of its president the *tanácselnök*, who was not elected but appointed from above. The chairman was almost always a member of the communist party and often not a native of the community for which he (the male bias was strong) was responsible. Of course, under socialist “democratic centralism” there was not much leeway at the local level. It is a platitude in the political science literature on “totalitarian” societies that socialist elections were mere ritual and had nothing to do with the democratic representation of citizens and their interests. For anthropologists, of course, rituals may be full of interest. But the representativeness of the results of socialist elections should not be too hastily dismissed. Members of the council were nominated by the Patriotic People’s Front (*Hazafias Népfront*), a non-elected body comprising senior officials of the Party, the Party Youth League, school, cooperative, surgery etc., and a sprinkling of respected farmers. The entire settlement was divided into constituencies, typically comprising some 20–40 families. After the *Népfront* had proposed a candidate, this was debated by the constituency at a public meeting, either in the village centre or at an outlying farm. Sometimes the individual did not accept the nomination, sometimes another name went forward following the public debate, at which a member of the *Népfront* was always present. The meetings were held following the conclusion of the harvest and were therefore well attended, highly social occasions. Later, when voting took place, attendance was high. Councillors elected in this way chose some of their number to become members of the Executive Body, which met more frequently. Even this body had little power to counter the will of a *tanácselnök* determined to impose policies dictated from outside the community. But in practice, in the later decades of socialism, such tensions seldom arose. Council and president negotiated priorities,

e.g. in how to spend centrally allocated funds for road improvements or for the electrification of outlying farms.

By the 1980s economic reforms were stalling and the opportunities for household accumulation were fewer. In cultural and political domains, there was an increasing concern with national identity and the history of the Hungarian nation. In elite oppositional circles, this took the form of reaffirming Hungary's place in Europe (or at least Central Europe). In popular culture, it was expressed in the folk-dance movement, in a rock opera about the foundation of the Hungarian state, and in growing concern for the fate of co-ethnics in neighbouring states, especially the Magyar minority in Transylvania (Kürti 2001). The political climate allowed for a cautious reappraisal of the tragic events of 1956 and for the reburial in 1988 of its premier victim, Imre Nagy. This was the moment when the young Viktor Orbán first seized the limelight with a speech in which he called for a more general reckoning with communist power holders. Barely a year later, the regime entered into "round table" talks with opposition leaders and in the course of the ensuing "negotiated revolution" (Tőkés 1996) it became possible to organize independent political parties once again. Throughout the countryside, the Independent Smallholders' Party emerged as the strongest force, calling for policies of decollectivization based on the same agrarian ideology it had espoused prior to socialism. While the material conditions of the countryside had been transformed over the preceding decades, few showed any signs of gratitude to the communists. Older villagers drew attention to the repression of the 1950s rather than the "civilizing" investments of the state in rural infrastructure and its consistent subsidies for household production. Instead of noting that the gap between town and country, and between Hungarian villages and Austrian villages, had closed, they asked why they did not have access to the same full range of consumer goods as Austrians and Westerners generally. Smallholder activists campaigned for the full restitution of private property rights and revived national symbols of the pre-war era, such as the *turul* bird and maps of the ancient kingdom, before its mutilation at the Treaty of Trianon. This was the ideological climate, in which the Hungarian Democratic Forum emerged as the clear winner of the free parliamentary elections of 1990; both the Smallholders and the Christian Democratic People's Party also formed strong fractions in the new parliament.

LAJOSMIZSE: AGRARIAN HISTORY ALMOST REPEATS ITSELF

Kürti has lived in Lajosmizse since 1994, when he resettled in Hungary after living and working in the United States. He was born in that town but moved away at an early age so his only connections to this settlement of 11 000 were his cousins, aunts and uncles he knew mainly through family stories. Since the mid-1990s, he has conducted fieldwork to study the socio-economic transformation that took place after the collapse of state socialism in 1989–1990. Formed only in 1877, Lajosmizse farmers achieved a well-nigh impossible: they re-cultivated a pastureland used originally for extensive animal husbandry for centuries. Now a bustling agro-industrial town, it has developed a maverick status based on family farming, entrepreneurial spirit and international investment that all contributed to its healthy status (Kürti, 2009). Demographic decline, adversely affecting nearby settlements, did not affect Lajosmizse since the 1930s; the only segment of the population that has increased somewhat is the local Roma, now numbering around 1 000. The emergence of a new entrepreneurial spirit has been facilitated not only by the revitalisation of farming

tradition, but – equally important – by the opening of a new highway and several foreign companies that provided ample jobs for locals and nearby residents. In terms of politics and especially party politics, Lajosmizse presents a fairly balanced picture since the last years of socialist rule, a situation quite unlike other settlements experiencing major upheavals. Ruled by the communist party (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) for more than thirty years, two council presidents (*tanácselnök*) left their mark on the town. Through their industriousness, successful cooperatives (*szakszövetkezet*), among them the Almavirág (Apple Blossom) and the Kossuth, both involved with wheat, fruit, poultry and cattle farming, were established. A few smaller industrial firms – mainly hydrotechnological (Vízfúró Vállalat) and household items producing coop (KTSZ) – also stood out in the county for their unique production and booming foreign trade. Yet, agriculture, both state and family farming, remained one of the most important sources of income for most. Since 1990 local elections, especially that of 2014, are well-suited for anthropological study for several reasons. They provide researchers not only with the possibilities to fine-tune analyses of micro-politics, but also offer a pig’s eye-view of the important contestatory reverberations within a community, hallmarks of political anthropological research since the pioneers such as Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, and Leach. In Lajosmizse, 2014 was the first time when a large number of candidates, both for mayor and for councillor, were put on the ballots. There were five individuals fighting to become mayor and in some voting districts as many eight candidates stood for election. For the first time, a woman candidate also ran supported by the Farmers Circle (Gazdakör), a situation that caused an outburst of public excitement in some quarters but outright rejection elsewhere.² Moreover, there were two main political formations vying to obtain leadership: the Farmers Circle and the ruling national Fidesz party.³ Despite the bitter final days of campaigning, the outcome surprised everyone: the Farmers Circle could not defeat the local branch of the national party and the council ended up with equal numbers from both. Elections between 1990 and 2014 in Lajosmizse, are interesting for two mayors have managed to remain in office, a task they achieved by drawing on the main conservative parties as well as local civic groups as supporters. How these local factions evolved and declined reveal that the mayor’s office continues to be held in high regard but also that the two men have very carefully negotiated their positions vis-a-vis national government by maintaining their concerns about the healthy state of the town’s economic and cultural life. One constant theme in election slogans has been that the town has not incurred any debt. At the same time, mayoral candidates echoed the need for a fundamental development and continuation of change. Conservative in their outlook, they have expressed a need to uphold traditions (whatever that may be), and promote family cohesion by maintaining a stringent Christian attitude in life. From time to time, fears about the growing number of Roma living in the town surfaced, a longstanding preoccupation of right-wingers and nationalists who suggested solutions ranging from expelling them, giving them jobs, and even re-educating them (Kürti 2011, 2012). Some held more extreme views, for example maintaining that the Roma cannot be changed, and should be left to fend themselves as they have done in the past. The persistence of this theme has

2 To be faithful to history, it should be mentioned that there was a female council president in 1955–1956 by the name Mrs. József Adácsi. At the height of the revolutionary skirmish in October 1956, she disappeared from the town and was never heard of again.

3 The party was founded in 1988 by 38 students in Budapest as a radical and liberal party; in 1995, signalling its new right-wing image, it added Magyar Polgári Párt (Hungarian Citizens’/Bourgeois Party). In 1998, Fidesz formed a coalition government with the Smallholders’ Party (Kisgazdapárt); in 2006 it joined a coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt). In 2010 and 2014, Fidesz triumphed in national and most of the local elections.

been paralleled by broader permanent ideological appeals, ideals and symbols employed by non-Roma residents echoing farmers' way of life and tax-paying status with stronger measurements against those who are "unable" to live decent lives, obtain a job and live according to majority standards. Many of these concerns point back to "existing state socialism" (a phrase the East German dissident Rudolph Bahro popularized in the late 1970s) as citizens variously argue about the positive as well as negative aspects of it. Lajosmizseans, for instance, compare full employment during socialism and the growing stratum of unemployed at the present. Similarly they hail the securities and benefits they had during the 1980s and their lack at the present.⁴ Change came to Lajosmizse in 1988, when the last council president was promoted to a higher county position (*káderképzés* was the fashionable term of the time for ideological repositioning), and an older trusted cadre was nominated to replace him. There was no time to manoeuvre, however. Suddenly the country underwent tremendous transformations, as it became a republic, the ruling socialist party disbanded, and new elections, both national and local, were held. In 1990, the forming of the new eighteen member local council (*képviselő-testület*) did not cause any conflict in the town: individuals representing successful agricultural state cooperative farms were the first candidates, others came from different walks of life (fireman, physician, dentist, veterinarian, chauffeur, stone carver, retired person, book keeper; two women also were elected). What really reveals popular attitudes of the time is that only Smallholders and MDF but none of the socialist or liberal candidates managed to secure seats. Having the upper hand, farmers and individuals from state cooperatives nominated the first mayor of Lajosmizse since the last incumbent was disposed by Stalinism in 1947 (Kürti, 2013).⁵ Unlike in other towns, where the former *tanácselnök* remained in office – this happened in neighbouring Felsőlajos and Ladánybene –, in Lajosmizse the new mayor, Viktor, as he is still known in Lajosmizse, was favoured because of his adamant support of independent and family farming. Known as a quiet and diligent member of the successful Kossuth state farm, he had already served a term on the town's council, and to many he seemed an ideal choice. Added to his imagery was the fact that he did not hold a membership in the communist party (his father being a well-respected physician was no hindrance either). Most people in the town believe that, as mayor for sixteen years, he represented a real rags-to-riches career. He managed to obtain large land-holdings throughout the privatization process of state farms during 1994–1995 but his position in the following years was never seriously challenged. In 1994, when the MDF had a dismal result at the national elections and the socialists came to power in the parliament to form a new government, Viktor managed to garner a mind-boggling seventy percent of votes. He still found support in the right-wing MDF, the Gazdakör (Farmers Circle), Christian Democrats, and – more surprisingly – the Retired Peoples' Club (Nyugdíjasklub).⁶ What followed in the next two decades was very similar to other middle and small-size settlements in Bács-Kiskun County: the mayor secured his office, and the council membership rotated minimally at each succeeding local election. In many ways, the national political transformations hardly touched the local "big man" politics, where powerful mayors, like Viktor, were able to gather support by leading parties and civil groups. Surely, other civic associations and smaller parties contested

4 In popular parlance, the term *átkos* (hated, cursed) is used to refer to state socialism.

5 According to the law, mayors in small towns were elected by the town council, a system later changed to direct popular vote.

6 The 2012 Constitution/Basic Law (*Alaptörvény*) specifies that not only strictly political parties but "nominating organizations" (*jelölőszervezetek*) – that is civil groups either formed specifically for the elections or already existing – can also propose candidates; there are no run-off elections, and no thresholds.

Viktor's rule, but none came close to beating him. Anchored in the nationalistic rhetoric of populism and fundamentalist Christian values, Lajosmizse and the three neighbouring settlements studied (Felsőlajos, Kerekegyháza, Ladánybene) remained rather static and few changes ensued.⁷ In 1998 Fidesz, a party that gained only seven percent of the votes in the 1994 national election, assumed the image of a radical ethno-national party and acquired much greater importance throughout the entire Great Plain. Local conservatism in Lajosmizse was boosted by this development.

Several aspects of this conservatism need to be clarified historically. The emergence of Lajosmizse as an independent settlement during the 1850s was a hotly debated issue in Jászberény, the historic market town, and Vác, the seat of the Catholic episcopate. Not finding adequate support among the county leadership, the Jászkun District, or the own of Jászberény, the settlers who moved to the pasture belonging to Jászberény could turn only to their church for support. Finally, the town was formed in small increments: a chapel was built, a parochial school opened, local sheriffs began to supervise the *puszta* as their own, and farmers bought up land originally rented from the city Jászberény. Thus, Catholicism and agrarian politics became fundamentally interconnected as the quintessential qualities of Lajosmizse farmers. Their worldview has remained conservative entailing close family ties, pride in being descendants of the original settlers, adhering to Roman Catholicism and upholding a farming way of life. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, mayors were nominated and elected only from the well-to-do peasant class. Even though Protestants live in the town today (estimates range between 800–1 000), attendance at services is rare. This is a curious development since the Upper-Kiskunság region of the county has been traditionally Protestant, but Lajosmizse Protestants never managed to form a vocal and strong political opposition.

Despite historical and political similarities, neighbouring settlements illustrate different paths. The first postsocialist mayor of Felsőlajos was also the last socialist *tanácselnök*. He did not adhere to any new party and, after his death, his successor also ran as an independent candidate in 2010 and retained his post in 2014. Ladánybene has also remained independent: neither mayor nor councillors since 2006 have had any party affiliation, with just one exception: a teacher nominated by the far right Jobbik party. In contrast, Kerekegyháza (a town of six thousand) remained staunchly loyal to the Government: both the mayor and the elected councillors ran on the Fidesz ticket.

In many ways, Lajosmizse has remained quite exceptional as a Catholic island within the Protestant sea of the Upper-Kiskunság region (as the northern part of the county has been known throughout the centuries). In its eight decades of political history, the town was ultra conservative and supported only government candidates. Only in 1935 was the candidate of the ruling party defeated: a local landlord by the name György Mizsey ran as the candidate of the Smallholders' Party. His election put a well-respected citizen in the national parliament for four years and boosted local patriotism. It became obvious that agrarian politics and personalities were fundamentally connected in the minds of the citizens. Previously, while not unknown, agrarianism had not been a serious concern in Lajosmizse. Anchored in inherited land-holdings, most proprietors belonged to the middle-peasantry, as described

7 Forming the "Jász Land", the four settlements share a similar history: all became the possession of the Jász towns in 1745, were settled by smallholder peasants in the 1840–1870s, and are predominantly Roman Catholic. For the medieval origins of religious differences in this district, see Szabó, 1980, 82, Tálasi, 1977, Kürti 2006.



Fig 1. One of the election committee, Lajosmizse 1990.

by Ferenc Erdei between the two world wars (Hann 1995). Even those who did not have the necessary means to maintain 30–50 hectares of arable land, consciously or not, emulated the life-style of the rich landholders, the *nagygazdák*.

One reason for the lack of a common agrarian platform had to do with the failed land reform of István Nagyatádi Szabó, a landowner and MP who attempted to distribute land to needy peasants during the 1920s. In Lajosmizse, only a small number of citizens received land, amounting to an average of 3–5 hectares at the most. As elsewhere, distributed property was infertile, peasants lacked machinery, and those who took loans to start business were forced by inflation, rising interest rates and competition in agrarian markets to sell their property or go bankrupt. In the process, however, some of the middle-peasant *nagygazda* farmers became even more prosperous as they managed to buy auctioned land cheaply, or exploited the labour of destitute cotters.⁸ Both classes were ready to vote for the first candidate whom they knew personally and who as a landlord also provided jobs for many, especially during the harvest season. This instance of “*gazda* politics” – to apply an elusive term to the local case – in 1935 was unique since it resulted in defeating the ruling government’s candidate.

Although none of the contemporary residents of Lajosmizse remember that historic election, the idea of the strong and unique *gazdatársadalom* (society of farmers) has lingered on in popular memory. This local myth has some truth in it, even though during the last two decades of state socialism most family farms were abandoned, while those that

⁸ Aside from offering extremely low wages, one form of payment involved sharecropping on a “halfie” or “partial” (*feles, részes*) basis, where half the remuneration was paid in cash and half in kind.

survived were extensively modernized. In 2014, one third of the population still lives and works outside the town on farms (*tanya*), mostly practicing wheat production, gardening, fruit orchards and animal husbandry. Some family farms are highly specialized (e.g. goat milk and cheese, strawberry farming, vegetables, sour cherry). Many families are involved with *főliázás* (greenhouses), a cheap technology which allows the cultivation of anything from green peppers to strawberries. Since the 1990s, a special form of tourist-*tanya* caters to visitors and foreign tourists, offering extra income to entrepreneurial families (Kürti 2004).

The 1994 national election saw the country take a major turn by electing the socialists back into office, but the citizens of Lajosmizse were not impressed. To them, Viktor remained the only leader whose political clout was unquestioned. Pitching his appeal to farmers, his agenda was clear and precise: privatization of state farms and firms, a program hailed as the most important of the national Smallholders' Party since 1990. Most of those who had obtained their previous properties, and those who were still waiting for restitution, willingly supported him. No alternative candidates to Viktor's rule emerged during the 1990s. The town's majority was reassured that all was proceeding well and that betterment comes in small increments instead of a great leap forward. The late 1990s and early 2000s thus resulted in few alterations: a new cultural centre was erected, a new highway was opened that redirected heavy traffic outside the town, and an impressive new municipal building and mayoral office was opened. In 2002, Viktor was challenged by one of the councillors, a teacher by profession. He was "shocked", not so much because someone dared to oppose him, but because the challenger was young and obviously an inferior (teachers were the salaried workers of the town, and the rival had been supported by Viktor to become the director of the school's dormitory). The time was obviously not yet ripe for a change and the teacher was unsuccessful, though he remained a councillor for the next four years. This was the only time in Lajosmizse politics when two members of the socialist party were elected to the council (one because he topped the poll in a ward, the other on the compensatory ticket). Ten years later, not a single leftist candidate bothered to stand.

Viktor's position seemed secure for the time being, but this did not last long. His position was shaken not by his political rivals or the Catholic priest, with whom he developed an uneasy relationship, but by family issues. Difficulties in his marriage and eventually having a child out of wedlock (by his secretary), caused a minor ruckus among the leadership and the clergy. Being outspoken, Viktor declared that this was a private matter and did not concern his office or the workings of the council. As it turned out, however, this scandal ended his political career. At the 2006 local election, he opted to stand for council membership only and supported one of the wealthiest farmers for the position of mayor. Both polled poorly, although Viktor secured a councillor's position on a compensatory ticket for another four year (in his own voting district he was beaten by the Fidesz candidate).

The elections in 2006 and 2010 turned out to be a watershed in Lajosmizse politics for many reasons. In the run-up to 2006 the local Fidesz underwent internal reorganizations as the entire leadership was dismissed for reasons which remain murky. A new local branch was organized by a husband and wife team, a move that was not difficult to achieve for law required only ten registered members. The next step was equally momentous: Fidesz identified new mayoral and council candidates. They won a landslide victory and the new Fidesz mayor was András, Viktor's opponent in 2002. The only political formation that remained

true to its original political platform was the Gazdakör.⁹ However, Fidesz's nationalistic and conservative policies pre-empted possibilities for the opposition.

Viktor's political role in the background after 2010 changed considerably. Following his defeat by Fidesz, he became a staunch opponent of the mayor, and an enthusiastic supporter of the Gazdakör. Perhaps his manoeuvring facilitated the sudden rise of its own mayoral candidate during August–September 2014 in the person of Márta, a book-keeper-accountant, who had served on the town council twice before (2002–2006, 2010–2014). In 2002, Márta was part of the Civic Union for Lajosmizse (CUL), and supported Viktor, who at that point was nominated jointly by Fidesz and the CUL. Astonishing as it may seem, the direction established in 2010 was partially reversed in 2014, for following the most recent elections the Roma minority is now unrepresented on the council. In 2010 the Fidesz leadership – perhaps with a view to winning the 5th ward where most Roma live in a neighbourhood called Cigányváros – identified a young Roma as their candidate to run for council seat. This tactic paid off: Lorenzo became only the second Roma to secure a seat on the council in the 21st century (the other was the socialist and entrepreneur who won in 2002). Feeling so secure of its power by 2014, Fidesz decided to drop Lorenzo and to nominate in the 5th district a Hungarian who was the deputy-director of the kindergarten. The so-called Roma-district descended into chaos: with no political or intellectual leadership to organize them, eight individuals competed for a single seat. All candidates ran as independents, among them three Roma, but the national rhetoric of Fidesz paid off and its candidate was victorious. Mirroring the political division in the country as a whole, Roma in Lajosmizse remain disunited, without adequate leadership and without hope.¹⁰

By 2014, popular dissatisfaction with András and his deputy was commonly voiced by residents. One of the most complicated issues had to do with the building of the new sewage system, an EU-funded public works that turned the town upside-down. Roads were closed, ditches dug, traffic diverted, and the few public hearings did not help clarify the exact cost families will have to bear (originally each family was required to contribute about 800 Euro to the project). Other hotly debated problems had to do with Roma guest workers from Romania, the rising crime-rate, and dissatisfaction with an increasingly shallow cultural life. The Gazdakör campaigned with slogans such as “Let there be change in Lajosmizse” (*“Változást Lajosmizsén”*) and “Let's be a real town” (*“Legyünk valóban város”*). Change and features connected to city-like living, as opposed to a more peripheral and village-like existence, are rather strange ideals from a political movement ostensibly devoted to tradition, agrarianism and family values. Nevertheless, it seemed that the agrarian ideology of the Gazdakör would still work, just as it had in 1935. At the end of the contest, almost half of the voters voted against the incumbent. With a turnout of just 35 %, Márta lost by a mere 223 votes, and the new council is divided equally between Fidesz and Gazdakör members.

9 In 2006 the Gazdakör secured four seats. This fell to three in 2010, but it is important to realize that at this point the size of the councils was reduced from seventeen to eleven.

10 In theory the Roma should be able to win two or three seats on the council (including election via the compensatory ticket) to push for immediate goals and necessary policies on the local level. However, in practice the political and civil will to create the necessary unity are lacking. The Roma are of course legally entitled to form a so-called minority/nationality government (Roma nemzetiségi önkormányzat), and Lajosmizse is no exception. However, if the past eight years is any indication, the three-man assembly forming the Roma Minority Government is unable to tackle the serious unemployment, poverty and second-class status of the Roma who live in Lajosmizse.

To conclude this brief analysis of local politics in Lajosmizse, a few questions still need to be answered. First, why was there such a renaissance in farmers' politicking and what fuelled it? Agrarian movements and radicalism have been known for centuries and received ample attention from scholars all over the world. For Lajosmizse in the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, one obvious answer would be to point to tradition, but that would be too simple. This term is one of those totalizing labels criticized over and over again by anthropologists, and for good reasons. Nevertheless, even today families in Lajosmizse attach a symbolic value to land and agriculture, together with descent from the original settlers. It should not be forgotten that family-based agriculture received several major blows during the inter-war period as well as from state socialism. After the collapse of communist rule, another difficult phase followed as botched land restitution resulted in an uneven redistribution of former properties. It is no wonder, then, that during the early 1990s, land became not only an economic resource, but also a powerful political symbol in the hands of political parties seeking to mobilize the rural population. Lajosmizse was not that different from other Great Plain settlements in that most of the state land was privatized, yet the mechanisms of privatization had many faults (Swain 2013). Even though only one-third of Lajosmizse's population remained rooted in agriculture and the more traditional way of life connected to the *tanya*, resort to a revitalised sense of agrarianism was the only conceivable alternative to the mainstream Fidesz rhetoric. In a dominant Catholic and conservative (and of course right-wing) community, any liberal, socialist or Europeanist political agenda is out of the question. There are too few intellectuals, and shopkeepers and merchants have remained silent, inert and disorganized. Thus, the only logical alternative to Fidesz-rule and the incumbent mayor nominated by Fidesz was a modestly radicalized new form of agrarian politics.

At the end, we must ask: why did it fail? The reasons are numerous. A rather inchoate program and a meagre election campaign, combined with a somewhat timid and shy female mayoral candidate, whose video messages contained well-known phrases but not enough zest and real programme, all worked against the Gazdakör. The local Fidesz campaign, while not strong in itself, had a tacit, if sinister, message to voters: those towns with a Fidesz majority local council and a Fidesz mayor can and will receive governmental support, while others are less likely to do so. Finally, there is also a lack of political commitment (perhaps maturity) on the part of those citizens (the majority), who opted to stay at home.

The result was the formation of a local council split equally between members of Fidesz and the Gazdakör. That the two are not far from each other ideologically is evident in the fact that a clear majority of voters chose Fidesz for county council seats. In this context, we may say that Lajosmizse remained truthful to its agrarian history: inhabitants voted for the ruling conservative government. At the same time, it remained loyal to its tradition by favouring a political group, which had assumed the mantle of the Smallholders' Party in promoting rural and agricultural agendas. Of course, the political opposition between the two local groups is more apparent than real, for ideologically both adhere to the same right-wing ideology. At the inaugural council meeting, where the smiling Viktor sat among the few inhabitants who bothered to attend, a joint effort was made to dispel any misunderstanding that the new council was "political." Rather, as the Gazdakör's leader argued, "democracy" was finally achieved.¹¹ As András, beginning his third term as mayor, put it:

11 Having even number representatives on the local council, means that: "*Lajosmizsén megvalósult a teljes demokrácia. Nem tud egyik fél sem pusztán csak politikai döntést hozni, kizárólag csak együttes támogatással tudunk döntenéi, a város és a lakosság érdekében.*" (Total democracy was achieved in Lajosmizse. No half can simply make a political decision, strictly jointly can we make decisions on behalf of the town and residents).

“there is only one party from now on, and it is called Lajosmizse.”¹² The real meanings which lie behind these questionable and dubious expressions will come to light in years to come. Whatever happens, we can certainly assert that local governance remains an exciting and important terrain to study for anthropologists who want to understand multi-scalar socio-cultural transformations. In this case study, we have investigated the reasons why the agrarian history of the inter-war period, notably the electoral upset of 1935, very nearly repeated itself in Lajosmizse in 2014.

TÁZLÁR: VILLAGE ON THE *PUSZTA*

Hann carried out fieldwork in Tázlár, a settlement on the Great Plain roughly 130 km southeast of Budapest, for his doctoral project in Britain in the 1970s (Hann 1980). He revisited regularly and has paid particular attention in recent years to the long-term history of the community and changing perceptions of time and space (Hann 2015). Tázlár provided a rather extreme example of how the “internal frontier” was conquered from the 1870s onwards, primarily by poor immigrants from the Szeged region of the Plain. Many struggled to attain self-sufficiency on the poor sandy soils of this region. They survived through entering into relations of dependency on wealthy peasants, either as farm labourers or through sending their children to work as farm servants. The Calvinist pastor and schoolteacher mobilized them for the communist cause during the revolutionary months of 1919 but the Directory he led was quickly suppressed following the national victory of the right. The pastor fled the village and was not heard of again. The population grew rapidly in the inter-war decades but conditions did not improve for the majority. In 1932 the local government provided emergency rations to alleviate desperate poverty (*ínség*) to 53 persons, and to a further 278 persons in exchange for public work (Szabadi 1997, 109). When Ferenc Erdei visited Tázlár a few years later he found it highly stratified and “bereft of every seed of a village” (Erdei 1957, 174). There was little or no associational life and no political party organization. In spite of this backwardness and inequality, we can surmise that the population of Tázlár endorsed the dominant agrarian ideology of the age. Some benefited from distributive land reform in 1944. The Smallholders triumphed in the election of 1947.

Hann outlined the socialist history of the village in his first book (1980). Population had fallen from a peak approaching 4 000 to a little over 2 000. By the 1970s private prosperity (and widening inequalities) contrasted with the instability of the unified cooperative (*szakszövetkezet*) and the unpopularity of the council president (*tanácselnök*). The communist party had very few members outside the village’s white-collar elite, including János, deputy headmaster of the village school at the time of Hann’s fieldwork. He was promoted to headmaster in the mid-1980s and resigned from the Party in 1989, when it became clear, that its days in power were numbered. The *tanácselnök*, it was generally agreed, had done a good job for the village in the early years after his appointment in 1958, instigating the major public investments of that era. However, by the mid-1970s it was commonly rumoured that he took bribes, e.g. in the authorization of the electrification of outlying farms. After being ensnared by a local entrepreneur who secretly taped their conversation, the president was

12 The mayor’s exact words were: “Politikai döntésnek innentől kezdve nincs helye, eddig volt a kritika, most innentől kezdve egy part lesz Lajosmizsén, amit úgy hívnak, hogy Lajosmizse” (From this point on there is no place for political decision, up till now there was criticism, from now on there is only one party, and it is called Lajosmizse”). (22 October, 2014, inaugural council-meeting, Lajosmizse).

found guilty in court and stripped of his office in 1987. For the last three years of socialism János, the headmaster of the school, also served as acting *tanácselnök*.

Villagers recall the first post-socialist free elections as exciting. They were not fought along party lines. No activists of the old Independent Smallholders' Party were still alive in the late 1980s. A branch was formed in Tázlár in 1989 and one activist, formerly the chief accountant of the cooperative, stood for the newly reinstated office of mayor in 1990. However, he did not campaign vigorously. János decided not to contest this election, because in addition to running, the school he was responsible for the Culture House and village library, and he felt this was quite sufficient for one villager. A lively campaign was organized by the entrepreneur who had successfully ensnared the communist *tanácselnök*. He stood as an independent, but his flamboyant style, dubious business deals (notably in the tobacco sector) and promises of rapid development were not trusted. Instead, the election was won by another independent, an elderly lady who had previously served as the senior executive secretary of the socialist council. She was a former member of the communist party. Although the post of village leader and the representative Assembly now carried new names (eventually followed by a new coat of arms), the election of "Aunt Mary", as the new mayor was popularly known, emphasized continuities (Hann 1992). Mary took over the old office of the *tanácselnök* within the building where she had worked for decades already. Her popularity was based on her personal integrity. No significant initiatives took place in the next few years, which were dominated by the de-collectivization agenda: public attention was focused more on the cooperative just down the street than on any other village institutions.

In 1994 the successor to the communist party, now known as the Hungarian Socialist Party, was voted back into power at the national level (in coalition with the Free Democrats). The secretary of the Tázlár branch, a former agronomist of the *szakszövetkezet*, now unemployed, ran for mayor but received only a handful of votes (by this time the party had no more than a handful of members in the village). Aunt Mary had reached the age of retirement. Activists of the right wing parties, notably the Independent Smallholders' Party and the Christian

In 1994 János was still the headmaster of the village school but having reached retirement age, he decided in 1998 to challenge Endre for the leadership position, which he had exercised during the last years of socialism. He too ran as an independent. Although not born in the village, János had lived there since beginning his career as a teacher and cultural cadre in 1961. He enjoyed considerable popular support: in addition to his unquestioned competence as a teacher and his long service as a stalwart of cultural activities, he was an active sportsman and the key figure in the "teacher's orchestra" which had provided the music at countless village weddings over the decades. He faced just one problem: although he had resigned from the old monopoly party in 1989, in the eyes of some villagers the fact that he had faithfully served the *ancient régime* until then disqualified him from holding the post of mayor in the new, democratic Hungary. At an election meeting, he attempted to address this gut objection by asserting that he and millions of others had been sadly "deceived" by the communists for decades. But this argument did not work and may have counted him votes. In 1998, there was a swing against the socialists at the national level, which brought Viktor Orbán to power at the head of a right-wing coalition including the Smallholders. Activists of the latter in Tázlár condemned János as either a sincere lifelong communist, or a turncoat. Endre was felt to have performed respectably during his first term and received 67 % of the votes cast (724 votes compared with 329 for János, on a 73 % turnout).




Fig. 2. Endre and his team, 2014.

Bízzon a Fideszben!
Előttünk Tázlár, mögöttünk a kormány!

Tisztelt Tázlári Választók!
 Közelednek az önkormányzati választások. Településünkön képviselőket, polgármestert választunk október 12-dikén. Mostanra már felkészültnék érzem magam, valamint csapatomat arra a feladatra, mellyel a falu életében a szükséges változásokat véghez tudnánk vinni.
 Kérem, amennyiben egyetért azzal, hogy változásra van szüksége Tázlárnak, támogassa képviselőjelölt csapatomat és engem az ajánlóívek aláírásával.
 Legyen ön is részese településünk fejlődésének!

Köszönettel:
Bán Róbert László




Fig. 3. Róbert's Campaign Flyer, 2014.

The *polgármester* proceeded to consolidate his position over the following two decades. While power at the national level was fiercely contested along party lines, these cleavages were not reflected in Tázlár. Standing as an independent, Endre encountered no serious opposition in the elections of 2002, 2006 and 2010. The Smallholders Party disintegrated around the turn of the century, out-manoeuvred by Prime Minister Orbán. As a result, a few villagers founded a local branch of Fidesz. However, it was no more active in the community than any other political party. Like the mayor, the representatives elected to the new village council were overwhelmingly independent candidates. Endre initiated the nomination of villagers with whom he was on good terms, but he had to accept that sometimes other candidates were elected on the basis of their personal standing. Numerous small-scale initiatives (all-weather surface for roads, improvement of the park, renovation of the Culture House etc.) were accomplished in these years, following successful applications for funding. Without such additional funds, the village budget provided no scope for such activities. Tázlár was as dependent on external investment decisions as it had been in the era of socialist democratic-centralism.

Following the disintegration of the *szakszövetkezet* and its ancillary units, it became almost impossible to find work in the village (Hann 2006). Even before Hungary joined the EU in 2004, young people were beginning to migrate abroad and population decline accelerated. In all of these domains, Tázlár was typical of postsocialist developments at village level elsewhere in rural Hungary. The gulf between town and countryside, which had narrowed significantly during the socialist years, began to widen again. The ideal of smallholder family-farming was shown to be illusory as foreign interests joined local “green barons” in the chaotic formation of a new agribusiness hierarchy (Swain 2013).

Following his defeat in the parliamentary elections of 2006, the first time that a government was re-elected in the postsocialist era, Viktor Orbán began a campaign to mobilize the entire nation with an intensified rhetoric of national unity against all elements of socialism and liberalism. The disastrous mismanagement of the re-elected socialists combined with (in part triggered by) negative developments in the wider economy ensured the overwhelming victory of Fidesz in 2010. In Tázlár, as in many other villages, the only opposition came not from the left but from nationalist activists further to the right. Neither Jobbik nor Fidesz had active branches in the village. However, in retrospect, we can see that a significant change took place in 2009 when two members of the village Assembly, Róbert (born 1969), a teacher at the general school, and Zsuzsa, his wife, a nurse at the village surgery, joined Fidesz. This couple were never part of Endre’s inner circle. It is rumoured in the village that Róbert considered running against Endre in 2010. There was friction between them at Assembly meetings. Róbert was younger, had superior IT skills, and had initiated several successful funding applications. By contrast, Endre sometimes gave the impression of being more interested in the expansion of his own vineyards than in the development of the village. Compared with neighbouring communities, Tázlár seemed significantly less dynamic. But it was well known that Endre shared the basic political orientation of Fidesz and eventually Róbert decided not to run for the top job in 2010. Endre was again elected unopposed as an independent and Róbert and Zsuzsa were both elected to the Assembly.

By 2014 Róbert was ready to mount a challenge and the local election was an exciting contest for the first time since 1994.¹³ The local branch of Fidesz was still moribund but Róbert

13 Hann talked to many families during a week spent in the village in mid-September but thereafter the account which follows is based on email correspondence. The selection bias is unavoidable but he did manage to talk to numerous individuals in both camps.

was supported by the party's hierarchy and organized a professional campaign. In addition to his wife, he put together a list of five independent candidates designed to appeal to a broad spectrum: a farmer, two skilled workers, a Protestant pastor and a Catholic farming female to represent the village's upper hamlet (*felsőtelep*). The team introduced themselves and outlined their ambitions at a meeting in the Culture House of the upper hamlet at the end of August. This was followed by a glossy flyer distributed to all village households in mid-September. Róbert refrained from any direct attack on Endre but contented himself with emphasizing his qualifications in science and information technology. He declared that under his leadership the communications and fundraising expertise, which he had already proven, and which had brought significant benefits to many individuals and to the community as a whole, would be consolidated by the formation of a dedicated team (*pályázatíróicsoport*). At the head of his flyer, he quoted the slogan of the dominant party: "Trust in Fidesz. Tázlár is in front of us, the government is behind us!" (*Bízzon a Fidezben! Előttünk Tázlár, mögöttünk a kormány!*).

Endre was obliged to respond. He produced a similar flyer to introduce himself and his own team of six independents. These too were carefully chosen to reflect a cross-section of the local society, including white-collar workers as well as a farmer and a mason. The first line of this address emphasized the team: "you know us, we are reliable, our lives and our work are an open book." The next line expressed indignation at the challenge mounted by the opposition: "we don't want to be the cat's paw" (literally, in the Hungarian rendering of the fable, "we don't want to have anyone else scrape out the chestnut", (*Mi nem akarjuk mással kikapartatni a "gesztenyét"*)). The third opening phrase at the top of Endre's flyer highlighted his record as an independent: "we do not hide away behind the logo of any party" (*Mi nem bújünk országos pártlogó mögé*). Conscious of the fact that his opponent was emphasizing his role in securing additional funding, the incumbent mayor arranged for an additional document to be distributed to all households, in which all funding applications since 2000 were recorded. The list was considerable and the great majority of projects were the work of the staff at the mayor's office, e.g. they could be credited to the mayor. Apart from circulating these flyers, Endre did not campaign. He had never taken part in a public debate with any previous rival for office and was confident that his supporters would remain loyal, recognizing that "there is no need to be ashamed of the results which have been achieved" (*nem kell szégyenkezni az elért eredmények miatt*). As noted, Endre has stepped up his grape and wine production considerably in recent years and the run-up to the election clashed with the harvesting of his estates.

Although Róbert too was busy during the opening weeks of the new school year, he and his wife managed to campaign actively, distributing Fidesz brochures in the process. They were careful not to do so overtly at their places of employment, the school and doctor's surgery respectively, but engaged in door-to-door canvassing in both the village centre and outlying districts. They also organized a *Fórum* in the main Culture House, which was attended by the local Member of Parliament and other leading Fidesz politicians from the county capital, Kecskemét, who declared their backing and support for Róbert's future plans. This *Fórum* departed from the tradition of village assemblies (*falugyűlés*) with its astute use of video material to drive home the Fidesz message of national consolidation. Over 100 villagers attended.

Just over a week later, Róbert defeated Endre by 430 votes to 406 on a turnout of 60 %. Zsuzsa was elected to the village assembly, but only one other member of Róbert's inexpe-

rienced team was elected. The other four successful candidates were nominees of Endre, the defeated incumbent; three (all males) had been members since 2002, the fourth, newly elected, was the young woman who headed the local savings bank. All but one of the successful candidates lives in the village centre. The upper hamlet was left without representation – a situation, which would have been unthinkable in socialist days, but is the inevitable consequence of the present majoritarian democratic system.

Endre was defeated by the candidate of the party which, ever since its absorption of the Smallholders' Party, had established itself as the leading party in the countryside, and which, following Viktor Orbán's triumphs in the national and European parliamentary elections of April and May 2014 seemed to have captured all the commanding heights of the nation for eternity. The explanation of this parochial event is complex. It is easier to specify the factors, which did *not* play a role. The opponents in Tázlár in 2014 shared the same political orientation and neither indulged in nationalist rhetoric.¹⁴ Neither candidate had the burden of any past association with the socialist party, which had been the fatal handicap for János in 1998. Both were model husbands and fathers, who attended the Catholic church regularly, but without any hint of zealotry. Personal factors may have determined some votes on both sides. Róbert's ancestors were poor in comparison with those of Endre; neither had a large network of kin inside the community. However, Zsuzsa came from a well-respected Calvinist family that was still numerous in Tázlár, whereas Endre's wife, who worked part-time in the village library, was an immigrant. I heard a few snide remarks about each candidate from members of the other camp, but few questioned the basic integrity of both candidates.

Some people said that they intended to vote for Róbert because it was time for a change. Endre had tried hard in his early years to develop an industrial park on the outskirts of the village centre, but these plans did not come to fruition after skeletal remains were found and the county archaeologists had to be called in. More than a decade later, the remains of a medieval church and associated cemeteries have been fully excavated and documented for posterity. But no further investors were found and in the new millennium it seemed too many villagers that Endre was more concerned to expand his family business than to take new initiatives on behalf of the community. Róbert, by contrast, had no business interests of any kind, but a good track record of writing financial applications.

While these and other personal factors undoubtedly played a role, the narrowness of his victory suggests that Róbert's status as a Fidesz party member tipped the balance in securing him victory. I have mentioned the village *Fórum*, ideally timed to persuade undecided voters that the Fidesz candidate was the man to overcome stagnation and secure a prosperous future for Tázlár. The message delivered by the outside visitors on that day was very simple: the standard refrain of pork-barrel politics in other modern democracies. Róbert and Endre might be politically identical, e.g. in terms of which party they supported at the national and European elections. But unlike Endre, Róbert as a Fidesz member had privileged access to influential Fidesz politicians at every level, from the district (*járás*) centre Kiskőrös to the county capital Kecskemét and the capital. Formally, of course, applications from an independent mayor should be assessed on their merits, no differently from paperwork submitted by a Fidesz mayor. In practice, in 2014 few believed that the system worked that way. With one party so entrenched in power, it was rational to vote for a member of that

14 Some suggested that one elected member of Endre's team, nominally independent, had expressed Jobbik (extreme right) sympathies in the past.

party. Róbert's appeal to Tázlár voters was superficially based on his acknowledged IT skills, which would enable him and the new *pályázatíróicsoport* to write convincing applications. But there was a subtext: even if our grant applications are less than fully convincing, the fact that I am a party member and can expect the support of other Fidesz members at every level will give us the best possible chances of success.

In this way we can see that Prime Minister Orbán's rhetoric of "we, the nation" has institutional as well as ideological implications. The party could have decided not to mount a challenge to an incumbent mayor whose views on national and international political issues were the same as their own. When the local activists (Róbert, Zsuzsa and a handful of others) had decided to contest the election, it would still have been possible for the Fidesz hierarchy to offer formal support while refraining from any active intervention. Instead, they were extremely pro-active by attending his *Fórum* and reinforcing the impression that a mayor who cannot call upon such external personalities is unlikely to be able to achieve very much for his community. In short, Fidesz showed in 2014 that it was determined to establish a local government monopoly, which in certain respects resembles the monopoly enjoyed by the communist party a generation before. The difference, of course, is that the ideology of this party is much closer to the evolved values of rural households, rooted in private property and national identity. That is why active party membership proved to be an asset for the Tázlár teacher. He defeated Endre in the mayoral election in 2014 to become the first village leader with a party affiliation since the era of socialism; by contrast, his past membership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was the fatal flaw in the profile of the village teacher, who was defeated by Endre in the contest of 1998.¹⁵

CONCLUSION

Village elections in Hungary have rarely been fought on party lines, since no ideological cleavage exists within the countryside, but they nonetheless afford insight into developments at the national level and more general problems of postsocialism. The Hungarian Socialist Party, successor to the communist Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, has become insignificant. Independents have not been squeezed out entirely, and individual charisma, family networks and energetic campaigning can all make a difference to the final outcomes. Local residents themselves often stress that people vote for the individual and not the party. However, the larger picture is that Fidesz is now well on the way to attaining the same monopoly over rural political life which the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party exercised coercively for four decades before 1989. The party of Prime Minister Orbán has been able to mobilize voters by tapping into the old ideology of agrarianism based on private property and the values of the Christian nation, but it has also entrenched its power institutionally. Nowhere in the country is it stronger than in the Kiskunság, where the lower form of cooperative known as the *szakszövetkezet* allowed for greater continuity in household economic practices during the socialist period. The ideology of Christian nationalist agrarianism has shown remarkable

15 In 2014 János, the ex-communist, was a staunch supporter of Róbert, who he had recruited to the staff of the school two decades earlier. His support was strengthened by the fact that their wives were close relatives. Endre was perhaps naïve in assuming that he could remain independent, without "prostituting himself" by joining a party. This strategy worked so long as power at the national level changed hands regularly, but it was doomed once Viktor Orbán had convinced most voters that Fidesz was in power to stay. Had Endre joined Fidesz in the run-up to the elections of 2010, when victory for Orbán was guaranteed, or even later, he would have been able to head off any challenge.

resilience throughout Hungarian society since the pre-socialist era. It does not matter that nowadays not even the village population is primarily dependent on agriculture any longer. The irony or paradox lies in the fact that only during the four decades of domination by the party of the workers were policies to transform the material conditions of Hungary's rural population consistently pursued.

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Sebechlebští vinaři / The Winemakers of Sebechleby

JOSEF KANDERT

ABSTRACT:

This paper attempts to depict one part of a complex society as it existed during Czechoslovak communism, more specifically at the height of political “normalization” in Czechoslovakia between 1974 and 1980. In doing research, anthropologists must not only rely on important informants but on all of their informants. Just as we from the outside world try to understand and know their world, they do the same and attempt to understand and know our world through us. The information that we then obtain is a result and consequence of this mutual understanding. Field data are thus the outcome of this game at “uncovering one’s own world.” Therefore, all anthropological work is based on data acquired thanks to the collective efforts of many individuals – mainly the anthropologist, who has spent time (or lived) in a certain field, and last but not least the members of the group in which he or she lived and studied. Europe is at an advantage due to the existence of the historical perspective,” which can be studied independently of informants by utilizing various written documents. Moreover, it is sometimes possible to draw from older research, from entries in old chronicles, all the while being fully aware of the fact that these sources are not one-hundred percent credible. It is therefore possible to use these historical data for comparison and also for observing social processes or at least for observing tendencies in social movement, whether they are later called “development” or “change.” Another important source of information is data obtained through recollections of the past. It may seem that such narratives, which are part of the historical consciousness of a certain event, should not differ from each other. But that is not the way things are; like with the texts of myths, evaluations of a certain event may fundamentally differ, for example, in relation to the historical moment at which they were narrated. Descriptions and assessments of a particular event may differ based on the narrator, but above all they differ according to the period of time in which they were narrated. I noticed such a difference, for example, when people spoke about collectivization, that is, the period when agricultural cooperatives were formed. Informants described collectivization differently when I was doing my research and differently after 1990 when the collectivized agriculture system collapsed and a new era of returning land and property to their rightful owners dawned. Research was based in the village of Sebechleby, which was considered a model village for collectivized farming in Central Slovakia to which foreign delegations and important state visitors paid visits.

KEYWORDS:

Anthropology of the socialist village; Identity; Winemaking; Central Slovakia; Hont; Sebechleby

MOTTO:

V letech 1970 až 1976 započal Petr Skalník výzkum každodenního života na Slovensku, v obci Nižná Šuňava; následně, během putování světem, započal v letech 1984 až 1989 výzkumy vinařů v Kapsku (Jižní Afrika). Tento text propojuje obě, geograficky dosti vzdálená, témata.

Tento text¹ je pokusem o zobrazení části komplexní společnosti, tak jak existovala v letech československého socialismu, přesněji za vrcholící politické normalizace Československa v letech 1974 až 1980. Je současně i pokusem o zachycení procesu poznávání společenské reality jedním výzkumníkem, jehož důležitou součástí je kolektivní hra, jíž se účastní spolu s celou skupinou spoluhráčů, kteří se na tomto procesu poznávání podílejí. Mním tím především obyvatele Sebechlebu a dalších vesnic oblasti Hontu, ve kterých jsem svoje výzkumy podnikal.

Badatel není při výzkumu závislý jen na významných informátorech, ale na všech svých informátorech. Bez jejich ochoty nás přijmout, bavit se s námi, ukázat nám část svého světa, by vlastně nevznikla žádná suma „terénních záznamů“ – základního materiálu pro každou antropologickou práci. Tak jako se my přichozí z vnějšího světa snažíme pochopit a poznat jejich svět, činí oni totéž a naším prostřednictvím se snaží pochopit a poznat zase náš svět. Informace, které pak získáváme, jsou právě výsledkem i důsledkem tohoto vzájemného poznávání i chápání. Stupni poznání jejich světa odpovídá i kvalita údajů, které získáváme (které jsme schopni registrovat) a stupni jejich poznání našeho světa odpovídá i kvalita a kvantita údajů, které nám poskytují. „Terénní data“ jsou výsledkem hry „na odkrývání vlastního světa“. Je proto každá antropologická práce vlastně založena na datech získaných díky kolektivnímu úsilí řady osob – především dotyčného antropologa, který se pohyboval (žil) v určitém terénu, v neposlední řadě však i příslušníků skupiny, v níž žil a kterou zkoumal. Tomuto tématu je věnována řada prací – jak antropologických, (z novějších je třeba zmínit např. práce Paula Rabinowa [1977] či Nigela Barleye [1983]), tak sociologických (např. Alfred Schütz [1974]), většinou se ale soustřeďují jen na roli badatele anebo zmiňují opět jen jednotlivé (individuální) informátory – většinou to jsou knihy jednoho či několika málo informátorů.² To však nebyl případ mých výzkumů, data jsem získával od desítek a stovek informátorů v řadě lokalit zkoumané oblasti; a děkuji všem svým informátorům, přátelům a hostitelům ze Středního Slovenska, kteří měli se mnou trpělivost a kteří mne nechali nahlížet do jejich soukromých záležitostí.

Evropská situace je nevhodná pro výzkumníka právě pro množství skupin a seskupení, do nichž se členové studovaného společenství sdružují a jejichž normami se řídí a podle nichž rámcově upravují svoje jednání/chování. Je ovšem pravděpodobné, jak ukázaly některé práce z Afriky (viz např. „Abutia Ewe“ Michela Verdoni) (Verdon 1983), že stejná situace je i na jiných kontinentech a že mohla být antropology potlačována ve prospěch „snadno“ postižitelné a vysvětlitelné „kostry“ příbuzenského systému.

Výhodou evropské situace je naopak existence „historické perspektivy“, kterou je možné sledovat nezávisle na informátorech, s využitím nejrůznějších písemných dokumentů. Mohou být použity pro konfrontaci se současnými, badatelem zjišťovanými názory vesničanů. Zejména záznamy soudů jsou z tohoto hlediska velmi cenné a zajímavé. Kromě toho je někdy

1 Terénní výzkum se konal v letech 1974 až 1980; text je výstupem vědeckého programu UK „Prvouk 20 – Sociální, kulturní a historická antropologie“.

2 Velmi dobře je „interaktivita“ soužití badatelů a jejich hostitelů (informátorů) vyjádřena i v některých kratších studiích, jako např. v „Eating Christmas in the Kalahari“ (R. B. Lee) anebo v „Shakespeare in the Bush“ (Laura Bohannan). „Akiga's Story. The Tiv Tribe as seen by One of Its Members“ (přeložil a poznámkami opatřil Rupert East. London 1965) je příkladem studie vypracované jedním informátorem a je jeho sebereflexí společnosti a kultury, v níž žije. Podobných prací z afrického, severoamerického i oceánského kulturního prostředí je mnoho. Některé byly dokonce vydány jako krásná literatura. Tyto práce známe i z evropského prostředí, z minulosti i ze současnosti. V minulosti byli tomuto přístupu asi nejbližší tzv. vesničtí písmáci. V současné sociologii je tomuto pojetí velmi blízký směr biografické sociologie.

možné opřít se o starší výzkumy, o zprávy ze starých kronik a to při plném vědomí jejich ne-stopprocentní věrohodnosti. To ostatně platí pro všechny námi sledované údaje. Je tedy možné použít ona historická data pro srovnání a také pro sledování společenských procesů, anebo alespoň pro sledování tendencí společenského pohybu, ať už se mu následně říká „vývoj“ či „změna“.

Důležitým zdrojem informací jsou data získávaná ze vzpomínek na minulost. Mohlo by se dát, že taková vyprávění, které jsou součástí vesnického historického povědomí o určité události, se nebudou mezi sebou lišit. Není tomu ale tak; podobně jako texty mýtů, se mohou hodnocení událostí od sebe zásadně lišit, např. v souvislosti s historickým okamžikem vyprávění. Popis a hodnocení určité události se může lišit nejen podle vypravěče, ale především podle doby, kdy bylo vyprávěno. Takový rozdíl jsem zaznamenal např. ve vyprávěních o kolektivizaci, tedy o letech, kdy vznikala zemědělská družstva. Vypravěči popisovali jinak združstevňování v době mých výzkumů, a jinak v době po roce 1990, kdy se systém družstev zhroutil a nastávala doba navracení půdy a majetků právoplatným majitelům. V tomto druhém případě mělo vyprávění dramatictější a pochmurnějších ráz. Vzhledem k tomu, že většina našich informací o združstevňování pochází právě z doby po zhroucení celého socialistického systému, je náš obraz o kolektivizaci padesátých a šedesátých let 20. století mírně zkreslený. Až na výjimky totiž neexistují výzkumy z dob československého či slovenského socialismu, a jsme tak odkázáni na data získávaná „post mortem“.³ Podívejme se nyní, jak vypadal život za tzv. reálného socialismu a to z mužského pohledu malé skupiny vinařů.

První písemná zmínka o vesnici Sebechleby je z roku 1135, v 18. století měly Sebechleby status tržové vesnice či městyse a v této době byly na krátkou dobu i sídlem župy.⁴ Sebechleby obývali v době mých výzkumů družstevní rolníci (katastr obce měl rozlohu 3 082 ha) a obec tehdy byla považována za vzorovou družstevní vesnici na Středním Slovensku, kam se vozily zahraniční delegace a významní státní návštěvníci. Proto také byla vybrána pro „budoucí“ monografii o životě socialistické vesnice, jejímž redaktorem byl Adam Pranda (Pranda 1986). Vesnice měla 1282 obyvatel, kteří, podle sčítání z roku 1961, žili ve 234 domech. Ve vzdálenosti 2 až 4 km od vesnice byly situovány dvě lokality s vinnými sklepy a vinařskými domky – Mladá Hora a Stará Hora. Většina obyvatel obojího rodu pracovala v ístním jednotném zemědělském družstvu; část z nich dojížděla za prací do okresního města Krupiny, část byla zaměstnána u železnice a u státního autobusového přepravce. Na okraji obce byla cikánská osada. Byl tu Národní výbor, ředitelství střediskového „Jednotného rolnického družstva“ (JRD), které roku 1971 získalo titul „JRD Československo-sovětského přátelstva“. V obci byl kulturní dům s hospodou a obchodním střediskem, škola a školka, kostel se hřbitovem. Obyvatelé byli převážně římskokatolíci; v sedmdesátých letech 20. století byli ale v rámci družstevní centralizace a vytváření zemědělských makro-podniků spojeni do jednoho JRD se sousední evangelickou vesnicí Ladzany. Se světem a okresním městem spojovaly Sebechlebany autobusy. JRD hospodařilo v obci na 3 042 hektarech, důležitou roli při provozování nížinného zemědělství tu hrálo i ovocnářství a vinařství. Někteří vesničané si drželi krávy (více jak 40 kusů), které byly paseny ve zvláštním stádu.

Vinařské stredoslovenské vesnice sedmdesátých let, zejména pak Sebechleby, byly vesnicemi družstevními a tak vinařství zde bylo jedním z odvětví zemědělské velkovýroby.

3 Výjimkou jsou výzkumy autora tohoto článku, Soni Švecové, Jána Botíka a dalších kolegů ze subkomise pro výzkum společenských vztahů tzv. Karpatské komise, a také výzkum Petra Skalníka.

4 Kuka 1978, referát přednesený na konferenci subkomise pro společenské vztahy MKVKB v Dudincích.

Ovšem kromě toho se každý z vesničanů a každý z družstevníků snažil získat anebo udržet si vlastní vinohrad, vlastní sklep a vyrábět vlastní víno. Zatímco zemědělská půda byla „družstevní“, domy, zahrady, vinice a vinné sklepy spolu s vinařskými domky byly soukromé a dědily se v jednotlivých rodinách.⁵ Pokud si měl družstevník vybrat mezi přidělením půdy na záhumenek, určený pro pěstování zeleniny či jiných plodin, a přidělením půdy na vinici od Jednotného rolnického družstva, vždy dal přednost vinici.⁶ Všechny rodiny velkých a středních sedláků vlastnily pozemky s vinicemi a také pozemky s vlastními sklepy a s vinařskými domky (viz dále). Předpokládalo se, že každá bývalá selská, nyní družstevně rolnická rodina bude mít svého vinaře, případně několik členů s pověstí dobrého vinaře. Stejný standart se snažili získat i ostatní vesničané, takže v době výzkumu byl v obci velký zájem o stavební pozemky; někteří vesničané pak pěstovali vinnou révu i ve svých zahradách. Vesničanů, považovaných za vinaře nebylo mnoho, ve dvoutisícové vesnici mezi jednou až dvěma stovkami.

Pěstování vinné révy bylo chápáno jako velmi výhodná a výdělečná činnost. Vyrobené víno bylo určeno nejen pro spotřebu vlastní rodiny a příbuzenstva (ušetřené peníze za nákupy v obchodě), ale také na prodej – v první řadě zájemcům z okolních měst, kteří sem zajížděli nakupovat víno ke známým vinařům, na druhém místě pak družstvu Jednota, které zakoupené víno prodávalo do státních lihovarů. Jednotě bylo možné prodat i nepřilíš kvalitní víno. Kromě toho bylo možné prodat i vlastní úrodu, tj. samotné hrozny, protože se vždycky našli vesničané, kteří měli na své vinici či zahrádce malou úrodu. Z vyrobeného vína, většinou takového, co bylo horší kvality, bylo také možné si vypálit v místní pálenici vínovici. Vesničané také používali vyrobené víno jako vhodný úplatek při vyřizování svých záležitostí na nejrůznějších úřadech okresního či krajského formátu.

Ovšem, zdaleka ne každý, kdo se věnoval v Sebechlebech pěstování vinné révy a výrobě vína byl považován za vinaře.

Podle Sebechlebanů musel „vinař“ svým chováním naplňovat několik podmínek, které tvořily místní obraz správného vinaře. Je také třeba říci, že „vinař“ byl chápán jak výrazně mužská role, ženy se na pěstování vinné révy i na výrobě vína podílely (i na kontrole jeho spotřeby), ale pojem „vinařka“ v místním slovníku neexistoval – z důvodů, které snad osvětlí následující řádky.

Vesničané si v první řadě velmi vážili „vkladu vlastní práce“ – tzn. že vinař se musel osobně podílet na pracích na vinici (okopávání, ořezávání, uvazování, sběr hroznů, sázení hlav, příprava a zatloukání dřevěných kolíků aj.) a také všech prací ve sklepech (čištění prázdných sudů, lisování hroznů, síření, ředění a slazení moštu aj.). Příslušné práce také musel vykonávat ve správných lhůtách, pokud se opozdil anebo pracoval v nevhodný čas, byl pomlouván a jeho pověst utrpěla.⁷ Mnohé práce mohly vykonávat a také vykonávaly ženy, zpravidla manželky a dcery – platilo to zejména o okopávání vinic, uvazování hlav, sběru a lisování hroznů; ovšem o některých pracích se tvrdilo, že je ženy nezvládnou ve správné kvalitě. K „náročným pracím“, které nejlépe zvládají muži, patřilo na příklad ořezávání hlav a pak všechny práce spojené s vlastní výrobou vína v době jeho zrání v sudech a také

5 Historie pěstování vinné révy v Sebechlebech sahá až do 18. století; ve 20. století bylo obnoveno ve dvacátých až třicátých letech, kdy si také celá řada místních sedláků zakoupila od urbárské společnosti pozemky na stavbu vinařských domků.

6 Družstevník měl možnost nárokovat půdu o velikosti 3 arů a úroda z vinice této rozlohy umožnila vyrobit v průměru tisíc litrů vína.

7 Např. nebyla tolerována práce v neděli; vesničané také velmi bedlivě sledovali, jak komu postupují jednotlivé práce na vinicích a jak pečuje o sudy a další vinařské nářadí ve svém sklepe.

všechny práce spojené s péčí o již zralé víno. Pokud vykonávaly ženy i tyto „vinařské“ práce, byla ohrožena vinařská pověst celé rodiny. Takové práce se tolerovaly jen vdovám s nedospělými či svobodnými syny, ale i v těchto výjimečných případech vesničané očekávali, že vdově případně vypomůže některý z blízkých mužských příbuzných.

Vlastní výsledek vinařova snažení, tj. kvalita vína, hrál ve srovnání s první kategorií méně důležitou roli. Vesničané se neustále, potajmu, vzájemně obviňovali z výroby špatného (kyselého) vína; existovalo několik žertovných označení pro víno špatné kvality – např. „trojchlapové“, „čtyřchlapové“ či „kolenačkové“⁸ a existoval i vtip na sebechlebské víno obecně, podle kterého se ve vesnici zvonilo o půlnoci zejména proto, aby se všichni pijáci obrátili na druhý bok a kyselé víno jim tak nepropálilo žaludek. Kvalita vína každého vinaře se průběžně ověřovala v rámci vinařské komunity neustálým zvaním „na skleničku“ a debatami o víně při takovýchto přátelských a neformálních rozhovorech. Reprezentace vinařovy činnosti tak směřovala do vlastní vinařské komunity, jen minimálně mimo ni. Vesničané se shodovali v tom, že vinařem se člověk stává postupně, když se učí od svých starších a moudřejších příbuzných, sousedů a známých. Schopnost učení a vůbec zájem o vinařství byl spojován se statutem ženatého muže; u svobodných mládců se předpokládalo, že budou mít jiné zájmy než je vážná práce na vinici a ve vinném sklepě. Dobré víno pak mohl vinař vyrobit jen z vlastní úrody, protože jen vlastní hroznové víno, jehož růst a zrání celou dobu sledoval, mu mohlo zaručit dobrou kvalitu příštího vína. Zralé hrozny bylo možné kupovat, bez újmy na pověsti, jen v případě nouze a pak pro výrobu vína na prodej. Vesničané, kteří neměli vlastní hrozny a jen je kupovali od jiných, aby si z nich vyrobili víno, nebyli za vinaře považováni. Vinaři, o nichž se vědělo, že dokážou pravidelně vyrábět dobré víno, zaujímali postavení jakýchsi poradců a v minulosti (před vznikem JRD) prý byli voleni do představenstva urbárské společnosti.

Pohostinnost tak byla další a velmi důležitou charakteristikou každého vinaře; skoupi lidé byli pomlouváni, stejně jako ti, kteří nedokázali s vyrobeným vínem hospodařit a přišli o svoje zásoby příliš brzy. Dobrý vinař musel hospodařit s vínem tak, aby mu vystačilo nejen do příští úrody, ale i do příštího hotového vína, a kromě toho nesměl zapomínat na pohostinnost. Návštěva vinných sklepů patřila k mužským činnostem tzv. „skrytého odpočinku“, protože muži odcházeli z vesnice do sklepů oficiálně pro zásoby, ve skutečnosti ale u sklepů mnohdy trávili celý den ve společnosti svých přátel a známých. Do sklepů a vinařských domků chodily i ženy, ale frekvence jejich návštěv – pochůzek byla nižší než u mužů. Zatímco muži přebývali ve vinařských domcích a ve sklepech jednotlivě a někdy tam i samotní přespali do dalšího dne, ženy se většinou večer vracely do vesnice. Pokud musely zůstat ve vinařském domku, přespávaly tam jen v přítomnosti manžela, blízkého příbuzného anebo nejčastěji ve společnosti příbuzné či sousedky. Nebylo také obvyklé, aby samotná žena zvala kolemjdoucího na víno, pokud to nebyl blízký příbuzný anebo jiná žena – poškodila by si tak svou pověst počestné ženy. V přítomnosti jiné ženy anebo muže ale mohla hostitelskou roli klidně naplňovat. Vlastní vinařova reprezentace byla obrácena dovnitř komunity vinařů, kteří se vzájemně navštěvovali ve vinných sklepech a jen v minimální míře mimo toto společenství – k cizincům, návštěvníkům z okolí a z měst.

8 Označování kvality vína posměšnými přívlastky „trojchlapové“, „štvorchlapové“ anebo „kolenačkové“ patří k vinohradnickému folklóru. „Trojchlapové“ víno je takové kvality, že piják musí držet dva chlapy a třetí mu musí víno násilím lít do úst, aby se vůbec napil; „čtyřchlapové“ potřebuje k pití tři chlapy, kteří musí držet vzpouzejícího se pijáka, zatímco čtvrtý do něj víno nalévá; „kolenačkové“ víno je takové kvality, že kolemjdoucí lezou po kolenou pod okénkem vinného domku, aby je majitel neuvídel a nepozval je na skleničku.

V době výzkumu pak bylo důležité i prostředí, v němž se víno konzumovalo, tzn., že důležitým znakem vinaře bylo i vlastnění dobrého vinného sklepa a také reprezentačního domku nad ním, kam bylo možné zvát hosty. Vedle starých sklepů, vysekaných do skalnatého podloží, si vesničané hloubili nové sklepy technikou bagrování a stavební jámy pak zastřešovali. Nad sklepy se stavěly nové vinařské domky, ozdobené v duchu dobové módy anebo se renovovaly staré domky, u nichž kladl majitel důraz na jejich starobylost. Hosté byli zváni na víno do vinařských domků anebo do vinných sklepů, do domů do vesnice si nosili Sebechlebané víno pro vlastní potřebu anebo pro domácí návštěvy.

Vinařem se tedy mohl stát jen takový vesničan, který řádně pracoval na vinici a ve vinném sklepě, vyráběl kvalitní víno především z vlastní úrody, byl pohostinný a byl majitelem vinného sklepa a vinařského domku. Statut „vinaře“ pak výrazně zlepšoval společenské postavení vesničana v celé obci.

V době mých výzkumů bylo místní zemědělské družstvo už více jak dvacet let staré (bylo založeno roku 1952) a naprostá většina vesničanů byla jeho členy od roku 1960. Přes veškerou realitu agitační výchovy k socialistickému myšlení a způsobu života však stále hrály ve vesnickém společenství důležitou roli rodiny bývalých sedláků („gazdů“). Selské rodiny a jejich členové si přes značné postihy, jimiž prošly v padesátých letech, to jest v době združstevňování, udržely význačnější postavení až do sedmdesátých let a např. mladá generace z těchto rodin, pokud zůstala žít ve vesnici, se dostala do vedoucích pozic v představenstvu JRD např. jako agronomové, skupináři apod. Tito lidé také mohli svým názorem ovlivnit vesnické veřejné mínění.

V Sebechlebech bylo také možné sledovat staré sociální a majetkové dělení vesničanů podle umístění jejich obydlí, domu či celého hospodářského komplexu v samotné vesnici. Na hlavní násvi stály domy a za nimi i hospodářské dvory a zahrady bývalých velkých sedláků, jeden vedle druhého po obou stranách silnice procházející vesnicí. Dále v řadě za nimi a ve vedlejších ulicích byly domy menších sedláků a za nimi domy se dvorky chalupníků a někde na okraji vesnice domy bezzemků. Cikánská osada byla umístěna při jednom konci vesnice; stála na půdě nevhodné pro nějakou zemědělskou činnost. V sedmdesátých letech 20. století si Sebechlebané svoje domy modernizovali a vytvářeli řady „krabicovitých“ domů. Dvory se měnily na zahradnický upravený prostranství a staré stodoly (neužívané, protože lidé pracovali v JRD) se bouraly a na jejich místech vznikaly další novostavby v podobě jedno i dvoupatrových vil.

Tradiční lokace domů vedla k tomu, že sousedy se stávali lidé zhruba stejného či podobného ekonomického (a pro staré vesničany tedy i sociálního) postavení. Stará zástavba tak podporovala „stavovské“ dělení z doby před nástupem socialismu. Vlna novostaveb ovšem tuto historickou lokační symboliku narušila – začalo se stavět v zahradách a také na okraji vesnice. JRD v Sebechlebech totiž dalo svým členům k dispozici stavební pozemky na zemědělské půdě u vesnice. Některé rodiny si zde zajišťovaly parcely ani ne tak z potřeby stavět (z potřeby nového domu) jako spíše z principu – před združstevněním, jak uváděli, jim ta půda patřila, a tak se na ní opět usazují, i když je to jen na malém kuse (parcely byly po 400 m²).

Ukazatelů příslušnosti ke společenské vrstvě sedláků bylo několik. V první řadě vesničané zmiňovali ukazatele většího majetku: sedláci měli vlastní potah, případně několik potahů, nemuseli tedy nikoho žádat o pomoc. Obvykle bylo vlastnictví potahu spojováno i s provozem

váním povoznické živnosti – tedy s dalším zdrojem příjmů. Sedláci měli pozemky i v katastrech sousedních vesnic. Sedláci byli držiteli majetku obecně, měli např. pronajatou krčmu, obchod, řeznictví apod. Sedláci se nenechávali najímat na zemědělské práce. Sedláci měli dostatečně velké domy, aby mohli zapůjčit prostory ve svém obytném domě pro taneční zábavy. Selské rodiny si pekly vlastní chléb. A sedláci měli vlastní vinice a vinné sklepy.

Na druhém místě uváděli vesničané charakteristiky, které měly trvalý význam a přetrvaly i do socialistických dob, do dob, kdy selská rodina např. ztratila svůj majetek díky združstevnění. Tyto charakteristiky existovaly i v době mých výzkumů. Použití takové charakteristiky v rozhovorech potvrzovalo, že příslušný jedinec je stále ještě sedlákem a že jeho rodina je stále chápána jako selská rodina. Sedláci chodí komukoliv za kmotry, a to i těm nejchudším obyvatelům vesnice, i cikánům. Někteří členové selské rodiny drží anebo zastávají, díky svému vzdělání, různé úřady nezávislé na vesnické komunitě. Takové rodiny mají vlastního faráře (tím bylo míněno, že nechali vystudovat člena rodiny na faráře), v minulosti měli vlastní notáře, v současnosti úředníky ve městech apod. Mnozí členové selských rodin studovali a mají „maturitu“ či jiné vyšší vzdělání. Toto hodnocení platilo zejména pro starší a střední generaci, protože v nejmladší generaci bylo lidí s maturitou daleko více. Místo maturity se pak hovořilo o vysokoškolském vzdělání. Účast rodinných farářů na rodinných svatbách a pohřbech byla obecně vysoce hodnocena. Selské rodiny byly obecně považovány za nejstarší usedlé rodiny v obci. Tato charakteristika selských rodin byla proklamována bez ohledu na historickou skutečnost. Když jsem kontroloval v matrikách stáří jednotlivých rodin ve vesnicích, nezřídka jsem zjistil, že předkové údajně nejstarších selských rodin se do vesnice přistěhovali daleko později než předkové rodin ne-selských. Členové těchto ne-selských rodin dokonce sami proklamovali archaičnost vesnických sedláků – obvykle se délkou usídlení ve vesnici vysvětlovalo bohatství a vážnost rodiny. Členové selských rodin drželi a drží vesnické úřady.

Příslušnost ke skupině sedláků ale nebyla trvalá, bylo možné o ni přijít. Důvody pro ztrátu společenského postavení byly spojeny především s morálními a etickými hodnotami vesnického společenství, v nichž hrály důležitou roli křesťanské hodnoty.

Patřily k nim projevy lakomství a jedním z možných náznaků lakomství bylo chování, kdy si poskytují kmotrovství jen v rámci skupiny nejbližších příbuzných a odmítali jít za kmotra/kmotru každému, kdo je o takovou službu požádal. Také příliš časté sňatky mezi blízkými pokrevními příbuznými byly chápány negativně. Pro takové případy existovalo označení „cikánské rodiny“. Negativně bylo také hodnoceno pomlouvání členů rodiny a příbuzných „na veřejnosti“ a veřejné hádky mezi příbuznými.

Vesnice, respektive její obyvatelé, byli propojeni sítěmi příbuzenských, sousedských, kamarádských, profesních a mnoha dalších vztahů. V tomto pletenci vztahů hrálo důležitou roli i vinařství, respektive vlastnictví vinic a vinných sklepů. Existovala shoda, že za sousedy lze považovat jen obyvatele sousedních domů, např. již ne obyvatele domů stojících na protější straně ulice či návsi. V některých případech se do sousedské skupiny počítali i obyvatelé domů, které stály až ve druhém pořadí co do vzdálenosti od centrálního domu (od ego). V přeneseném smyslu byli za sousedy považováni i lidé, kteří sice nežili v sousedním obytném domě, ale měli v sousedství hospodářské budovy či pozemku mluvčího nějaký vlastní hospodářský či rekreační objekt. V Sebechlebech tak existovali sousedé, jejichž vztah byl založen na sousedství u vinných sklepů či vinařských domků. I pro tyto lidi se užívalo oslovení „soused“ – „sousedka“ (súsed – súseďa) a platily pro ně „sousedské“ normy chování.

Vůči sousedovi se má jedinec chovat zdvořile, v případě potřeby je od něj očekávána pomoc a to i bez vyzvání. Při oslovení se používá referenční termín – tj. „soused“ či „sousedka“. Členové mladší generace se obvykle oslovují křestními jmény. Výpomoc poskytovaná při zemědělských aj. pracích se odpracovává a přitom se pečlivě sleduje, zda byla „vrácena“ odpovídající protihodnota. Při hodnocení odpracované protihodnoty se bere v úvahu nejen množství odvedené práce, ale i termín, ve kterém byla práce vykonána. Protihodnota se stávala a stává i předmětem sporů mezi sousedy.

Ve středoslovenských vesnicích byl v sedmdesátých letech patrný vývoj k chataření městských obyvatel. Ve Sebechlebech tak začal nabývat vrchu názor hodnotící vinařské domky a sklepy jako rekreační objekty. Majitelé vinných sklepů začali v průběhu tohoto desetiletí nejen s rekonstrukcí starých staveb, ale začali k nim také přistavovat místnosti určené čistě na rekreaci – jídelní kouty, ložnice a kuchyňky, často bohatě zdobené a vybavené speciálním nábytkem a sedacími kouty. Staré vinařské domky vesničané rekonstruovali do podoby miniaturních rodinných vilek, nové vinařské domky se tak už rovnou projektovaly. Současně i vzrostl zájem o stavební parcely v obou lokalitách, do nichž jsou ve vesnickém katastru soustředěny sklepy i vinařské domy (Stará Hora, Mladá Hora) a vesničané začali také pátrat po starých zasypaných sklepech, které by si mohli odkoupit od obce a nad nimiž by si mohli nové rekreační objekty – tj. vinařské domky – chaty postavit. Tento „rekreační“ zájem, spojený se zájmem o zvýšení prestiže, způsobil i značné zvýšení ceny pozemků v obou lokalitách. Zde je třeba připomenout, že starší představa (z doby před „rekreačním boomem“) uvažovala o sklepech i o vinařských domcích jako o zásobárnách (některé domky sloužily v minulosti i jako seníky či maštale) a jako o pracovních místech – ovšem při zachování představy o kamuflovaném odpočinku, který zmiňují výše.

K obci patřily dvě lokality s vinicemi a vinařskými domky, z nichž Mladá Hora byla již plně přestavěná (ležela blíže vesnice), zatímco na Staré Hoře bylo ještě mnoho vinařských domků z 18. a 19. století. V sedmdesátých letech i jim hrozilo, že budou zbourány či přestavěny. Poté, co jeden příslušník selské rodiny obnovil domek v původní podobě a tuto rekonstrukci vysvětlil jako viditelný symbol svého vysokého společenského postavení: rekonstrukce starého vinařského domku byla totiž dražší než postavení nového a starých domků se zachovalo jen několik, takže se staly symbolem exkluzivního majetku. Když si pak i televize vybrala tuto lokalitu pro její starobylý vzhled jako dějiště jakéhosi pořadu, bylo vyhráno.

Vinařské domky byly také chápány jako součást mužského odpočinkového světa. Celkově lze říci, že muži chodí do hospody se všeobecným souhlasem žen, a to zejména v pátek či v sobotu večer, kdy následují volné dny. Zdůvodnění, která jsem slyšel od mužů i žen, se shodovala: aby se napili, porozprávěli mezi sebou, aby se dozvěděli nějaké novinky. Některé ženy dodávaly „a kde by chodili?“ anebo poznamenávaly, že muži „nemají kam jít“. Jak se ukazovalo, ženy se scházejí po domech – mají kam jít. Jak z výroků, tak z chování vesničanek i vesničanů jasně vyplývalo, že domy či domácnosti jsou ženským světem, patří ženám; naopak hospody, vinice a vinařské sklepy či vinařské domky byly mužským světem. V naší vesnici odcházeli muži v neděli do vinných sklepů, aby přinesli „zásoby na celý týden“ (víno, klobásy, ovoce, brambory, maso konzervované ve sklenicích atp.). U sklepů pak trávili celý den, zvali sousedy i kolemjdoucí na skleničku, společně popíjeli a debatovali. V některých případech za nimi odpoledne přišla i žena s dětmi, případně další příbuzní a pobyt u sklepů má ráz rodinného výletu. Stejně „zásobovací“ cesty se konaly i v týdnu, měly ale úplně jiný ráz – muž se obvykle hned vracel se zásobami a u sklepů se nezdržoval, pokud tam nemá skutečně práci.

Vinařské domky byly také místem, kde se vesničané setkávali s „cizinci“, tj. obyvateli sousedních vesnic a s návštěvníky z blízkých i vzdálenějších měst. Sebechlebané ve svých výrociích odmítali, že by se jakýmkoliv způsobem v minulosti stýkali s obyvateli sousedních Ladzan, kde žili evangelíci. Ukázalo se ale, že v současnosti i v minulosti, když se pořádaly taneční zábavy „na Starej Hore“ – tj. v místě vinařských bud a sklepů, docházeli na ně pravidelně lidé z Ladzan a to nejen z tamních katolických rodin. Tato lokalita totiž ležela v blízkosti hranic ladzanského katastru.

Jiným případem byly návštěvy z měst. Vesnice, leží na hlavní silnici z Krupiny a Levice a tak sem zajížděli zájemci o čerstvé ovoce a o víno. Vůči náhodným návštěvníkům hráli vesničané, tj. muži, kteří s nimi jednali o prodeji vína apod., často roli „rázovitých vesničanů“ (rozuměj přihlouplých vesnických mudrlantů) do níž se krásně stylizovali. Bylo obecně známo, kdo si vede lépe a kdo hůře v podobném chování. Celá situace setkání měšťáků s vesničany byla hodnocena nahodilými přihlížejíci, rozuměj vesničany, stejně jako chování jednotlivých aktérů. Celá, vlastně herní, situace kontaktu byla zdrojem zábavy jak v okamžiku prodeje, tak později při rozhovorech vesničanů. Toto chování „prostých vesničanů“ jsem nikdy ne-zaregistroval při jakýchkoliv kontaktech mezi obyvateli ze dvou vesnic – sousedících či od sebe více vzdálených; chování bylo jednoznačně určeno pro lidi z měst.

Vinařství hrálo jistou roli i při hodnocení socialismu a existence družstevnictví. Vzpomínky na združstevňování měly obecně temný charakter; bylo chápáno jako násilný zákrok státu do každodenního, obyčejného a ověřeného vesnického života. Součástí těchto vzpomínek byla i vyprávění o velké nespravedlnosti, proti které neměli vesničané obranu, a tou bylo násilné vystěhování nejbohatší selské rodiny z vesnice. Vesničané také zdůrazňovali neodvratitelnost této změny – i když se o ní debatovalo a lidé se vstupu do zemědělského družstva bránili, nebylo v lidských silách změně zabránit. Ve vyprávění se ale také vracel motiv nepřejících a mstivých spoluobyvatel, obvykle chudých, kteří státní nespravedlnost ještě zvyšovali příliš tvrdým postihem všech, kdo se združstevňování bránili. V sedmdesátých letech 20. století byly již tyto vzpomínky součástí místní historie, zejména pak činy jednotlivých rolníků a jejich protivníků, politických aktivistů. Většinou byly spojeny s vyprávěním o letech, která následovala po vlastním združstevnění, kdy se ekonomická situace vesničanů silně zhoršila. Byla to kulturní změna, která byla na počátku špatná a teprve časem se obrátila v „kladnou“ změnu. V sedmdesátých letech 20. století družstevní vesničané tuto změnu již oceňovali a jedním z jejích znaků bylo i místní vinařství. Nové zemědělské družstvo totiž v padesátých letech obnovilo místní pěstování vinné révy a přispělo tak i k obnově soukromých, záhumenkových vinic.

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Gambie: geneze politického stranictví /

The Gambia: The Genesis of Party Politics

VLASTIMIL FIALA

ABSTRACT:

The study “The Gambia: The Genesis of Party Politics” deals with the emergence of party politics in the small West African nation of the Gambia. First it focuses on the emergence of the first Gambian pressure and interest groups in the nineteenth century and political parties in the first half of the twentieth. It then follows the postwar formation of the first political parties active in the Gambia in the 1950s and 1960s (the Gambian Democratic Party, the Gambian Muslim Congress Party, and the United Party). However, the main role in gaining political independence in 1965 was played by the newly formed People’s Progressive Party, which stayed in power until the military coup in 1994, when all political organizations were banned. Party politics were partially restored in 1996, when the military government formed its own party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) and political parties whose members were not politically active during the previous regime were allowed. Only in 2001 was the ban on political parties fully lifted. Today, we can observe the strengthening of the political power of the quasi-civilian government, whose former military leaders limit political opposition and whose ruling APRC has become the dominant political party in the Gambia through “controlling” the election process.

KEYWORDS:

The Gambia; Politics; Political parties; Party politics

Gambie se nachází v regionu západní Afriky. Zatímco na západě země její břehy omývá Atlantický oceán, ze všech ostatních stran sousedí se Senegalem. Území Gambie o rozloze 11 295 km² je velmi specifické, jedná se fakticky o dlouhý pruh území podél řeky Gambie. Šířka území se pohybuje od 10 po 17 km.

Gambii obývá pět hlavních etnických skupin. Nejpočetnější z nich jsou Mandingové (40 %), dále zde sídlí Fulové (13 %), Wolofové (12 %) a příslušníci etnika Jola a Serahuli (každá po 7 %). Kromě černošského obyvatelstva jsou v zemi usazeny malé skupiny Evropanů, Libanonců, Syřanů a mauritijských Arabů. Na území Gambie žije přibližně 1 840 000 obyvatel (OSN 2012). Oficiálním a obchodním jazykem Gambie je angličtina, nicméně všechny

etnické skupiny hovoří vlastním jazykem. Hlavním gambijským náboženstvím je islám, který vyznává více jak 80 % místního obyvatelstva (Darboe 2004).

Země je rozdělena do menších okresů, které řídí náčelníci ve spolupráci s tradičními vesnickými autoritami. Tyto menší obvody jsou pak sdruženy do sedmi volebních regionů, v jejichž čele stojí centrálně vládou jmenovaní komisaři. Komisaři spolupracují se zvolenými regionálními radami, jejich členy jsou i nevolení místní náčelníci. V hlavní městě Banjulu pak působí lokálními volbami zvolená městská rada (PHW 2013, 509).¹

Území dnešní Gambie se dostalo pod britský vliv po roce 1588, kdy se Britové poprvé objevili v ústí řeky Gambie. Britové zde vybudovali své první opevněné tvrze, nicméně jako oficiální kolonie se Gambie stala součástí britského impéria až v roce 1888. V roce 1963 Gambie získala vnitřní samosprávu a plně nezávislou uvnitř Commonwealthu se stala 18. února 1965. Všechno stálo formálně až do roku 1970 britská panovnice. V únoru 1970 gambijský parlament na základě úspěšného referenda schválil novou republikánskou ústavu v čele s nepřímo voleným prezidentem. O prezidentovi nejdříve rozhodovali poslanci, od roku 1977 je prezident volen ve všeobecných přímých volbách, přičemž délka jeho funkčního období je pět let a prezident může být opakovaně volen bez jakéhokoliv omezení.

Fakticky od získání politické nezávislosti se v zemi stala vedoucí (predominantní) politickou stranou Lidová pokroková strana (People's Progressive Party – PPP) v čele s předsedou a ozději prezidentem Dawdou K. Jawarem. Opozice, která v parlamentních volbách v letech 1972, 1977 a 1982 získala dohromady více jak 30 % hlasů, díky většinovému volebnímu systému nebyla schopna obsadit v parlamentu odpovídající politické zastoupení. Přestože PPP nikdy neusilovala o zavedení politického systému s jednou vládnoucí politickou stranou, vybudovala v zemi pevný stranický systém s predominantní politickou stranou (s ústavní většinou), který opozice nebyla schopna nikdy demokratickými prostředky (volbami) výrazněji ohrozit.

Na počátku 80. let politické elity Gambie a Senegalu zahájily jednání o vytvoření konfederace, která vešla v účinnost 1. února 1982. Vzhledem k zásadním politickým neshodám se však 30. září 1989 konfederace rozpadla (srovnej Coppa 1986; Hughes 1992).

V červenci 1994 došlo v Gambii k vojenskému převratu, během kterého byl prezident a předseda vládnoucí Lidové pokrokové strany (PPP) Dawda Kairaba Jawara svržen nenásilným pučem. Přebírat provedla skupina mladých vojenských důstojníků vedených kapitánem Yahyem Jammehem, který se následně dostal do čela státu. Armáda zrušila platnost ústavy, rozpustila sněmovnu a zakázala v zemi veškeré politické aktivity.

V roce 1996 vojenská vláda předložila k diskusi a následně schválila návrh nové ústavy. Ústava ponechala prezidentovi dřívější pětiletý mandát a upravila volební zákon. Počet členů poslanecké sněmovny byl zvýšen na 53, přičemž 48 z nich bylo voleno většinovým systémem. Další pět poslanců podle nové ústavy jmenoval přímo prezident, přičemž poslanci z nich musí povinně zvolit předsedu parlamentu (mluvčí) a jeho zástupce.

1 Political Handbook of the World (PHW), Africa Confidential (AC) a Africa Research Bulletin (ARB) jsou odborné přehledové časopisy, které přináší přehled tisku (ARB), komentáře aktuálních událostí na africkém kontinentě (AC) či roční přehledy politického vývoje afrických zemí. V textu jsou tyto časopisy a ročenky využity a citovány způsobem obvyklým v politologickém výzkumu.

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K částečnému obnovení politického soutěžení došlo až v polovině roku 1997, kdy se vojenská vláda rozhodla uvolnit činnost některých politických stran a vyhlásit termín prezidentských a parlamentních voleb. Vítězem voleb se stala nově vytvořená politická strana Aliance za vlastenecké směřování a pokrok (Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction – APRC), která vznikla na základech bývalé vojenské vlády. Prezidentem republiky byl zvolen D. K. Jawara.

V roce 2001 došlo k úplnému uvolnění politické činnosti všech politických stran a v zemi pak pravidelně až do současnosti probíhaly jak parlamentní, tak i prezidentské volby, které díky dobře zformulovanému volebnímu zákonu opakovaně vyhrávala vládnoucí APRC. Prezident Jammed dokázal ve všech třech následujících prezidentských volbách (2001, 2006 a 2013) obhájit svůj prezidentský mandát. V zemi byl nastolen stranický systém s jednou predominantní politickou stranou, která byla opakovaně schopna v parlamentních volbách získat ústavní většinu.

U zrodu politického stranictví v Gambii stály nejdříve nejrůznější nátlakové skupiny, které působily na území britské kolonie již od poloviny 19. století. Již v 1. polovině 19. století fungovaly v Bathurstu kluby hájící zájmy různých etnických skupin, zejména kreolské, které se snažily ovlivňovat rozhodnutí koloniálních úřadů (Nyang 1975, 4). Tyto zájmové skupiny se často obracely na britskou vládu s nejrůznějšími stížnostmi a peticemi. Jednou z prvních takových politických nátlakových skupin byla Západoafrická indická společnost (Africa-West Indian Society – AWIS), která vznikla někdy v 60. letech 19. století (Nyang 1975, 3). Jejím cílem bylo hájit zájmy svých členů, zejména při jednání s koloniálními úřady.

Na tyto většinou nepolitické organizace usilující o zlepšení životních podmínek gambijského obyvatelstva či sdružovaly jeho ekonomické a sociální zájmy navázaly v meziválečném období první proto-politické organizace jako např. Gambijská sekce Národního kongresu Britské západní Afriky (National Congress of British West Africa – NCBWA), která se označuje za první moderní gambijskou politickou stranu.

Vznik NCBWA souvisí s činností Gambijského domorodého obranného svazu (Gambia Native Defensive Union – GNDU), který vytvořil již v roce 1919 E. F. Small. Zástupci GNDU se v březnu 1920 zúčastnili v ghanské Akkře konference vzdělaných Západoafričanů původem z britských kolonií, kde došlo ke zformování NCBWA. Nově vzniklá regionální organizace se skládala ze čtyř územních frakcí, včetně gambijské sekce. Jinou verzi vzniku Gambijské sekce NCBWA uvádí J. A. Langley, podle kterého za vznikem gambijské sekce a samotné NCBWA stál I. J. Roberts (Langley 1969, 382–383).

GNDU byla podle Langleye spíše nepříliš úspěšná nátlaková skupina bez politických cílů, která sdružovala vládní úředníky, jak Gambijce, tak Sierra-Leonce. Podle britských archivních pramenů GNDU nebyla britskou vládou považována za politickou organizaci a během 1. světové války usilovala především o zvýšení mzdových prostředků pro své členy v koloniálních úřadech (Nyang 1975, 7).

Gambijská sekce NCBWA pod vedením E. F. Smalla měla převážně elitistický, náboženský a etnický charakter, když se opírala především o vzdělané křesťanské příslušníky etnika Aku, i když v ní měli své zastoupení i muslimští Wolofové (Nyang 1975, 10). NCBWA se nikdy nepodařilo získat širší podporu gambijské společnosti, navíc se od svého vzniku potýkala s ostrým frakčním bojem. Konzervativní frakce včele se S. J. Forsterem Jr. NCBWA nakonec opustila.

NCBWA se potýkala i s neskrývanou nelibostí britských koloniálních úřadů, které ji prohlašily za nereprezentativní skupinu vzdělaných pobřežních Afričanů s nulovým mandátem hovořit za většinu domorodého obyvatelstva. Aktivita NCBWA byly utlumeny odchodem jejich předsedy Smalla do zahraničí a nakonec v roce 1928 vyústily v její úplný zánik. Za zánikem gambijské sekce NCBWA stály nejen vnitřní etnické, náboženské a sociální rozpory, ale i činnost britských koloniálních úřadů, které otevřeně vystupovaly proti jeho aktivitám. Členové gambijské sekce NCBWA následně vstoupili buď do nově vzniklého Gambijského reprezentativního výboru (Gambia Representative Committee – GRC) či Asociace plátců daní (Rate Payers' Association – RPA).

Větší pozornost si však zaslouží zejména Asociace plátců daně (Rate Payers' Association – RPA), která vznikla v roce 1932 s cílem organizovat protesty proti nepopulárním právním reformám guvernéra H. R. Palmera, zejména v souvislosti se zavedením nové Trestního zákoníku a Trestního procesního zákona. RPA však měl i politické ambice, když se snažila najít kandidáta pro volby do Bathurst Urban District Council (BUDC), který by se mohl postavit proti kandidátovi Gambijského reprezentativního výboru (Gambia Representative Committee – GRC) (Gailey 1965, 193).

Včele RPA byl Richard Shokelu Rendall, bývalý státní zaměstnanec na odpočinku, který stál později u vzniku Lidové strany (People's Party – PP), která neúspěšně kandidovala ve volbách do Legislativní rady v roce 1947. Nicméně hlavním motorem této nátlakové skupiny byl E. F. Small, i když sám nepatřil k plátcům daní.

Do činnosti RPA se zapojila i řada aktivistů NCBWA a část představitelů Bathurst Trade Union. V meziválečném období RPA stála za řadou protestních shromáždění a peticí proti trestním zákonům a další legislativě, ale ve většině případů byla neúspěšná. Kandidáti RPA poprvé kandidovali i do BUDC v roce 1933, ale nikdo z nich neuspěl. Teprve v roce 1934 se čtyřem jejím kandidátům podařilo v BUDC získat zastoupení na úkor doposud dominantní GRC. V prvních volbách do Bathurst Council v roce 1936 RPA dokonce obsadila všechny místa. Své dominantní postavení si RPA udržovala až do roku 1946, kdy v Bathurst Town Council získala jen 6 z 15 míst a krátce poté zanikla (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 185–186).

GRC vznikl v únoru 1926 z iniciativy Johna Ambrose N' Jai-Gomez, který byl blízkým spolupracovníkem S. J. Forstera Jr. a W. D. Carrola. GRC vznikla s cílem reprezentovat konzervativní postoje Bathurstské společnosti. V říjnu 1930 se N' Jai-Gomezovi podařilo obnovit činnost skomírajícího GRC, který následně získal 5 z 6 míst v prvních volbách v lednu 1931 do nově zformované Bathurst Urban District Council (BUDC). Členové GRC ovládali BUDC až do prosince 1934, když se v BUDC prosadili kandidáti opoziční RPA. Následně GRC zmizela z gambijské politické scény.

Skutečné politické organizace se na gambijské politické scéně objevují až v souvislosti s poválečnými ústavními reformami, které umožnily omezenou přímou volbu koloniální

Legislativní rady. Jako první vznikla Gambijská demokratická strana (Gambia Democratic Party – GDP), kterou krátce nato následoval Gambijský muslimský kongres (Gambia Muslim Congress – GMC) a Sjedenocná Strana (United Party – UP).

Gambijská demokratická strana vznikla v červnu 1951 na základech Unijního a pokrokového výboru (Committee of Union and Progress – CUP). Jejím předsedou se stal reverend J. C. Faye, který pak s pomocí GDP usiloval o zvolení do Legislativní rady (Nyang 1975, 14). GDP se opírala především o podporu z komunit Aku a Wolof v Bathurstu, včetně státních zaměstnanců, obchodníků, obchodních úředníků a dřívějších stoupenců E. F. Smalla. Přestože většina stoupenců GDP se hlásila ke křesťanskému vyznání, strana měla podporu i ze strany muslimů.

Volební kampaň GDP byla úspěšná a Faye se stal členem Legislativní rady a svůj mandát obhájil i v roce 1954. V roce 1955 GDP vytvořila taktickou koalici s UP proti GMC v Bathurst Town Council, ale jejich koalice se v roce 1957 rozpadla. Od roku 1959 se GDP postupně přibližovala GMC a v dubnu 1960 obě strany vytvořily společnou Demokratickou kongresovou alianci (Democratic Congress Alliance – DCA), čímž GDP zcela zanikla (Nyang 1975, 16).

Výše zmíněný Gambijský muslimský kongres se zformoval v lednu 1952 na základě sjednocení přibližně 40 menších muslimských organizací pod vedením jeho generálního tajemníka Ibrahima Momodou Garby-Jahumpy. Nejvýznamnější zakládající organizací GMC byla Bathurstská mládežnická muslimská společnost (Bathurst Young Muslim Society – BYMS), která se chtěla přeměnit v efektivní politický nástroj hájící zájmy muslimské populace. GMC šířila své politické ideje a cíle především mezi gambijskou muslimskou populací prostřednictvím muslimských zájmových skupin. Hlavní podporu GMC čerpala především z muslimského etnika Wolof, přičemž GMC podporovali zejména státní zaměstnanci a obchodní úředníci (Gailey 1965, 194).

Garba-Jahumpa, který skončil v roce 1951 na druhém místě, v následujících volbách v roce 1954 utrpěl nepříjemnou porážku, když skončil jako poslední. GMC dlouhodobě úzce spolupracovala s britskými koloniálními úřady, přičemž Garba-Jahumpa se později stal dokonce ministrem zemědělství. Nicméně spolupráce s Brity a zejména s nepříteli populárním britským guvernérem Percy Wyn-Harrisem se odrazila na řadě volebních neúspěchů GMC v 50. letech minulého století a vážným způsobem oslabilo postavení GMC ve prospěch UP a GDP. Nicméně v roce 1959 díky aktivnímu odporu proti připravované ústavě GMC opět získal širokou podporu. V dubnu 1960 se GMC spojilo s GDP a vytvořily Demokratickou kongresovou alianci (DCA). GMC tím aktem zcela zaniklo.

Poslední významnější aktivní politickou stranou byla Sjedenocná strana, která vznikla v říjnu 1951 s cílem podpořit P. S. N'Jieho při jeho budoucí kandidatuře do tehdejší Legislativní rady (Nyang 1975, 20). Největší úspěch UP pravidelně dosahovala v obvodu Colony mezi etnickou skupinou Wolof, zejména pak sub-etnika Saloum-Saloum. UP měla také silnou oporu wolovských žen, které se sdružovaly v řadě ženských svépomocných organizací. UP získávala velmi silnou podporu od římskokatolické církve, ale podporovali ji i muslimové, kteří byli zastoupeni i ve vedení UP. UP se nicméně označovala jako gambijská celonárodní politická strana.

Díky volebnímu úspěchu UP v Bathurstu v roce 1954 zaujal P. S. N'Jie o rok později místo v Legislativní radě, ale po násilných střetnutích UP se stoupenci GMC v říjnu 1955 byl

odvolán z BTC. Díky tomu se UP ocitla na dobu pěti let v opozici, ale na druhé straně se nemusela v následujících letech potýkat s označením, že byla politickým nástrojem britské koloniální vlády. V roce 1960 se stala nejvýznamnější politickou stranou v Bathurstu, když ve volbách v Protektorátu obsadila tři z 12 poslaneckých mandátů. Dohromady pak měla ve sněmovně pět poslanců. Přestože UP skončila ve volbách jako druhá, britský guvernér vyzval Njeha ke zformování kabinetu. V roce 1962 UP utrpěla drtivou porážku, když získala jen 13 z 32 poslaneckých mandátů a musela ustoupit volební koalici PPP a DCA (19 mandátů).

V nezávislé Gambii popularita UP neustále klesala. První volební neúspěch přišel již ve volbách v roce 1966, kdy v koalici s GCP přišla o pět poslaneckých mandátů (Rice 1968). V roce 1970 předsedu UP P. S. N'jeha nahradil jeho bratr E. D. N'jie. Po jeho tragické smrti se P. S. Njie opět vrátil do čela strany, ale již se mu nepodařilo obnovit dřívější postavení UP jako nejsilnějšího opozičního konkurenta.

Všechny tři hlavní politické organizace, které dominovaly před-nezávislostnímu stranickému systému, omezovaly činnost pouze na oblast Bathurstu a jeho blízké okolí a většinou měly silný personalistický charakter, když v jejich čele stáli prominentní lokální politici. Vzhledem k jejich teritoriálnímu působení měly téměř shodnou etnickou podporu (Wolof, příp. Aku) a z pohledu náboženství se pokoušely sjednocovat jak křesťany, tak muslimy. Nicméně z podstaty věci GDP a především UP se opíraly více o podporu křesťanů a římskokatolické církve, zatímco GMC čerpal hlavně podporu mezi muslimskými věřícími. Nicméně náboženské konflikty v 60. letech nevytvářely žádnou větší konfliktní linii. Všechny tři strany se opíraly především o vzdělanější část městského obyvatelstva a fakticky neměly žádný větší vliv na venkovskou populaci, což se stalo hlavní příčinou jejich následující postupné ztráty politického vlivu, zejména když na politickou scénu vstoupila Lidová pokroková strana (People's Progress Party – PPP).

K dalšímu rozvoji politického stranictví v Gambii, zejména na venkově, došlo na přelomu 50. a 60. let v souvislosti s rozšířením volebního práva. Nově vzniklá masová Lidová pokroková strana (PPP) se opírala především o venkovské obyvatelstvo a stala se silným oponentem městských politických stran. PPP se na dlouhé období stala jedinou politickou stranou, která sdružovala vesměs negramotné venkovské voliče.

Ideovým předchůdcem PPP byla Lidová protektorátní společnost (People's Protectorate Society – PPS), která měla silný etnický charakter, když se opírala o podporu etnika Mandinka. PPS, která vznikla v prosinci 1956, byla prakticky až do konce roku 1959 označována spíše jako Lidová protektorátní strana (Protectorate People's Party). V čele společnosti stál původně Sanjaly Bojang, kterého na konci roku 1959 nahradil nový stranický vůdce D. K. Jawara. Nový předseda následně prosadil změnu názvu politické strany na Lidovou pokrokovou stranu při zachování zkratky PPP.

Krátce po svém vzniku se PPP dostala do ostrého konfliktu s regionálními a místními náčelníky, kteří se cítili ohroženi vznikem nové politické entity. PPP se bránila označení jako anti-tradicionalistická strana a na kandidátce pravidelně zařazovala rodinné příslušníky jednotlivých náčelníků (WA, 16. 5. 1962). Nicméně v následujících letech se PPP pravidelně dostávala do konfliktu s náčelníky, které obviňovala z podpory městských politických stran. Naopak městské politické strany označovaly PPP kvůli etnickému základu za tribalistickou stranu.

Po svém přejmenování na Lidovou pokrokovou stranu PPP ve volbách v květnu 1960 postavila kandidáty v 11 ze 12 provincií. PPP se stala překvapivým vítězem voleb, když získala 36,92 % a obsadila devět z 19 poslaneckých mandátů, nicméně se jí nepodařilo získat potřebnou parlamentní většinu. Díky účinné kampani PPP se jí podařilo přesvědčit venkovské voliče, aby vyjádřili podporu jejich kandidátům místo kandidátům podporovaných jejich náčelníky (Nyang 1975, 24). Volební úspěch přinesl straně dvě ministerské funkce, na které strana však rezignovala, když guvernér jmenoval premiérem předsedu UP. Po následující dva roky PPP působila na půdě parlamentu jako opoziční strana.

Aktivní působení PPP v opozici a důsledná podpora snah o dosažení politické nezávislosti udělaly z PPP hlavního favorita voleb v roce 1962. Přestože v těchto volbách vládnoucí UP zvýšila počet poslanců z šesti na 13 a dokonce v koalici s GNU získala 38 % hlasů, vítězem voleb se stalo PPP s 18 poslanci (+1 koaliční poslanec DCA). Dawda Jawara nahradil N'jeho na místě premiéra a vládu převzali ministři PPP. Krátce před vyhlášením politické nezávislosti v roce 1965 PPP a UP vytvořily koalici, která byla spíše projevem euforie ze získání politické nezávislosti než vyjádřením politické vůle jejich politických elit (Nyang 1975, 25).

Po získání politické nezávislosti se PPP díky většinové podpoře etnika Mandinka (cca 40 % veškeré populace) stala dominantní politickou silou v zemi prakticky až do roku 1994, kdy byla smetena vojenským převratem. Hlavní opoziční sílu nejdříve představovala UP, která si udržela kontrolu Bathurstu (pět z šesti mandátů), částečně Kombo St. Mary (jeden ze dvou mandátů) a získala mandáty ve třech ze čtyř protektorátních volebních obvodů. N'Jie se považoval za vítěze mezi obyvatelstvem, které nemělo příslušnost k nejsilnějšímu etniku Mandinka, hlavní opoře PPP. V říjnu 1966 počet poslanců UP klesl na pět, když osm jejich členů přešlo k PPP či DCA.

UP částečně posílila svůj kredit na gambijské politické scéně v souvislosti s neúspěšným referendem o republikánském zřízení, o který usilovala PPP s cílem zcela se zbavit i formálního propojení s Velkou Británií. V parlamentních volbách v roce 1966 UP v koalici s GCP získala pouze 33 % hlasů, které proměnila v sedm poslaneckých mandátů, nicméně na počátku 70. let řada jejich poslanců přešla do tábora PPP.

V roce 1964 se o návrat do vysoké politiky pokusil dřívější předseda GMC Jahumpa, který vystoupil z DCA a založil novou politickou stranu Gambijskou kongresovou stranu (Gambia Congress Party – GCP). Jahumpa prozíravě z názvu vypustil odkaz na muslimskou komunitu a pokoušel se oslovit širší okruh voličů. Jahumpa se poté pokusil o vytvoření spojení s UP. Ve volbách v roce 1966 GCP v koalici s UP získala jeden poslanecký mandát v bathurstském obvodu, kde zvítězil Jahumpa. O dva roky Jahumpa opustil koalici UP-GCP a stal se členem PPP (Nyang 1975, 19).

PPP se stala krátce před získáním politické nezávislosti rozhodující politickou silou v zemi a toto postavení si udržela i po roce 1965. Díky podpoře většinové etnika Mandinka PPP pravidelně ovládla většinu venkovských oblastí a ve městech soupeřila s tzv. historickými politickými stranami. Průběh 60. let ukazuje postupný úpadek těchto historických politických stran (GDP, GMC a UP), z nichž jen UP dokázalo v 2. polovině 60. let vytvářet určitou opozici především v městských volebních obvodech. Jak ukázal vývoj v 70. letech, UP již nebyla dostatečně silná, aby stála v čele gambijské opozice. Před volbami v roce 1972 UP díky poslaneckým přeběhlíkům obhájila již jen tři poslanecké mandáty. Přestože UP tyto tři mandáty obhájila, jednalo se o její nejhorší volební výsledek v historii strany a bylo

jen otázkou času, kdy bude nahrazena jinou opoziční silou, která by se pokusila narušit dominantní postavení PPP.

UP se v 2. polovině 70. let snažila zachovat své postavení na stranické scéně účastí v různých taktických koaliciích, nejdříve v roce 1977 s Národní osvobozenou stranou (National Liberation Party – NLP) a v roce 1982 se Stranou národního konventu (National Convention Party – NCP). V následujících volbách UP dosahovala jen skromných výsledků (2–3 poslanecké mandáty), přičemž se musela neustále potýkat s odchodem svých poslanců do jiných politických stran. Personální charakter UP se potvrdil po smrti N'jeho v prosinci 1992, když UP následně přestala fakticky existovat (Diene-N'jie 1996). Vojenská junta ji dokonce neuvedla ani mezi zakázanými politickými stranami (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 233–235).

Přestože PPP po celé období až do vojenského převratu v roce 1994 zastávala v Gambii postavení dominantní politické strany, díky své slabé organizační struktuře a nepřilíš vyjasněné ideologii nikdy neusilovala o vytvoření státu s jednou vládnoucí politickou stranou (one-party state). Navíc i politické elity v čele s prezidentem Dawdou Jawarem díky svému silnému postavení v politickém systému nemusely hledat cesty k posílení své dominantní pozice.

Jedinou politickou hrozbou pro PPP byla ona sama. Po roce 1965 jsme svědky velkého množství vnitrostranických konfliktů, jejichž cílem bylo nahrazení předsedy a prezidenta Dawdu Jawara jinými stranickými osobnostmi. Po neúspěchu se řada těchto neúspěšných stranických frakcí rozhodla PPP opustit a přejít do opozice.

Jednou z prvních takových nově vzniklých politických stran na základě personálního vnitrostranického konfliktu byla Lidová pokroková aliance (People's Progressive Alliance – PPA), která vznikla v říjnu 1968. PPA založili čtyři bývalí ministři vlády PPP, Sheriff Sisay, Paul Baldeh, K. C. A. Kah a Yusupha Samba. První tři museli opustit v průběhu roku 1968 své ministerské úřady, zatímco Y. Samba byl odvolán z pozice parlamentního tajemníka. V srpnu 1968 tyto čtyři vedoucí představitelé PPP spojili své síly s UD a hlasovali proti vládním klíčovým zákonům, načež byli pro porušování stranické linie v září 1968 vyloučeni z PPP.

Přestože se k PPA připojila řada dalších významných politických a veřejných osobností, PPA se nepodařilo získat větší podporu voličů. Velký vliv na neúspěchu PPA mělo úmrtí P. Baldeha (prosinec 1968) a návrat Kaha do PPP v červenci 1969. PPA se neúspěšně postavila v roce 1970 proti druhému referendu o republikánské ústavě. Brzy po referendu v červenci 1970 Sisay a Samba iniciovali jednání s Jawarou a ústředním výborem PPP, ale až v prosinci 1971 bylo oběma politikům obnoveno členství v PPP. V únoru 1972 krátce před volbami byla činnost PPA ukončena (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 178–179).

Další politickou stranou, kterou vytvořili nespokojení politici PPP, byla Strana národního konventu (National Convention Party – NCP). U jejího vzniku stál v září 1975 bývalý gambijský viceprezident Sheriff Dibba, který byl krátce před tím vyloučen z PPP. Program NCP se jen minimálně lišil od programu PPP a opíral se o stejnou voličskou základnu jako PPP. Při první zkoušce své politické síly ve volbách v roce 1977 NCP postavil své kandidáty v 1 z 35 volebních obvodů, ale se ziskem 23 % hlasů získal jen čtyři mandáty. Neúspěch NCP se dal vysvětlit velmi agresivní volební kampaní PPP, která Dibbu označovala za kariéristu, renegáta a jeho stranu za tribalistické hnutí etnika Mandinka.

Na nepřilíš úspěšném volebním výsledku v roce 1982 se projevilo údajné napojení NCP na organizátory vojenského převratu v roce 1981, po kterém byla většina čelních představitelů

strany včetně Dibby zatčena (Wiseman 1982). Za těchto okolností se NCP podařilo postavit své kandidáty jen v 19 volebních obvodech, ve kterých získala tři poslanecké mandáty, přičemž Dibba sám byl těsně poražen ve svém volebním obvodu v Central Baddibu. Přestože NCP soutěžila v omezeném počtu obvodů, získala 20 % hlasů a v následujících prezidentských volbách Dibba skončil druhý s 28 % hlasů (AfricanElections2014).

Před volbami v roce 1987 NCP vytvořila omezenou koalici s UP (pro obvod Banjul). Její volební zisk však klesl, zejména v souvislosti se vznikem nové opoziční politické strany Gambijská lidová stran (GPP), která byla nepřátelská nejen vůči vládnoucí PPP, ale i NCP. Koalice NCP/UP získala celkem pět poslaneckých mandátů, ale Dibba byl opět ve svém volebním obvodu neúspěšný (Hughes 1987).

Před volbami v roce 1992 se NCP potýkala s vážnými vnitrostranickými problémy, které vyústily v odchod řady vedoucích stranických činitelů do vládnoucí PPP. Volební kampaň NCP byla o něco úspěšnější než v předchozích volbách, když navýšila počet poslaneckých mandátů na šest, včetně Dibby. Výsledky voleb naznačily, že NCP se začíná prosazovat v nových oblastech země a že postupně roste nespokojenost s vládou PPP. Naopak podpora NCP klesala v jejích tradičních obvodech.

V polovině 70. let vznikla i další opoziční levicově orientovaná Národně osvobozenická strana (National Liberation Party – NLP). Ve srovnání s ostatními gambijskými politickými stranami se NLP odlišovala kolektivním vedením. NLP od svého vzniku v roce 1975 zaujímal poměrně radikální socialistické postoje. NLP se zúčastnila jen parlamentních voleb v roce 1977, kdy společně s UP představila své kandidáty v šesti volebních obvodech (pouze dva byli členové NLP). Po volebním neúspěchu se představitelé NLP aktivně podíleli na pokusu o vojenský převrat v roce 1981, po kterém byla strana zakázána a vedoucí představitelé odsouzeni k trestu smrti.

Politický neklid a nespokojenost s činností vlády a PPP se v 2. polovině 70. let promítl do vzniku řady nových opozičních stran a organizací. Kromě zmíněné NLP vzniklo v roce 1979 v Libérii marxistické Hnutí za spravedlnost v Africe (Movement for Justice in Africa – MOJA). MOJA byla především aktivní v Libérii, kde se podílelo na destabilizaci Tolbertova režimu a výrazně podpořila Doeův převrat v březnu 1980. Gambijská sekce MOJA údajně vyvíjela aktivity v Gambii před pokusem o státní převrat v říjnu 1980, po kterém bylo hnutí zakázáno (Hughes 1991, 96).

Podobné ideologické zaměření měla i Gambijská revolučně socialistická strana (Gambia Revolutionary Socialist Party – GRSP), v jejímž čele stál Dr. Gibril L. (Pengu) George. GRSP bývá někdy spojována se zaniklou Gambijskou socialistickou stranou (GSP), která působila v 70. letech. GSRP byla zakázána společně s Hnutím za spravedlnost v Africe – Gambia (MJAG) v souvislosti s obviněním z organizace protivládního povstání v říjnu 1980. V čele GSRP/GUSRWP stála řada představitelů etnika Jola, ale nešlo o čistě etnickou, jako spíše revoluční politickou skupinu.

Po svém zákazu se GSRP přejmenovala na Gambijskou podzemní socialistickou revoluční dělnickou stranu (Gambia Underground Socialist Revolutionary Workers Party – GUSRWP) a měla ilegální statut.

Další vlnu vzniku opozičních politických stran můžeme sledovat v 2. polovině 80. let. V srpnu 1986 vznikla radikální levicová socialistická skupina Lidově demokratická organizace za demokracii a nezávislost (People's Democratic Organization for Independence and

Socialism – PDOIS), která měla kořeny v již neexistující marxistické panafrické podzemní skupině Lidové hnutí za nezávislost proti neokolonialismu a kapitalismu v Gambii (People's Movement for Independence against Neo-Colonialism and Capitalism in Gambia – známé pod názvem Red Star).

Voleb do parlamentu se PDOIS účastnila poprvé nepříliš úspěšně v roce 1987 a strana propadla i ve volbách v roce 1991. PDOIS, která spíše představovala politické hnutí než politickou stranu, nebyla po vojenském převratu v roce 1994 zakázána. I když představitelé PDOIS veřejně neodsoudili vojenský převrat, jak Sallah, tak Jatta odmítli nabídnuté ministerské posty ve vojenské vládě. Parlamentní zastoupení se PDOIS podařilo získat až v lednu 1997. PDOIS obsadila jeden poslanecký mandát, přičemž do voleb postavila 17 kandidátů a celkově jí volilo 8 % voličů. V parlamentních volbách v roce 2002 PDOIS postavila kandidáty do osmi okrsků (14 % hlasů) a získala dva mandáty. Její mírný úspěch víceméně spočíval s bojkotem voleb ze strany hlavní opoziční politické strany UDP.

Ve stejném roce vznikla z popudu bývalého viceprezidenta Hassana Musy Camara a dlouhodobého člena vládnoucí PPP ještě Gambijská lidová strana (Gambia People's Party – GPP) (Wiseman 1990, 58). Camara byl zvolen předsedou nové politické strany a GPP uveřejnila program a stanovy strany. Do GPP v roce 1987 vstoupila řada odpadlíků z vládnoucí PPP, kteří nesouhlasili s prezidentskou kandidaturou Jawara. Vznik GPP měl narušit dosavadní dvoustranický systém (PPP vs. NCP) a přinést na stranickou scénu nového silného politického aktéra. GPP vznikla spíše na personálních konfliktech vedoucích představitelů PPP než na odlišném politickém programu.

GPP získala v roce 1986 parlamentní zastoupení, když kromě třech zakladatelů (všichni byli poslanci) do GPP vstoupili další nezávislí poslanci (Henry Jammeh a Suntú Fatty). Krátce po vzniku GPP výrazně poškodily zprávy v tisku (za kterými stála vládnoucí PPP), že strana je financována ze zahraničí.

Krátce před volbami v roce 1987 se GPP musela potýkat s další negativní kampaní, která souvisela s obviněním z defraudace a zatčením M. L. Saha v Londýně. Pokud se při vzniku GPP zdálo, že by mohla nahradit NCP jako hlavní opoziční politická strana, pak nešťastné načasování stranických skandálů ji ve volební kampani výrazně oslabilo. V následujících volbách GPP nebyla příliš úspěšná, parlamentní zastoupení získala až v roce 1993. Po vojenském převratu byla GPP zakázána (podobně jako PPP a NCP) a v prezidentských volbách v prosinci 2001 podporovala kandidáta UDP. Camara umírá v roce 2007 a strana mizí z gambijské politické scény (PHW 2013, 513).

Na počátku 90. let se na politické scéně Gambie objevuje ještě nová opoziční politická strana Lidově demokratická strana (People's Democratic Party – PDP), která navázala na aniklou NCP. V parlamentních volbách v roce 1992 PDP postavila 16 kandidátů, ale nikdo z nich nebyl úspěšný. PDP po volbách v roce 1992 fakticky zmizela z politické scény a až do vojenského převratu neexistují žádné relevantní informace o její politickém působení (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 177).

Předseda strany a gambijský prezident Jawara zaujímal v PPP dominantní postavení. Neschopnost opozice ohrožit mocenské postavení PPP vedlo k rutinizaci činnosti strany, která byla vystavena kritice nejen ze stran opozičních politických stran (PPA, NCP a GPP), ale i ze strany svých členů. Vládu PPP nakonec smetl nekrvavý vojenský převrat v roce 1994, po kterém byla PPP (a ostatní politické strany) zakázána. PPP obnovila svou činnost

až v červenci 2001, ale obnovená strana pod vedením prozatímního vůdce O. A. Jallowa již nebyla schopna zaujmout na stranické scéně předchozí dominantní postavení (Saine 2002).

Po vojenském převratu v roce 1994 byla činnost všech politických stran zakázána, přičemž ke zmírnění tohoto zákona došlo až v roce 1996 krátce před volbami (srovnej Yeebo 1995; Wiseman a Vidler 1995; Wiseman 1996; Saine 1996; Loum 2002). Díky uvolnění politické činnosti obnovila svoji existenci PDOIS, ale zákaz činnosti PPP, GPP a NCP pokračoval až o roku 2001. Krátce před volbami v září 1996 vojenská junta zformovala vlastní politickou stranu Alianci pro vlasteneckou změnu a přestavbu (Alliance for Patriotic Re-Orientation and Construction – APRC) v čele s vůdcem junty Yahyaem Jammahem. APRC zvítězilo nejen v parlamentních volbách, ale Jammah byl zvolen i novým prezidentem země (srovnej Saine 1998; Wiseman 1998).

Řada bývalých členů opozičních politických stran se začala angažovat v nové opoziční politické straně Sjedenocná demokratická strana (United Democratic Party – UDP), která vznikla v srpnu 1996 v reakci na neočekávané ohlášení termínu prezidentských voleb. UDP se podařilo při svém vzniku sdružit část členů původních politických stran (PPP, NCP a GPP), které měly doposud zakázanou politickou činnost (Edie 2000). Funkci generálního tajemníka zaujal prominentní právník Ousainu Darboe. Strana zaujímal centristické postavení a ve svém programu vystupovala na obranu lidských práv a ekonomický a sociální rozvoj země (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 232).

V prezidentských volbách konaných 26. září 1996 UDP zastupoval Ousainu Darboe, který skončil za Jammehem na druhém místě se ziskem 35,34 % hlasů. V parlamentních volbách v lednu 1997 UDP kandidovala v 34 volebních okrscích a dosáhla 34 % hlasů, které se promítly do zisku sedmi poslaneckých křesel. UDP získávala především podporu v oblastech, kde dříve působila opoziční NCP (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 232).

V prezidentských volbách v roce 2001 Darboe získal 32,7 % hlasů. Následující volby do Národního sněmu v lednu 2002 se strana rozhodla bojkotovat na protest proti rozhodnutí Nezávislé volební komise, která povolila voličům volit na jakémkoli volebním místě, čímž vytvořila nekontrolovatelný prostor pro masivní machinaci s voličskými hlasy (Cesay 2006).

V listopadu 2002 uvnitř strany vyvrcholil personální konflikt mezi Jawarou a Darboem, když prvně jmenovaný neoprávněně obvinil Darboa ze zneužívání stranických prostředků. Jawara, který byl následně z UDP vyloučen, poté založil vlastní stranu NDAM.

Kromě UDP se v roce 1996 na gambijské politické scéně ještě objevila Strana za národní smíření (National Reconciliation Party – NRP), která vznikla v září krátce před prezidentskými a následně parlamentními volbami. NRP se jen nepatrně lišila svým programem a členskou základnou od UDP, ale všechny pozdější pokusy o jejich sloučení ztroskotaly.

Její předseda Hammat Bah se v září 1996 neúspěšně zúčastnil prezidentských voleb, kde skončil s 5,52 % hlasů na třetím místě. NRP postavila v lednu 1997 kandidáty do němovních voleb jen v pěti volebních okrscích, kterým se podařilo získat 2 % hlasů, což straně přineslo zisk dvou poslaneckých mandátů (Saine 1997).

V následujících prezidentských volbách v roce 2001 opět za NRP kandidoval Bath, který sice získal o dvě procenta hlasů více (7,7 %), ale opět skončil na třetím místě.

Ve sněmovních volbách v roce 2002 zaznamenala strana neúspěch, protože se jí podařilo obhájit pouze jedno křeslo.

Po zrušení zákazu činnosti bývalých politických stran v roce 2001 Dibba obnovil činnost NCP a v roce 2001 neúspěšně kandidoval v prezidentských volbách. Po této drtivé porážce Dibba souhlasil s vytvořením koalice s vládou APRC, díky čemuž dva kandidáti NCP se dostali na společnou kandidátku obou stran. PPP fakticky pohltila NCP, která následně přestala existovat (Saine 2003).

V prvním desetiletí tohoto století vznikla řada dalších nových opozičních politických stran. Nejdříve bychom měli zmínit Národní demokraticko-akční hnutí (National Democratic Action Movement – NDAM), které založil v roce 2002 Lamin Waa Jawara, který původně pracoval jako tajemník propagandy v UDP, ale byl následně vyloučen za kritiku předsedy strany. Jawarovi se z NDAM velmi rychle podařilo vytvořit jednu z nejsilnějších opozičních politických stran v zemi.

V roce 2004 byl Jawara na šest měsíců zavřen za pobuřování, nicméně jeho uvěznění výrazně zvýšilo jeho popularitu mezi opozicí. V roce 2005 se NDAM stalo součástí Národní aliance za demokracii a rozvoj (NADD), v dubnu 2007 však tuto koalici opustilo. Proti tomuto rozhodnutí se postavil dosavadní národní prezident hnutí Pa Manneh, který zůstal loajální původní koalici. V květnu 2008 předseda Jawara přeběhl do vládnoucí APRC s vysvětlením, že sdílí Jammehovu ideologii a usiluje o politickou jednotu (PHW 2013, 514).

V roce 2004 vznikla další menší opoziční politická strana Gambijská strana za demokracii a pokrok (Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress – GDPD) pod vedením Henry Goméze. Strana měla poměrně ambiciózní politický program, ve kterém se zaměřila na podporu rozvoje Gambie a v tomto smyslu podporovala Jammehovu politiku. Nicméně ve volbách GDPD podporovala kandidáty koalice UDP/NRP. V roce 2009 Gomez nabídl prezidentovi Jammehovi politickou alianci (Hughes a Perfect 2008, 78).

Hlavním problémem gambijské politické opozice na počátku 21. století (ale i v období tzv. První republiky) byla její roztržitost. Velké množství malých opozičních stran nesoupeřilo jen s APRC, ale i navzájem mezi sebou, což je v konečném důsledku významně oslabovalo. Výsledkem rozdrobené opozice pak byla jejich neschopnost čelit ve volbách kandidátům APRC.

Jedním z pokusů o vyřešení tohoto problému a vytvoření sjednocené opozice se měla stát Národní aliance za demokracii a rozvoj (National Alliance for Democracy and Development – NADD), kterou se podařilo zformovat 17. ledna 2005 (oficiální registrace 29. května 2005). Zakládajícími členy koalice bylo pět hlavních opozičních stran, jejichž představitelé měli jasný cíl: ukončit vládu APRC a zaručit, že se lidé budou moci podílet na rozvoji země. Původními členy koalice byly Národní demokratické akční hnutí (NDAM), Strana za národní smíření (NRP), Lidově demokratická organizace za nezávislost a socialismus (PDOIS), Lidová pokroková strana (PPP) a Sjednocená demokratická strana (UDP).

Vytvoření NADD mocenské složky státu považovaly za závažnou hrozbu vládnoucímu politickému systému, a proto vyvinuly značné úsilí, aby postavení této organizace oslabilo. Jelikož NADD byla zaregistrována jako politická strana, státní instituce ji prohlásily za protiústavní z důvodu dvojího členství v politických stranách. Čtyři opoziční poslanci byli zbavení svého poslaneckého mandátu. Ke konci roku 2005 úřady na základě falešného obvinění uvěznilo několik vysokých představitelů NADD, které po několika měsících opět propustily.

Koalice se od svého vzniku potýkala s vnitrostranickými konflikty. Ještě v březnu 2005 více jak 2 500 členů NRP na protest z účasti v koalici vystoupilo ze strany a připojilo se k vládoucí APRC. NRP pak v následujícím roce z koalice vystoupila a společně s UDP a GPDP zformovaly Alianci pro režimní změnu (ARC). Na počátku roku 2006 došlo ke konfliktu v otázce obsazení pozice prezidentského kandidáta, který se měl v zářijových prezidentských volbách postavit současnému prezidentovi Jammehovi. Ousainou Darboe se postavil proti kandidatuře O. A. Jallowa (PPP) a za podpory Hamata Baha a NRP v únoru 2006 opustil koalici. O měsíc později následovala i NRP (PHW 2013, 513).

Koalici následně opustila i jedna z frakcí PPP vedená Yayaem Ceesayem a podobně se rozhodl i vůdce GPP Assan Musa Camara, který byl předsedou NADDD. Vedoucí pozici v NADD pak převzal Halifa Sallah (PDOIS). V lednu 2007 se oslabená NADD zúčastnila parlamentních voleb, ale usilovala o zisk jen pěti poslaneckých mandátů. Vnitrostranické konflikty výrazně přispěly ke ztrátě kreditu mezi voliči, protože NADD získala pouze jeden mandát, přičemž ani předseda Sallah neobhájil svůj poslanecký post (Saine 2009, 120–121).

V dubnu 2007 činnost v koalici NADD ukončila i NDAM, která se zcela stáhla z veřejného politického života. V oznámení o vystoupení její představitelé uvedli, že NADD je ve fázi úplného rozkladu. NADD tak tvořily jen PDOIS, skupina členů kolem předsedy NDAM Lamina Waa Juwara a frakce PPP vedená O. A. Jallowem (PHW 2013, 514).

Hamat Bah a jeho NRP pak v roce 2007 iniciovala další volební koalici s GPDP a UDP pod názvem Aliance pro změnu režimu (Alliance for Regime Change – ARG), která však neměla dlouhého trvání. Před parlamentními volbami v roce 2007 se NRP spojila s UDP (Saine 2008).

Po neúspěchu o vytvoření jednotné opozice se nejsilnější opoziční politickou stranou po volbách v lednu 2007 stala UDP, když její kandidáti získali čtyři poslanecké mandáty. Během své existence se UDP neustále potýkala s odchodem řady svých vrcholových politiků do PPP, kteří neodolali nejrůznějším nabídkám představitelů APRC k účasti ve vládě či státní správě.

V prezidentských volbách v roce 2011 se rozdrobená opozice (UDP, GMC, PPP a NCP) dohodla na podpoře společného kandidáta, předsedy UDP Darboea, který získal necelých 18 % hlasů. Většina opozičních politických stran (kromě NRP) se pak následně rozhodla bojkotovat parlamentní volby v roce 2012, když zjistila, že Nezávislá volební komise zaregistrovala téměř 300 tis voličů negambijského původu (obyvatele Casamancy).

Ironií současného gambijského politického vývoje je skutečnost, že APRC fakticky zaujala stejné postavení jak PPP před vojenským převratem. Řada opozičních politických stran se během posledních dvou desetiletí pokusila APRC porazit ve volbách, jako např. nově vzniklá Sjedenocená demokratická strana (United Democratic Party – UDP) vedená Ousainem Darboem, ale APRC zcela dominuje politickému životu a její nejvyšší představitelé s velkou dovedností brání všem případným politickým změnám. APRC nedominuje jen na celostátní úrovni, ale je dominantní politickou silou i v regionální politice. Např. v roce 2008 v lokálních volbách získala 101 ze 114 mandátů (AfricanElections2014).

V současnosti je gambijská opozice v hlubokém rozkladu, neúčast v posledních parlamentních volbách jen potvrdila dominantní postavení APRC v gambijském politickém systému a upevnila moc současné politické elity. Vzhledem k charakteru gambijského politického režimu (autoritářský quasi civilní režim, kde politické elity v úzké spolupráci s armádou

ovládají všechny klíčové politické instituce bez jakékoli šance na politickou alternaci) není možné předpokládat, že by v krátké budoucnosti došlo k nějakému zásadnímu pohybu na stranické scéně.

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The Slovakization of the Prešov Region in the 1920s and 1930s

DAVID Z. SCHEFFEL

ABSTRACT:

My contribution addresses the process of linguistic and cultural Slovakization of Prešov and the surrounding district during the 1920s and 1930s. Aside from the introductory section which establishes the historical and political context that prevailed in this part of Czechoslovakia between the end of the First World War and the declaration of the independent Slovak Republic in 1939, the material used here comes exclusively from archival holdings. It provides insights into the manner in which the new Czechoslovak régime sought to fortify its legitimacy by helping Slovak nationalists confront various real and imagined threats. Throughout the period under consideration local ethnic Hungarians were targeted as enemies of the new order, but the threat of “Magyarization” was also attributed to Greek Catholic clergy and Rusyn intelligentsia as well as a large portion of the numerous Jewish minority. As the fortunes of Czechoslovakia declined and the militancy of Slovak nationalism magnified in the latter 1930s, the ideology of Czechoslovakism joined Magyarization as a perceived threat that had to be countered through intensified Slovakization of public life. It led to the re-naming of Prešov’s streets, the removal of Czech language signs, and the harassment – and eventual expulsion – of Czech officials and their families. This unfolding of national chauvinism culminated in the attack on Prešov’s largest minority – the Jews.

KEYWORDS:

Slovakia; First Czechoslovak Republic; Ethnic politics; Czechs and Slovaks

INTRODUCTION

Petr Skalník’s personal and professional life is closely linked to Slovakia. My own scholarly interests led me to Slovakia and more specifically to rural settlements of Roma living in the eastern Prešov region. Although my research has been mostly ethnographic, whenever possible I have sought to provide a historical dimension by utilizing the rich holdings of local archives. In view of Petr’s interest in and personal confrontation with the manifold expressions of the Slovak “national spirit”, I decided to celebrate his 70th birthday by focusing on the way in which that national spirit was intertwined with political goals and aspirations during the 1920s and 1930s. Those two decades were crucial in the history of Slovaks and Slovakia. The emergence of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 brought to an end the

centuries – long era of the “Hungarian yoke” and the accompanying Magyarization of Slovak culture and society. For the first time, Slovaks became a nation capable of generating and maintaining their own state, albeit under the not always welcome tutelage exercised by the politically more mature Czechs.

While the Czechs were regarded as welcome allies in the Slovak struggle against vestiges of “Magyar chauvinism”, their self-ascribed role as the senior partner in the Czecho-Slovak alliance fuelled at times extreme forms of Slovak nationalism which eventually led to a complete break with the Czechs and the birth of a fascist Slovak state in 1939. This process of ethnic radicalization left behind an archival trail which I pursue in this essay. Of course, the story I recount has been told many times by professional historians and other scholars. My aim is not to provide an overview, let alone revision, of conclusions reached by other authors. The contribution I seek to make here is to focus on the ethnographic reality of local events and common people as it is captured in documents that describe the Slovakization of Prešov and the surrounding region during the years between the constitution and dissolution of the First Czechoslovak Republic. All the material used here comes from the Prešov branch of the Slovak State Archive.

THE MAGYAR THREAT

Following the birth of Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of WW1 one of the most important political goals was to embed the country’s former Hungarian territories in the administrative structure of the new state. In view of the small number of ethnic Slovaks capable of replacing Magyar or Magyarized officials, this required the dispatch of thousands of Czech administrators, teachers, and police officers who filled the vacuum left behind by departed or dismissed officials loyal to the old régime. These public servants became enmeshed in a comprehensive system of surveillance that included the monitoring of virtually all public events – from political gatherings all the way to village dances – by means of monthly reports filed by municipal notaries and police officers. The head of the new administration in the region that is surveyed here was the chief of the Prešov district, designated as *okresný náčelník*. Although some of the new public servants were ethnic Slovaks, Czechs played a key role in the local apparatus. This is disclosed by the language of the reports and memos exchanged within and beyond its confines as well as the names of their authors. They played a particularly prominent part in local detachments of the state police (*četnictvo*) where the maintenance of law and order remained in predominantly Czech hands until the late 1930s.

Foremost among the subjects of scrutiny and monitoring required to be conducted by police and civilian authorities were members of the Magyar intelligentsia, such as teachers, clerics and members of the professional class. As a matter of course, such individuals were presumed to be working as spies for Hungary. In a circular dispatched in January of 1923 to all district commissioners, the župan of Košice conveyed the suspicion that “Magyar teachers and professors in Slovakia are the staunchest enemies of the Czechoslovak Republic who ... systematically engage in spying activities in favour of Hungary.”¹ Although self-proclaimed Magyars comprised only about ten per cent of Prešov’s population,² their high

1 Štátny archív v Prešove – pobočka Prešov (Slovak State Archive – Prešov branch, further abbreviated as ŠA Prešov), fund Okresný úrad Prešov (further abbreviated as OU-P), Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 75/23, “Maďarskí učitelia – šetrenie”.

2 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, admin. spisy, 1925, box 32, 5836/25, “Národnostné pomery zdravotných obvodov”.

concentration in the ranks of the teaching profession caused much anguish in official circles. In 1923, for example, the city's police headquarters warned the district commissioner about two local teachers who allegedly maintained secret contacts with Magyar institutions in the USA. The conduct of one of these persons was deemed particularly provocative as though Slovak by birth, she refused to speak Slovak in public, and she kept exclusive company with Magyar society.³ These suspicions were magnified by confidential reports indicating that teachers with pro-Magyar inclinations who had been discharged from public service appeared to maintain a comfortable lifestyle in spite of being unemployed. This seemed to indicate that they received financial support from Hungary.⁴

Magyar intelligentsia, politicians and other leaders were also targeted, often posthumously, in the decision to rename seventy-two of Prešov's streets that bore the names of men deemed hostile to Slovaks and their national aspirations. They were replaced by the names of famous Slovaks and Czechs in a spirit of brotherly concord,⁵ though many of the new celebrities fell victim to subsequent purges that lasted until the early 1990s.

The administrative apparatus required municipal officials and school inspectors to file monthly reports – on pre-filled Czech forms – about all local events that might have fostered sentiments hostile to the new régime. For example, in July of 1925 the notary of the small town of Veľký Šariš described a “Magyar celebration” that drew 300–350 “Magyar sympathizers” from Prešov and the surrounding district. The attendees – who entertained themselves “exclusively in Hungarian” – included the chief officer of the local train station, a fact highlighted in capital letters by the district commissioner in his report to the župan in Košice.⁶

The relatively small number of people drawn to the “Magyar celebration” of 1925 justifies the conclusion that the “Magyar threat” in the Prešov district was of a much lower order than in the southern territories along the border with Hungary, such as the metropolitan Košice region. There, many municipalities had solid Magyar-speaking majorities, such as the district of Moldava where 28 out of 41 municipal councils conducted their official business in Hungarian.⁷ In the Prešov district, on the other hand, all 88 municipalities displayed overwhelming Slovak majorities⁸ – though according to a 1925 overview of the ethnic composition of the city of Prešov itself, it boasted a respectable minority of almost two thousand self-declared “Magyars.”⁹ Subsequent Slovakization – including the adoption of de-Magyarized family names – as well as moves to districts with greater Hungarian presence – reduced that number to a mere 626 residents according to the 1940 census.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the suspicion that Magyarized Slovaks were as capable of subversive activities as ethnic Hungarians seemed to justify vigilance that at times bordered on the comical. For example, in 1923 it was discovered and reported that a newly installed church bell in the Roman Catholic parish of Brestov bore inscriptions written in Hungarian. The

3 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 75/23, “Maďarskí učitelia – šetrenie”.

4 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 75/23, “Maďarskí učitelia – šetrenie”.

5 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1924, box 2, no. 23, 174/1924, “Zoznam ulíc – Prešov – maď. a slov.”.

6 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1925, box 3, no. 23, 1137/1925, “Maďarská slávnosť vo V. Šariši”.

7 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, admin. spisy, 1930, box 45, 682/1930, “Jednací jazyk v obciach na Slovensku”.

8 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, admin. spisy, 1930, box 45, 682/1930, “Jednací jazyk v obciach na Slovensku”.

9 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, admin. spisy, 1925, box 32, 5836/25, “Národnostné pomery zdravotných obvodov”.

10 ŠA Prešov, fund Notarský úrad Prešov (further abbreviated as NU-P), 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 213/1944 prez., “Štatistické dáta obyvateľstva v okrese Prešov”.

ensuing investigation led to the district commissioner's demand that the offending words – apparently commemorating Hungary's patron saint and first king Stephen – be removed.¹¹ In the same vein the Czech police commander of the Prešov district complained to the civilian district commissioner about two small bilingual signs he had discovered in the city's main Roman Catholic church – one instructing visitors to keep the door closed; the other one proscribing spitting – because the Hungarian version preceded the Slovak one. Filled with indignation, officer Karel Dvořák riled, in Czech:

Such provocative preference for Hungarian and belittling of Slovak in this city where the majority comprises Slovaks (Czechs) certainly insults every good Slovak, and it would be in the state's interest to remove and replace these signs ...¹²

The same officer experienced a similar shock upon visiting a Prešov cinema on New Year's Day and seeing that the New Year's greeting flashed onto the screen also privileged Hungarian over Slovak.¹³

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

Prešov of the 1920s and 1930s was not only a multi-ethnic but also a multi-religious city. While the majority population was ethnically Slovak and denominationally Roman Catholic, there were significant pockets belonging to other faiths. Foremost among these were the more than four thousand Jews who by the late 1930s constituted almost twenty per cent of the city's population.¹⁴ Prior to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and the emergence of the fascist Slovak Republic the sizeable Jewish minority doesn't appear to have caused any significant concerns to the local engineers of Slovakization. Although active in municipal politics, business, and cultural affairs, local Jewish professionals seem to have refrained from taking clearly demarcated sides in the larger competition between pro-Slovak and pro-Hungarian forces. On the surface at least, official representatives of Prešov's Jewish congregations and cultural organizations refrained from overt challenges to the new régime. This was nicely illustrated on the occasion of President Masaryk's 74th birthday in 1924 when the district commissioner issued an official request that all of Prešov's religious communities commemorate this event. The five replies he received all assented to the request, but they did so in divergent ways. The Slovak Roman Catholic parish used Slovak in its reply. The head of the Greek Catholic eparchy composed his letter in Rusyn/Ukrainian. The combined congregation of Hungarian and German Lutherans used the Hungarian language. Both the Neological and the Orthodox Jewish communities, on the other hand, replied in Slovak spiked with assurances of deep affection for and loyalty to the "President-Liberator."¹⁵ A clear evidence of this stance was given in 1930 when the Orthodox Jewish congregation contributed the sizeable sum of fifty thousand crowns towards the construction of a new district hospital in honour of Masaryk's 80th birthday.¹⁶

11 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 1367/1923, "Maďarský nápis na zvonoch v kostole v Brestove".

12 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1924, box 2, no. 23, 73/1924, "Farský kostol Prešov".

13 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1924, box 2, no. 23, 73/1924, "Farský kostol Prešov".

14 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938-1944, box 2, no. 35, 213/1944 prez., "Štatistické dáta obyvateľstva v okrese Prešov".

15 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1924, box 2, no. 23, 369/1924, "Oslavy narodenín prezidenta".

16 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, admin. spisy, 1930, box 72, no. 23, 3521/1938, "Prešov, okr. verejná nemocnica, rituálne stravovanie".

With the growth of ethnic chauvinism in the late 1930s, however, there is scattered evidence that the Jewish minority was being drawn into the escalating ethno-political tensions. For example, in August of 1937 the erection of a war memorial for fourteen Jewish soldiers is reported to have led to conflicts between pro-Magyar Jews and their co-religionists loyal to Czechoslovakia.¹⁷ A reference made in the same year to a Jewish pharmacist as “one of the few Prešov Jews who always followed the stipulations of our national associations concerning the Slovakization (*poslovenčenie*) of the city”¹⁸ seems to indicate a degree of ethnic politicization that was absent in earlier years.

Prešov’s second largest religious minority was Lutheran. Divided along ethnic lines, the city boasted German, Hungarian and Slovak Lutheran communities, each with its own church and school. These schools were small – for example, only 36 children attended the Hungarian Lutheran elementary school in 1934¹⁹ – but certainly in the case of both the Hungarian parish and its school covert Magyarization was felt to be a potent threat, especially during the latter part of the 1930s. Thus in 1937 the district notary warned his superiors that Prešov’s Hungarian Lutheran school was well-endowed due to the parish’s association with “the wealthiest citizens of the city”, and that it engaged in “cultural Magyarization” by means of various festivities and cultural events conducted in Hungarian. Of particular concern was the senior elder of the parish who still hadn’t mastered Slovak.²⁰ The Slovak Lutherans, by contrast, seemed loyal enough. A “strictly confidential” investigation into the ethno-political preferences of pastor Gustav Pogány conducted in 1930 sought to ascertain the status of the “state language” in his household and church. The municipal notary of Prešov assured district authorities that the pastor’s mother tongue was Slovak, and that although he conversed with his wife in Hungarian, both parents spoke only Slovak with their children. Concerning the three minors, the notary stated reassuringly that “the few [Hungarian] words they know they pronounce with a typical Slovak pronunciation and accent.”²¹ The pastor’s sermons were delivered in Slovak as well.²²

By far the most politically suspect religious minority was the population segment affiliated with Greek Catholicism. The 1940 census lists only approximately 850 Rusyns, Russians and Ukrainians for Prešov itself, but dozens of small towns and villages north and north-east of the city harboured robust Eastern Christian communities. Most of the residents subscribed to Greek Catholicism, though there were also a few small Russian Orthodox congregations.²³ Local “Rusyns” – or “Russians” as they were often designated interchangeably – comprised the backbone of virtually all Greek Catholic parishes, and in the eyes of Czechoslovak officials both their ethnic and religious orientation became synonymous with the “Great-Magyar” idea. Already in the early 1920s local authorities subscribed to the conviction that the dominant language of the Greek Catholic intelligentsia was Hungarian rather than “Russian/Rusyn”, and that all social and cultural activities conducted by their manifold societies and committees helped maintain the traditional status of Hungarian as the language of high culture and learning.²⁴ Even at the very onset of a campaign in support

17 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 147/1937, “Pomník padlým v Prešove”.

18 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 80/1937, “Žid Ph.Mr. Klein Vojtech – informácie”.

19 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1934, box 10, no. 23, 935/34, “Maďarská škola v Prešove”.

20 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 31/1937, “Maďarská ev. a.v. cirkev v Prešove”.

21 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 57/1930, “Pogány Gustav, býv. ev. a.v. farár – informácie”.

22 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 57/1930, “Pogány Gustav, býv. ev. a.v. farár – informácie”.

23 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 213/1944 prez., “Štatistické dáta obyvateľstva v okrese Prešov”.

24 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 747/1923, “Zvaz ruských žien”.

of the introduction of the Russian language in schools attended by large numbers of Greek Catholic children the priests spearheading this demand were being accused of preparing the ground for the re-annexation of such municipalities by Hungary. Tellingly, the administrative file devoted to this campaign bears the heading “Agitation of Greek Catholic priests against Czechoslovakia”.²⁵

Accusations of Greek Catholic clergy of disloyalty and animosity toward the new Czechoslovak state continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s. An investigation carried out in 1925 by the Prešov police headquarters concluded that of the thirteen Greek Catholic priests residing within the district, only three had “completely adjusted to present-day conditions”, while the rest remained “in the Magyar spirit in which they had been raised.”²⁶ Interestingly enough, the alleged Magyarophiles included Mons. Štefan Gojdič (1887–1968), a prominent priest and professor at Prešov’s Greek Catholic teachers’ college whose brother Pavel eventually rose to the rank of bishop of the Prešov eparchy before meeting a martyr’s death during the communist era.

By 1935 bishop Gojdič himself had become implicated in disloyal inclinations attributed to local Greek Catholics. This year saw a “remarkable Russification campaign” steered by Greek Catholic clergy and intelligentsia allegedly under instructions given by the bishop. As interpreted by the authorities, its goal was “to flood the entire city with Cyrillic signs” distributed by students of Greek Catholic schools. Commercial establishments that failed to display them apparently faced a boycott by indoctrinated Greek Catholic customers. But, once again, what appeared as a blatant illustration of Russification acquired a different connotation after intelligence reports had revealed that the “agitators” spoke Hungarian among themselves.²⁷ A similar conclusion was drawn a year later when a “strictly confidential” account of a meeting of Greek Catholic advocates of a church – affiliated Rusyn-language *gymnázium* claimed that much of the talking had been conducted in Hungarian.²⁸ Accordingly, a subsequent fund-raising trip to Greek Catholic congregations in the United States raised the suspicion that the delegation – which included “well-known agitators” against the Czechoslovak régime with Magyar inclinations – was likely to spread false propaganda about the treatment of Rusyns in Slovakia, and local officials recommended not to issue the requisite exit visas.²⁹

SLOVAK NATIONALISTS

The official ideology of Czechoslovakism propagated by the founders of the new state defined it as a union of two equal fraternal nations – Czechs and Slovaks – whose members spoke a single Czechoslovak language that comprised two dialects – Czech and Slovak. From the very beginning the alleged symmetry between the two entities was undermined by the numerical, political and economic preponderance of the Czechs, and this led to protests

25 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1924, box 2, no. 23, 223/24, “Agitácia Gréckokatolíckych kňazov proti ČSR”.

26 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1925, box 3, no. 23, 1580/1925, “Šetrenie činnosti gréckokatolíckych kňazov”.

27 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 181/1937, “Slovenčina v meste Prešov – závadné firemné nápisy”.

28 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 61/1937, “Pomery v Grécko kat. eparchii v Prešove”.

29 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 138/1936, “Zbierka v USA v prospech grécko-kat. inštitúcií v Prešove”.

by many Slovak intellectuals and public figures. Foremost among these, the Roman Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938) defended Slovak national interests and sought to redress the political imbalance between the two founding nations. Throughout the duration of the First Republic Hlinka led the Slovak People's Party and represented it in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Clerical and fiercely anti-communist, the party advocated Slovak autonomy and, eventually, independence. After Hlinka's death in 1938, it adopted openly fascist ideas and principles and became the backbone of the régime that engineered Slovak independence and joined WW2 as an ally of Hitler.

Hlinka's followers came to be known as "populists" (*l'ud'áci*), and their targets were the representatives of "alien" nations on Slovak soil, including the Czechs. As opponents of the Czechoslovak idea, they and their activities were closely monitored by state authorities. For example, in 1923 the cabinet minister responsible for Slovakia wondered whether increasing numbers of young Slovaks studying at Polish universities – rather than in Prague or Bratislava – could be attributed to Hlinka and his flirtation with Poles as a counterforce to the domineering Czechs.³⁰ In the same year, death threats against Czech officials stationed in a suburb of Prešov were attributed to local *Magyar intelligentsia*,³¹ but future events pointed in the direction of Slovak nationalists. The support they enjoyed already within the first few years of Czechoslovakia's existence is revealed by various disciplinary proceedings ordered by district authorities against clerics and teachers who failed to pay homage to the new régime. For example, celebrations of its fifth anniversary were sabotaged by some teachers,³² and during festivities in a Roman Catholic church the organist and school principal deliberately reversed the order of the national anthem, playing the Slovak part first.³³

The extent of anti-Czech sentiments in and around Prešov can be surmised from a popular uprising that took place in July of 1925 in the small town of Nižná Šebastová near Prešov. Here the police investigation of a Franciscan monastery that seemed to have become a hotbed of Slovak nationalist agitation triggered an attack by a "mob" of some 700 angry villagers armed with scythes, axes and clubs. In the ensuing confrontation police officers discharged firearms and killed one of the attackers. The subsequent official evaluation of the events characterized the surrounding district as a centre of *l'ud'ák* populism.³⁴

Throughout the period under consideration, the threat of Hlinka's nationalists was taken very seriously. All gatherings of the Slovak People's Party were monitored by authorities, and speeches delivered by attending leaders were transcribed and analyzed for potential subversive pronouncements. For example, when the district chairman of the party, Anton Stašš, declared at a gathering held in 1933 that "under Magyar rule we had an iron yoke, but now we have a steel one", he was convicted to eight days in prison for violating the "defence of the republic" law.³⁵

30 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 66/1923, "Štúdium slovenských študentov v Poľsku".

31 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 121/3, "Násilnosti voči štátnym úradníkom".

32 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1923, box 1, no. 23, 1100/23, "Oslavy vzniku ČSR".

33 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1934, box 10, no. 23, 2/34, "Haršághy Vojtech správca školy – hranie štátnej hymny".

34 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1925, box 3, no. 23, 1230/1925, "Udalosti v kláštore Františkánov v Nižnej Šebastovej".

35 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1934, box 10, no. 23, 381/34, "Schodzka hlinkovej strany – Kendice".

THE TRIUMPH OF SLOVAKIZATION

The second half of the 1930s can be seen as the beginning of the end of cultural pluralism and the triumph of Slovakization that attained political confirmation with the proclamation of an officially mono-cultural Slovak Republic in March of 1939. This era began with an intensified struggle for the recognition of the Slovak language as the sole legitimate medium of communication in all spheres of public life. The opening salvo was fired in February 1935 when the district commissioner appealed to Prešov's municipal officials to see to it that the "Slovak character" of the city be more forcefully demonstrated through signage employed by private businesses. He pointed out that although the number of bi-lingual and tri-lingual signs had been declining, it was in "public and state-wide interest to eliminate even the last remainder" and replace it with mono-lingual Slovak ones.³⁶ The stated goal of "peaceful coexistence" was allegedly being undermined when "the great majority of Czechoslovak nationality is gratuitously provoked by signs in foreign languages."³⁷ The commissioner's directive was accompanied by a list of all of the city's 106 businesses. While all of them displayed signs written in Slovak, the commissioner pointed out that some of them contained errors, and some of them displayed foreign language versions composed in one or more of Prešov's other languages: Hungarian, German, Russian, and "Jewish". For the next two years, the city notary filed periodic reports about the progress of the Slovakization offensive in this realm.³⁸ It is noteworthy that by the district commissioner's own admission the law governing the signage of private firms did not curtail the use of foreign languages.³⁹

Simultaneously, the district commissioner demanded that increased vigilance be exercised with respect of Magyarized Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergy who reportedly disregarded the right of Slovak parishioners to have sermons delivered in their own language. He repeated the often-raised accusation against Greek Catholic priests of "provocative Magyarization" and asked local authorities to also pay attention to their activities outside the narrow confines of churches.⁴⁰ In the case of an orphanage run in Prešov by Greek Catholic nuns, city officials recommended to district authorities that the institution be denied registration because the nuns were, for the most part, foreigners who didn't speak Slovak and through their influence the inmates failed to learn proper Slovak.⁴¹ On the other hand, as far as Prešov's Roman Catholics were concerned, by 1937 the Slovakization efforts seem to have paid off as Hungarian language masses and events were attracting fewer and fewer attendees.⁴²

Amidst the intensified concern for the demarcation of Slovak as the sole language suitable for public discourse, the year 1937 saw the first explicit attack on Czech as a legitimate

36 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 181/1937, "Slovenčina v meste Prešov – závadné firemné nápisy".

37 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 181/1937, "Slovenčina v meste Prešov – závadné firemné nápisy".

38 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 181/1937, "Slovenčina v meste Prešov – závadné firemné nápisy".

39 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 181/1937, "Slovenčina v meste Prešov – závadné firemné nápisy".

40 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 127/1935, "Boj o Slovenčinu v kostoloch".

41 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 195/1937, "Kongregácia Služobníčiek Nepoškvrneného Počatia".

42 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 7/1937, "Rímsko-katolícka cirkev v Prešove – národnostné pomery".

alternative. In November of that year, a newspaper published in Košice carried a report about the protest of Slovak students at Bratislava's Komenský University – an institution founded in 1919 by Czech pedagogues – which was waged under the slogan “In Slovakia – in Slovak” and criticized the common practice of Czech professors to lecture in Czech.⁴³ By Christmas, police officers stationed in a suburb of Prešov had intercepted small stickers affixed to the gates and windows of the homes of Czech officials bearing the same slogan.⁴⁴ At the same time, a thorough vetting of Prešov's police detachment of nineteen officers was being carried out whereby the main concern seemed to have been whether they supported Slovak institutions and whether they spoke Slovak at home and in public.⁴⁵

The year 1938 saw the culmination of Sudeten German efforts at joining Hitler's Reich, which led to the Munich Agreement. Concurrently, Slovak separatists kept pressing the Prague régime for formal autonomy, and this was granted in November. These events opened the floodgates of Slovak nationalists' resentment. Prešov's district commissioner kept reporting infractions against the still nominally valid doctrine of Czechoslovakism, such as the distribution of leaflets advocating Slovakia's secession from the joint state accompanied by inflammatory slogans demanding “Down with the Czechs! Away from Prague! Let's declare our independence! Let's not tolerate Czech tyranny any longer!”⁴⁶ But when Hlinka's successor, Rev. Jozef Tiso, visited Prešov in October 1938 – only ten days before the 20th anniversary of the founding of the First Republic – his speech before a crowd of seven thousand admirers destroyed the last illusion of Czechoslovak unity. Although Tiso conceded that the common state still existed, he announced the official end of “the fiction that Czechs and Slovaks are one nation” and predicted a future where Slovaks would become the sole masters of their country.⁴⁷ In his speech the district chairman of the Slovak People's Party, Florián Stašš, spelled out what Tiso had left unsaid by comparing the future government of autonomous Slovakia to “a broom that will sweep all the corners of Slovakia in order to remove the dirt accumulated over the last twenty years.” He ended with the words “Brother here, brother there, get down from the Slovak pear tree!”⁴⁸

Prešov's district commissioner – in his position as the local head of the Czechoslovak civil administration – continued to monitor all these events through his network of police officers, municipal officials and clandestine informers in a remarkably dispassionate manner, perhaps uncertain about the outcome of these volatile developments. German and Slovak nationalists were not the only faction pressing Prague for concessions. Already in May of 1938 representatives of Slovakia's Greek Catholic organizations had drafted a memorandum, written in Czech and addressed to President Beneš and the central government in Prague, containing “pressing demands of the Russian nation in eastern Slovakia” for recognition as an equal partner of the “fraternal Czechoslovak nation.”⁴⁹ District officials had dismissed the legitimacy of the petition in the customary fashion by attributing it to a fringe of “crypto-

43 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1930–1945, box 1, no. 35, 147/1937, “Jazykový boj na Komenského univerzite”.

44 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 23/1937, “Protištátne letáky”.

45 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 38/1938, “Mestská polícia v Prešove”.

46 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 23/1937, “Protištátne letáky”, letter dated 21. 10. 1938.

47 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4086/38, “Príchod Dr. Tisa na Slovensko”.

48 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4086/38, “Príchod Dr. Tisa na Slovensko”.

49 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 94/1938, “Memorandum Národného výboru ruských poslancov a ruských kultúrnych osvetových spolkov na Východnom Slovensku”.

Magyars,”⁵⁰ but during the stormy autumn Bishop Gojdič aligned himself with the cause of the petitioners, and the district commissioner received disconcerting intelligence about meetings where plans were being made for enlarging the borders of Sub-Carpathian Rus – Czechoslovakia’s easternmost province – at the expense of eastern Slovakia, and for placing this Rusyn homeland under Hungarian protection.⁵¹ This was a serious matter in view of Magyar territorial gains following the Viennese Arbitrage of November 1938 which cost Slovakia most of its Hungarian-populated territories, including the south-eastern metropolis of Košice.

Remarkably enough, while Slovakia’s arch-enemy was occupying one fifth of the country, a few kilometres north of the new border, the people of the Prešov region were holding joyous mass rallies in celebration of Slovak autonomy officially approved by the Czechoslovak parliament on the 19th of November 1938. The event was commemorated in every municipality with torch parades, speeches by Roman Catholic priests and patriotic teachers, and nationalistic songs that were still outlawed a few days earlier, including a new national anthem, all of this under the slogan “One God, one nation, one party.”⁵² While the recently deceased “great Leader” Andrej Hlinka served as the godfather of the unleashing Slovak pride movement, Tomáš Masaryk, the godfather of Czechoslovakism, was about to be symbolically and factually de-throned. In Prešov the first attempted defenestration took place a mere three weeks after the declaration of Slovak autonomy. According to a report penned down, in Slovak, by a Czech officer of the Prešov police detachment under the heading “Statue of Mr. President – Liberator threatened”, in the early morning hours of December 10th a group of approximately fifteen men attempted to pull down Masaryk’s statue in the centre of the city. Admonished by the officer on duty – another Czech – the mob rebuked the policeman and advised him to “get lost, disappear, those who do not love Slovakia should move out, and we will help you leave Slovakia.” Nevertheless, the group eventually dispersed without accomplishing the task.⁵³ This episode had a follow-up in the form of a hand-written note sent to the district commissioner in which an anonymous “Slovak” demanded the removal of the statue of “the freemason Masaryk”, threatening that if it remains in place for another week, it will have to be carried away by street sweepers.⁵⁴ The statue was pulled down and carted away shortly thereafter.

GLEICHSCHALTUNG AND ETHNIC CLEANSING

The Slovakization campaign of the late 1930s went hand in hand with a process of political homogenization and centralization comparable to Adolf Hitler’s *Gleichschaltung* after his rise to power. In October of 1938 the Communist Party was outlawed.⁵⁵ The Social Demo-

50 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 94/1938, “Memorandum Národného výboru ruských poslancov a ruských kultúrnych osvetových spolkov na Východnom Slovensku”.

51 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 185/1938, “Akcia za pripojenie Východného Slovenska k Podkarp. Rusi”.

52 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4461/1938, “Manifestační zhromaždenia”.

53 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4584/1938, “Pokus o odstránenie sochy T.G. Masaryka”.

54 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4584/1938, “Pokus o odstránenie sochy T.G. Masaryka”.

55 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 21/1938, “Činnosť komunistickej strany”.

cratic Party followed a month later.⁵⁶ Within a short period of time, all remaining parties were either outlawed or “united” with Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party. Also in October the Bratislava – based ministry responsible for Slovakia, an office by then controlled by the autonomists, dissolved Prešov’s elected city council and replaced it with an appointed commissary responsible directly to the minister. The commissary’s advisory council was led by the district secretary of the Slovak People’s Party, Floro Stašš.⁵⁷ The central government still remained in charge of the district administration, army units and state police (*četnictvo*) stationed in and around Prešov, but events following the October declaration of Slovak autonomy sent a clear message to the Prague régime that its authority was becoming increasingly nominal.

The goals and aspirations of the Slovak People’s Party leadership rang out loud and clear during a rally held in Prešov on 11th December 1938 in preparation for the election of the first autonomous Slovak legislative assembly scheduled for the next week. The speakers included Vojtech Tuka, honorary commander of the paramilitary Hlinka Guard and future prime minister of the independent Slovak Republic, and Šaňo Mach, propaganda chief and future minister of the interior. The event was attended by some twenty thousand spectators – an astounding number for a city of thirty thousand – and 1,500 members of the Hlinka Guard. According to transcripts provided by the district commissioner’s sources, Šaňo Mach declared: “On Sunday we shall vote for the first Slovak Assembly which will generate new Slovak laws that are going to take care of [*urobia poriadok*] Jews and Czechs.... Slovaks must be at home in their own land; here they will have their own schools, offices, economy, everything.”⁵⁸ Tuka, an ardent admirer of Hitler who had spent almost ten years in prison for spying on behalf of Hungary, lambasted the presence of 350,000 foreigners – without counting the Hungarians and the Germans – and demanded not just autonomy but full independence for Slovakia.⁵⁹

Starting in 1938, the presence of “foreigners” on Slovak soil led to demands for and – increasingly as Slovak autonomists gained political ground – instances of ethnic cleansing and physical attacks on people considered to be “aliens”. The first victims were Roma whose settlements were targeted for removal from frequented roads and neighbourhoods where their presence aroused the ire of Slovak neighbours.⁶⁰ Soon after the declaration of Slovak autonomy, Czech residents and institutions came under attack. In late November the Czech patriotic Sokol organization had its Prešov building confiscated,⁶¹ and throughout the winter of 1939 there were instances of Hlinka Guard members destroying or defacing symbols of the Czechoslovak state although Slovakia was still, at least nominally, under its authority. For example, in late February a Hlinka Guard member smashed a picture of the late president Masaryk that was hanging in the post office of a village outside Prešov.⁶² A few days later another HG member entered the post office in a suburb of Prešov and

56 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4503/38, “Zákaz činnosti soc.- dem. robotníckej strany”.

57 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 17/1939, “Menovanie vládnych komisárov”.

58 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4691/38, “L’udové zhromaždenie v Prešove dňa 11.12.1938”.

59 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 4691/38, “L’udové zhromaždenie v Prešove dňa 11. 12. 1938”.

60 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1938, box 15, no. 23, 580/38, “Oslava 20. výročia vzniku ČSR”.

61 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 247/39, “Sokol v Prešove”.

62 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 566/39, “Nepriстойnosti členov Hlinkovej gardy”.

demanded that the picture of Masaryk's successor be removed.⁶³ In late January the Hlinka Guard sawed off a wooden flag pole with Czechoslovak colours that stood outside a school, and soon thereafter Masaryk's monument in the centre of Prešov was torn down without any protest.⁶⁴ The wholesale elimination of Czechoslovak symbols was completed by March 1940 when several police detachments reported that all official inscriptions and signs of the previous régime had been removed and the stored portraits of former presidents burned.⁶⁵

The symbolic gestures of insubordination were followed by far more radical steps soon after Slovakia's declaration of independence in March 1939. Barely two months later, the new administration ordered each municipality to provide lists of local "communists, Marxists and Czechs"⁶⁶ and in September the minister of the interior demanded district-wide intelligence about the work of resident Czechs and whether they were replaceable by Slovaks.⁶⁷ The city of Prešov had discharged most of its Czech employees already in May.⁶⁸ The last one to be let go seems to have been the fire chief Eduard Štekal. This man had been the subject of a complaint made by his subordinates who had reported him for having insulted the memory of Andrej Hlinka and for behaving "like a Czech who doesn't belong in Slovakia anymore." Štekal's fellow firefighters were upset about his municipal apartment serving as a meeting point for other local Czechs "whose children play in the yard and ridicule Slovaks." Their boss had allegedly always "looked down on Slovaks, [and] had mercilessly persecuted Slovak firefighters."⁶⁹ Similar incidents in all ranks of the public service as well as the disbanding of Czechoslovak army and police units led to the departure of some 2,500 Czechs by August 1939 from the city of Prešov alone.⁷⁰ A more massive and compulsory "evacuation" followed the next year.

Slovak autonomy and independence brought about a marked turn for the worse for Prešov's substantial Jewish minority. Only a month after Slovakia's declaration of autonomy in October 1938, a circular from the district commissioner titled "The Jewish question in Slovakia" and marked "strictly confidential!" and "very urgent!" was sent to all municipalities. It addressed the need to deal with Jewish immigrants from the eastern province of Sub-Carpathian Rus – a region that the Vienna Arbitrage had assigned to Hungary – "without harming the economic interests of Slovakia."⁷¹ In a nutshell, while the circular ordered the expulsion of all foreign nationals, self-employed and other affluent Jewish immigrants were to be left untouched – at least for now – in anticipation of future Aryanization. In January of 1939 the Jewish Party was dissolved and its property confiscated.⁷² A month later, the district commissioner asked the city notary for the names and religion – "Christian" or "Jew" – of

63 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 566/39, "Neprístojnosti členov Hlinkovej gardy".

64 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 566/39, "Neprístojnosti členov Hlinkovej gardy".

65 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1940, box 18, no. 23, 538/1940, "Odstránenie českých nadpisov a čsl. št. znakov".

66 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 17, no. 23, 1229/39, "Súpis komunistov, marxistov a ... Čechov".

67 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 17, no. 23, 2.160/1939, "Výkaz Čechov v okrese".

68 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 17, no. 23, 976/1939, "Prepustenie zamestnancov bez sl. štátnej príslušnosti".

69 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Admin. spisy, 1939, box 81, no. 23, 10500/1939, "Štekal Eduard, hasič, Prešov, st'ážnosť občanov Prešova".

70 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 116/1939, "Ubytovacie pomery v Prešove".

71 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 196/1938, "Židovská otázka na Slovensku".

72 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 275/39, "Zastavenie židovskej strany".

all employees working in local pharmacies.⁷³ Another request for a list of all taverns and inns – and the religion of their owners – soon followed.⁷⁴ Not surprisingly, of the 78 establishments, 42 were in Jewish hands.⁷⁵

Between January and March of 1939, Czech state police reported first instances of Hlinka Guard members attempting to evict Jewish residents from their homes or businesses in several communities – attempts thwarted by the police.⁷⁶ After the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939, police detachments had become de-facto emasculated by Hlinka Guards, but their (Czech) officers continued to provide the district commissioner with intelligence about attacks on Jewish lives and property filed under the heading “Protection of Jewish citizens.” On April 16th, the police chief of Široké reported an attack on the residence of Lazár Hönig of Chminiany. Its windows had been broken, and the house had been hit by about fifty bullets.⁷⁷ The next day, the windows of several Jewish homes in Prešov were broken by unknown culprits.⁷⁸ A week later, another Czech officer reported similar attacks on Jewish properties in seven communities in the vicinity of Prešov.⁷⁹

The latter part of 1939 brought a series of discriminatory regulations issued by the new Slovak government and aimed at the Jewish minority. Henceforth, Jews were barred from public service,⁸⁰ they were required to perform manual labour in special work camps in lieu of military service,⁸¹ and Jewish companies and businesses were to be designated as such by means of special signage.⁸² In Prešov these measures culminated in a proposal, made in November of 1940, that barred Jews from residing in the centre of the city.⁸³ This was the beginning of the physical removal of local Jews – a process that eventually led to their wholesale deportation to Nazi death camps.

73 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 22/39, “Šetrenie náboženství zamestnancov lekární”.

74 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 2/7 list. “Súpis hostinských a výčapnických živností v Prešove”.

75 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 2/7 list. “Súpis hostinských a výčapnických živností v Prešove”.

76 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 566/39, “Nepřístojnosti členov Hlinkovej gardy”.

77 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 862/39, “Ochrana žid. občanov”.

78 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 862/39, “Ochrana žid. občanov”.

79 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 862/39, “Ochrana žid. občanov”.

80 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 104/1939, “Vypovedenie Židov z verejných služieb”.

81 ŠA Prešov, OU-P, Prezidiálne spisy, 1939, box 16, no. 23, 224/1939, “Židovská otázka”.

82 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 119/1939, “Výkaz majiteľov ornej pody národ. žid. a cudzích prísluš. na území Prešova”.

83 ŠA Prešov, NU-P, 1938–1944, box 2, no. 35, 272/1940, “Židovský domový majetek v Prešove”.

Afrikanistika na Filozofické fakultě UK: Ambice a bolesti / African Studies at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University: Ambitions and Constraints

LUBOŠ KROPÁČEK

ABSTRACT:

Decolonization boosted interest among travelers and researchers in Africa, an interest that had developed over many generations in Czechoslovakia. In 1960, the “Year of Africa”, experts on various aspects of Africa joined together and established African Studies as a field of study at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University. The field was conceived of as a comprehensive area studies program based on the humanities and social sciences. It was developed at the then Department of Asian and African Studies and respected the department’s primary focus on philology. It introduced opportunities for studying several African languages (specifically Swahili, Hausa, and Amharic), African literature (both in European and African languages), art, history, and ethnology, as well as social and cultural anthropology. Our study summarizes the accomplishments made in various disciplines (e.g., in history, with involvement in UNESCO’s General History of Africa project under the leadership of I. Hrbek). The first class of graduates of the five-year field of study produced several important figures, including Petr Skalník. Later graduates also found success both at home and abroad. The field, however, faced many struggles before November 1989: purges during normalization, scant opportunities for traveling and gaining contacts and information from abroad, and a lack of new literature in the field, which was developing rapidly elsewhere in the world. After November 1989, the doors were opened wide to gaining contacts and information; nonetheless, financial problems only continued to grow. The program underwent a revival in the 1990s, and in 2000 its fortieth anniversary was celebrated with a large international conference. In 2003 it took part in the Book World Prague trade fair, which took as its central theme African literature, where it contributed to reviving interest in this literature in the publication plans of Czech publishers. However, it would then lose its accreditation and therefore ceased to offer academic degrees. The reason for this was a lack of assistant professors to supervise the program. There is great, serious interest in studying Africa in the Czech Republic; now Charles University only partially covers this interest. New centers, albeit ones that only partially deal with Africa, are coming together in Plzeň, Hradec Králové, and at several other universities. In addition, the activities of several non-governmental organizations and media outlets, including the Humanitas Africa organization, which was founded by Africans, are expressions of the serious interest in this field. The future of this field of study, thus, remains wide open.

KEYWORDS:

African history; African languages; Swahili; African society; African literature; Normalization; African studies graduates

V naší malé vnitrozemské kotlině, kterou tak rádi označujeme za střed Evropy, nikdy nescházel zájem o život lidí ve vzdálených krajích, třeba i daleko za hranicemi našeho starého kontinentu. O českých cestovatelských touhách bylo již napsáno mnoho.¹ Ano, k evropskému poznávání Afriky, nikoli však k jejímu koloniálnímu ovládnutí, přispěli svým dílem také naši lidé. Jejich osudy a zásluhy jsou někdy oproti starším účelovým zkruslováním reálně hodnoceny až dnes. Tak byl například nedávno pročištěn obraz afrických cest Emila Holuba a osudů jeho sbírek (Šámal 2013). Po koloniální parcelaci Afriky se ve 20. století otevřely rozsáhlé možnosti rozvinout poznatky někdejších badatelských cest do systematického studia africké sociální a kulturní reality s využitím jak rychlého pokroku relevantních vědních oborů, tak přístupu do terénu a přibývajících kontaktů s Afričany. Československo sice kolonie nemělo – je dosti známo, že představitelé nové republiky při redistribuci odňatého německého koloniálního panství po Velké válce moudře odmítli nabídku spravovat Togo – avšak do studijního úsilí se naši odborníci zapojili. Zájem o africké společnosti a kultury projevovali v rámci svých oborů geografové, etnografové a etnologové, využívající muzejní a výstavní zkušenosti, jazykovědci a v relativně menší míře příležitostně také historikové.

V tomto článku budeme sledovat příběh nedokončeného půlstoletí trvání a snah oboru afrikanistika na Filozofické fakultě Univerzity Karlovy (FF UK). Termín afrikanistika se objevil počátkem 20. století u klasiků, zakladatelů tohoto oboru, jakými byli v Německu Carl Meinhof a Diedrich Westermann. Rozumělo se jím nejprve studium afrických jazyků. Pro studium kultury, jejího členění a dějin hrály v Německu určující roli postupně různé proudy a školy, které se přirozeně přenášely také k nám. Jako příklad si z vlastního raného mládí pamatuji, jak se u nás v antikvariátech hojně prodával tlustý špalík *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas* Leo Frobenia. Byla to okouzující četba, bylo však třeba jít dál k přesnějším metodám a historickým a antropologickým poznatkům. Naše univerzitní afrikanistika měla ambici stát se souhrnným areálním studiem zapojujícím přístupy všech humanitních a sociálních věd. U našich západoněmeckých sousedů v tehdy ovšem nedostupném Bayreuthu se pro takový komplexní přístup po nějaký čas zvažoval termín *Afrikanologie*. Příliš se neujal. Naše pojetí afrikanistiky na Filozofické fakultě se zcela přirozeně hlásilo k filologickému základu. Byl dán už tou skutečností, že obor byl přiřazen k primárně filologickým orientalistickým oborům na tehdejší Katedře věd o zemích Asie a Afriky. Váhu tu měla také skutečnost, že mezi průkopníky oboru měl přední místo docent arabistiky a etiopistiky Karel Petráček a že externí učitelé přicházeli zejména z Orientálního ústavu ČSAV. Zapojili se také odborníci z etnologických pracovišť, dějin umění a pro soudobá politická témata z resortního ústavu ministerstva zahraničí, který se tehdy nazýval Ústav pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii (UMPE).

Rozhodujícím vnějším faktorem otevření nového vysokoškolského oboru na FF UK se nepochybně stal mezinárodní vývoj. Rok 1960 vešel do dějin jako „Rok Afriky“. V jeho průběhu postupně získalo nezávislost 17 afrických koloniálních území, nadále států s vlastními státními symboly a uznanými představiteli. Byla to éra velkých očekávání, barvitě mystiky světlých zítřků třetího světa, příslibů *tiers-mondismu*, v němž Africe patřilo čestné místo. Již po několika málo letech se bohužel ukázalo, že „černá Afrika špatně vykročila“. ² René Dumont tuto myšlenku vyslovil s přesvědčením, že respektovat dekolonizovaného znamená říkat mu pravdu.

1 Přehledné shrnutí představuje např. malá encyklopedie *Kdo byl kdo, naši cestovatelé a geografové* (Martínek et al. 1998).

2 Srov. titul známé monografie *L'Afrique noire est mal partie* (Dumont 1962).

Pro nás v srdci Evropy hledat tuto pravdu znamenalo osvojit si teorie a metody několika vědních oborů a jejich aplikace na kulturně značně odlišné obyvatelské skupiny Afriky, zvláště její subsaharské části. Severní Africe věnovaly fakultní programy určitou pozornost již dříve v rámci arabistiky. Od počátku 60. let se však na FF UK přistupovalo k otevření nového, komplexního oboru. Obdobná afrikanistická studia v těch letech byla zakládána na mnoha univerzitách po celé Evropě. A také v Africe se nově nezávislé státy snažily posílit své sebevědomí rozvojem vědeckého a školského sebepoznání a sebe prezentace. Cestu ukazovala zvláště Nkrumahova Ghana, s níž českoslovenští odborníci záhy rozvinuli spolupráci. Do té se v průběhu let zapojovala také řada našich afrikanistů, včetně těch univerzitních, o nichž bude v našem článku řeč.³ S výraznou podporou UNESCO se tehdy afrikanistická studia bezprecedentní šíře i hloubky rozvíjela samozřejmě nejenom v afrických zemích, pokud k tomuto cíli nalezly kromě motivace také prostředky, ale samozřejmě také v někdejších koloniálních metropolích Anglie a Francie. Do této doby spadá vznik důležitých institucí a odborných časopisů. Zvláště silně se oživil zájem o studium afrických dějin, do té doby často zlehčovaných i zcela zpochybňovaných.⁴

Naše vyličení nedokončeného půlstoletí výuky oboru afrikanistika na FF UK se opírá o vzpomínky autora a některých jeho kolegů a o dostupné dokumenty. Archiv Univerzity Karlovy má materiály plně zpracovány pouze do roku 1966, dále, pokud jde o osobní i věcné informace, jen zčásti přístupné. Ve srovnání šanonech dnešního Ústavu Blízkého východu a Afriky FF UK (dříve Katedry věd o zemích Asie a Afriky) lze nalézt relevantní korespondenci a listiny zajímavé pro naše téma také jenom v omezené míře. Náš článek je pokusem o souhrnnou informaci a reflexi věnovanou někdejšími snahám o vybudování komplexní humanitně a společenskovědně zaměřené univerzitní afrikanistiky. Bilancuje výsledky, jichž jsme dosáhli, i slabiny, které dospěly až k současnému utlumení. Téma bylo zvoleno jako příspěvek do sborníku k uctění životního jubilea Petra Skalníka, jehož životní dráha významného sociálního antropologa a afrikanisty zahrnuje i několik fází jeho studentského života a pak pedagogického, výzkumného a organizačního působení v rámci sledovaného oboru.

VÝUKA AFRIKANISTIKY NA FF UK 1960–2006

Označení „afrikanistika“ se objevilo poprvé v Seznamu přednášek FF UK na akademický rok 1960/61, tedy příznačně v „Roce Afriky“. Tehdejší nabídka zahrnovala pouze kurs svahilštiny, již vyučoval vědecký pracovník Orientálního ústavu (OÚ) ČSAV Karel F. Růžička (1914–1972). Svahilštinu k nám badatelsky uváděl již dříve jeho učitel, známý lingvista Vladimír Skalička. V Růžičkově kursu, určitém předstupni plné afrikanistiky, se pedagogicky uplatnil jako lektor také Rashidi Malik ze Zanzibaru, později působící v Londýně v BBC. S významným bantuským jazykem se v Praze seznamovali arabisté Elena Zúbková a Luboš Kropáček. Oba se později tomuto jazyku a oboru věnovali hlouběji pedagogicky i publikačně (Kropáček 1994).

3 V Ghaně v 60. letech působil filosof, autor tehdy u nás populární monografie *Na Západ od Londýna* (Menert 1967), jejíž ukázky vycházely v Literárních novinách; jako visiting professor byl pozván do rostoucího afrikanistického centra v Legonu u Akkry Ivan Hrbek; jako účastník symposia o přesídlování obyvatelstva ze zaplavované oblasti na Voltě nad přehradou u Akosomba pobýval v zemi autor tohoto článku; jako stážista přijel do Akkry historik doktorand Milan Kalous. Později se terénnímu výzkumu tradiční politické moci a konfliktů na severu Ghany věnoval Petr Skalník v letech 1978 až 2003. Ve výčtu bychom mohli pokračovat.

4 Podrobně o tomto tématu přednášel L. Kropáček na XXVII. Letní škole historie pro učitele dějepisu, pořádané Pedagogickou fakultou v aule FF UK dne 1. 7. 2014.

V roce 1961/62 byla afrikanistika konečně otevřena, zprvu jako nediplomní obor vedle angličtiny nebo francouzštiny. I nadále se realizovala vždy v dvouoborovém studiu jako obor hlavní nebo vedlejší, případně doplňkový. Od roku 1962 ji už bylo možné studovat i jako obor diplomní a zvolit si jako jazykovou specializaci buď svahilštinu, nebo hauštinu. Byla také nabídnuta kombinace se studiem dějin umění. Sbor vyučujících se ustavil převážně z externích odborníků, kteří vtiskli svou pečť pojetí a rozvoji předmětů, jež garantovali. Vedle bantuisty Karla F. Růžičky razil cestu studiu hauštiny a rozvíjející se africké jazykovědy Petr Zima. Jeho učebnice hauštiny, schválená v roce 1970 ministerstvem školství jako vysokoškolská příručka, zůstává vlastně dodnes jedinou velkou českou učebnicí afrického jazyka (Zima 1973).⁵ Jazykovědnou nabídku rozšiřoval samozřejmě také docent (od 1968 profesor) Karel Petráček (1926–1987), který své hlavní zaměření na semitskou filologii rozšiřoval i směrem k jazykové problematice Afriky a k rozvoji etiopských studií. Pro pokročilé studenty i absolventy vedl volné kursy staré etiopštiny (gi'iz). Studentům afrikanistiky byla také dána možnost osvojit si základy arabštiny.

Garantem výuky afrických dějin se již od prvního běhu stal Ivan Hrbek (1923–1993). Také on se vedle arabistiky a islamistiky od 60. let stoupající měrou zaměřoval na historii Afriky. Na tomto poli dosáhl mezinárodního uznání jako člen byra UNESCO pro vypracování osmidílné *General History of Africa* (1981–1993, paralelně anglicky, francouzsky a arabsky). V tomto monumentálním díle redigoval některé svazky a zprostředkoval také uplatnění kapitol vypracovaných autory z FF UK: Kropáček o arabizaci Súdánu (Kropáček 1984) a Veselý o osmanském Egyptě (Veselý 1992). Pro českou veřejnost vydal Ivan Hrbek s kolektivem autorů dvoudílné *Dějiny Afriky* (1966). Periodizaci afrických dějin, kterou pro ně vypracoval, uplatnilo víceméně i mezinárodní dílo UNESCO.

Etnografické či sociálně a kulturně antropologické přednášky a semináře vedl obdobně od prvního běhu i v dalších realizacích oboru na FF UK antropolog Josef Wolf (1927–2012). Pro obor vypracoval řadu skript a přehledových knižních publikací, studenty vedl k zájmu o antropologii v plně šíři jejích významů a k vlastní publikační činnosti. Jeho oblíbeným tématem byly jednak obecné pradějiny člověka (na tomto poli vyšly jeho spisy v 15 zemích), jednak otázky etnogeneze, konstituování národů; v Africe velmi složitá otázka. Vedle Josefa Wolfa přinesl na poli výuky o afrických tradičních společnostech a kulturách od III. ročníku (1963/64) cenný vklad Ladislav Holý (1933–1997), který své speciální zaměření na Afriku prohloubil i významnými terénními výzkumy (Berti a Fúr v Súdánu) a profesionálním působením (ředitel muzea v Livingstonu v Zambii).

Pro další okruhy obor trvale využíval externí přednášející. Pro otázky současné politiky je čerpal z UMPE (pro jižní a východní Afriku Jaroslav Pátek). Afrikou se tehdy zabývali i lidé výrazně (Josef Haubelt) nebo svérázně (Václav Opluštil) konformní k režimu. Jinak tomu bylo u probouzejícího se zájmu o umění černé Afriky. Na tomto poli probouzela u prvního běhu zájem o krásu a svěbytnou filosofii africké výtvarné tvorby Hana Volavková, sama okouzlená západními autory upozorňujícími na myšlenkový svéráz odrážející se v obrazu světa, v jazyce i v umění (např. Placid Tempels, Janheinz Jahn aj.)

Na první kurs afrikanistiky z let 1961–1966, z něhož vyšla řada výrazných českých i slovenských osobností oboru, navázal v letech 1966–1971 druhý. Rozvíjel koncepci, která se osvědčila, zčásti se stejným pedagogickým obsazením. Výuku svahilštiny převzala Elena

5 Jedinečnost české učebnice připomněl při Zimových osmdesátých narozeninách v roce 2014 v *Lidových novinách* orientalista Petr Komers (Komers 2014, 23).

Zúbková, která se však záhy provdala do Itálie a pod jménem Bertoncini si získala široké uznání na evropských univerzitách jako odbornice na moderní svahilskou literaturu. V našem oboru ji nahradila nedávná absolventka Magdalena Slavíková, vyškolená po Praze u přední bantuistické autority prof. Malcolma Guthrieho na londýnské SOAS (*School of Oriental and African Studies*). Bohužel i ona po srpnu 1968 dala přednost životu v exilu. Provádala se za českého historika Milana Haunera, přesídlila do USA a stala se vedoucí osobností svahilských studií na University of Wisconsin v Madisonu. Výuky věnované tradiční a moderní africké společnosti se rovněž ujali nedávni absolventi Petr Skalník a Ladislav Venyš. Skalník po počátečním studiu na FF UK vystudoval v letech 1963–1967 afrikanistiku a hauskou filologii v Leningradě, na prestižním univerzitním centru vedeném profesorem Dmitrijem A. Olderoggem. Venyš,⁶ orientovaný zvláště na mezinárodní vztahy, svou erudici prohloubil postgraduálním studiem na Syracuse University (USA, NY).

Náležitou pozornost věnoval obor také africkým literaturám v evropských jazycích; anglofonní přednášel odborník z Orientálního ústavu Vladimír Klíma, francouzskou Jarmila Ortová.⁷ Do oboru se svébytně začlenila také etiopistická studia, zaštiťovaná prof. Petráčkem. Roku 1969 na FF UK absolvoval etiopistiku po předchozích studiích v Leningradě a v Addis Abebě Zdeněk Poláček. Jeho životní dráhu vyznačují později zejména lexikografické práce věnované moderní amharštině, kulturně historické studie a působení v diplomatických službách.

Třetí realizovaný kurs afrikanistiky v letech 1970–1975 poznamenaly již tvrdé údery normalizačních personálních čistek. Seznam přednášek na rok 1970/71 vyšel příznačně zcela bez údajů o jménech vyučujících. Katedra věd o zemích Asie a Afriky, na níž se afrikanistika realizovala, ztratila – řečeno dobovým žargonem – „stranické krytí“, neboť hrstka jejích partajníků byla tehdy z KSČ vyškrtuta. Ostatní, nestraníci, museli postupně z fakulty odejít. Na afrikanistice se to týkalo jak staršího Josefa Wolfa, tak mladých Ladislava Venyše a Luboše Kropáčka. Petr Skalník přešel nejprve do Bratislavy a roku 1977 emigroval do Nizozemska a následně do Jižní Afriky. Do zahraničí, jak již bylo uvedeno, odešly také obě významné svahilistky Elena Bertoncini-Zúbková a Magdalena Haunerová-Slavíková. Hauštinu nebylo možné realizovat, protože za normalizačních čistek byl z Orientálního ústavu propuštěn Petr Zima.

Na FF UK zajišťovali výuku dějin Ivan Hrbek a další disciplíny až do svého odchodu Ladislav Venyš a Luboš Kropáček. Pozoruhodnou, nepřehlédnutelnou osobností oboru v této etapě byl konzský sociolog a politik Etienne-Richard Mbaya. Nabízel francouzské přednášky o africké sociologii a kursy jazyků čiluba a lingala. Byl aktivně zapojen do zahraničních akcí proti Mobutuovu režimu a zřejmě proto byl po dvou letech působení na FF UK náhle vyhoštěn z ČSSR. V roce 1998 po změnách u nás a po vítězství Kabily v Zairu byl Mbaya v Kinshase jmenován ministrem pro hospodářskou obnovu (*reconstruction*). Ve spolupráci s ministerstvem zahraničí byl tehdy pozván do Prahy, neboť perspektivy výhodné hospodářské spolupráce s rozsáhlým, potenciálně bohatým Kongem se tu jevily velmi reálně. Brzy po návratu zpět do Kinshasy však Mbaya upadl v nemilost a byl odstraněn.

6 Jeho diplomovou práci *A History of the Mau Mau Movement in Kenya* (Venyš 1970) vydala FF UK.

7 Roku 1970 společně publikovali česká vysokoškolská skripta *Literatury zemí subsaharské Afriky* (Klíma a Ortová 1970) a knižní publikaci *Modern Literatures of Subsaharan Countries* (Klíma a Ortová 1969). V hlubším záběru byly africké literatury dále zpracovány v kolektivním díle *Literatury černé Afriky* (Klíma et al. 1972) a poté v úspěšné anglické verzi *Black Africa: Literatures and Languages* (Klíma et al. 1976).

Vraťme se ale k naší afrikanistice v Celetné ulici. V roce 1974/75 museli tehdejší studenti posledního, diplomového ročníku – mezi nimi někteří velmi nadějní – absolvovat již bez vyhozených učitelů v konstelacích, jaké určili normalizátoři. V několika dalších letech se pak obor neotevíral. V novém pojetí byl postupně začleněn pod záhlaví nově koncipované takzvané „orientalistiky“, v níž dominovaly obecné dějiny kolonialismu a národně osvobozeneckých hnutí, přiřazovaných účelově po bok mezinárodního dělnického hnutí a „revolučních sil současnosti“. Africkou část této restriktivní historiografie vedl jako interní učitel Josef Poláček (1931–2012), absolvent aspirantury v Institutu Afriky AV SSSR v Moskvě. Upřímně obdivoval africký protikoloniální boj, zvláště RDA, jíž zasvětil svou disertaci a pak velkou část svých přednášek (Poláček 1979). Obecně podléhal marxistickým dogmatickým koncepcím afrických dějin, za jejichž nejlepší výklad pokládal jinde již právem zapomenutý spis Endre Síka (Sík 1961). Osobně byl Poláček slušný člověk, oběť iluzí, jakými byla orientalistika-afrikanistika na FF UK dušena až do listopadu 1989. O tradičních společnostech se tehdy vyučovalo víceméně jen na Katedře etnografie a folkloristiky pod hlavičkou cizokrajné etnografie.

Filologickému zájmu se dostalo znovu trochu prostoru až v 80. letech. Velmi obětavě se na tomto poli snažil o akademický standard Karel Petráček, zvláště v pohledu na afroasijskou (semito-hamitskou) a nilo-saharskou skupinu a na literatury severovýchodní Afriky. Svahilštinu dostaly za úkol udržet absolventky posledního plnohodnotného ročníku (z roku 1975), krátce Vladka Hoštová a pak Marie Brzobohatá, přijatá do aspirantury (1980–1986) (Brzobohatá 1986). Praktickou konverzaci zabezpečoval lektor (Mlangwa). Vzhledem k nedostatku jiných možností se afrikanistům nabízely také kursy arabštiny a portugalského. Jen v okrajovém dotyku s fakultou působili tehdy afrikanisté v jiných institucích, kteří se i v dusném klimatu doby věnovali odbornému výzkumu a také publikovali práce patřící trvale k zlatému fondu kultivované popularizační nabídky českému čtenáři. Uvedu alespoň pracovníka Náprstkova muzea Josefa Kanderta (Kandert 1984) a zaměstnance Orientálního ústavu Vladimíra Klíma (Klíma, Kubica a Wokoun 1983).⁸ Bibliografickému zmapování českých badatelských i popularizačních prací o Africe se věnovali v Orientálním ústavu v nové éře po listopadu 1989 Jaroslav Černý, Petr Hereit a Otakar Hulec – první část je dovedena do roku 1988 (Hulec a Černý 1993; Hulec a Hereit 2001).⁹

Rozsáhlé změny, které přinesla československé společnosti revoluce roku 1989, se velmi rychle odrazily v poměrech na FF UK ve všech oborech. Na afrikanistiku se v rámci rehabilitací vrátil na jaře 1990 autor tohoto článku a z Jižní Afriky se do Ústavu Blízkého východu a Afriky na čas vrátil také Petr Skalník, zprvu do r. 1992, kdy byl jmenován velvyslancem v Libanonu, a pak na léta 1997–1998. ÚBVA ve své vnitřní organizaci ustavil Seminář afrikanistiky, jehož vedoucím byl jmenován Luboš Kropáček. Oboru byl stanoven závazný fakultní obecný základ: filosofie, základy jazykovědy a dva světové jazyky. Vlastní obor pak uzavíraly zkoušky z předmětných okruhů: africký jazyk, dějiny kontinentu a africká společnost a kultura. V dalším vývoji obor akceptoval rozdělení studia na bakalářský a návazný magisterský cyklus. Nebývalé možnosti se otevřely pro mezinárodní spolupráci. V Evropě jsme je nejvíce využili v kontaktech s německými univerzitami v Bayreuthu a v Lipsku a k výměně publikací se Skandinávským institutem afrikanistiky (*Afrikainstitutet*) v Uppsale. Výčet realizovaných a částečně využitých kontaktů by ovšem mohl být mnohem širší.

8 V. Klíma se zabývá literaturou, V. Kubica hudbou a A. Wokoun výtvarným uměním Afriky.

9 Druhá část zahrnuje i obhájené, ale nepublikované magisterské diplomní práce. Oba díly jsou velmi přehledně tematicky utříděné.

Měnil se samozřejmě obsah výuky a rychlé zavádění výpočetní techniky ukazovalo nové cesty metodice výzkumů a zadávaných úkolů. Již v roce 1990 byla tehdejšími posluchačům 5. ročníku v některých případech pozměněna témata diplomních prací. Nový 1. ročník od školního roku 1991/92 byl již koncipován v duchu nových pojetí a možností. Petr Skalník otevíral témata afrického raného i postkoloniálního státu. Zároveň paralelně k navázání diplomatických styků ČR s měnící se Jihoafrickou republikou usnadňoval svými konexemi meziuniverzitní spolupráci v tomto novém, dříve nemyslitelném vztahu. Na oboru se rozeběhla i výuka jazyka a literatury afrikaans, zahájená na podzim 1992 intenzivním čtrnáctidenním kursem, který vedli Chris a Bibi van derMerweovi z University of Cape Town. Dále pokračovala manželka velvyslance paní Nicole Du Bois. Na FF UK přijížděli z vlastní iniciativy jihoafričtí profesori filologických i společenskovedních oborů a nabízeli přednášky a spolupráci. Někdy směřovali k nám, někdy na fakultní nederlandistiku. Seminární knihovnu obohatily knižní dary od choti prezidenta De Klerka a také z velvyslanectví JAR a od četných hostů. Významným kontaktem se pro nás stal prof. Jan K. Coetzee z univerzity v Grahamstownu, který spolu s Otakarem Hulcem z Orientálního ústavu vypracoval komparativní studii o vývoji represivních režimů a pak přechodu k demokracii v JAR a v Československu.¹⁰ V našem Semináři jsme se tomuto tématu také autorsky věnovali (Skalník 1999). Z významných jihoafrických hostujících profesorů v našem Ústavu zmiňuji ještě literárního vědce G. A. Joosteho z Port Elizabeth (1993) a politologa Hermana Gilliomeeho z University of Cape Town (1998).

Studium svahilštiny zabezpečovali Luboš Kropáček, krátce (1993/94) také nedávná absolventka Irena Smetánková. K výuce amharštiny a etiopistiky jsme využili externí spolupráce s kolegy spjatými s naším pracovištěm, Zdeňkem Poláčkem a Pavlem Mikešem. Od roku 1997 se interním pracovníkem Semináře stal Alemayehu Kumsa z Etiopie. Ten nadále až do zániku oboru vyučoval kromě areálně konkretizované sociologie, v níž v Praze předtím dosáhl Ph.D., také amharštinu a svou mateřskou oromštinu (*oromiffa*). V roce 1999 vyučoval v našem semináři ghanský lektor jazyk *twi*. Jeho působení bylo bohužel jen krátkodobé a výjimečné. Studium západoafrických jazyků se snažil na UK mimo naši fakultu zavádět Petr Zima. Do většího počtu afrických jazyků (včetně např. jorubštiny) se v době svého doktorského studia po roce 2000 pustila naše absolventka filosofie, germanistiky a afrikanistiky Alena Rettová. Dnes působí na londýnské SOAS na oboru svahilských studií a získává si mezinárodní renomé studii o *afrofonní filosofii*, to jest konceptualizaci světa v afrických jazycích (Rettová 2001 a 2007). V zájmu zkvalitnění výuky afrických jazyků u nás jsem apeloval na ministerstvo zahraničí, aby našim studentům pomáhalo ke stážím či studijním pobytům v Africe. S nevalným výsledkem.¹¹

Na poli studia afrických společností a kultury jsme se do značné míry opírali o osvědčené externisty. Velkou oporou byl Semináři trvale Josef Kandert. Jeho mateřským pracovištěm bylo po čtyři desetiletí Náprstkovo muzeum, později také Fakulta sociálních věd UK. Nám vycházel vstříc v širokém spektru výuky i atestací. U některých předmětů jsme se o přednášky dělili, například k tématu africké duchovní kultury Kandert přednášel o tradičních náboženstvích, Kropáček o afrických podobách křesťanství a islámu. O africkém výtvarném umění Kandert přednášel v koordinaci s Aloisem Wokounem (1926–2007), jehož v mládí obrna upoutala

10 Společné studie *Oppression, resistance, imprisonment: a montage of different but similar stories in two countries* (Coetzee a Hulec 1999) zahrnuje i srovnání s Ruskem z pera Mary Ustinovy z let 1997 a 1998 – viz přesné údaje *Africana Bohemica* II (Hulec a Hereit 2001, 146).

11 V šanonech korespondence ÚBVA je dochován dopis z 4. 1. 1999 adresovaný tehdejšímu řediteli afrického odboru MZV Jaroslavu Olšovi jr., mimochodem někdejšímu absolventu naší katedry.

natrvalo na vozík, ale nedokázala zbavit nesmírného životního elánu. Nasměroval jej do nadšeného zájmu o africké moderní umění, přes veškeré obtíže létal za ním i do Afriky samé a jezdil přednášet k nám do Celetné. K našim externistům se samozřejmě počítali odborníci na specializované úseky dějin, jako již jmenovaní Otakar Hulec (dějiny jižní Afriky), Vladimír Klíma (africké literatury) a další. Mohli jsme také počítat se spoluprací Petra Skalníka, a to i poté, kdy s perspektivou cílenějšího zaměření na sociální antropologii přešel na Přírodovědeckou fakultu UK. Setkávali jsme se dále při řadě projektů, jako byly Gellnerovské semináře nebo práce věnované politické antropologii.

Jako svou vrcholnou akci náš malý obor uspořádal ke 40. výročí Roku Afriky a své vlastní existence mezinárodní konferenci *Africa 2000*. Konala se v historické budově Karolina ve dnech 4.–5. prosince 2000. Zúčastnilo se asi 80 afrikanistů, zahraniční účastníci přijeli ze třinácti zemí: SRN, Rakouska, Slovenska, Maďarska, USA, Izraele, Francie, Británie, Nizozemska, Itálie, Angoly, Jižní Afriky a Pobřeží Slonoviny. Vedle známých odborníků přijely ze zahraničí také skupiny studentů: z Lipska, Mnichova a Bratislavy. Po úvodním zasedání za účasti diplomatů a vedoucích představitelů UK a české rozvojové pomoci konference probíhala ve dvou souběžných sekcích. Do výsledné publikace jsme témata utřídili na všeobecné problémy Afriky; sociologii, antropologii a archeologii; jazyky a literaturu; a zdravotnictví (Kropáček a Skalník 2001).

Obor, posílený širší mezinárodní spoluprací, úspěšně rozvinul i svůj přednáškový záběr. Rok u nás působil na Fulbrightovo stipendium významný afroamerický odborník na východoafrickou archeologii Chapurukha Kusimba (sám s keňskými kořeny jako tehdy ještě neznámý Barack Obama). Pohlíželi jsme s nadějami do budoucnosti, podobně jako tehdy africké země, probírající se ze skepse a letargie předchozích desetiletí. Nadějně vyznívala i jedna z přednášek zahraničního návštěvníka, aniž jsme tušili, že už jedna u nás z posledních, protože oboru hrozí útlum. Řeč je o přednášce prof. Richarda Werbnera *Afro-pessimism and its alternatives*.¹² Hrozba útlumu vyvstávala s nevlídným přístupem akreditačních komisí, v jejichž očích obor nesplňoval požadavek garance dvěma interními profesory nebo docenty. Interní pracovníci byli skutečně jenom dva: profesor Kropáček, věkem již překračující požadovaný strop 65 let, a odborný asistent Alemayehu Kumsa. Autor tohoto článku tehdy vypracoval několik verzí akreditačních návrhů bakalářského a magisterského studia afrikanistiky, buď jako oboru filologického, jako byla převážně dosud, nebo historického. Akreditace dána nebyla a obor se od poloviny prvního desetiletí již nemůže otevřít.

K posledním významným iniciativám naší afrikanistiky patřila ještě výrazná účast na Světě knihy v roce 2003. Prestižní knižní veletrh si v tomto ročníku vzal za cíl představit českým čtenářům bohatou rozmanitost současných afrických literatur. Poté co v předchozích letech by se knižní překlady z děl afrických autorů daly „spočítat takřka na prstech jedné ruky“ (Komers 2003), nyní si přední česká „kamenná“ nakladatelství uložila jako bezmála věc cti něco pěkného afrického vydat. A bylo z čeho vybírat! Naše fakultní afrikanistika dostala na veletrhu vlastní stánek a naši studenti se účastnili besed, instruktáží a setkání s významnými africkými autory. Byli mezi nimi i tak významné osobnosti jako Amadou Kourouma. Ze Světa knihy jsme si tehdy odnášeli posílené vlastní renomé, chuť do práce a cenné knížky, které naši knihovně před odjezdem darovali někteří zahraniční vystavovatelé, včetně UNESCO.

12 Richard Werbner je profesorem University of Manchester. Přednášku u nás pronesl 17. 5. 2004. Zaměřil se hlavně na kladný příklad, jaký dává pokojný rozvoj a prosperita Botswany.

Výuka oboru nicméně končila. Uchovala se jen možnost doktorského studia v rámci oborů Dějiny a kultury zemí Asie a Afriky, případně obdobně koncipovaných oborů jazykovědných a literárněvědných. Tituly Ph.D. u nás v tomto nedávném, utlumeném období získali ještě Alena Rettová (*Afrophone Philosophies: Reality and Challenge*, 2005), Petr Jelínek (*Transformace státu v postkoloniálním Mozambiku*, 2009), Jan Záhorský (*Etiopie v letech 1923–1935*, 2009) a zatím naposledy Zuzana Beranová (*Role ženy v Keni*, 2014).

ABSOLVENTI

Tato podkapitola by neměla být výčtem jmen, ale spíše gratulací všem, komu náš obor dal dobré startovní vybavení do života, v němž nechybí vědomí smyslu, úcta k humanitě, užitečnost a radost z poznání a práce. Bylo jich podstatně více, než zde stačíme uvést; s úctou si připomínáme i nezmíněné. Velmi mnohovýznamných jmen se objevuje již v první „generaci“ z počátku 60. let, o mnohých z nich zde již byla řeč. Patří k nim již adresát tohoto sborníku Petr Skalník a dále Josef Kandert, Ladislav Venyš, Magdalena Haunerová-Slavíková a další. Spolu s nimi studovali také průkopníci slovenské afrikanistiky. Viera Pawliková-Vilhanová krátce po absolvování v Praze získala stipendium k postgraduálnímu studiu na Makerere v Kampale a archivním a terénním bádáním o dějinách Ugandy založila svou vědeckou dráhu ve slovenských akademických institucích jako historička Afriky (Pawliková-Vilhanová 1988). Její spolužák z pražské afrikanistiky Cyril Hromník se brzy po Praze dostal do USA (Syracuse University) a dále pak k expedičním výzkumům a do Jižní Afriky (University of Cape Town). Zaměřil se na bádání o raných kontaktech Afriky s Indií, Indonésií a Arábií. Jeho odvážné hypotézy na tomto poli vyvolaly v JAR i v širší afrikanistické obci rozporuplné diskuse. V podobném duchu se ostatně věnoval i archeologickým hypotézám o prehistorických kontaktech Slováků.

První skupina absolventů naší afrikanistiky ze 60. let záhy splynula v odborné společnosti s mírně staršími pražskými afrikanisty, kteří se k nim aspiranturami připojili z jiných oborů: na FF UK z arabistiky (Elena Bertoncini-Zúbková, Luboš Kropáček) nebo zaměřením na Afriku v Orientálním ústavu (historik Otakar Hulec, anglista, literární vědec Vladimír Klíma). Byla o nich zde již řeč. Dalším ročníkům či „generacím“ fakultní afrikanistiky zabránila působit ve zvoleném oboru nastupující normalizace. Kvalitní vzdělání a pracovní elán dokázali nicméně uplatnit později i jinak. Petr Kučera těžil nepochybně z někdejší americké politologické inspirace od Ladislava Venyše, když v listopadu 1980 spoluzakládal Občanské fórum a přiřadil se k jeho vedoucím činitelům. Jaromír Kalus u nás absolvoval znamenitou diplomovou práci o kimbanguismu, po listopadu 1989 se stal ředitelem Slezského zemského muzea v Opavě a na čas poslancem. Někteří absolventi si našli místa v redakcích (např. Dagmar Rohanová v Odeonu) nebo ve školách. Na fakultě zůstala pouze Marie Brzbobohatá, již byla umožněna aspirantura a pak výuka svahilštiny. Počátkem 90. let odjela s manželem do Německa.

Zdá se, že jediný z našich starších absolventů, kdo přijal konformní pojetí a terminologii normalizační historiografie, byl v 70. a 80. letech Karel Lacina (Lacina et al. 1987).¹³ Mohl pak studovat soudobou tematiku i v okruhu ústředí Organizace africké jednoty (OAJ) v Addis Abebě, po listopadu 1989 přešel k jiné práci. Absolventi z předlistopadových let se naopak

13 Rozsáhlá kniha (820 stran) byla zamýšlena jako aktuální pokračování Hrbkových *Dějin Afriky* z roku 1966. Ličila vývoj nezávislých afrických států v duchu režimní ideologie.

zařadili do změněných poměrů s chutí a elánem. Nejúspěšnější dráhu nastoupili dva afrikanisté v českých i mezinárodních diplomatických službách: Pavel Mikeš a Juraj Chmiel. Pavel Mikeš je dnes předním českým odborníkem na problematiku Etiopie a Rohu Afriky. Ve vysokých diplomatických funkcích působil v Etiopii, Kongu (Kinshase) a Nigérii, vydal řadu knižních publikací věnovaných etiopské kultuře a etiopské a somálské lidové slovesnosti. Dr. Chmiel působil mj. jako ministr pro evropské záležitosti ve vládě Jana Fischera a svou afrikanistikou erudici uplatnil jako český velvyslanec v Nigérii (1996–1999) a autor cestopisu *Hrob bílého muže* (2008) ze západní a střední Afriky. Zmínku si také určitě zaslouží výborná lingvistka Irena Smetánková (dnes doprovází manžela v diplomatických funkcích) a Marie Imbrová. Ta si uchovává kontakty v Zimbabwe a neúnavné nadšení pro africké umění a kulturu, které propaguje řadou akcí (*Tengenenge Friends Club*).

Absolventům z devadesátých a dalších let se otevřely nesrovnatelně rozsáhlejší perspektivy než dřívějším ročníkům. Získali více možností studia a stáží v zahraničí, cest, osobního poznání, volby výzkumných záměrů a samozřejmě také uplatnění. Psát osobní příběhy, jak těchto možností využili, by si zasloužilo zvláštní prostor. Jsou to příběhy – na rozdíl od naší fakultní afrikanistiky – stále živé a otevřené, z nichž můžeme jen heslovitě zachytit malý zlomek. Diplomní práce z našeho Semináře, které bohužel zůstávají nepublikovány, zahrnují výborně zpracovaná témata afrického lidového divadla (Geroldová 2004), rodinného života v Mali (Gojčová 2003), reprezentaci rwandské minulosti (Arcia 2008), otázky jazykového ostrova tasawaq (Síbrt 2006), politiky a společnosti v Angole v 70. letech (Joao 2009),¹⁴ zvířecích motivů v africké a afroamerické slovesnosti (Šelbická 2001) a řadu dalších.

Co se týká uplatnění, ve výzkumné akademické sféře se kromě již vícekrát jmenované Aleny Rettové nejúspěšněji prosazuje Pavel Onderka, absolvent oboru v kombinaci s egyptologií. Působí v Národním muzeu jako vedoucí velmi úspěšných vykopávek ve Wad Naga v Súdánu. Naši veřejnosti byly představeny v roce 2014 výstavou *Země černých faraonů* v Náprstkově muzeu. Onderka již za studií iniciativně organizoval výstavy a publikační projekty. Společně s učiteli a spolužáky na afrikanistice editoval k 10. výročí významných událostí sborník studií *Afrika: dvojznačné jaro 1994* (Onderka 2004). Jiní absolventi se uplatnili natočením dokumentárních filmů o afrických zemích (Radovan Síbrt), prací na rozvojových projektech (Hana Geroldová v Mali, Tea Tihounová v Etiopii), odbornou prací v Náprstkově muzeu (Jana Jiroušková), ve školství a v řadě státních nebo soukromých institucí doma nebo v zahraničí. Útlum oboru s nejasnou perspektivou je neteší – stejně jako jejich někdejší učitele.

ÚVAHY BEZ ŘEŠENÍ

Kde se stala chyba? Můžeme přemýšlet o širokých souvislostech a skládat mozaiku slabin, které nedovolily nepochybně dobré vůli prorazit svíravý rámec proměnlivých nálad a vnějších tlaků. Obor vznikl v době mladistvého optimistického elánu v čerstvě nezávislé Africe i v Československu šedesátých let. Následovala zklamání, skepse, provázející africké diktatury a stagnaci, u nás normalizaci. Již tehdy, počátkem 70. let, když naši fakultní afrikanistiku nekryl žádný straník, normalizátoři uvažovali, že by potřebu odborníků tohoto směru mohlo plně uspokojit vysílání studentů do Moskvy, Leningradu nebo Lipska. Náš listopad 1989

14 Tři spolustudenti z posledního ročníku naší afrikanistiky vydali společně česko-portugalský sborník z konference, kterou jsme spolupořádali v Praze 2. 11. 2005 (Joao et al. 2006)

spadá do doby paradigmatického zlomu a obnovy nadějí také v Africe. Náš obor, jehož mini-historii jsme sledovali, nabral novou energii, narážel však na rostoucí finanční restriktce. Ta nabyla v současnosti na FF UK míry, kdy se znovu hovoří o rušení malých oborů. Obnovit afrikanistiku nepadá v úvahu.

Náš obor měl vždy jen velmi malý interní pedagogický sbor. Soustřeďoval nicméně ke společné práci odborníky z dalších pražských institucí, zvláště z Orientálního ústavu a Náprstkovy muzea. Vysoce nadpoloviční většinu českých a slovenských afrikanistů sledovaného půlstoletí představují odborníci, kteří u nás učili nebo studovali (Filipský 1999).¹⁵ Jako slabina se nicméně ukázaly časté výjezdy našich afrikanistů do zahraničí, na konference, studijní pobyty i dlouhodobé působení v diplomatických službách. V západních zemích taková praxe patří běžně ke zkvalitňování oboru, v našich stísněných podmínkách však spíše destabilizovala. Nepříznivě se promítlo také oslabení zájmu o Afriku u případných zdrojů státní nebo soukromé podpory. V 90. letech se u nás nezdařil projekt Česko-afričké obchodní komory, nalézt soukromé sponzory pro akademickou afrikanistiku nebylo a není reálné. Řada afrických zemí zrušila v Praze svá velvyslanectví a v období škrtů před 10 lety vláda nedomyšleně drasticky rušila česká diplomatická zastoupení v subsaharské Africe. Trend zasáhl i vědu a školství. V Orientálním ústavu, kde kdysi africké oddělení pod Hrbkovým vedením mělo 12 odborných pracovníků, afrikanistika dnes neexistuje. Jako obor na FF UK fakticky (dočasně?) zanikla.

Zájem mladé generace o Afriku je ovšem značný a roste. Každý rok dostávám e-mailové dotazy od maturantů z Česka i ze Slovenska, zda, případně jak a kdy by se u nás mohli přihlásit ke studiu afrikanistiky. Obor se zatím ujal ve formách akcentujících antropologický, politologický a historický přístup jednak v Hradci Králové (vedle Petra Skalníka, docenti Hana Horáková, Jan Klíma a Vlastimil Fiala), jednak v Plzni (od r. 2014 doc. Jan Záhořík, koncepční spolupráce s Etiopíí). Střední a mladší generace hledá způsoby jak posílit poznávání Afriky v rámci české vzdělanosti i mezinárodní vědecké spolupráce. K tomuto cíli byla ustavena *Czech Association for African Studies*.¹⁶ Existují také další iniciativy k šíření poznatků o africké kultuře. Zmínku si zasluhuje festival *Tvůrčí Afrika aneb Všichni jsme Afričané*, který již několik let pečuje o inscenace divadelních her afrických, nejčastěji frankofonních autorů a setkávání s nimi. Pořádá jej občanské sdružení *Komba*, jako spiritus agens působí zvláště Lucie Němečková. Anglofonní Afričané, zvláště z Ghany (Kofi Nkrumah), ustavili zase v Praze v Ječné ulici kulturní centrum *Humanitas Africa* s bohatou knihovnou a programem přednášek, besed, filmových projekcí a kurzů věnovaných různým stránkám života na jih od Sahary. Neměli bychom zapomenout ani na rozsáhlou oblast humanitárních projektů a zdravotní a školní pomoci, kterou naši občané, lidé dobré vůle, často s velkým nasazením organizují na mnoha místech nejchudšího kontinentu. Naše sebereflexe se tedy nemusí uzavírat jen povzdechy. Změnily se a dále se mění možnosti a podoby humanitárních snah poznávat, orientovat a pomáhat, vyvstávají ovšem také nové hrozby a nejistoty. Předkládáme své dobré i nedobré zkušenosti s vědomím, že v mozaice velkých dějin, které sledujeme a které nás bezprostředně obklopují, má své místo i naše vlastní mikrohistorie.

15 Encyklopedická příručka soustřeďuje údaje o 36 afrikanistech. Z nich 20 patřilo nějak k našemu okruhu; mezi ostatními převládají Češi spjatí s Afrikou ve starší minulosti.

16 Kvalitním dokladem tohoto úsilí je poslední číslo revue *Modern Africa, politics, history and society* (2014) vydané Filosofickou fakultou Univerzity v Hradci Králové, resp. zmíněnou Asociací, k osmdesátinám Petra Zimy.

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Contested Disciplines in New Europe: Ethnology and Sociocultural Anthropology in Lithuania

VYTIS CIUBRINSKAS

ABSTRACT:

The discipline of sociocultural anthropology has particular political and epistemological connotations in post-socialist Central/Eastern Europe. What are the contexts where certain ideologies and methodologies were produced and reproduced as well as contested in the field? This presentation is a participant informed reflection on professional practicing (by teaching and doing research) of this discipline(s) in the course of ongoing social and institutional changes in Lithuania during the last three decades. My aim is to link the local politics of the discipline of Lithuanian ethnology and the discipline of sociocultural anthropology with dominant discourses and national culture and research policies in the country of the period of the late socialist and post-socialist change. I will try to unpack the influence of dominant discourses and national identity politics on the research and teaching strategies of the discipline.

KEYWORDS:

National ethnology; Sociocultural anthropology; Tradition; Ethnic culture; Identity; Program in anthropology; Lithuania

INTRODUCTION

Chris Hann, an acknowledged specialist in post-socialist anthropology, in a debate (Hann 2007b) about the specifics of the discipline of ethnology in Central and Eastern Europe compared to the understanding of ethnology in the US, the UK, and other Western European countries, pointed on to Herder, the scholar who made the terms *nation* and *folk* synonymous (Hann 2007b, 261), something that has had a long lasting effect on ethnological scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe (Hann 2007a, 7). The emphasis Herder placed was on the “recognition of the unique spirit of each people” (Hann 2007a, 9). Thus “studying peoples” was often taken in Central and Eastern Europe to mean an interest in documenting the “pristine” local/regional/areal “folk culture” found and described in the rural hinterlands of nation-states. Ernest Gellner defined the development of ethnological scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe as a “salvage operation” which could be understood as culture politics and “ethnography at home”. In his words ethnology appeared in

this region in the 19th century as a “salvage operation” and “cultural engineering” (Gellner 1996, 115–116).

So due to “Herder legacy” the “peoples studying discipline” has particular connotations in post-socialist Central/Eastern Europe where “studying peoples” is still defined differently. One way is just studying any “people”, the other way is studying people who do belong to “nation” in Europe and thus to the discipline of *European Ethnology* (formerly known as *Volkskunde*). Such a division had a lasting effect on scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe during the era of nationalist mobilization, which followed both, the disintegration of the region’s empires in the end of nineteenth century as well as the collapse of the Soviet bloc at the end of twentieth century.

In regard to that particular directions of politics of knowledge backed up in both ethnology and sociocultural anthropology disciplines different epistemologies were employed in the Central and Eastern Europe. What are the contexts where particular ideologies, methodologies and epistemologies were produced and reproduced as well as contested in the field in Lithuania? What are the research and teaching strategies of the disciplines in the course of ongoing social and institutional changes in Lithuania during the last three decades?

To answer these questions I am using documentary sources but mainly depending on my own experience of participation in the “academic field” of ethnology and anthropology in the period of rapid social change from 1980s in particular with *Perestroika* and took at least until 2004 when Lithuania became EU member.

CATEGORY OF *TRADITION(IONAL)* AS A KEY CONCEPT

Due to the “Herder legacy”, as it was mentioned, *Volkskundian* approaches to “culture” were predominant historically in Central and Eastern European understanding of national/folk culture, which heavily influenced studies of the “people” in the region well before the Soviet era. During the Cold War period it was backed up by Lenin’s formula of culture as “socialist in content and national in form” that to study cultures meant to learn about “national forms of culture” and define the “socialist content of culture” as well. It paved the way to post-Stalin period non-conformist intelligentsia in Lithuania to folk culture revivalism ideology, which in Herderian terms, was also national culture revivalist.

Such an ideology of the late Soviet period of 1970–1980s (see more Ciubrinskas 2000) in its concern about the Lithuanian *folk culture* (understood in Herderian – nation = folk– sense) and *national traditions* was almost similar to that of “culture builders” (Frykman and Lofgren 1987) period, of the end of the nineteenth century nation-state building period. So both the Romantic intelligentsia of the nineteenth century period and the neo-Romantic intellectuals, who appeared almost a hundred years later and turned into folk/national culture revivalists of the late twentieth century, shared the same general attitude to *folk culture*, identifying it as the “peasants’ culture” as “genuine”, “ancient” and “traditional”. The Herderian concept of *Volksgeist*, the “genuine folk spirit” enshrined in traditional culture and language, was invoked in both periods.

The difference among the two – Romantic and neo-Romantic – was only in the degree of “professionalism” of the points of departure. Romantics treated *folk culture* as the culture

of “naiveté and simplicity” also being “emotional and genuine” and opposed it to the “high” culture which lacked these qualities. Neo-Romantics were more advanced in this sense. Aware of “folk/national culture studying” disciplines – ethnology, history, archaeology, linguistics, folklore studies, ethnomusicology etc. they had already learned about “archaic”, “pre-Christian”, and in Lithuanian case – “ancient Baltic” and even “Indo-European roots” of the traditional folk culture. Thus the words “archaic” and “ancient” became for them markers of authenticity.

Thus the word *authentic* itself became a keyword in Lithuania of the period and served to make a methodological distinction between the Soviet and the non-conformist approach to the social sciences and the humanities, presenting a point of opposition to the dominant Soviet definition and manipulation of the term “culture”. The ascription of authenticity enhanced symbolic power to Lithuanian folk/national culture, indeed to every “authentic” remnant or survival of the past, which could now be approved to be an essential item of the national heritage.

The definition of “the traditional folk” was a meeting point where both the Soviet and the revivalist ideologies met. Both were referring to groups such as the peasants who were, by common consent, regarded as the repositories of historic continuity and tradition, (Hobsbawm 1983, 7–8) but the difference was that for the Lithuanian nationalists, the peasantry was never just a “laboring mass”. The peasants were regarded as Lithuanians *par excellence*, the nation’s most genuine representatives on the grounds that they were the “least contaminated” by foreign influences and the most in touch with the nation’s distant past (cf. Falness 1933, 55 in Burke 1992, 297–298). Thus everything “archaic” and “authentic” was supposed to be “genuine national” and was understood as “tradition(s)” first of all.

So the essentialist definition of Lithuanian-ness was constructed by revivalists based on strategy of handling with “tradition”. Such a strategy was neo-Romantic, anti-modernist form of nationalism aiming at promotion and implementation of a formula for maintaining tradition: this involved collecting particular traditions, and then perpetuating and reviving them through performance.

Knowledge of the *folk traditions* and the Lithuanian heritage has been made into a distinguishing feature of the “proper Lithuanian” who refused to become *homo Sovieticus*. Of course it was the professionals of the disciplines of “Lithuanian studies” – ethnologists, folklorists, linguists etc. who led the discourse on Lithuanian traditions “dying out”, but still available “to witness” and – unlike Western Europeans who are able to conduct field-work only in the archives – we “the Lithuanians” ought to go and to register them. Thus the registration of “surviving traditions” became both, a patriotic endeavor and also was treated as an “urgent form of scholarly activity” in the field of Lithuanian studies but in particular in ethnology and folklore studies. The main moral imperative behind the ethnologists work was simply “to record for posterity as many traditions as possible” and to fill the museums and archives with collections of “typical and authentic items” of local, regional and eventually national folk culture.

The nonconformist ethnologists of the Soviet period saw their discipline as an instrument for “nurturing” Lithuanian nation/folk (traditional) culture studies through participation in a “salvage operation” by “collecting cultural traditions” and taking part in “folk culture” revivalist practices. As noted by James Clifford, culture collecting serves identity needs

because the “collection and preservation of an authentic domain of identity cannot be natural or innocent. It is tied up with nationalist politics ...” (Clifford 1988, 218). Cultures become, in his words, “ethnographic collections” of strategic importance to particular ethno-national politics:

Cultures’ are ethnographic collections [...] Collecting [...] implies a rescue of phenomena from inevitable historical decay or loss. The collection contains what “deserves” to be kept, remembered, and treasured. Artefacts and customs are saved out of time. [...] Culture collectors have typically gathered what seems “traditional” – what by definition is opposed to modernity [...] What is hybrid [...] has been less commonly collected and presented as a system of authenticity. (Clifford 1988, 230–231)

Thus the “culture collector” of the late 20th century, like the salvage ethnographer of the 19th, could claim, in Clifford’s words, to be the last to rescue “the real thing” (Clifford 1988, 228). In professional practice it is a reification of “traditional culture” but under the Soviet regime it was actually understood as professional virtue and a patriotic act (Ciubrinskas 2008). So-called “traditional rituals” were “collected in the field” of Soviet Lithuania’s rural hinterlands as “typical and specific cultural traits” (using the terminology of the period) and were very often documented as “real things” of an “authentic Lithuanian past”.

Both newly collected data and archive collections were labelled “typical traditions” and were included in the repository of national identity politics, and played a significant role as an effective symbolic power against the Soviet establishment. The ethnographic and folklore collections were viewed as some sort of “treasuries of the nation”, folk traditions as national traditions and ethnographers were encouraged to fill this “treasury” with “collected culture” items, which, with little criticism, were labelled “ancient” and “authentic” and were easily used to create normative categories. Thus the building of a normative “traditional folk culture” was a sort of a “weapon of the weak” of a nation that had lost its statehood due to the Soviet occupation. The discipline of ethnology was expected to play a key epistemological and political-culture standardising role. Thus both “the ancient Lithuanian tradition” and the “ancient Lithuanian language” were acclaimed major cornerstones of nationhood, paving the way for the ethnification/folklorization of the culture through the category of “ethnic culture”, understood as folk culture. It was a sort of nationalization of folk culture, putting culture into framework of authenticity and archaism.

So after a hundred years of “salvage operations” the popularity of the discipline of ethnology grew significantly again during *Perestroika* (mid to late 1980s). At this time ethnology was seen as a discipline of primary importance for the contemporary policies for rebuilding the Lithuanian nation state. Ethnologists and folklorists, along with other Lithuanian academic professionals: historians, linguists, and literature specialists were supposed to be “experts” in the field of “traditional Lithuanian folk culture” studies. Their research into ancient Lithuanian mythology, rituals, and symbols was used for branding a “core nationhood” by scientifically proving the *nation*’s (synonymous with *folk* according to Herder) cultural-historical “rootedness” through “traces” and “survivals” of the traditional folk culture patterns. The research strategy of “culture collecting” was succeeded by ethnification of culture in terms of “ethnic culture”.

“ETHNIC CULTURE” AND METHODOLOGICAL ETHNIFICATION OF LITHUANIAN STUDIES

During the *Perestroika* and especially during and after the *Singing Revolution*, the categories of “folk culture” and “tradition” in the epistemology of Lithuanian ethnology continued to be profiled in a rather mono-culturalist framework focusing on “Lithuanian culture” and “ethnicity”. In the late 1980s the category of *ethnic culture* was introduced by leading folklorist of the period Norbertas Vėlius (Kalnias 2011, 75). It was defined (at least in a narrow sense of the term – cf. Kalnias 2011) as a synonym of the term “folk culture” or “traditional culture”, but it actually hinted at the “traditional spiritual culture” beliefs, mythology, rituals, folk art monuments, etc. that were neglected by the Soviet regime’s profile of a “folk culture” paradigm. It was a step back to the pre-Soviet *Volkskunde* type or “folk culture studies” but in fact “ethnic culture” eventually became the most popular label for ethnology and the folklore field of expertise. It showed a focus on a single culture which was an appropriate subject of the discipline of Lithuanian ethnology, which was, as has already been mentioned, national ethnology *par excellence*.

Due to a new name (or nickname), the discipline’s actual profile appeared to be the study of the *culture* locked in ethnicity. This rather mono-culturalist and ethnocentric framework produced a reification of both Lithuanian culture and Lithuanian ethnicity.

In addition, in the early 1990s the category of “ethnic culture” was supported by national identity politics and became a label for anything aside from Soviet and foreign culture. “Ethnic culture” served to empower the identity that uses *ethnicity* as one of its main “building materials” (Castells 1997) to construct and enhance the identity of a subaltern group or national minority. In the case of the Lithuanians in the Soviet state, they were in a situation of stateless minority and their traditional (ethnic) culture was invoked as a key resource in the competitive field of recognition. After Lithuania regained its independent nation-state in 1990, this “ethnification of culture” continued and even became institutionalised. “Ethnic culture” institutions mushroomed in Lithuania, especially after its Parliament’s Council for the Protection of Ethnic Culture was founded in 2000 as a result of the *Law on the Principles of State Protection of Ethnic Culture* (Law on the Principles 1999).

In this identity politics situation, a significant role was given to the methodological ethnification of “ethnic culture”, something that affected the whole field of Lithuanian studies. The disciplines of Lithuanian language, Lithuanian history, folklore studies, and “national ethnology” were reinforced by their role as “identity cornerstones”. Lithuanian ethnology was assumed to be one of the most resourceful discipline to address “ethnicity + culture” as a research strategy and to use “ethnic culture” as a focal category. Thus ethnologists of the early 1990s were challenged by methodological ethnification during both fieldwork and data analysis.

It was also challenging to teach (at that time the author taught at Vilnius University) ethnology and anthropology by using global comparative perspectives on cultural studies and insisting on Fredrik Barth’s conceptualisation of ethnicity.

SOCIOCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ANTHROPOLOGIZATION OF ETHNOLOGY

In the end of the twentieth century sociocultural anthropology along with other disciplines, i.e. political science (in post-soviet part of New Europe also religious studies) became adopted in the Central East European region through the post-socialist change as a “product of West”. In opposition to ethnology or “national ethnology” or “national ethnography” it paved the way to learn about the peoples of the world in comparative perspective and eventually challenged the “natural” order of the nationally established social sciences and humanities by introducing politics of knowledge beyond methodological nationalism.

The discipline of anthropology became fashionable and received “recognition” in the countries of the region by undergoing “conformity” and re-branding of the “national ethnography”. In the era of post-socialism, a number of Central and Eastern European ethnological (former ethnographic) institutions were (re)named to *ethnology and cultural anthropology* departments. The most common way was to add the fashionable label of “anthropology” to the name of any former *Volkskunde* department. The new label recognized the fact that anthropology had lately become fashionable along with other trends of Western scholarship. Folklorists and ethnographers gave up their identities overnight, calling themselves “anthropologists” (Godina 2002, 13).

How it happened in Lithuania? The *Singing revolution* showed the effectiveness of Lithuanian ethnology as an applied discipline of the ethnic and national identity politics (see more Ciubrinskas 2008) and a scholarship that had resisted the Soviet regime. Essentially this was the situation from the late 1980s to 1991, and it has, of course, influenced the current attitudes to emerging Social Anthropology, a quite different discipline with a comparative relativistic reach, a holistic concept of culture, not binding the observer to his or her ethnic roots or nation. Renaming and refurbishing of the former soviet ethnography/Volkskundian ethnology moved forward with the use of modern anthropological theory. Changing from descriptivism, oral history, documentation and the gathering of data depended on verbal statements (tape recorded) recited by seated informants and on interviews with seated informants based on questionnaires to positivist representation of the field research. In Hann’s terms contemporary European Ethnology is becoming national anthropology (Hann 2003). Its practitioners subscribe to the thesis that ethnology can be equated with social and cultural anthropology. They have taken to adopting the nomenclature of the US, British and German anthropologists who understand ethnology, as it has been understood and practiced in the West, however as more or less a synonym of sociocultural anthropology. At the same time, there is a distinction, acknowledged by many post-Soviet scholars, between these two separate fields. The Slovenian anthropologist Vesna Godina points out that delimiting ethnology from anthropology rests on mostly unclear criteria. The modern paradigms of “anthropology at home”, “anthropology back home”, a “native anthropology” or “indigenous ethnology” were not recognized by the Central/East European ethnologists she interviewed as being new (Godina 2002). The East European ethnologists’ point of view is that, in so far as West European anthropology no longer insists on *otherness* as its subject of study, their approach is sociocultural and always has been. The praxis in post-socialist countries, therefore, is marked by a tendency to equate “reclassified” ethnology with anthropology, a tendency directly linked to the “money and power dilemma” (Godina 2002, 9). It has become both fashionable and profitable to use the brand “anthropology” to enhance prestige and raise funds.

There remains a clear difference, nevertheless, in all East European countries between ethnology, with its long and recognized tradition, and sociocultural anthropology which lacks, in most cases, any tradition at all (cf. Skalník 2002; Godina 2002, Geana 2002; Ciubrinskas 2005 etc.). Gathering and analyzing data and conducting fieldwork are different projects for ethnologists and anthropologists. The ethnographic participant observation is different not only in amount of time spent in the field but also in content, orientation and research paradigms such as synchronic investigation and comparative methods. Petr Skalník points out very clearly that the discipline of anthropology does not simply appear with a formal change of the name.

Those, who maintain that ethnology (ethnography) is a synonym for anthropology and therefore anthropology is not actually needed, underestimate the strength of the historical sciences tradition, for they must know well that by making no distinction they automatically – in the specific conditions of Central/East Europe – help to preserve the ancient regime (that is soviet system – V.C.). (Skalník 2002; VII–VIII)

So appearance of anthropology facilitated changes in “people’s studies”, but first let’s have a look to institutional development of the field.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN LITHUANIA

Sociocultural anthropology was almost unknown in Lithuania until the 1990s: there were no local professionals educated as anthropologists and scarcely any anthropological fieldwork research conducted in the country. Nevertheless from the early 1990s, Lithuania attracted some anthropologists from the West. As was mentioned, Lithuanian-Americans had been the first to start teaching anthropology, and they were among the first to conduct research here. The first anthropologist to teach anthropology on a regular basis in 2001 was Romas Vastokas, the first anthropology textbook in translation appeared in 1993 (Harris 1993), the first monograph based on ethnographic fieldwork was done by the Danish anthropologist Pernille Hohnen, during the late 1990s, and appeared in 2003 (Hohnen 2003).

BEGINNINGS OF SOCIOCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN KAUNAS 1989–1992

Vytautas Magnus University (VMU) has been re-launched in Kaunas in 1989 mainly by the efforts of the diaspora. It was reopened at the very end of the Soviet period just months before the Berlin Wall fall, after being closed down in the 1950s by the Stalinist regime. It was excellent example of economic and social remittances. Lithuanian diaspora in the U.S. and Canada sponsored VMU which has been formed as a modern Western university, becoming a prime example of the post-colonialist-style export of Western standards. The first two university presidents were Lithuanian-Americans. They set up the system along the North American lines with the strong “Anglo-Saxon” bias, an emphasis on English, and an attitude of openness to the faculty visiting from abroad – based after all on a flexible system designed to accommodate guest professors (Vastokas 2005). The field of sociocultural anthropology first in the country appeared in the university curriculum at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas.

Many faculty staff came and/or were personally invited to come from the diaspora and one of them Liucija Baskauskas (Ph.D., UCLA), who founded the first Department of Anthropol-

logy in the country (Ciubrinskas 2005). She and three other anthropologists of Lithuanian background from the US and Canada started to give lectures in cultural anthropology including an integrated (four field anthropology) introductory course (Vastokas 2005). They were about to build a program in anthropology, but it did not happen. Before the program in anthropology was fully established, however, after two years of effort, the Department was re-structured (Apanavicius 2009, 144) and integrated into the newly-formed, but actually old fashioned, *Volkskunde* focused department of Ethnology and Folklore Studies. It was a step towards conformity with the predominantly “ethno-nationalist” educational politics in the country of the period. A highly placed academic commented on the decision, suggesting that:

We don't need to be taught about Africa: there is an urgent need to learn about our traditions instead. Even more so, we should learn more about our traditions because they are dying and the former, Soviet regime was not in favor of studying it. (Sauka 1999)

It shows how still almost a decade after the regaining of independence in 1990s socio-cultural anthropology in Lithuania was still perceived as a foreign “product of Westernization”. This cite taken from particular discussion panel which formed part of the activities supported by the *Open Society Lithuania Foundation*, a local branch of the *Soros Foundation* known for its promotion of the new fields of knowledge and scholarship. One of it was sociocultural anthropology, deprived by the regime or acknowledged as biological anthropology only and appeared contested by the national disciplines of ethnology and folklore.

The field of sociocultural anthropology has been stunted by a general perception of “culture” as intellectual achievement or confusion with national “ethnic culture”. Small wonder, then, that sociocultural anthropology in its Western guise, a discipline with a comparative, relativistic reach, a holistic concept of culture, not binding the observer to his or her roots, race, or bloodline, has not found a ready soil in the academic world or among still neo-Romantically and ethno-nationalist intelligentsia. Some academic authorities have called anthropology “an American concoction” (Vastokas 2005).

VILNIUS 1995–2003

The second attempt to found an anthropology program was at Vilnius University in 1991–2003. Already since the 1991 the (then) first introductory course of anthropology has been put into the curriculum of the program of History studies – the module of sociocultural anthropology (taught by the author) has been successfully expanding, partly due to cooperation with the Scandinavian anthropologists at Copenhagen and Lund universities and with a support from Soros Foundation and Nordic Ministry of Education.

In 1995–1996 he established contacts and cooperated with the Western anthropological schools through scholarships in Lund, Copenhagen and in London. This made a crucial impact on curriculum development of the history program by including courses in anthropology. The co-operation and TEMPUS, later SOCRATES, student/teacher exchange program with Lund and Copenhagen anthropology departments made it possible for two of his students, Vilnius University graduates, to gain their MA in Social Anthropology at Lund University. At one time there were four anthropology faculty members (including these two MA's in anthropology a visiting professor from the US) and four to six courses in anthropology were taught under the Program of History studies. In 1996, an informal Center for Social

Anthropology and Ethnology with a first in the country collection of anthropological books was founded, donated mainly by the Scandinavian colleagues.

The period 1996–2002 saw the expansion of international collaboration in anthropology. The first International Nordic-Baltic School of Anthropology for research students was organized in 1996. It brought first hand acquaintance with previously barely known field – sociocultural anthropology for a couple of dozens of Lithuanian doctoral students mainly from the field of history and political science.

Credit courses for Ph.D. students were given by Jonathan Friedman in 2000 and Steven Sampson in 2001. Since 2001 the number of anthropology courses at Vilnius University increased with the launching of the new BA Program in Cultural History and Anthropology. International teaching – including distance learning courses given simultaneously for Copenhagen and Vilnius students – were under way to be established on a permanent basis. It was hoped that eventually this program would split into two separate programs and the first independent anthropology studies program in Lithuania will emerge.

However, in spite of the fact that the anthropology classes were extremely popular and attracted some excellent students, in 2003 the discipline was reduced to a minimum and the Center was closed down. It largely became abandoned because of academic politics, and, in particular, because of anthropology was found “in competition” with the field of history, which was about to lose its popularity among the students of the Faculty of History itself.

A crucial point in regaining and expanding the field occurred in the fall of the same year, when the Lithuanian Anthropological Association was founded and the First Baltic Anthropology conference was organized in Vilnius by the four Vilnius University anthropologists: Romas Vastokas (Ph.D., Columbia University), Kristina Sliavaite (Ph.D., Lund University), Ausra Simoniukstyte, (Ph.D. Cand., Vilnius University) and Vytis Ciubrinskas (Ph.D., Vilnius University). The conference was appropriately titled *Defining Ourselves: Establishing Anthropology in the Baltic States*. More than twenty participants came from nine countries, including keynote speakers Jonathan Friedman, Chris Hann, Finn Sivert Nielsen and Steven Sampson. The topics ranged over the proper definition of the discipline, the subject matter of the anthropological inquiry, the urgency of understanding the post-Soviet “transition”. All participants urged the establishment of anthropology in the Baltic States. It was suggested that Lithuania take a lead. At the concluding round-table the representative of Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Jolanta Kuznecoviene (Ph.D., University of St. Petersburg), Chair of the Department of Sociology, invited the program of anthropology to be established at VMU within the Department of Sociology.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN KAUNAS SINCE 2004

The Master’s Program in Social Anthropology¹ was developed at VMU by Vastokas, Ciubrin-

1 The Program each year admits from 7 to 12 students. While studying in the Master’s program several students plan to continue their studies in Ph.D. programs in the profile of Anthropology. As doctoral studies in Anthropology are not currently available anywhere in the country they choose to make it in Sociology (profile of Cultural Anthropology) or go abroad. Currently, 10 of MA graduates in Social Anthropology are enrolled in doctoral studies. Five of them in anthropology programs at the University College London (SOAS); University of Birmingham; City University of New York; Martin Luther University in Halle (Germany); Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh and another five in Lithuania. Seven of the Program graduates have already defended their Ph.D. dissertations.

skas and Kuznecoviene and approved by the Lithuanian Ministry of Science and Education in 2004. It was the first anthropology program launched in the Baltic States (cf. Ciubrinskas 2005) and it is still the only program of its kind in the country, other programs, which incorporate “anthropology” in their designation, actually belong to the subject area of humanities, and courses in anthropology, as well as the anthropological perspective, remain marginal. The peculiarity of the Program in comparison to the range of similar programs in other countries lies in its focus on social change (post-socialist and post-colonial) on politics of identity, as well as regional emphasis (particularly Central/East Europe). It aims also to build students’ skills and competence in intercultural understanding for which since 2010, there are given possibility to enroll into joint VMU and Southern Illinois University (SIU) certificate study program of *Intercultural Understanding*, taught mostly by the visiting faculty from the SIU. The Certificate from the SIU is issued alongside their Master’s Diploma from VMU.

The Center for Social Anthropology (SAC) was established at VMU in 2005. Since then it remains the main anthropological research unit at the University and is a single one in the country. It runs anthropological and interdisciplinary research projects and also serves as a resource for the Programme students to get involved into ongoing projects. SAC has its own anthropological book collection and is known for the Thursday Research Seminars *Current Research Issues in Anthropology*. Some of Social Anthropology Program students are involved in the research projects run by the Center. Three of the recently defended Ph.D.s in Sociology within the profile in Cultural Anthropology based their dissertations upon participation in the ongoing research projects carried out at the Center.

Despite quite a success of the institutionalization of the anthropology at VMU since 2004 still there is a lack of confidence in sociocultural anthropology as a discipline within the Lithuanian academia. Yet still, public understanding of the present day problems facing the Lithuanian society rely to a large extent on sources that have not examined them at the grass-roots level and are not professionally prepared to suggest solutions. Sociological surveys are still predominant in the field as well as in the public commentaries on major social problems. Anthropologists, despite their powerful analytical instruments of fieldwork, holism, and global comparison, are not much visible. Although, as a successes could be noted an application of paradigm of identity in ethnology influenced by anthropology.

PARADIGM OF “IDENTITY” AS A MEETING GROUND OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY

The Lithuanian ethnology in the 21st Century, compared to that of the previous century became a more diverse field of studies in its thematic and problematic framework shaped

Since 2004 visiting staff included faculty from the Departments of Anthropology at Concordia and Trent Universities, Canada; Mediterranean Institute of Comparative Ethnological Studies, France; SUNY, Binghamton University and Southern Illinois University, USA; Copenhagen University, Denmark; Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany; Fribourg University, Switzerland; Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh etc. At present the permanent teaching staff of the Program consists of 3 professors, 2 associate professors, 2 assistant professors. Since 2014 there is a joint doctoral program under development by the four Baltic States Universities running study programs in anthropology – Baltic Anthropology Graduate School (BAGS), which includes Tallinn University; University of Latvia; Riga Stradins University and VMU in cooperation with the Manchester University; the Southern Illinois University (SIU) and the Copenhagen University. It is funded by the grant from Wenner-Gren Foundation.

as “cultural studies at home” (Savoniakaite 2008, 61). It has both the continuity of the previous paradigms, like historicism, and also openness to new approaches, especially to re-employing “tradition” under the influence of anthropology addressing the paradigm of “identity” in terms of national identity in particular.²

The paradigm of “identity” is approached through the “exploration of human particularity in respect to local borders and boundaries” by basically identifying patterns of regional identity (Savoniakaite 2011a, 132; Savoniakaite 2011b, 391). This approach is methodologically part of the area studies approach. In this case, the cultural identity approach is “regionalised” by being based on “contemporary ethnographic boundaries” (Savoniakaite 2011b, 132; Savoniakaite 2012, 189–235).

“Identity” as an epistemological concept is quite popular in Lithuanian ethnological research although its application as a paradigm is the subject of continuous discussion within the discipline of sociocultural anthropology. The limitations of its use are also clearly noticeable in Lithuanian ethnology, especially when “identity” is used as a substitute for “tradition”. For instance, research into regional or local belonging, and especially Lithuanian minority studies, i.e. in Latvia (Merkiene et al. 2005), is being approached from the perspective of identity. In her research, Regina Merkiene provides an understanding of ethno-cultural identity as a continuity of cultural patterns that includes innovations (Merkiene and Savoniakaite 1999). In this way “identity” is conceptualised as a prescribed entity, which, according to Clifford Geertz, can be assumed to be a “primordial loyalty” (Geertz 1994) where the world of local life is seen as being shaped by long-term social relationships and notions of belonging while identity practices are experienced as a “natural” extension of the past in the present.

As is shown by the anthropological approach employed by Darius Dauksas, the epistemological efficiency of the application of the concept of *identity* fails in its analytical capacity when dealing with such complex research issues as border zones and border areas, i.e. the construction of the Polish Lithuanian or Lithuanian Polish identity in Lithuania and Poland (Dauksas 2008). Here the paradigm of identity proves difficult to apply because not only

2 Projects on “national identity” led by the Centre for Social Anthropology in 2005–2014: *Expression Models of Lithuanian National Identity: Social Memory, Cultural Succession and Changes under Conditions of Globalization*, funded by Lithuanian State Science and Studies Foundation (2005–2006) aimed at exploring the variety of models of Lithuanian national identity and investigating factors that determine either the stability or the change of identity under conditions of globalization; *Lithuanian National Identity under Conditions of Europeanization and Globalization: Patterns of Lithuanian-ness in Response to Identity Policies in England, Ireland, Norway, Spain, and the USA*, funded by Lithuanian Research Council and Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007–2009) aimed at: identifying models of national identity among Lithuanian migrants; exploring processes of identity maintenance vis-à-vis assimilation in response to national identity politics in the host countries; *The Impact of Globalization and Transnationalism on the Fragmentation of State and National Identity funded by the Lithuanian Research Council* (2012–2014) aimed at investigation of the impact of globalization and transnationalism marked processes on the reshaping of national loyalties and belongings of Lithuanian citizens or persons of Lithuanian background born 1980–1990, taken in ethnic minority, borderland or diasporic cases. All three cases are taken as a point of departure to understand the process of de-territorialisation, the state and trans-state relations as well as fragmentation of national belonging. Ethnic minority case is focused on Russians in significantly Russian populated cities of the country and unfolds the issue of civic and ethnic belonging to the national narrative. Border area case takes Lithuanian minority situated on the Polish – Lithuanian border and Polish minority in Vilnius area, which supposed to be a historical border area of these two countries. This case is focusing on the problem of non-territorial loyalties in terms of kin-state etc. The third case explores transnational Lithuanians in global cities like London and Chicago and aims at understanding of their ways of adherence to ethnicity, nation-state(s) and/or cosmopolitan sentiment and difference making.

institutional power or institutionalised identities are at stake and cross-cutting ties and networks are at work, but also the factor of individualised strategies and experiences makes it difficult to reveal more or less “exact” “hyphenated” or “pluralist” identity constructions and the question of belonging, as identity enactment, becomes much more situational.

Danish anthropologist Karen Olwig notes that the paradigm of “identity” is quite problematic to apply in general. She sees problems in the epistemology of a “marked culture” (Olwig 2002). “Marked culture” [cf. the Appadurai term “culture in markers” (Appadurai 1996)], refers to a highly select subset of differences chosen from a virtually open-ended archive of differences. “Marked culture” only includes the subset of those differences that have been mobilised to articulate the boundary of a difference or that constitute the diacritics of group identity. It leaves aside those forms of identity that spring from the “unmarked culture” that is associated with everyday lives (Appadurai 1996).

Ingo Schroeder (2009) further criticises “identity” by pointing to the “softness of identity as an analytical tool” by citing the Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper phrase: “if identity is everywhere, it is nowhere” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). He also disapproves of “group” and “culture” as analytical terms: “the preoccupation with groups as clearly defined entities with observable boundaries, on the one hand, and with culture as the stuff identity is made of, on the other, have led to the uncritical reification of the notions: *group* and *culture*” (Schroeder 2009, 79). It is a misuse of *identity* as an analytical term if we are “simply taking people’s [narratives – V. C.] and claims based upon a folk understanding of identity at face value without, at the same time, studying the social relations behind such statements”. He concludes that identity is not the manifestation of culture but the opposite: culture is a product of shifting political projects of collective identifications. This conclusion is not new, having been thoroughly scrutinised by Jonathan Friedman in his book *Cultural Identity and Global Process* (Friedman 1994).

After the criticism of the “identity” paradigm in the conceptualisation of the construction of a national identity, it is good to look at how “culture” is reified and an identity model is created along the lines of political interests. The identity politics of newly independent states (like Lithuania twenty years ago) can easily recreate “unique” cultural heritages which, according to Gerd Baumann, refer to “actual ethnic groups and these groups are defined with reference to a discrete culture [...] and dominant discourse views ‘culture’ as reified possession of ‘ethnic’ groups or communities” (Baumann 1997, 209).

On the other hand, Auksuole Cepaitiene points out the understanding of an ethnic identity through an identity construction from an *emic* perspective and reveals the individual and institutional nature of such identification (Cepaitiene 2001, 167–196). She shows that “individual self-ascription to a certain ethnic group goes in parallel with a strategy oriented towards the institutionalisation of personal decision” (Cepaitiene 2001, 167–196). She also addresses *ethnic* aspects of identification by noting the question of the “politics of ethnic categorisation” and addressing the issue of “contested identities”, i.e. the “variety of contradicting identities that negotiate, contest, add, or cover each other” (Cepaitiene 2001, 167–196) as well as primordial attachments such as locality and language by using examples of regional identity. Her approach and analysis is new to Lithuanian ethnology and marks synthesis of both ethnological and anthropologic approaches.

CONCLUSION

The politics and praxis of the peoples studying discipline(s) in Lithuania shows a clear difference which remains between national ethnology and sociocultural anthropology. The former, throughout the periods of its existence, applied “cultural tradition” and was used as a discipline for “national culture engineering”. The latter, supposed to be cosmopolitan and coming from the West as “post-socialist novelty”, has been contested in Lithuanian academia.

The epistemological *modus vivendi* for these two “peoples studying disciplines” is suggested by Hann as “methodological pluralism” (Hann 2006). Such pluralism is noticeable and gains recognition in the recent fieldwork-based research conducted by Ullrich Kockel, in which Lithuania is portrayed as part of a “re-visioned” Europe (Kockel 2010), and also in the “good life” studies of post-socialist Lithuanian society by Asta Vonderau (2010). It is also clearly seen in the scope of the journal *Lithuanian Ethnology: Studies in Social Anthropology and Ethnology*, published since 2001.

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Postmoderní antropologie? / Postmodern anthropology?

TOMÁŠ BOUKAL

ABSTRACT:

This paper critically considers several aspects of the current direction of social and cultural anthropology in the Czech Republic. Through addressing the question of creating authority in ethnography, the author attempts to demonstrate the problems associated with adopting the concepts of "Western" anthropology in a non-homogeneous Europe.

KEYWORDS:

Social anthropology; Postmodernity; Anthropology in the Czech Republic

Důvodem, proč jsem se rozhodl přispět do sborníku věnovanému významnému výročí Petra Skalníka právě krátkým zamyšlením nad postmoderní antropologií, není náhodný. Byla to má i Petrova bývalá domovská katedra sociálních věd na Univerzitě Pardubice, kde jsem byl konfrontován s „nástupem“ tohoto proudu v sociální antropologii. Bohužel, v té době už Petr Skalník členem katedry nebyl. Předpokládám, že jeho autorita a úcta ke „klasické“ antropologii, by situaci na katedře mohla změnit.

Upozornění na propojenost antropologické metodologie a reprezentace s historickým a politickým kontextem je bez pochyb významné a pro obor přínosné (Clifford, Marcus, Rabinow, Fischer atd). Otázkou ovšem je, kam nás (tedy sociální antropologii) toto směřování zavede ve své radikálnější podobě? Zatím můžeme sledovat pokračující vzdalování od přírodních věd o člověku. V době bouřlivého rozvoje např. genetických výzkumů nabízejících řadu nových pohledů na člověka, by ani sociální antropologie neměla zůstat stranou debaty sociálních a přírodních věd. Konstruktivní kritika metod přírodních věd a snahy o jejich použití v sociální antropologii, která by jistě mohla být prospěšná pro všechny zainteresované obory, by neměla přejít v tažení proti těmto metodám.

V dobách etablování nových pohledů na antropologii se hovořilo o hegemonii pozitivismu a postmoderní antropologie žádala své místo na slunci. Uvažovalo se o heteroglosii v bachtinovském smyslu, kdy by např. Cliffordův pohled na antropologii mohl být jedním

z mnoha neprivilegovaných hlasů (Tošner 2008). Skutečnost je ale jiná. Postmodernismus v antropologii se stává hlavním a hegemonním proudem, který si stále výrazněji uzurpuje právo na antropologické myšlení. Zřejmě se zde naplňuje např. Sangrenova kritika postmoderny v antropologii, ve které upozornil na budování mocenských pozic nového směru. Tedy chování, které postmodernisté v rámci oboru kritizovali (Sangren 1992 in Tošner 2008, 71). Proklamovaná postmoderní pluralita názorů a teorií, která byla utopií zřejmě už v dobách J. F. Lyotarda, se v některých případech mění (v myslích zastánců postmoderní antropologie) v prosté schéma unilineárního vývoje sociální antropologie přes významné body tohoto vývoje, jako např. vydání sborníku *Writing Culture* (Clifford a Marcus 1986).

V takové schematičnosti a de facto unilineárním evolucionistickém myšlení (oblíbeném v 19. stol.) můžeme těžko hledat něco pokrokového. Spíše zde nacházíme staré schéma nahrazování starých paradigmat novými, než snahu o myšlení skutečně nové, které by se pokusilo tvořivě využívat plurality mezi různými přístupy. Místo toho probíhá stigmatizace „klasické“ sociální antropologie. Bylo zahájeno tažení proti metodám přírodních věd – pozitivismu v sociální antropologii. Ovšem už od dob Geertze, který odmítá možnost verifikovatelnosti vlastní přírodních vědám, a svým příklonem k interpretativnímu přístupu předznamenává nástup postmoderny (její hlavní inspirační zdroje však leží jinde), se nepozitivistická antropologie zbavuje možnosti dokázat nemožnost použití pozitivistického přístupu (Geertz 2000). Legitimně upozorňuje na jeho omezení a úskalí, ale nepodává žádné „důkazy“, které by skutečně ospravedlňovaly jeho současnou stigmatizaci. Autorita některých sociálně-vědních prací bývá ovšem na úroveň důkazů stavěna, a to i přesto, že mohou obsahovat velice sporné závěry. Přesto dál slouží jako stavební kameny celých směrů. Známá Sokalova aféra přitom ukázala, že s trochou správného „newspeaku“ je možné v sociálních vědách uplatnit i zjevné nesmysly (Sokal 1996). Vzpomenout můžeme i mnohem starší případy, kdy autorita určité skupiny nebyla výrazně narušena ani tvrdou kritikou, která by v rámci přírodních věd zřejmě vedla ke konci této školy. Směr propagující kulturní relativismus a kulturní determinismus v USA soustředěný kolem F. Boase a jeho žáků svůj vliv na sociální vědy nijak neztratil ani poté, co práce jednoho z prominentních členů směru byla výrazně zpochybněna (známá kauza M. Mead vs. D. Freeman). Naopak, vliv této antropologické školy je patrný i v postmoderní antropologii akcentem na kulturní rozmanitost, jedinečnost a problematičnost interpretace cizí kultury v pojmech kultury vlastní – krize reprezentace. Otázkou je, zda se dokonce v postmoderní antropologii neukrývá dobře zamaskovaná a často kritizovaná fascinace exotičností – jinakostí. Pokud klademe příliš velký důraz na rozdíly mezi lidmi a zdůrazňujeme problematičnost (ne-li nemožnost) kulturního překladu, blížíme se k orientalistům (prahnoucích po exotičnu), které sociálně zkonstruoval E. Said (2006).

Na několika ilustračních příkladech bych chtěl ukázat, že i v klasických dílech antropologické (sociálně-vědní) postmoderny můžeme najít řadu sporných míst: Přemýšlel jsem nad nevolí, s jakou jsem četl některá tvrzení E. Saida v jeho slavné studii *Orientalismus*. Hlavní problém vidím v tom, že se v obhajobě svých myšlenek uchyluje přesně k témuž způsobu stereotypního pohledu, zjednodušování a zjevné zaujatosti, kterou kritizuje na přístupu „Západu“ k „Orientu“. Stačí pohled na strany 21 a 22 jeho práce. „Být v tomto případě Evropanem nebo Američanem přitom není nepodstatným faktem, znamenalo a znamená to být si – byť třeba jen matně – vědom své vazby na mocnost, jež má v dané oblasti jasně definované zájmy...“ (Said 2006, 21–22) S tímto prohlášením můžeme souhlasit jen stěží. Vytváří jasný – opačný – stereotyp o povaze Evropy a Evropanů. Podobně stereotypní a homogenizující je i pohled na samotný orientalismus, který je považován za imperialistický nástroj. Existovala

řada badatelů, které bychom mohli označit za orientalisty, kteří byli prodchnuti láskou a obdivem ke zkoumaným oblastem a zanechali řadu důležitých děl, která jsou podstatná nejen pro Evropu, ale jsou neméně významným zdrojem poznání i pro kultury a skupiny, které byly objektem badatelova zájmu. Jsem přesvědčen o tom, že zatížení imperialistickou minulostí i současností není univerzálním prvkem západních prací, které pojednávají o „Východu“.

Stejně jako není homogenní „Orient“, není homogenní ani „Západ“. V České republice zvláště zní celá postmoderní kritika, která z velké části stojí na reflexi koloniální minulosti, poněkud nemístně. I když se o to často snažíme, Česká republika i řada dalších evropských zemí myšlenkově nenáleží k „Západu“ nebo „Prvnímu světu“. Naše historická zkušenost má možná stejně daleko k prvnímu, jako k třetímu světu. Ne nadarmo byl východní blok označován jako „svět Druhý“. Prohlášení o západním imperialismu a jeho koloniálních a postkoloniálních choutkách nejsou pro nás ničím novým. Samozřejmě, imperialismus byl spojen i s východním blokem, ale ani ten se nás, jako obyvatel Československa příliš netýkal. Lépe řečeno týkal, ale v roli obětí „přátelské“ okupace r. 1968.

Realita ČSSR také většinu pamětníků naučila velice důležitou znalost, kterou se ohání postmoderní antropologie, kritickou interpretaci textů v kontextu politického a mocenského pozadí jejich vzniku. Že by v tehdejšímu tisku a dalších médiích bylo možné nalézt objektivní realitu, nevěřili snad ani členové KSČ. Každý věděl, že je třeba konzumovat text specifickým způsobem. Nelze jej chápat doslovně, ale informace, které media přináší, je třeba pečlivě začlenit do kontextu politické a historické situace: propagandy, zkreslování apod. Málokdo ze čtenářů např. Rudého práva považoval jeho informace za objektivní. Nehledal v něm odraz pravdy, ale spíše zkreslený obraz v křivém zrcadle. Ovšem, pokud byl čtenář schopen zakřivení zrcadla odhadnout, mohl si vytvořit obraz reality o něco bližší, než byla původní informace.

Kritika provázanosti kolonialismu a „klasické“ antropologie byla jistě oprávněná, ale ne obecně. (např. upozornění na vliv západního důrazu na příbuzenství v rámci pozůstalostní praxe apod., nemůže popírat těžko zpochybnitelný význam příbuznosti v řadě světových společností.) Na druhé straně je jistě možné najít provázanost současné americké postmoderní antropologie s historií a politikou USA. Pokud kritizujeme provázanost Evans-Pritcharda nebo Malinowského s koloniálním režimem, jistě by bylo prospěšné zabývat se také provázaností současné americké a západní antropologie s vlastní pohnutou historií, která byla na kolonizaci (vnitřní) založena a stojí na ní do současnosti (vnější). Nemůžeme nevidět paralely mezi snahou současné americké antropologie o „férový“ přístup k Jiným, který je patrný např. ve sporech o terminologii a chápání našich „terénních spolupracovníků“, a doktrínou politické korektnosti, která ovládá americkou společnost. Přes formální sympatičnost těchto snah je očividné, že nekorespondují s reálnou politikou USA, která je vůči Jiným stejně přezíravá a nekoloniální, jako byla takřka po celé své dějiny. Na tomto místě není mým cílem kritika těchto procesů, ale snaha o jejich pochopení. Nemohu se ovšem zbavit dojmu, že mnohem lepší interpretační zázemí pro popis těchto globálních procesů (do kterých je ovšem včleněno chování jednotlivců), poskytuje např. „stará dobrá“ evoluční teorie než postmoderní antropologie. Aby mohl stát úspěšně bojovat o své přežití v současném světě, je nucen se chovat dravě. Důvodem je omezenost zdrojů na planetě a růst populace (Malthus). Současné kulturní prostředí ovšem popírá přijatelnost takového chování. Z těchto důvodů dochází k oddělení procesů vnitřních, které stále směřují k aktivnímu boji o zdroje, a procesů vnějších, které v rámci kulturního prostředí vnitřní procesy reinterpretovaly v pojmech, které jsou kulturně přijatelné (např. šíření demokracie na „Západě“ nebo v poslední době „pravoslavného světa“ na „Východě“).

Pokud se vrátíme k postmoderní antropologii, můžeme ji chápat jako součást těchto vnitřních procesů, které korespondují s oficiálním politickým vývojem USA (nejen). Nejsou tedy ani příliš revoluční, ale spíše konzervativní ve smyslu podpory oficiální politické linie. Sebemrškačství bývalých koloniálních mocností nepůsobí příliš autenticky ani v jejich hranicích a už vůbec ne v akademickém prostředí České republiky.

Pro další namátkově vybrané problematické pasáže postmoderní antropologie nemusíme chodit příliš daleko. Např. J. Clifford v předmluvě k *Writing Culture* kritizuje Linhartovu a Walkerovu etnografii (Clifford a Marcus 1986, 17) a zřejmě oprávněně poukazuje na některé jejich nedostatky. Ovšem ani on se neodvažuje tyto práce zpochybnit jako celek. Jakou odpověď nám tyto etnografie mohou dát v naší touze o poznání kultury Dingů a Lakotů? Jsou „nepravdivé“? Z jakého typu etnografií se dozvídáme více o lidech, kteří by měli být v centru zájmu etnografů? Z Walkerovy „klasické“ nebo např. Rabinowa „postmoderní“? Dokazuje Clifford přesvědčivě „nepoužitelnost“ „klasických“ etnografií? Dle mého názoru tomu tak není.

Pokračujme v četbě *Writing Culture*. Na s. 32 se nás M. Prattová snaží přesvědčit o zjevné nepravdě: „Fakt, že osobní vyprávění je marginalizované a stigmatizované vysvětluje, proč kniha jako *Shabono* musí být vhodná pouze k zavržení.“ (Pratt 1986, 32) Prattová kritické přijetí knihy *Shabono* od Florindy Donnerové dává do souvislosti s nechutí přijmout „vědecký“ naladěnými antropology netradiční autorčin styl – osobní vyprávění (personal narrative). Ovšem dokonce z jejího textu nepřímo vyplývá, že problematika této knihy je mnohem složitější. Z neznámého důvodu se Prattová jaksí opomenula zmínit o velice zajímavé osobě autorky. Pokud postmoderní antropologie klade takový důraz právě na osobu a kulturní pozadí autora, je o to podivnější, že Prattová se tomu v tomto případě vyhnula. Jméno Carlose Castenady je v souvislosti s knihou zmíněno pouze proto, že se nad její kvalitou rozplývá na jejím obalu. Nikde se však Prattová nezmiňuje, že autorka Florinda Donnerová byla součástí Castenadovi „sekt“, skupiny jeho žen, kterým se říkalo „čarodějnice“. Jednalo se o ženy, které odvrhly svou původní identitu (včetně jména), zpřetrhaly svazky s příbuznými. Proto také, když v roce 1998, krátce po smrti Castenady, zmizely, dlouhou dobu je nikdo nehledal. Není vyloučeno, že spáchaly sebevraždu. V našem případě je jistě důležitá informace, že práce samotného Carlose Castenady byla řadou antropologů zpochybňována. Důvodem nebyl odpor antropologů k osobnímu vyprávění, ale pochybnosti ohledně etnografických reálií. Ze stejných důvodů byla kritizována i práce Florindy Donnerové. V jejím případě se ještě přidalo podezření, že se jedná z velké části o plagiát. Prattová ráda používá výraz „killed by science“. Zdá se zřejmé, že pokud byla kniha Florindy Donnerové (nebo jak se jmenovala) kýmsi „zavražděna“, byla to spíše než věda, sama Donnerová a její velice svévolná práce se zdroji. Byla tvrdě kritizována ne za použití „osobního vyprávění“, ale za podezření z plagiátorství. Nemohu se zbavit dojmu, že Prattová úmyslně zamlčuje některé informace, ve prospěch svého vidění problematiky. Prattová ve své práci obhájí existenci „osobní narativity“ v antropologickém textu, zároveň ho však kritizuje v případě Shostakové. Zbytečně ho klade do opozice s popisným textem. Dostatečně neargumentuje, proč by mělo dojít k nějaké zásadní změně ve způsobu antropologického psaní a hlavně jakým směrem by se podle ní mělo ubírat.

Až směšně působí Prattová úpornou snahou dokázat rozdíl mezi etnografem a trosečníkem (Pratt 1986, 38). Zdá se, že nepochopila nadsázku, když někteří etnografové používali tuto paralelu pro vyjádření psychického rozpoložení v terénu jistě ne zcela bezsmyslnou. Těžko předpokládat, že by se někdo z nich považoval za trosečníka v doslovném smyslu slova.

Myslím, že tato pasáž dobře ilustruje taktiku postmodernistů v „boji“ s „klasikou“ antropologie. Jako zbraň zde slouží snaha o zesměšnění – ponížení oponenta. Do tohoto arzenálu patří také často předhazovaná fráze o „zmizení primitivů“ (např. Tošner 2008), ke kterému údajně nedochází.

Prattová v závěru svého textu správně upozorňuje na nebezpečí pohledu na !Kungy jako na pravěký relikv, který nám má pomoci nahlédnout do minulosti lidstva. Upozorňuje na nebezpečí ahistorického pohledu na tyto skupiny, které za sebou mají zkušenost s kolonizací a pronásledováním (Pratt 1986, 49). Určitý problém ale vidím v tom, že se zde dopouští podobného prohřešku jako jí kritizovaní antropologové a také výše zmíněný Said – zobecňování, přehlížení rozdílů a pestrosti různých skupin. Oblast Kalahari byla obývána už dávno před příchodem kolonistů, proto není vyloučené, že některé skupiny !Kungů zde přežívají ve svém původním prostředí, které se ovšem výrazně měnilo (viz petroglify). Že nám !Kungové mohou předat mnoho zkušeností s adaptací na prostředí polopouště je jisté. Takové výzkumy jistě mohou být užitečné i pro archeology, i když srovnání se způsobem života našich předků má celou řadu metodologických problémů. Výzkumy vedené v duchu pozitivistického přístupu s použitím kvantitativních metod, např. známá ekonomická studie !Kungů R. Lee (1988), jistě nesnižují význam jednotlivých participantů na výzkumu, jak se nám snaží postmoderní antropologové podsouvat.

Několik výše uvedených pasáží má být pouhou ilustrací toho, že postmoderní antropologie nepodává jednoznačně přesvědčivou argumentaci, která by nezbytně musela vést ke změně antropologického myšlení. Její relativní úspěch na kolbišti nevidím ani tak v síle argumentů, jako v líbivosti toho, co nám nabízí. Kdo by nechtěl studovat čtivé práce (jeden z požadavků postmoderních antropologů) korektní a férové k našim „spolupracovníkům“ (bude se spíše jednat o kolektivní monografie ve formě románu), ve kterých se toho hodně dozvíme především o jednom z kolektivu autorů (práce bude pravděpodobně citlivou reflexí jeho výzkumu).

Jako příklad opovrhovaného pozitivistického (scientistického) přístupu k terénu se často objevuje B. Malinowski. I když uznávám, že ve svém koloniálním „outfitu“ působí dnes spíše jako objekt karikatur, dle mého je opomíjen důležitý aspekt jeho pohledu na získávání etnografických dat v terénu. Podle Malinowského nemůžeme předpokládat, že by naši informátoři (spolupracovníci) vždy chápali smysl kulturních prvků, které s nimi konzultujeme (Malinowski 1932). V tom vidím hlavní důvod, proč nemůžeme zcela opustit „vědecký“ pohled na terén. Není žádný důvod nevěřit, že by alespoň částečně nemohl mít Malinowski pravdu. Jistě existuje celá řada způsobů chování, jejichž emické vysvětlení není postačující pro jejich pochopení. To částečně odporuje Geertzovu chápání porozumění promluvě. Geertzem je důraz kladen na porozumění skrze vysvětlení dostupné aktérům (Geertz 2000). Pokud si vybavíme jeho známý příklad rozšířování situace s mrkajícími chlapci, znamenalo by to, že ani vyčerpávající vysvětlení, které by nám tito aktéři mohli dát o svých motivech, důvodech a smyslu, který je k jejich jednání (mrkání) motivoval, by nemohlo zcela objasnit a vysvětlit pozorovanou situaci. Předpokládá to, že jejich chování by bylo součástí širšího modelu chování, který by v daném případě mohl být skryt. Mohlo by se jednat např. o psychologickou motivaci jejich chování, která by vycházela ze snahy o vyjádření dominance. Tzn. mrknutí by mohlo vyjadřovat nevědomou snahu o ovládnutí situace a získání převahy nad ostatními chlapci. Malinowski jako příklad uvádí svou studii Kula, kdy jednotliví informátoři znají pouze malou část tohoto složitého jevu. Jeho širší smysl nejsou schopni postihnout. V tomto širším pochopení by zřejmě měla spočívat práce antropologa. Zde se poněkud dostáváme i do polemiky s Cliffordem, který

uvažuje o možnosti vydávat etnografické práce jako kolektivní díla informátorů (například Walkerovu) (Clifford 1986, 16–17). To by jistě mělo své opodstatnění, pokud by se jednalo o pouhý soubor textů, které by byly přepisem toho, co nám naši informátoři sdělili. Ale např. v případě Malinowského by to nemělo opodstatnění. Hlavní síla jeho práce není v přepisu vyprávění, ale analýze získaného materiálu a jeho interpretaci. Samozřejmě, jednotlivým informátorům by mělo být věnováno zasloužené místo, a pokud to etika výzkumu dovoluje i přiznání autorství citátů, ale není na místě toto zaměňovat s autorstvím samotné práce.

Při četbě postmoderních antropologů vzniká dojem, že zatímco klasičtí antropologové naivně věřili v možnost pozitivistického studia kultury, společnosti a odkrytí jejich zákonitostí, Geertzova generace ve vědecké poznání víru už ztratila, ale ještě u ní přetrvávala naděje v možnost porozumění některým kulturním prvkům, to u postmoderních autorů se ztrácí i tato naděje. Zůstává jen možnost sebereflexe a přemýšlení nad tím, proč jsme určitý výzkum chtěli uskutečnit, uskutečnili nebo neuskutečnili a jaký jsme při tom měli pocit.

Můj příspěvek působí jistě kritickým dojmem. Ani já ovšem nepopírám přínos postmoderny v obohacení pohledů na člověka. Odmítám ale její snahu o vytlačování pohledů jiných. Bohužel jsem se právě s tímto na akademické půdě setkal. Problém vidím v tom, když se kritik metavyprávění sám metavyprávěním touží stát.

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Why are social anthropologists not interested in the study of human origins?

ALAN BARNARD

ABSTRACT:

My argument is that even if we recognize our dependence both on the biological sciences and on archaeology, these other subjects alone cannot explain everything. Social anthropology should also be involved. My recent *Social Anthropology and Human Origins* (Barnard 2011) discusses topics such as the difference between primatological and social anthropological methods, the social implications “Dunbar’s number”, how new findings in genetics open up new possibilities for looking at diversity in human kinship, and what fossils can tell us (and what they cannot). The sequel, *Genesis of Symbolic Thought* (Barnard 2012), looks more specifically at the origins of symbolic cultural institutions and language in the African Middle Stone Age. This is very roughly dated from after 300,000 to before 25,000 years ago. All modern humanity had its beginnings in a very small southern or eastern African population, living only around 70,000 years ago. Yet our methods as a discipline exclude this significant population from our scope of interest. Or do they? Symbolic thought lies clearly within the domain of social anthropology, and our contribution should be no less than that of other disciplines. However, it is not. Why is this? The answer must lie either within our own discipline, or in the questions asked within our sister disciplines. We should indeed work more closely with biological scientists, but we social anthropologists, not they, should be prime movers when it comes to assessing ideas that fall within our domain.

KEYWORDS:

Human origins; Social anthropology; Hunter-gatherers; Symbolic thought; Language

This paper was inspired by an invitation Petr Skalník extended to me in 2012 to present my findings, based on my books *Social Anthropology and Human Origins* (Barnard 2011) and *Genesis of Symbolic Thought* (Barnard 2012). This was at a conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists held in Nanterre, France, and I was keen to place my work on the map. Petr very kindly put me down as keynote speaker for his session, and I leave this otherwise unpublished paper essentially as written. I am especially grateful to Petr for allowing me twice the usual time for my presentation at that conference, and that brief presentation resulted in great discussion. *Genesis of Symbolic Thought*, which I regarded as my best book, had only come out one week before the conference, and the excitement for

me, and I hope for others, helped spark a rekindling of larger anthropological ideas. This, I felt then and still feel, was possibly part of Petr's intention.

My argument here is that even if we recognize our dependence both on the biological sciences and on archaeology, these other subjects alone cannot explain everything. The bigger anthropology has got to shine through. That is why we came into such a discipline, and why we are still here. Social anthropology is important, and it belongs within a constellation of anthropological sciences – as often it is seen in North America, if not generally on the European continent.

My *Social Anthropology and Human Origins* (2011) discusses topics such as the difference between primatological and social anthropological methods, the social implications “Dunbar's number”, how new findings in genetics open up new possibilities for looking at diversity in human kinship, and what fossils can tell us (and what they cannot). The sequel, *Genesis of Symbolic Thought* (2012), looks more specifically at the origins of symbolic thought and language in the African Middle Stone Age, very roughly from after 300,000 to before 25,000 years ago (McBrearty and Brooks 2000). All modern humanity had its beginnings in a *very small* southern or eastern African population, living only around 70,000 years ago. Symbolic thought lies in the domain of social anthropology, and our contribution should be no less than that of other disciplines. We *should* work more closely with biological scientists. But we social anthropologists, *not* they, should be prime movers when it comes to assessing ideas that fall within our domain. For this reason, it seems to me, we must be prehistorians and well ethnographers. Hiding behind our usual methods as ethnographers should not allow us to escape the big questions. Above all, it should not enable us to leave symbolism and symbolic thought generally to those trained in archaeology or biological anthropology. Symbolic thought lies clearly within our, social anthropological, domain.

THE BASIC PROBLEM

Who is likely to have the most insight into *human origins*? Someone who...?

- dissects brains,
- measures fossil femurs,
- scrapes dirt,
- or whatever...

There is of course no correct answer. We all have things to contribute, but our contributions will be quite different. I come from social anthropology. This is the field that befriends strangers and asks them silly questions. On the question of symbolic thought, we must have at least as much to say as people in any other field. We observe *symbolic behaviour* throughout our careers, especially during our field research. We ask our informants questions about it, and try to explain it every day of our working lives.

Yet of the fourteen contributors to a recent book called *What Makes us Human?* (Pasternak 2007), not one of them was a social anthropologist. Biological anthropology, evolutionary psychology, archaeology, genetics, theology and other fields were all represented, but not social anthropology. Similarly, when a team of social anthropologists got together to look at the “big, comparative questions” of our discipline, not one of them even touched on either

human origins or symbolic thought – except peripherally (in discussions of ritual, religion and truth). The latter book, *Questions of Anthropology* (Astuti 2007), aims to reach out to “ordinary people” rather than to neighbouring disciplines. But its publication in the series *London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology* clearly implies that it can only do so from within our discipline, and not from outside it. Clearly, this is a problem, and a problem for us to solve.

In 1945, Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote that the genesis of symbolic thought cannot be explained. One simply has to “take it for granted” (Lévi-Strauss 1945, 518). Lévi-Strauss lived to the age of 101. I like to think that later in life he would have agreed with me: *The Genesis of Symbolic Thought* is open at least to some kind of explanation. Through analogy, through ethnographic comparison and an appreciation of the significance of linguistic and cultural universals, there is a great deal that lies beyond the purely biological. The point is that such investigations ought to be possible with advances in linguistics, genetics and dating methods in archaeology to help us. But this really is a problem for those of us in social anthropology, and not for interlopers. That is why we need to be at the forefront of these debates. Yet strangely, social anthropologists rarely attend conferences of human origins or debate these matters with those who do.

ONE INTERESTING QUESTION

Let me illustrate my argument with just one interesting question: when and why did language begin? This is really the subject of my most recent book, *Language in Prehistory* (Barnard 2016). Together, *Social Anthropology and Human Origins*, *Genesis of Symbolic Thought* and *Language in Prehistory* form a trilogy – though I had not realized this when I started writing.

The short answer is that we do not really know when language began. However, what we do know is that virtually everyone who tries to answer this question starts from the wrong premise: that language has something to do with communication. We, in social anthropology, know that this cannot be the case. There are many reasons how we know this. The most self-evident is that language does far more than just communicate. Nor can it be the case that language is merely about thought, in other words that cognition must take precedence over communication. Communication is when I say something like: “*Ig hit Ug. Ig take meat.*” Language is not just about this: it is about thinking as well – albeit thinking ultimately invoked through a mutation in the human FOXP2 gene within the last 200,000 years (Enard et al. 2002). The notion that communication is less important than internal thought has long been part of Noam Chomsky’s (e.g., 1986) assumption that thinking is at least as important as communication in the origin of language. My own view is more one of a co-evolution of thought or “I-language” and communication or “E-language”: internal and external aspects developing simultaneously.

What do I mean when I say that language does far more than communicate? As any anthropologist should know, the languages we use in fieldwork are often far more complicated than they need to be just to express simple observations or ask simple questions. My own fieldwork language, Naro, has at least 86 person-gender-number markers. Most of these are what might more conventionally be classified as pronouns. Naro are hunter-gatherers, and they live on the edge of the Kalahari – traditionally by *hunting and gathering* alone. They tell stories, they babble, and they exchange information. Their groups traditionally

number no more than 35. Why do 35 illiterate people need 86 pronouns or nominal suffixes, plus a very rich vocabulary, and the propensity to utter perhaps hundreds of sentences a day per adult person; and almost certainly use far more, on average, than I do? We know what language enables us to do. But what is the Darwinian reason for it?

Another Naro ethnographer, Mathias Guenther (2006, 243), argues that Naro San talk “is not just oral discourse, but is instead rhetorical discourse”. By this he means that it exists in order to persuade. Persuasion is central to Naro discourse, except in story-telling. The Naro language has twenty-six words for “talk” or “talking” plus another seven words for “tell”: “talk”, “talk about”, “talk at the same time”, or “talk too much”, and so on (Guenther 2006, 242, 256–257; Visser 2001, 209–211). It is not just French or English that has tens of thousands of words: hunter-gatherer languages do as well.

Or take another hunter-gatherer group. According to one expert, the mean number of affixes in an *average* Inuit or Inuktitut dialect is about 450 (Dorais 1990, 219). Why does a fisherman or seal hunter need 450 affixes, on average? According to Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956, 86), Albert Einstein made a mistake trying to speak German: he would have been better off doing his physics in Hopi, or Inuktitut. Most languages have, in fact, been hunter-gatherer languages. Even those languages that have not been spoken by hunter-gatherers have a biological basis in hunter-gatherer thought. By this I mean mythology, theology and beliefs about the spirit world. *Homo sapiens* have been on this planet for 200,000 years, and while others often claim that symbolic thought has been in existence for only 50,000 or 60,000 years, I believe it was more like 130,000 years (see Barnard 2012). Humans have lived as non-hunter-gatherers for only the last 10,000 years or so, whereas language has been around for many tens of thousands of longer.

Lévi-Strauss (1968, 351) taught us that 200,000 years ago there were people around of the intellectual calibre of a Plato or an Einstein. We know that hunting and gathering are not labour intensive activities. They take up only some two or three hours a day. So, what did these primal Platos and Einsteins do all day? According to Lévi-Strauss, they were probably mainly interested in *kinship*. I agree. Lévi-Strauss was also quite right when he spoke of *Homo sapiens* hunter-gatherers thinking great thoughts, borrowing ideas and structures from each other, from Ju’hoan to Naro for example, by way of a G/ui-type kinship terminology in between. Or even shifting language in between, as the ancestors of Naro apparently once did (see Barnard 2014). Sophisticated human beings were evolving biologically sophisticated, Darwinian reasons to create complex social worlds. Understanding these social words is actually our domain, as social anthropologists, not that of biological scientists. Nor indeed is changing languages as odd as it may seem, because like many hunting-and-gathering peoples, ancestral Naro were undoubtedly living in very small groups that were multilingual. Indeed, on my last visit to Botswana in 2011 I met a N!aqliaxe man who spoke languages is five different language families (Kx’a, Khoe-Kwadi, Taa, Bantu and Indo-European). His native language is spoken today by fewer than 50 people (see Traill 1973).

The Toba volcano blew up about 74,000 years ago, reducing the global population from which we are all descended to as few as 2,000 individuals. (Or some geneticists say 10,000.) But whatever the number, it was very small (see, e.g., Ambrose 1998). Out of Africa migrations took the first Australians to their continent, by sea from Indonesia – probably with forethought, planning and purpose, as early as 60,000 years ago. Indeed, population groups were all very small then, and multilingualism was the norm – as one can see today across

the continents. South America alone is reputed to have had some 1,500 languages at one time. Symbolic thought is securely dated to at least 77,000 year ago, in Blombos Cave on the South African Indian Ocean coast (e.g., Henshilwood and Marean 2003). There is no reason to suppose that the inhabitants of that cave were not capable of speaking a variety of languages, practising a variety of kinship patterns and possessing rich symbolism and ritual. At Blombos, there were pieces of etched red ochre, decorated with patterns, stored in containers and brought from several kilometres away. The ochre was presumably there in order to paint on people's faces or bodies, possibly for ritual purposes.

BACK TO HUNTER-GATHERER THOUGHT

There is no reason for social anthropology to neglect material from genetics or archaeology, but nevertheless, geneticists and archaeologists need social anthropologists to help them interpret their findings. I know from experience that they cannot, in general, explain what they deduce with any greater accuracy than we can. We, and not they, often have real expertise in hunter-gatherers and a practical knowledge of what *communication* actually entails. Non-literate people do not necessarily converse in sequence as we do. They converse differently: several individuals at once, one individual in monologue, or people engaging in dialogues, alternating one to the next (see Lewis 2009). And they converse in myth, in poetry and in above all with complex grammar and with some very complex sound systems. !Xóó has 126 consonant phonemes (Traill 1994, 13), and Ju/'hoan is not far behind.

Above all, hunter-gatherers possess not only complex languages but rich mythological systems, and the two are no doubt related. The idea of commonalities among the world's mythologies is very possible. Michael Witzel (2012), a professor of Sanskrit at Harvard, has argued that the world's shared mythologies can be traced to a common origin, which, he argues was over 100,000 years ago. Myths held in common are still shared by most of the world's religions, he argues: South American, Eastern, Indic and European mythologies have a common, what Witzel calls, "Laurasian" source. African, Australian and Andaman Islands myths have a different, "Gondwana", foundation, but ultimately all are related.

As we have seen, non-literate people generally do not speak just one language: they speak several. And they are capable of moving from one to the next, and sometimes from one symbolic system to the next, through a kind of comparative method. I have witnessed choices people make in deciding, for example, which language people will speak with their children. In the recent past, communities were small enough for individuals to speak more than one language. Individuals who can speak languages in four or five different language families are not stupid. In the past, they shared access to wild game. They shared access to melon patches, the only source of water in the dry season. And in the case of the N!arqiaxa language, even the word for 'band' implied sharing. The word is *!da*, which means to share meat, to share things, to share water, and to share space. Languages are lost because children communicate with each other, in big communities. In "natural", hunter-gatherer, communities, with group sizes of 25 to 35, things are very often different. More languages, not fewer, can be spoken. Linguistic diversity creates a degree of cultural diversity, and with it, both cultural creativity and cultural exchange.

The /Xam language, once spoken in South Africa, has at least 24 verbal prefixes and 6 verbal suffixes. It has at least 14 ways to make a plural. It is rich in narrative. Narra-

tive exists primarily, for expressing mythological thought – or at least narrative thought. Look at this /Xam sentence, recorded in 1878:

Then /*kyaŋmañ-a* said: “I desire thee to say to grandfather, Why is it that grandfather continues to go among strangers [literally, people who are different]?” (Bleek and Lloyd 1911, 33)

The unidentified character /*kyaŋmañ-a* is probably a meerkat, and in this one short sentence he illustrates by example the grammatical complexity required by the story. The sentence is, in fact, five or six implied sentences, in one. The phrase *!k'é ē /χárra* (meaning “people who are different”), is in fact the object of a complex, and specifically narrative-form, verb *ha /kũ /é //ě*, (roughly, “to continue habitually to go among”).

An implied sentence describing habitually continuous action, within an interrogative sentence, within an imperative sentence, within another imperative sentence, within an indicative sentence, within a myth or fable in which animals act as people, and deceive them and other animals, told to an English woman by a /Xam man, who had learned it from his mother, who had learned it from someone else, who had put it together with culturally-significant social action, with metaphor and with complex syntax – all for a reason well beyond the requirements of ordinary communication! In short, linguistic complexity is not required simply for communication, but it is required for myth.

Geoff Miller (2000, 341–391) has written that language evolved due to the “Scheherazade effect”. In other words, complex language came about so that speakers could attract potential mates and keep them entertained. Narrative, including myth and poetry, became part of sexual allure and a focal point of natural selection. That is why social anthropology is important for understanding these wider issues, and that is how it can be integrated into a larger anthropological framework. I believe that only by doing such can social anthropology reach its full potential.

CONCLUSIONS

What is social anthropology for, if not to explain social aspects of human existence? What is the point of anthropology of the past, if only archaeologists and biologists can play the game? How can ignoring everything we know about human social life, be good for our discipline? Socially ignorant biologists, disinterested linguists, and the movers and scrapers of archaeology cannot, by themselves, make much sense of society. That is why social anthropology is important – for the rest of the anthropological sciences.

From archaeology, we know that mythology reached Australia by 40,000 years ago and possibly 20,000 years before that. We know that it reached South America at least by 13,000 years ago. We know that Eagle and Crow are related, and that they are equally related, as A. Radcliffe-Brown (1951, 17) explained, both in Australia and in North America, where common myths explain much the same phenomena. Our theoretical perspectives, whatever they are, give us social anthropological reasons for this. We can tell the difference between a parallel cousin and a cross-cousin, and we know why this difference is important and how its importance might have affected human evolution. I have heard well-known geneticists explain social life from the point of view of a matriline. To my mind, *people* think: *matri-*

lines do not think. What people think, and why they think it is a social question. Biological, archaeological and social sciences can only benefit by working together, as equal partners, in a shared framework in which we, as well as the others, help to call the shots.

My own view is that full modernity began in southern Africa, possibly 130,000 years ago. And certainly by 60,000 or 70,000 years ago. *Biological studies* have shown us the way, but it has to be up to social anthropology to take it from here.

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Petr Skalník – antropolog tělem a duší /

Petr Skalník – Anthropologist in body and soul

HANA ČERVINKOVÁ

ABSTRACT:

In this personally conceived text, the author writes about Petr Skalník and his role in building the Czech and Central European Anthropology.

KEYWORDS:

Petr Skalník; Wrocław; Anthropology; Central Europe

Když mě autoři poprosili o text do sborníku vydávaného při příležitost sedmdesátých narozenin Petra Skalníka, snažila jsem se připomenout si začátky mých kontaktů s ním. Ukázalo se, že moje paměť není nejlepší, protože jsem se domnívala, že poprvé jsme se setkali v New Yorku někdy v roce 2001, ale Petr (kterého jsem se na to, doufám nenápadně, zeptala) si správně pamatoval, že to bylo dříve, ke konci 90. let 20. století, kdy pracoval ve Viničné, na Přírodovědecké fakultě Univerzity Karlovy. Tak jako na všech pracovištích, na kterých působil, i zde organizoval semináře s mezinárodní účastí. Ty na Přírodovědecké fakultě se jmenovaly *Sociokulturní antropologie ve Viničné*. Antropologii jsem studovala ve Spojených státech, kde jsem také žila, a Petr byl jedním z prvních českých antropologů, se kterým jsem se setkala. Pozval mě, abych v lednu 2000 vystoupila na tomto jeho semináři a od té doby jsme byli už vždy v kontaktu, setkávali jsme se v Čechách i v zahraničí při příležitosti různých antropologických akcí a já sledovala Petrovu kariéru od doby kdy pracoval ve Viničné, potom na Univerzitách v Pardubicích a Hradci Králové až po jeho působení v polské Vratislavi, kde se naše cesty zcela náhodně geograficky sešly.

Možná paradoxně to bylo právě ve Vratislavi, ve městě, které kdysi mělo také svou českou historii, kde jsme spolu strávili nejvíce času. Petr přijížděl učit na Katedru etnologie a kulturní antropologie na Vratislavskou univerzitu a když zůstal déle než jeden den, přišel k nám na večeri. Jeho návštěvy se staly časem jakousi tradicí a nabraly téměř rituální formu. Petr se

vždy objevil kolem šesté, už u dveří předal našemu synovi svůj nejnovější objev v oblasti pitných jogurtů s exotickými příchutěmi a mně potom v kuchyni balíček výborných uzených lososových proužků, které kupoval ve věhlasném obchodním domě Feniks na hlavním vratislavském náměstí. K nim většinou přinesl kapary a občas ještě něco na zub. Já jsem už také byla po kulinární stránce připravena, měla jsem na stole připravený dobrý chléb a máslo, v troubě většinou ještě nějaký druhý chod a samozřejmě vychlazené bílé víno. A potom jsme seděli celý večer, Petr, můj manžel a já a bavili jsme se o politice a o antropologii. Teď, když už Petr do Vratislavi moc nejezdí, vzpomínám s trochou nostalgie na ty večery naplněné antropologií, kterou Petr všude kam přijde s sebou přináší.

Petr Skalník je totiž antropologem tělem a duší. Popularizaci této disciplíny v Čechách věnoval obrovské množství energie a času. Tak jako mnoho jiných vizionářů a vědeckých osobností je často nekompromisní ve svých názorech a postojích a tato jeho vyhraněnost, spojená s jistou neochotou podřídit se akademické politice a politikaření, ho nečiní vždy populárním. Nicméně rozhodně příliš často se zapomíná na všechno, co Petr pro českou kulturní a sociální antropologii udělal, a to zejména pokud jde o popularizaci tohoto vědního oboru u nás a šíření věhlasu české a středoevropské antropologie v zahraničí. Ve svých sedmdesáti letech je nadále jedním z mála českých antropologů, s jehož názorem se v zahraničních kruzích počítá, a tím, na koho se kolegové ze zahraničí obracejí. Je neúnavný ve svém hledání nových výzkumných témat a nadále vede velké grantové úkoly a týmy. Je to člověk nesmírně otevřený světu a současně středoevropský patriot, krajně citlivý na různé druhy orientalizace a kolonizace místní antropologie zahraničními vlivy. Úvod ke knize *Postsocialist Europe: Anthropological Perspectives from Home* (Kürti and Skalník 2009), složené téměř výhradně s příspěvků lokálních antropologů, kterou v roce 2009 připravil pro Berghahn Books společně s maďarským antropologem László Kürtim, je manifestem jeho přístupu. Tato kniha byla pro mnoho z nás jistou emancipační záležitostí prostřednictvím které Petr a László chtěli ukázat, že místní antropologie nejsou replikami ani ozvěnami hegemonních západních trendů, ale unikátními a samostatnými tradicemi.¹

V podobném duchu Petr také organizoval evropské semináře a konference, které se občas konaly v nezapomenutelných podmínkách a okolnostech. V paměti účastníků jistě navždy zůstane evropský seminář na téma výuky antropologie, který se konal v říjnu 2003 v místní hospodě v Dolní Rovni, kde Petr v tu dobu prováděl výzkum. Hned další rok nás pozval na další seminář financovaný tentokrát Evropskou nadací pro vědu (European Science Foundation) v Litomyšli. Na tyto semináře Petr zval jednak hvězdy oboru, ale také tehdy začínající antropology jako jsem byla já. To zde jsem poznala lidi, na které jsem se později mohla spolehnout, kolegy, se kterými jsem navázala skutečná přátelství, která trvají dodnes. Výsledkem těchto setkání byly knihy, které Petr nezávisle vydával. Svérázným a pro sebe typickým způsobem zajišťoval také jejich distribuci – vozil je prostě s sebou v kufru na všechny domácí a zahraniční konference a setkání a za výrobní cenu je prodával všem, kdo o ně měli zájem. Tímto svérázným způsobem se naše knihy ocitly v místech, kam by se jinak nemohly asi nikdy dostat, v knihovnách zahraničních institucích a domech předních světových antropologů, se kterými Petr udržuje přátelství.

1 “European anthropology of the ‘other kind’... should not be thought of simply as ‘echoes’ or ‘replicas’ of dominant and hegemonic Western anthropology, but rather as anthropological traditions of their own right, mortgaged in specific political, cultural and academic milieu” (Kürti and Skalník 2009, 14).

Chtěla bych Ti, Petře, za to všechno, co jsi pro českou antropologii a pro mě osobně udělal, vyjádřit svou vděčnost a poděkování. Přeji Ti současně mnoho dalších let neúnavné antropologické činnosti a samozřejmě také mnoho štěstí v osobním životě na Tvém sídle v Komárově u Pardubic!

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Fig. 1. Jedenáct let po konferenci *Anthropology of Europe. Teaching and Research*, kterou Petr Skalník zorganizoval ve spolupráci s Andrésem Barrerou Gonzálem v Dolní Rovni nedaleko Pardubic (17.–19. října 2003) se někteří její středoevropští účastníci znovu setkali, tentokrát v Praze. Příležitostí k tomu byla konference *Rethinking Anthropologies of Central Europe* (26.–27. května 2014), kterou pořádal Etnologický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i. ve spolupráci se Alexandrou Bitušíkovou, Michalem Buchowskim a Vladem Naumescu s podporou Mezinárodního víšegradského fondu. Na fotografii z 27. května 2014 ve Vile Lanně vidíme zleva Alexandru Bitušíkovou, Petra Skalníka, Hanu Červinkovou, Zdeňka Uherka, Michala Buchowského a Gražynu Kubicu.

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Aleksandar Bošković is Director of Research and Head of the Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research in the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, and Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Ethnology and Anthropology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade (Serbia). He was Visiting Professor in the Program in Anthropology at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), Visiting Professor of European Ethnology at the University of Brasília (Brazil), and Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at Rhodes University in Grahamstown (South Africa). Bošković is the author or editor of ten books, including, most recently, *A Brief Introduction to Anthropology* (Zagreb, 2010), *Other People's Anthropologies: Ethnographic Practice on the Margins* (New York, 2008), and (co-edited, with Chris Hann) *Anthropological Field on the margins of Europe, 1945–1991* (Berlin, 2013). His research interests are history and theory of anthropology, contemporary theory, myth, ethnicity, nationalism, and gender.

Tomáš Boukal vystudoval etnologii na FF UK. V letech 2004 až 2013 působil na Katedře sociálních věd Filozofické fakulty Univerzity Pardubice. Zabývá se problematikou vztahu původních obyvatel Sibiře a prostředí v antropologické perspektivě. Své poznatky publikoval např. v knize *Ekologická antropologie* (2012).

Marcin Brocki is the Chair of the Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. His research interests focus on theory in anthropology, intercultural communication, anthropology of the body, community studies, and postsocialism and postcolonialism. He conducted his fieldwork in diverse sites in southwestern and southeastern Poland. Recent publications include books *Antropologia: Literatura – dialog – przekład* (Wrocław 2008), *Antropologia społeczna i kulturowa w przestrzeni publicznej* (Krakow 2013) and articles („Konteksty. Polska Sztuka Ludowa”, 2011), *Problemy podstaw wiedzy antropologicznej* (In *Teren w antropologii*, T. Buliński, M. Kairski (eds.), Poznań 2011), *Badania ponowne w Wisłoku Wielkim – założenia projektu i wstępne wyniki* („Zeszyty Etnologii Wrocławskiej”, 2012) and *The Late 1980s and Early 1990s in Poland as a Dynamic Process in Culture. The Question about Bifurcation* (In *Semiotics of Communications*, A. Lusińska, A. Kalinowska-Żeleźnik (eds.), Gdańsk 2014).

Hana Červinková získala titul Ph.D. v oboru antropologie na New School for Social Research v New Yorku (2003) a titul docenta na Dolnoslezské univerzitě ve Vratislavi (2013), kde pracuje jako profesorka antropologie a pedagogiky a vede Mezinárodní institut pro studium kultury a vzdělávání, který v roce 2003 založila a který je dnes důležitým centrem programů mezinárodních studií a vědecké spolupráce. Od 2012 roku je také vědeckým pracovníkem Etnologického ústavu AV ČR, v. v. i. a od roku 2016 bude vedoucí redaktorkou časopisu Český lid : Etnologický časopis, který ústav vydává. Je autorkou četných publikací na téma středoevropské transformace, antropologie města, pedagogické antropologie a akčního výzkumu a členkou prezidia Evropské asociace sociálních antropologů (EASA).

Vytis Ciubrinskas is a social anthropologist. He earned his Ph.D. at the Vilnius University in ethnology and history (1993), and is currently a Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Vytautas Magnus University and an Associate Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Vilnius University, as well as an Adjunct Associate Professor of Anthropology at Southern Illinois University. Previously, Ciubrinskas worked as a Research Curator for the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture (1982–1988) and as a Research Assistant at the Lithuanian National Museum (1979–1982). His principal research has been social anthropology, ethnicity, migration and politics of identity along with anthropological theory, history and politics of the discipline. Ciubrinskas currently is the principle coordinator of a research project titled, “The Impact of Globalization and Transnationalism on the Fragmentation of State and National Identity (LIVE)” which is funded by the Research Council of Lithuania.

Vlastimil Fiala zahájil v roce 1984 svou akademickou kariéru jako interní doktorand na oddělení Afriky Orientálního ústavu ČSAV v Praze. Po úspěšné obhajobě kandidátské práce krátce pracoval jako vědecký tajemník OÚ ČSAV (1989–1990) a na jaře 1990 se vrátil na Univerzitu Palackého v Olomouci, kde se podílel na vzniku oboru politologie na katedře politologie a evropských studií. V roce 1998 absolvoval docentské habilitační řízení v oboru politologie a od stejného roku se stal vedoucím katedry politologie FF UP. V roce 2001 v rámci univerzity přešel na Právnickou fakultu, kde se stal vedoucím katedry politologie a společenských věd a podílel se na budování oboru evropská studia se zaměřením na evropské právo. Od roku 2002 do roku 2014 vykonával funkci proděkana pro vědu a výzkum PF UP. V roce 2006 se aktivně zapojil do budování nového oboru afrikanistika na Filozofické fakultě Univerzity Hradec Králové. V současnosti se úzce specializuje výhradně na výzkum politického stranictví v Africe. Je autorem více jak deseti vědeckých monografií věnovaných evropské integraci, metodologii výzkumu a v posledních pěti letech zejména politickému stranictví ve vybraných afrických zemích.

Christian Giordano is Full Professor of Social Anthropology at University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He is Doctor Honoris Causa at the University of Timisoara and Permanent Guest Professor at the Universities of Bucharest, Murcia, Bydgoszcz and Honorary Guest Professor at the Universiti Sains Malaysia at Penang, School of Social Sciences and Centre for Policy Research and International Studies. His research interests span political and economic anthropology, Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Romania), Mediterranean societies (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore). Among Professor Giordano's vast body of peer-reviewed publications, *Die Betroffenen der Geschichte. Überlagerungsmentalität und Überlagerungsrationaltät in mediterranen Gesellschaften* (*The Dupes of History*). Frankfurt, New York: Campus, 1992; *Essays in Intercultural Communication* Belgrade, Biblioteka XX vek, 2001 (in Serbian); *Power, Mistrust and Legacy: Sceptical Anthropology* Sofia: Polis, 2006 (in Bulgarian); *Power, Legitimacy, Historical Legacies: A Disenchanted Political Anthropology*, Berlin, Zurich: Lit-Verlag 2015.

Chris Hann studied Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Oxford University before switching to Social Anthropology as a graduate student in Cambridge. His first major publication was based on his Ph.D.: *Tázlár: a Village in Hungary*, Cambridge University Press, 1980. Later he carried out fieldwork in Poland (*A Village Without Solidarity; Polish peasants in years of crisis*, Yale University Press, 1985) and in Turkey (*Turkish Region; state, market and social identities on the East Black Seacoast*, James Currey 2000, with Ildikó Bellér-Hann). After holding teaching positions in the UK at the universities of Cambridge and Kent (Canterbury), Hann moved in 1999 to Halle, Germany, to take up his present position as a Director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. In Halle, he has initiated numerous projects concerning property and religion after socialism. He has also been active in the field of economic anthropology (e.g. *Economy and Ritual. Studies of Postsocialist Transformations*, Berghahn 2015, edited with Stephen Gudeman). His current projects include an ethnographic monograph on rural Xinjiang, an ongoing restudy of Tázlár, and (2014–2019) a major comparative research initiative supported by the European Research Council: *Realising Eurasia: Civilisation and Moral Economy in the 21st Century*.

László Kürti is a social anthropologist (Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, 1989) with extensive fieldwork experiences in Hungary, Romania, and the USA. He taught at The American University in Washington DC, and the Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest, and presently teaches at Institute of Political Science, University of Miskolc, Hungary. His English-language books include: *The Remote Borderland* (2001), *Youth and the state in Hungary* (2002), and served as co-editor for *Beyond Borders* (1996), *Working Images* (2004), *Post-socialist Europe* (2009), *Every Day's a Festival: Diversity on Show* (2011). From 2001 to 2006 he was secretary of the European Association of Social Anthropologists; currently he serves on the international editorial advisory board of *Visual Studies*, *Urbanities*, *Anthrovision and Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*.

Josef Kandert studoval na Filosofické fakultě UK v Praze etnografii, folkloristiku a afrikanistiku. V roce 1967 dosáhl titulu PhDr., v roce 1970 hodnosti CSc., v roce 1996 byl na základě habilitačního řízení jmenován docentem pro obor politologie. Roku 2004 získal profesuru pro obor Dějiny a kultura zemí Asie a Afriky. V letech 1964 až 2009 pracoval jako kurátor afrických sbírek v Náprstkově muzeu v Praze, posléze i jako vedoucí oddělení a zástupce ředitelky muzea. Jeho základním pracovištěm je dnes Fakulta sociálních věd UK. Soustřeďuje se na výzkum společenských vztahů se zřetelem k příbuzenské a politické organizaci a na problematiku sociálních hierarchií; kromě toho se zabývá i otázkami kulturní a sociální změny a vzájemným ovlivňováním kultur. Uskutečnil řadu výzkumů v Africe, ve Střední Evropě a také v USA. Je autorem devíti monografií, celé řady článků a více jak stovky výstav zaměřených většinou na africkou problematiku.

Luboš Kropáček je orientalista a afrikanista, narozen 1939 v Praze. V letech 1959–1964 vystudoval na Filozofické fakultě UK anglistiku a arabistiku, v návazném doktorském studiu se zabýval dějinami Afriky. V roce 1967 pobýval na stáži na univerzitě v Káhiře a o rok později se účastnil univerzitní expedice 13 africkými zeměmi do gabonského Lambaréné. Za normalizace byl propuštěn z asistentského místa na fakultě, živil se nadále překlady a tlumočením. Roku 1990 se vrátil rehabilitován na FF UK, obhájil disertaci o Dáfúrském sultanátu a působil jako docent (od 1992) a pak profesor (od 2001) v Ústavu Blízkého východu a Afriky. Od roku 2009 působí na Husitské teologické fakultě UK na oboru religionistika. Pedagogickou práci a vědeckou i rozsáhlou popularizační činnost zaměřuje hlavně na otázky islámu, jeho dějin, myšlenkových proudů a vztahů ke křesťanství. Na tato témata publikoval řadu prací u nás i v zahraničí.

Grażyna Kubica is a lecturer of Social Anthropology in the Institute of Sociology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow. One of her research areas is the history of anthropology, especially the life and work of Bronisław Malinowski. She coedited the volume *Malinowski – Between Two Worlds* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), as well as the *Polish Dzieła* (Completed Works) of the anthropologist. She authored the introduction and edition of the full and comprehensive version of Malinowski's diaries in their original language: *Dziennik w ścisłym znaczeniu tego wyrazu* (2002). The spin-off from this work was a feminist book, *Siostry Malinowskiego, czyli kobiety nowoczesne na początku XX wieku* (2006), concerning

several women appearing in the diaries, among them the Polish-British anthropologist Maria Czaplicka. Kubica has just wrote the biography of her: *Maria Czaplicka, pleć, szamanizm, rasa. Biografia antropologiczna* (2015). Another research area is connected with her fieldwork in her native Silesia in Poland. She has recently published a second book about the region: *Śląskość i protestantyzm. Antropologiczne studia o Śląsku Cieszyńskim, proza, fotografia* (2011). She is also a photographer and visual anthropologist.

David Z. Scheffel získal Ph.D. na McMaster University, Ontario, Canada a momentálně působí jako profesor antropologie na Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, BC, Canada. Sociální a kulturní antropologii dále studoval na Vrije Universiteit v Amsterdamu, University of Manitoba, University of Cambridge a Memorial University of Newfoundland. Mezi jeho terénní zkušenosti patří výzkum na severním Labradoru (Eskymáci), dále v Albertě, Polsku, Rumunsku, na Ukrajině (pravoslavní staroobřadci), na Filipínách (AtiNegritos) a Slovensku (Romové). Hlavními oblastmi jeho zájmu jsou slovenští Romové, ruští staroobřadci, ideologie a věda.

Robert James Thornton holds currently a position of Associate Research Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg (since 1996), after teaching at Rutgers University, Princeton, Universities of Cape Town or Chicago where he defended his Ph.D. He is an author of vast number of journal articles and several books, among the latest are *Healing the Exposed Being: healers, scepticism and belief in the South African Lowveld* (in press) and *Unimagined Community: Sex, networks and AIDS in Uganda and South Africa* (2008). He currently specialises in southern and eastern Africa, HIV/AIDS, sexuality, ethnography, community development and medical anthropology.

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Petr Skalník (nar. 5. 7. 1945 v Praze) je jednou z nejvýraznějších osobností středoevropské sociální antropologie. Vystudoval afrikanistiku v Praze a Leningradě a během své neobyčejně bohaté profesní kariéry působil mj. v Bratislavě, Leidenu či Kapském Městě. Po návratu z exilu vyučoval na Univerzitě Karlově v Praze a od konce 90. let 20. století na Univerzitě Pardubice. Poblíž Pardubic, v Komárově, také žije. Do sborníku k životnímu jubileu přispěla mezinárodně respektovanému badateli a neúnavnému propagátorovi sociální antropologie řada jeho přátel a kolegů z celého světa.

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